diff --git a/.github/instructions/broken-access-control-prevention.instructions.md b/.github/instructions/broken-access-control-prevention.instructions.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..394e6cd3e --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/instructions/broken-access-control-prevention.instructions.md @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +--- +applyTo: '**/*.py' +--- + +# Security: Broken Access Control Prevention + +## Critical Requirement + +**NEVER treat caller-supplied ids or stored active-scope settings as authorization decisions after login.** + +Treat all of the following as untrusted authorization inputs unless the code proves otherwise: + +- `conversation_id`, `message_id`, `document_id`, `file_id`, `approval_id`, `group_id`, and `public_workspace_id` +- `activeGroupOid` and `activePublicWorkspaceOid` values loaded from user settings +- Plugin or tool-call arguments such as `user_id`, `conversation_id`, `group_id`, `public_workspace_id`, `scope_id`, and `scope_type` + +## Preferred Safe Patterns + +Use these patterns by default: + +- Revalidate personal conversation ownership with `_authorize_personal_conversation_read(...)`, `_authorize_personal_conversation_access(...)`, or an explicit owner check before reading dependent data. +- Route `activeGroupOid` writes through `update_active_group_for_user(...)`. +- Route `activePublicWorkspaceOid` writes through `update_active_public_workspace_for_user(...)`. +- Resolve active group scope through `require_active_group(...)` instead of raw settings reads in backend and plugin code. +- Resolve active public workspace scope through `require_active_public_workspace(...)` instead of raw settings reads in backend and plugin code. +- In Semantic Kernel plugins, normalize tool-call scope ids through `_resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(...)`, `_resolve_blob_location_with_fallback(...)`, or `_resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call(...)` before storage, blob, or Cosmos access. +- Prefer request-scoped authorization context such as `g.authorized_chat_context` over raw tool arguments. + +## Disallowed Patterns For New Code + +Do not add new code that does any of the following without a reviewed exception: + +- Call `update_user_settings(...)` with a literal `{"activeGroupOid": ...}` payload outside `update_active_group_for_user(...)` +- Call `update_user_settings(...)` with a literal `{"activePublicWorkspaceOid": ...}` payload outside `update_active_public_workspace_for_user(...)` +- Read `activeGroupOid` or `activePublicWorkspaceOid` directly from raw settings in backend routes or plugins when a shared validator exists +- Expose `user_id`, `conversation_id`, `group_id`, `public_workspace_id`, `scope_id`, or `scope_type` in a `@kernel_function` surface without immediately rebinding those values to the authorized request context +- Read a personal conversation by request-derived `conversation_id` and continue to message, blob, or feedback work without an explicit ownership boundary + +## Safe Examples + +```python +conversation_item = _authorize_personal_conversation_read(user_id, conversation_id) +messages = list( + cosmos_messages_container.query_items( + query=query, + partition_key=conversation_item['id'], + ) +) +``` + +```python +update_active_group_for_user(requested_active_group, user_id=user_id) +active_group_id = require_active_group(user_id) +``` + +```python +authorized_scope = self._resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call( + scope_type=scope_type, + scope_id=scope_id, + conversation_id=conversation_id, +) +``` + +## Unsafe Examples + +```python +update_user_settings(user_id, {'activeGroupOid': group_id}) +``` + +```python +active_group_id = settings.get('settings', {}).get('activeGroupOid') +``` + +```python +@kernel_function(name='unsafe_tool') +def unsafe_tool(self, user_id: str, conversation_id: str, group_id: str = ''): + return self.store.lookup(user_id=user_id, conversation_id=conversation_id, group_id=group_id) +``` + +```python +conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( + item=conversation_id, + partition_key=conversation_id, +) +``` + +## PR Review Checklist + +For any Python change that reads or mutates user, group, workspace, conversation, or plugin-scoped data: + +1. Identify every caller-controlled id that crosses into a data read or mutation. +2. Revalidate ownership or membership at the sensitive operation boundary, not just at route entry. +3. Use the dedicated active-scope validators instead of raw settings reads and writes. +4. Rebind plugin scope parameters to the authorized request context before storage, blob, or Cosmos access. +5. Add or update a regression test when the change touches an authorization boundary. + +## Workflow Guardrail + +This repository includes a Development PR check in `.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml` backed by `scripts/check_broken_access_control.py`. + +If a reviewed exception is unavoidable, add the suppression token below near the specific line and include a justification comment: + +```text +bac-check: ignore +``` + +Use that escape hatch rarely. It is for reviewed legacy exceptions, not normal route or plugin code. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.github/instructions/xss-prevention.instructions.md b/.github/instructions/xss-prevention.instructions.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aa9d156d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/instructions/xss-prevention.instructions.md @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +--- +applyTo: '**/*.js, **/*.html, **/*.py' +--- + +# Security: XSS Prevention and Browser Rendering + +## Critical Requirement + +**NEVER pass untrusted data into browser HTML or JavaScript execution sinks without an explicit safe boundary.** + +Treat all of the following as untrusted unless the code proves otherwise: + +- User profile fields, workspace names, group names, agent names, document titles, filenames, tags, descriptions, emails, and ids +- API response values returned from storage, Microsoft Graph, Cosmos DB, Azure AI Search, or any plugin/tool response +- Markdown, rich text, uploaded text files, generated summaries, model output, and any server-returned error string + +## Preferred Safe Patterns + +Use these patterns by default: + +- Create DOM nodes with `document.createElement(...)` +- Set untrusted text with `textContent` +- Set trusted static classes with `className` +- Use `setAttribute(...)` or `dataset` for inert data only when DOM node creation is not practical +- Attach behavior with `addEventListener(...)` +- Normalize dynamic HTTP links with a helper such as `sanitizeHttpUrl(...)` before assigning `href` or `src` +- Sanitize rendered markdown with `DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(...))` before inserting HTML +- Keep static modal or card shells fully static, then populate untrusted fields with DOM APIs after creation + +## Disallowed Patterns For New Code + +Do not add new code that does any of the following with untrusted values: + +- `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `insertAdjacentHTML`, or jQuery `.html(...)` +- Inline event handlers such as `onclick=`, `onerror=`, `onload=`, or `setAttribute('onclick', ...)` +- Dynamic interpolation into HTML attributes such as `href`, `src`, `title`, `style`, or `data-*` +- `javascript:` URLs +- `Markup(...)` in Python on untrusted content +- Jinja `|safe` on untrusted content +- `marked.parse(...)` output rendered without `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` + +## Safe Examples + +### JavaScript + +```javascript +const row = document.createElement('tr'); +const nameCell = document.createElement('td'); +nameCell.textContent = user.displayName || 'Unknown User'; + +const actionButton = document.createElement('button'); +actionButton.type = 'button'; +actionButton.dataset.userId = user.id || ''; +actionButton.addEventListener('click', handleUserClick); + +row.appendChild(nameCell); +row.appendChild(actionButton); +``` + +```javascript +const renderedHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(markdownText || '')); +markdownContainer.innerHTML = renderedHtml; +``` + +### HTML / Jinja + +```html + +``` + +### Python + +```python +return render_template( + 'page.html', + title=page_title, + items=items, +) +``` + +## Unsafe Examples + +```javascript +row.innerHTML = `${user.displayName}`; +``` + +```javascript +button.setAttribute('onclick', `selectUser('${user.id}', '${user.displayName}')`); +``` + +```html +Run +``` + +```python +return Markup(user_supplied_html) +``` + +```html +{{ user_supplied_html|safe }} +``` + +## Static HTML Shell Exception + +When a static HTML shell is genuinely simpler, it is acceptable only if: + +- The HTML string is fully static +- It contains no `${...}` interpolation or dynamic concatenation +- Untrusted values are populated afterward with `textContent`, `setAttribute(...)`, or `dataset` + +## PR Review Checklist + +For any JavaScript, HTML, or Python change that affects browser rendering: + +1. Identify the trust boundary for every value that reaches the browser. +2. Prefer DOM node creation and `textContent` for untrusted text. +3. Normalize dynamic URLs before assigning them to clickable or loadable attributes. +4. If HTML rendering is required, document the sanitizer boundary explicitly. +5. Add or update a regression test when untrusted data reaches a browser-rendering path. + +## Workflow Guardrail + +This repository includes a Development PR check in `.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml` backed by `scripts/check_xss_sinks.py`. + +If a reviewed exception is unavoidable, add the suppression token below near the specific line and include a justification comment: + +```text +xss-check: ignore +``` + +Use that escape hatch rarely. It is for reviewed legacy exceptions, not for normal rendering code. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml b/.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..33869b28f --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +name: Broken Access Control Check + +on: + pull_request: + branches: + - Development + paths: + - 'application/**/*.py' + - 'scripts/check_broken_access_control.py' + - 'functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py' + - '.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml' + - '.github/instructions/broken-access-control-prevention.instructions.md' + +jobs: + broken-access-control-check: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + + steps: + - name: Checkout code + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + python-version: '3.11' + + - name: Get changed Python files + id: changed-files + uses: tj-actions/changed-files@v46.0.1 + with: + files_yaml: | + bac_surface: + - 'application/**/*.py' + bac_guardrails: + - 'scripts/check_broken_access_control.py' + - 'functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py' + - '.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml' + - '.github/instructions/broken-access-control-prevention.instructions.md' + - 'docs/explanation/features/v0.241.022/BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_PR_GUARDRAILS.md' + + - name: Run Broken Access Control validation + env: + CHANGED_BAC_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.bac_surface_all_changed_files }} + GITHUB_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} + GITHUB_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.sha }} + run: | + if [[ -z "$CHANGED_BAC_FILES" ]]; then + echo "No changed application files detected for Broken Access Control validation." + exit 0 + fi + + echo "Changed application files:" + printf '%s\n' "$CHANGED_BAC_FILES" | tr ' ' '\n' + + python scripts/check_broken_access_control.py \ + --base-sha "$GITHUB_BASE_SHA" \ + --head-sha "$GITHUB_HEAD_SHA" \ + $CHANGED_BAC_FILES + + - name: Run Broken Access Control guardrail self-test (advisory) + if: steps.changed-files.outputs.bac_guardrails_any_changed == 'true' + continue-on-error: true + run: | + python functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml b/.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..938df6061 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +name: XSS Sink Check + +on: + pull_request: + branches: + - Development + paths: + - 'application/**/*.js' + - 'application/**/*.html' + - 'application/**/*.py' + - 'scripts/check_xss_sinks.py' + - 'functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py' + - '.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml' + - '.github/instructions/xss-prevention.instructions.md' + +jobs: + xss-sink-check: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + + steps: + - name: Checkout code + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + python-version: '3.11' + + - name: Get changed XSS-related files + id: changed-files + uses: tj-actions/changed-files@v46.0.1 + with: + files_yaml: | + xss_surface: + - 'application/**/*.js' + - 'application/**/*.html' + - 'application/**/*.py' + xss_guardrails: + - 'scripts/check_xss_sinks.py' + - 'functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py' + - '.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml' + - '.github/instructions/xss-prevention.instructions.md' + - 'docs/explanation/features/v0.241.021/XSS_PR_GUARDRAILS.md' + + - name: Run XSS sink validation + env: + CHANGED_XSS_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.xss_surface_all_changed_files }} + GITHUB_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} + GITHUB_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.sha }} + run: | + if [[ -z "$CHANGED_XSS_FILES" ]]; then + echo "No changed application files detected for XSS sink validation." + exit 0 + fi + + echo "Changed application files:" + printf '%s\n' "$CHANGED_XSS_FILES" | tr ' ' '\n' + + python scripts/check_xss_sinks.py \ + --base-sha "$GITHUB_BASE_SHA" \ + --head-sha "$GITHUB_HEAD_SHA" \ + $CHANGED_XSS_FILES + + - name: Run XSS guardrail self-test (advisory) + if: steps.changed-files.outputs.xss_guardrails_any_changed == 'true' + continue-on-error: true + run: | + python functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/application/single_app/config.py b/application/single_app/config.py index 3ccb6ca98..4d0cb7f0a 100644 --- a/application/single_app/config.py +++ b/application/single_app/config.py @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ EXECUTOR_TYPE = 'thread' EXECUTOR_MAX_WORKERS = 30 SESSION_TYPE = 'filesystem' -VERSION = "0.241.007" +VERSION = "0.241.022" SECRET_KEY = os.getenv('SECRET_KEY', 'dev-secret-key-change-in-production') @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ def get_allowed_extensions(enable_video=False, enable_audio=False): Args: enable_video: Whether video file support is enabled + enable_audio: Whether audio file support is enabled Returns: set: Allowed file extensions """ diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_agent_templates.py b/application/single_app/functions_agent_templates.py index f5cda8a3f..af566ef88 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_agent_templates.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_agent_templates.py @@ -102,10 +102,32 @@ def _serialize_additional_settings(raw: Any) -> str: return json.dumps(parsed, indent=2, sort_keys=True) +def _normalize_actions_to_load(actions: Any, strict: bool = False) -> List[str]: + if actions in (None, ""): + return [] + if not isinstance(actions, list): + if strict: + raise ValueError("actions_to_load must be an array of strings") + return [] + + cleaned: List[str] = [] + for action in actions: + if isinstance(action, str): + trimmed = action.strip() + elif strict: + raise ValueError("actions_to_load entries must be strings") + else: + trimmed = str(action).strip() + + if trimmed: + cleaned.append(trimmed) + + return cleaned + + def _sanitize_template(doc: Dict[str, Any], include_internal: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]: cleaned = _strip_metadata(doc) - cleaned.setdefault('actions_to_load', []) - cleaned['actions_to_load'] = [a for a in cleaned['actions_to_load'] if a] + cleaned['actions_to_load'] = _normalize_actions_to_load(cleaned.get('actions_to_load')) cleaned.setdefault('tags', []) cleaned['tags'] = [str(tag)[:64] for tag in cleaned['tags']] cleaned['helper_text'] = _normalize_helper_text( @@ -287,7 +309,7 @@ def _base_template_from_payload(payload: Dict[str, Any], user_info: Optional[Dic tags = payload.get('tags') or [] tags = [str(tag)[:64] for tag in tags] - actions = [str(action) for action in (payload.get('actions_to_load') or []) if action] + actions = _normalize_actions_to_load(payload.get('actions_to_load'), strict=True) template = { 'id': payload.get('id') or str(uuid.uuid4()), @@ -366,6 +388,11 @@ def update_agent_template(template_id: str, updates: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional else: payload['additional_settings'] = _parse_additional_settings(doc.get('additional_settings')) + if 'actions_to_load' in payload: + payload['actions_to_load'] = _normalize_actions_to_load(payload['actions_to_load'], strict=True) + else: + payload['actions_to_load'] = _normalize_actions_to_load(doc.get('actions_to_load')) + if 'tags' in payload: payload['tags'] = [str(tag)[:64] for tag in payload['tags']] diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_approvals.py b/application/single_app/functions_approvals.py index a6c733467..b755d5c2c 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_approvals.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_approvals.py @@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ def approve_request( approver_id: str, approver_email: str, approver_name: str, - comment: Optional[str] = None + comment: Optional[str] = None, + approval: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, ) -> Dict[str, Any]: """ Approve an approval request. @@ -295,10 +296,11 @@ def approve_request( """ try: # Get the approval request - approval = cosmos_approvals_container.read_item( - item=approval_id, - partition_key=group_id - ) + if approval is None: + approval = cosmos_approvals_container.read_item( + item=approval_id, + partition_key=group_id + ) # Validate status if approval['status'] != STATUS_PENDING: @@ -368,7 +370,8 @@ def deny_request( denier_email: str, denier_name: str, comment: str, - auto_denied: bool = False + auto_denied: bool = False, + approval: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, ) -> Dict[str, Any]: """ Deny an approval request. @@ -387,10 +390,11 @@ def deny_request( """ try: # Get the approval request - approval = cosmos_approvals_container.read_item( - item=approval_id, - partition_key=group_id - ) + if approval is None: + approval = cosmos_approvals_container.read_item( + item=approval_id, + partition_key=group_id + ) # Validate status (allow denying pending requests) if approval['status'] not in [STATUS_PENDING]: @@ -543,6 +547,29 @@ def get_approval_by_id(approval_id: str, group_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, An return None +def get_authorized_approval( + approval_id: str, + group_id: str, + user_id: str, + user_roles: List[str], + require_approval_rights: bool = False, +) -> Dict[str, Any]: + """Return an approval only if the current user is allowed to view or approve it.""" + approval = get_approval_by_id(approval_id, group_id) + if not approval: + raise LookupError("Approval not found") + + is_authorized = ( + _can_user_approve(approval, user_id, user_roles) + if require_approval_rights + else _can_user_view(approval, user_id, user_roles) + ) + if not is_authorized: + raise PermissionError("You are not authorized to access this approval") + + return approval + + def auto_deny_expired_approvals() -> int: """ Auto-deny approval requests that have expired (older than 3 days). diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_documents.py b/application/single_app/functions_documents.py index 7c6e4a272..362729ffd 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_documents.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_documents.py @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # functions_documents.py that has some changes I need to merge into Development +import re import traceback from config import * from functions_content import * @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ def allowed_file(filename, allowed_extensions=None): ARCHIVED_SCOPE_PREFIX = "__archived__::" CURRENT_ALIAS_BLOB_PATH_MODE = "current_alias" ARCHIVED_REVISION_BLOB_PATH_MODE = "archived_revision" +TAG_COLOR_PATTERN = re.compile(r'^#?(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{3}|[0-9a-fA-F]{6})$') def _get_blob_container_name(group_id=None, public_workspace_id=None): @@ -7566,6 +7568,58 @@ def sanitize_tags_for_filter(raw_tags): return valid_tags +def normalize_tag_color(color): + """ + Normalize a tag color to a canonical 6-digit lowercase hex code. + Returns None for invalid values. + """ + if not isinstance(color, str): + return None + + normalized_color = color.strip() + if not normalized_color: + return None + + if not TAG_COLOR_PATTERN.fullmatch(normalized_color): + return None + + if not normalized_color.startswith('#'): + normalized_color = f'#{normalized_color}' + + if len(normalized_color) == 4: + normalized_color = '#' + ''.join(component * 2 for component in normalized_color[1:]) + + return normalized_color.lower() + + +def get_safe_tag_color(color, tag_name): + """ + Return a normalized tag color or the deterministic default for the tag. + """ + normalized_color = normalize_tag_color(color) + if normalized_color: + return normalized_color + + safe_tag_name = normalize_tag(tag_name) or str(tag_name or '') + return get_default_tag_color(safe_tag_name) + + +def validate_tag_color(color, tag_name): + """ + Validate a requested tag color. + Returns (is_valid, error_message, normalized_color). + Missing colors resolve to the deterministic default for the tag. + """ + if color is None: + return True, None, get_safe_tag_color(None, tag_name) + + normalized_color = normalize_tag_color(color) + if not normalized_color: + return False, 'Tag color must be a valid 3- or 6-digit hex color', None + + return True, None, normalized_color + + def get_workspace_tags(user_id, group_id=None, public_workspace_id=None): """ Get all unique tags used in a workspace with document counts. @@ -7662,7 +7716,7 @@ def get_workspace_tags(user_id, group_id=None, public_workspace_id=None): results.append({ 'name': tag_name, 'count': count, - 'color': tag_def.get('color', get_default_tag_color(tag_name)) + 'color': get_safe_tag_color(tag_def.get('color'), tag_name) }) # Add defined tags that haven't been used yet (count = 0) @@ -7671,7 +7725,7 @@ def get_workspace_tags(user_id, group_id=None, public_workspace_id=None): results.append({ 'name': tag_name, 'count': 0, - 'color': tag_def.get('color', get_default_tag_color(tag_name)) + 'color': get_safe_tag_color(tag_def.get('color'), tag_name) }) # Sort by count descending, then name ascending @@ -7728,34 +7782,40 @@ def get_or_create_tag_definition(user_id, tag_name, workspace_type='personal', c """ from datetime import datetime, timezone + safe_color = get_safe_tag_color(color, tag_name) + if workspace_type == 'group' and group_id: from functions_group import find_group_by_id group_doc = find_group_by_id(group_id) if not group_doc: - return {'color': color or get_default_tag_color(tag_name)} + return {'color': safe_color} tag_defs = group_doc.get('tag_definitions', {}) if tag_name not in tag_defs: tag_defs[tag_name] = { - 'color': color if color else get_default_tag_color(tag_name), + 'color': safe_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } group_doc['tag_definitions'] = tag_defs cosmos_groups_container.upsert_item(group_doc) - return tag_defs[tag_name] + stored_tag_def = dict(tag_defs[tag_name]) + stored_tag_def['color'] = get_safe_tag_color(stored_tag_def.get('color'), tag_name) + return stored_tag_def elif workspace_type == 'public' and public_workspace_id: from functions_public_workspaces import find_public_workspace_by_id ws_doc = find_public_workspace_by_id(public_workspace_id) if not ws_doc: - return {'color': color or get_default_tag_color(tag_name)} + return {'color': safe_color} tag_defs = ws_doc.get('tag_definitions', {}) if tag_name not in tag_defs: tag_defs[tag_name] = { - 'color': color if color else get_default_tag_color(tag_name), + 'color': safe_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } ws_doc['tag_definitions'] = tag_defs cosmos_public_workspaces_container.upsert_item(ws_doc) - return tag_defs[tag_name] + stored_tag_def = dict(tag_defs[tag_name]) + stored_tag_def['color'] = get_safe_tag_color(stored_tag_def.get('color'), tag_name) + return stored_tag_def else: # Personal: store in user settings from functions_settings import get_user_settings, update_user_settings @@ -7771,12 +7831,14 @@ def get_or_create_tag_definition(user_id, tag_name, workspace_type='personal', c if tag_name not in workspace_tags: workspace_tags[tag_name] = { - 'color': color if color else get_default_tag_color(tag_name), + 'color': safe_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } update_user_settings(user_id, {'tag_definitions': tag_definitions}) - return workspace_tags[tag_name] + stored_tag_def = dict(workspace_tags[tag_name]) + stored_tag_def['color'] = get_safe_tag_color(stored_tag_def.get('color'), tag_name) + return stored_tag_def def propagate_tags_to_blob_metadata(document_id, tags, user_id, group_id=None, public_workspace_id=None): diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_group.py b/application/single_app/functions_group.py index e50b09f60..2c60fab58 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_group.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_group.py @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ # functions_group.py from config import * +import functions_authentication +import functions_settings from functions_authentication import * from functions_settings import * from typing import Iterable @@ -103,12 +105,20 @@ def find_group_by_id(group_id): except exceptions.CosmosResourceNotFoundError: return None -def update_active_group_for_user(group_id): - user_id = get_current_user_id() +def update_active_group_for_user(group_id, user_id=None): + if not user_id: + user_id = functions_authentication.get_current_user_id() + + assert_group_role( + user_id, + group_id, + allowed_roles=("Owner", "Admin", "DocumentManager", "User"), + ) + new_settings = { "activeGroupOid": group_id } - update_user_settings(user_id, new_settings) + functions_settings.update_user_settings(user_id, new_settings) def get_user_role_in_group(group_doc, user_id): """Determine the user's role in the given group doc.""" @@ -129,12 +139,17 @@ def get_user_role_in_group(group_doc, user_id): return None -def require_active_group(user_id: str) -> str: - """Return the active group id for a user or raise ValueError if missing.""" - settings = get_user_settings(user_id) +def require_active_group( + user_id: str, + allowed_roles: Iterable[str] = ("Owner", "Admin", "DocumentManager", "User"), +) -> str: + """Return the active group id for a user after validating current membership.""" + settings = functions_settings.get_user_settings(user_id) active_group_id = settings.get("settings", {}).get("activeGroupOid") if not active_group_id: raise ValueError("No active group selected") + + assert_group_role(user_id, active_group_id, allowed_roles=allowed_roles) return active_group_id diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_keyvault.py b/application/single_app/functions_keyvault.py index a523eeaa9..c40977507 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_keyvault.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_keyvault.py @@ -60,6 +60,109 @@ class SecretReturnType(Enum): NAME = "name" +def _normalize_allowed_sources(allowed_sources): + """Normalize one or many allowed sources into a comparable set.""" + if allowed_sources is None: + return None + if isinstance(allowed_sources, str): + return {allowed_sources} + return { + str(source).strip() + for source in allowed_sources + if str(source).strip() + } + + +def parse_secret_name_dynamic(secret_name): + """Return parsed Key Vault secret reference parts when the name is valid.""" + scopes_pattern = '|'.join(re.escape(scope) for scope in supported_scopes) + sources_pattern = '|'.join(re.escape(source) for source in supported_sources) + pattern = ( + rf"^(?P.+?)--(?P{sources_pattern})--" + rf"(?P{scopes_pattern})--(?P.+)$" + ) + match = re.match(pattern, secret_name) + if not match: + return None + if len(secret_name) > 127: + return None + return match.groupdict() + + +def secret_reference_matches_context(secret_name, scope_value=None, scope=None, allowed_sources=None): + """Return True when a secret reference belongs to the expected scope and source.""" + parsed = parse_secret_name_dynamic(secret_name) + if not parsed: + return False + + normalized_sources = _normalize_allowed_sources(allowed_sources) + expected_scope_value = None + if scope_value is not None: + expected_scope_value = clean_name_for_keyvault(str(scope_value)) + + if expected_scope_value is not None and parsed["scope_value"] != expected_scope_value: + return False + if scope is not None and parsed["scope"] != scope: + return False + if normalized_sources is not None and parsed["source"] not in normalized_sources: + return False + return True + + +def _log_secret_reference_context_mismatch(secret_name, context_label, scope_value=None, scope=None, allowed_sources=None): + """Emit a warning when a stored secret reference does not match its expected context.""" + parsed = parse_secret_name_dynamic(secret_name) or {} + expected_scope_value = None + if scope_value is not None: + expected_scope_value = clean_name_for_keyvault(str(scope_value)) + + log_event( + f"[KeyVault] Rejected mismatched secret reference for {context_label}.", + extra={ + "context_label": context_label, + "expected_scope_value": expected_scope_value, + "expected_scope": scope, + "allowed_sources": sorted(_normalize_allowed_sources(allowed_sources) or []), + "provided_scope_value": parsed.get("scope_value"), + "provided_scope": parsed.get("scope"), + "provided_source": parsed.get("source"), + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + + +def resolve_secret_reference_for_context( + secret_name, + scope_value=None, + scope=None, + allowed_sources=None, + context_label="secret reference", +): + """Resolve a Key Vault reference only when it matches the expected context.""" + if not validate_secret_name_dynamic(secret_name): + return secret_name + + if not secret_reference_matches_context( + secret_name, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources=allowed_sources, + ): + _log_secret_reference_context_mismatch( + secret_name, + context_label, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources=allowed_sources, + ) + raise ValueError(f"Stored Key Vault reference for {context_label} does not match the expected scope.") + + resolved_value = retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name(secret_name) + if validate_secret_name_dynamic(resolved_value): + raise ValueError(f"Unable to resolve stored Key Vault secret for {context_label}.") + return resolved_value + + def _get_nested_dict_value(data, path): """Return a nested dictionary value, or None when the path is missing.""" current = data @@ -119,10 +222,28 @@ def _store_plugin_secret_reference(updated_plugin, existing_plugin, path, secret if not value: return + path_label = ".".join(path) + existing_reference = _get_existing_secret_reference(existing_plugin, path) if value == ui_trigger_word: if existing_reference: + if not secret_reference_matches_context( + existing_reference, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={source}, + ): + _log_secret_reference_context_mismatch( + existing_reference, + f"plugin field '{path_label}' existing reference", + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={source}, + ) + raise ValueError( + f"Stored Key Vault reference for '{path_label}' no longer matches the expected scope. Re-enter the secret value." + ) _set_nested_dict_value(updated_plugin, path, existing_reference) return _set_nested_dict_value( @@ -133,6 +254,22 @@ def _store_plugin_secret_reference(updated_plugin, existing_plugin, path, secret return if validate_secret_name_dynamic(value): + if not secret_reference_matches_context( + value, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={source}, + ): + _log_secret_reference_context_mismatch( + value, + f"plugin field '{path_label}'", + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={source}, + ) + raise ValueError( + f"Stored Key Vault reference for '{path_label}' does not match the expected scope." + ) _set_nested_dict_value(updated_plugin, path, value) return @@ -377,18 +514,7 @@ def validate_secret_name_dynamic(secret_name): Returns: bool: True if valid, False otherwise. """ - # Build regex pattern dynamically - scopes_pattern = '|'.join(re.escape(scope) for scope in supported_scopes) - sources_pattern = '|'.join(re.escape(source) for source in supported_sources) - # Wildcards for secret_name and scope_value - pattern = rf"^(.+)--({sources_pattern})--({scopes_pattern})--(.+)$" - match = re.match(pattern, secret_name) - if not match: - return False - # Optionally, check length - if len(secret_name) > 127: - return False - return True + return parse_secret_name_dynamic(secret_name) is not None def keyvault_agent_save_helper(agent_dict, scope_value, scope="global"): """ @@ -616,8 +742,20 @@ def keyvault_plugin_get_helper(plugin_dict, scope_value, scope="global", return_ value = auth.get(auth_field) if value and validate_secret_name_dynamic(value): try: + is_expected_reference = secret_reference_matches_context( + value, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action"}, + ) if return_type == SecretReturnType.VALUE: - new_auth[auth_field] = retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name(value) + new_auth[auth_field] = resolve_secret_reference_for_context( + value, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action"}, + context_label=f"action auth field '{auth_field}'", + ) elif return_type == SecretReturnType.NAME: new_auth[auth_field] = value else: @@ -635,8 +773,20 @@ def keyvault_plugin_get_helper(plugin_dict, scope_value, scope="global", return_ for k, v in additional_fields.items(): if (k.endswith('__Secret') or _is_sql_sensitive_additional_field(updated, k)) and v and validate_secret_name_dynamic(v): try: + is_expected_reference = secret_reference_matches_context( + v, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action-addset"}, + ) if return_type == SecretReturnType.VALUE: - new_additional_fields[k] = retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name(v) + new_additional_fields[k] = resolve_secret_reference_for_context( + v, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action-addset"}, + context_label=f"action additional field '{k}'", + ) elif return_type == SecretReturnType.NAME: new_additional_fields[k] = v else: @@ -834,6 +984,20 @@ def keyvault_plugin_delete_helper(plugin_dict, scope_value, scope="global"): for auth_field in ('key', *SQL_PLUGIN_SENSITIVE_AUTH_FIELDS): secret_name = auth.get(auth_field) if secret_name and validate_secret_name_dynamic(secret_name): + if not secret_reference_matches_context( + secret_name, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action"}, + ): + _log_secret_reference_context_mismatch( + secret_name, + f"action auth field '{auth_field}' deletion", + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action"}, + ) + continue try: key_vault_url = f"https://{key_vault_name}{KEY_VAULT_DOMAIN}" log_event(f"Deleting action auth secret '{auth_field}' for action '{plugin_name}' for '{scope}' '{scope_value}'", level=logging.INFO) @@ -847,6 +1011,20 @@ def keyvault_plugin_delete_helper(plugin_dict, scope_value, scope="global"): if isinstance(additional_fields, dict): for k, v in additional_fields.items(): if (k.endswith('__Secret') or _is_sql_sensitive_additional_field(plugin_dict, k)) and v and validate_secret_name_dynamic(v): + if not secret_reference_matches_context( + v, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action-addset"}, + ): + _log_secret_reference_context_mismatch( + v, + f"action additional field '{k}' deletion", + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action-addset"}, + ) + continue try: key_vault_url = f"https://{key_vault_name}{KEY_VAULT_DOMAIN}" log_event(f"Deleting action additionalField secret '{k}' for action '{plugin_name}' for '{scope}' '{scope_value}'", level=logging.INFO) diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py b/application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py index 45e5f80e6..8039845f4 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ # functions_public_workspaces.py from config import * +import functions_settings from functions_authentication import * from functions_group import * +from typing import Iterable def create_public_workspace(name: str, description: str) -> dict: """ @@ -114,13 +116,57 @@ def get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws_doc: dict, user_id: str) -> str | None: return None if ws_doc.get("owner", {}).get("userId") == user_id: return "Owner" - if user_id in ws_doc.get("admins", []): - return "Admin" + for admin in ws_doc.get("admins", []): + if isinstance(admin, str) and admin == user_id: + return "Admin" + if isinstance(admin, dict) and admin.get("userId") == user_id: + return "Admin" if any(dm["userId"] == user_id for dm in ws_doc.get("documentManagers", [])): return "DocumentManager" return None +def build_public_workspace_public_summary(ws_doc: dict) -> dict: + """Return the non-sensitive workspace fields safe for any authenticated caller.""" + owner = ws_doc.get("owner", {}) or {} + return { + "id": ws_doc.get("id", ""), + "name": ws_doc.get("name", ""), + "description": ws_doc.get("description", ""), + "owner": { + "displayName": owner.get("displayName", ""), + }, + "status": ws_doc.get("status", "active"), + "heroColor": ws_doc.get("heroColor", "#0078d4"), + "userRole": None, + "isMember": False, + } + + +def build_public_workspace_member_payload(ws_doc: dict, user_id: str) -> dict: + """Return the workspace fields required by member-facing workspace pages.""" + role = get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws_doc, user_id) + owner = ws_doc.get("owner", {}) or {} + payload = { + "id": ws_doc.get("id", ""), + "name": ws_doc.get("name", ""), + "description": ws_doc.get("description", ""), + "owner": { + "displayName": owner.get("displayName", ""), + "email": owner.get("email", ""), + }, + "status": ws_doc.get("status", "active"), + "heroColor": ws_doc.get("heroColor", "#0078d4"), + "userRole": role, + "isMember": bool(role), + } + + if role in ("Owner", "Admin") and "retention_policy" in ws_doc: + payload["retention_policy"] = ws_doc.get("retention_policy") + + return payload + + def is_user_in_public_workspace(ws_doc: dict, user_id: str) -> bool: """ Check if a user has any role in the workspace. @@ -224,9 +270,46 @@ def count_public_workspace_documents(ws_id: str) -> int: def update_active_public_workspace_for_user(user_id: str, ws_id: str) -> None: """ - Persist the user's activePublicWorkspaceOid in their settings. + Persist the user's activePublicWorkspaceOid after validating the workspace. """ - update_user_settings(user_id, {"activePublicWorkspaceOid": ws_id}) + normalized_workspace_id = str(ws_id or "").strip() + if not normalized_workspace_id: + functions_settings.update_user_settings(user_id, {"activePublicWorkspaceOid": ""}) + return + + workspace_doc = find_public_workspace_by_id(normalized_workspace_id) + if not workspace_doc: + raise LookupError("Workspace not found") + + functions_settings.update_user_settings( + user_id, + {"activePublicWorkspaceOid": normalized_workspace_id}, + ) + + +def require_active_public_workspace( + user_id: str, + allowed_roles: Iterable[str] = ("Owner", "Admin", "DocumentManager"), +) -> tuple[str, dict, str]: + """Return the active public workspace after validating it still exists and the user can access it.""" + settings = functions_settings.get_user_settings(user_id) + active_workspace_id = str(settings.get("settings", {}).get("activePublicWorkspaceOid") or "").strip() + if not active_workspace_id: + raise ValueError("No active public workspace selected") + + workspace_doc = find_public_workspace_by_id(active_workspace_id) + if not workspace_doc: + raise LookupError("Active public workspace not found") + + role = get_user_role_in_public_workspace(workspace_doc, user_id) + if not role: + raise PermissionError("Access denied") + + allowed = {allowed_role.lower() for allowed_role in allowed_roles} + if role.lower() not in allowed: + raise PermissionError("Access denied") + + return active_workspace_id, workspace_doc, role def get_user_visible_public_workspaces(user_id: str) -> list: diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_search.py b/application/single_app/functions_search.py index 6851778f0..0859cf064 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_search.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_search.py @@ -94,6 +94,22 @@ def build_tags_filter(tags_filter): tag_conditions = [f"document_tags/any(t: t eq '{tag}')" for tag in safe_tags] return " and ".join(tag_conditions) + +def _escape_odata_literal(value: Any) -> str: + """Escape a value for safe inclusion inside an OData single-quoted literal.""" + return str(value or "").replace("'", "''") + + +def _build_odata_eq(field_name: str, value: Any) -> str: + """Build a simple equality clause with an escaped OData literal.""" + return f"{field_name} eq '{_escape_odata_literal(value)}'" + + +def _build_odata_any_eq(collection_field: str, iterator_name: str, value: Any) -> str: + """Build an OData any(...) equality clause with an escaped literal.""" + escaped_value = _escape_odata_literal(value) + return f"{collection_field}/any({iterator_name}: {iterator_name} eq '{escaped_value}')" + def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, doc_scope="all", active_group_id=None, active_group_ids=None, active_public_workspace_id=None, enable_file_sharing=True, tags_filter=None): """ Hybrid search that queries the user doc index, group doc index, or public doc index @@ -155,9 +171,9 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, doc_id_filter = None if document_ids and len(document_ids) > 0: if len(document_ids) == 1: - doc_id_filter = f"document_id eq '{document_ids[0]}'" + doc_id_filter = _build_odata_eq("document_id", document_ids[0]) else: - conditions = " or ".join([f"document_id eq '{did}'" for did in document_ids]) + conditions = " or ".join([_build_odata_eq("document_id", did) for did in document_ids]) doc_id_filter = f"({conditions})" # Generate cache key including document set fingerprints and tags filter @@ -237,9 +253,9 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, # Build user filter with optional tags user_base_filter = ( ( - f"(user_id eq '{user_id}' or shared_user_ids/any(u: u eq '{user_id},approved')) " + f"({_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} or {_build_odata_any_eq('shared_user_ids', 'u', f'{user_id},approved')}) " if enable_file_sharing else - f"user_id eq '{user_id}' " + f"{_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} " ) + f"and {doc_id_filter}" ) @@ -258,8 +274,11 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, # Only search group index if active_group_ids is provided if active_group_ids: - group_conditions = " or ".join([f"group_id eq '{gid}'" for gid in active_group_ids]) - shared_conditions = " or ".join([f"shared_group_ids/any(g: g eq '{gid},approved')" for gid in active_group_ids]) + group_conditions = " or ".join([_build_odata_eq("group_id", gid) for gid in active_group_ids]) + shared_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_any_eq("shared_group_ids", "g", f"{gid},approved") + for gid in active_group_ids + ]) group_base_filter = f"({group_conditions} or {shared_conditions}) and {doc_id_filter}" group_filter = f"{group_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else group_base_filter @@ -282,11 +301,14 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, # Create filter for visible public workspaces if visible_public_workspace_ids: # Use 'or' conditions instead of 'in' operator for OData compatibility - workspace_conditions = " or ".join([f"public_workspace_id eq '{id}'" for id in visible_public_workspace_ids]) + workspace_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_eq("public_workspace_id", workspace_id) + for workspace_id in visible_public_workspace_ids + ]) public_base_filter = f"({workspace_conditions}) and {doc_id_filter}" else: # Fallback to active_public_workspace_id if no visible workspaces - public_base_filter = f"public_workspace_id eq '{active_public_workspace_id}' and {doc_id_filter}" + public_base_filter = f"{_build_odata_eq('public_workspace_id', active_public_workspace_id)} and {doc_id_filter}" public_filter = f"{public_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else public_base_filter @@ -303,9 +325,9 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, else: # Build user filter with optional tags user_base_filter = ( - f"(user_id eq '{user_id}' or shared_user_ids/any(u: u eq '{user_id},approved')) " + f"({_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} or {_build_odata_any_eq('shared_user_ids', 'u', f'{user_id},approved')}) " if enable_file_sharing else - f"user_id eq '{user_id}' " + f"{_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} " ) user_filter = f"{user_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else user_base_filter.strip() @@ -322,8 +344,11 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, # Only search group index if active_group_ids is provided if active_group_ids: - group_conditions = " or ".join([f"group_id eq '{gid}'" for gid in active_group_ids]) - shared_conditions = " or ".join([f"shared_group_ids/any(g: g eq '{gid},approved')" for gid in active_group_ids]) + group_conditions = " or ".join([_build_odata_eq("group_id", gid) for gid in active_group_ids]) + shared_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_any_eq("shared_group_ids", "g", f"{gid},approved") + for gid in active_group_ids + ]) group_base_filter = f"({group_conditions} or {shared_conditions})" group_filter = f"{group_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else group_base_filter @@ -346,11 +371,14 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, # Create filter for visible public workspaces if visible_public_workspace_ids: # Use 'or' conditions instead of 'in' operator for OData compatibility - workspace_conditions = " or ".join([f"public_workspace_id eq '{id}'" for id in visible_public_workspace_ids]) + workspace_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_eq("public_workspace_id", workspace_id) + for workspace_id in visible_public_workspace_ids + ]) public_base_filter = f"({workspace_conditions})" else: # Fallback to active_public_workspace_id if no visible workspaces - public_base_filter = f"public_workspace_id eq '{active_public_workspace_id}'" + public_base_filter = _build_odata_eq("public_workspace_id", active_public_workspace_id) public_filter = f"{public_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else public_base_filter @@ -396,9 +424,9 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, if doc_id_filter: user_base_filter = ( ( - f"(user_id eq '{user_id}' or shared_user_ids/any(u: u eq '{user_id},approved')) " + f"({_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} or {_build_odata_any_eq('shared_user_ids', 'u', f'{user_id},approved')}) " if enable_file_sharing else - f"user_id eq '{user_id}' " + f"{_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} " ) + f"and {doc_id_filter}" ) @@ -417,9 +445,9 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, results = extract_search_results(user_results, top_n) else: user_base_filter = ( - f"(user_id eq '{user_id}' or shared_user_ids/any(u: u eq '{user_id},approved')) " + f"({_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} or {_build_odata_any_eq('shared_user_ids', 'u', f'{user_id},approved')}) " if enable_file_sharing else - f"user_id eq '{user_id}' " + f"{_build_odata_eq('user_id', user_id)} " ) user_filter = f"{user_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else user_base_filter.strip() @@ -439,8 +467,11 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, if not active_group_ids: results = [] elif doc_id_filter: - group_conditions = " or ".join([f"group_id eq '{gid}'" for gid in active_group_ids]) - shared_conditions = " or ".join([f"shared_group_ids/any(g: g eq '{gid},approved')" for gid in active_group_ids]) + group_conditions = " or ".join([_build_odata_eq("group_id", gid) for gid in active_group_ids]) + shared_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_any_eq("shared_group_ids", "g", f"{gid},approved") + for gid in active_group_ids + ]) group_base_filter = f"({group_conditions} or {shared_conditions}) and {doc_id_filter}" group_filter = f"{group_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else group_base_filter @@ -456,8 +487,11 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, ) results = extract_search_results(group_results, top_n) else: - group_conditions = " or ".join([f"group_id eq '{gid}'" for gid in active_group_ids]) - shared_conditions = " or ".join([f"shared_group_ids/any(g: g eq '{gid},approved')" for gid in active_group_ids]) + group_conditions = " or ".join([_build_odata_eq("group_id", gid) for gid in active_group_ids]) + shared_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_any_eq("shared_group_ids", "g", f"{gid},approved") + for gid in active_group_ids + ]) group_base_filter = f"({group_conditions} or {shared_conditions})" group_filter = f"{group_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else group_base_filter @@ -481,11 +515,14 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, # Create filter for visible public workspaces if visible_public_workspace_ids: # Use 'or' conditions instead of 'in' operator for OData compatibility - workspace_conditions = " or ".join([f"public_workspace_id eq '{id}'" for id in visible_public_workspace_ids]) + workspace_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_eq("public_workspace_id", workspace_id) + for workspace_id in visible_public_workspace_ids + ]) public_base_filter = f"({workspace_conditions}) and {doc_id_filter}" else: # Fallback to active_public_workspace_id if no visible workspaces - public_base_filter = f"public_workspace_id eq '{active_public_workspace_id}' and {doc_id_filter}" + public_base_filter = f"{_build_odata_eq('public_workspace_id', active_public_workspace_id)} and {doc_id_filter}" public_filter = f"{public_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else public_base_filter @@ -507,11 +544,14 @@ def hybrid_search(query, user_id, document_id=None, document_ids=None, top_n=12, # Create filter for visible public workspaces if visible_public_workspace_ids: # Use 'or' conditions instead of 'in' operator for OData compatibility - workspace_conditions = " or ".join([f"public_workspace_id eq '{id}'" for id in visible_public_workspace_ids]) + workspace_conditions = " or ".join([ + _build_odata_eq("public_workspace_id", workspace_id) + for workspace_id in visible_public_workspace_ids + ]) public_base_filter = f"({workspace_conditions})" else: # Fallback to active_public_workspace_id if no visible workspaces - public_base_filter = f"public_workspace_id eq '{active_public_workspace_id}'" + public_base_filter = _build_odata_eq("public_workspace_id", active_public_workspace_id) public_filter = f"{public_base_filter} and {tags_filter_clause}" if tags_filter_clause else public_base_filter diff --git a/application/single_app/functions_settings.py b/application/single_app/functions_settings.py index 8d09ee614..304660f42 100644 --- a/application/single_app/functions_settings.py +++ b/application/single_app/functions_settings.py @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # functions_settings.py +from flask import has_request_context + from config import * from functions_appinsights import log_event import app_settings_cache @@ -15,6 +17,43 @@ def is_tabular_processing_enabled(settings): """Tabular processing is available whenever enhanced citations is enabled.""" return bool((settings or {}).get('enable_enhanced_citations', False)) + + +def _authorize_user_settings_access(user_id, operation, allow_cross_user=False): + """Authorize user-settings access for the current request context.""" + normalized_user_id = str(user_id or '').strip() + if allow_cross_user or not has_request_context(): + return None + + try: + # Import locally to avoid a circular dependency during app startup. + from functions_authentication import get_current_user_id + except ImportError: + from application.single_app.functions_authentication import get_current_user_id + + actor_user_id = str(get_current_user_id() or '').strip() + if actor_user_id and normalized_user_id and actor_user_id != normalized_user_id: + log_event( + f"[UserSettings] Denied cross-user {operation}", + { + "actor_user_id": actor_user_id, + "target_user_id": normalized_user_id, + "operation": operation, + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + raise PermissionError(f"Cannot {operation} settings for another user.") + + return actor_user_id or None + + +def _should_sync_session_profile(target_user_id, actor_user_id, allow_cross_user=False): + """Return True when session-derived profile data should update the target settings doc.""" + if allow_cross_user or not has_request_context(): + return False + normalized_target_user_id = str(target_user_id or '').strip() + normalized_actor_user_id = str(actor_user_id or '').strip() + return bool(normalized_target_user_id and normalized_actor_user_id and normalized_target_user_id == normalized_actor_user_id) import copy from support_menu_config import ( get_default_support_latest_features_visibility, @@ -306,7 +345,7 @@ def get_settings(use_cosmos=False, include_source=False): 'enable_web_search': False, 'web_search_consent_accepted': False, 'enable_web_search_user_notice': False, # Show popup to users explaining their message will be sent to Bing - 'web_search_user_notice_text': 'Your message will be sent to Microsoft Bing for web search. Only your current message is sent, not your conversation history.', + 'web_search_user_notice_text': 'Your current message will be sent to Microsoft Bing for web search. Conversation history is not sent for web search, but any sensitive content you paste into this message may be sent.', 'web_search_agent': { 'agent_type': 'aifoundry', 'azure_openai_gpt_endpoint': '', @@ -1035,9 +1074,14 @@ def decrypt_key(encrypted_key): ) return None -def get_user_settings(user_id): +def get_user_settings(user_id, allow_cross_user=False): """Fetches the user settings document from Cosmos DB, ensuring email and display_name are present if possible.""" - from flask import session + actor_user_id = _authorize_user_settings_access(user_id, "read", allow_cross_user=allow_cross_user) + should_sync_session_profile = _should_sync_session_profile( + user_id, + actor_user_id, + allow_cross_user=allow_cross_user, + ) try: doc = cosmos_user_settings_container.read_item(item=user_id, partition_key=user_id) updated = False @@ -1058,27 +1102,62 @@ def get_user_settings(user_id): doc['settings']['showTutorialButtons'] = True updated = True - # Try to update email/display_name if missing and available in session - user = session.get("user", {}) - email = user.get("preferred_username") or user.get("email") - display_name = user.get("name") - if email and doc.get("email") != email: - doc["email"] = email - updated = True - if display_name and doc.get("display_name") != display_name: - doc["display_name"] = display_name - updated = True - - # Check if profile image needs to be fetched - if 'profileImage' not in doc['settings']: + if should_sync_session_profile: + # Try to update email/display_name if missing and available in session + user = session.get("user", {}) + email = user.get("preferred_username") or user.get("email") + display_name = user.get("name") + if email and doc.get("email") != email: + doc["email"] = email + updated = True + if display_name and doc.get("display_name") != display_name: + doc["display_name"] = display_name + updated = True + + # Check if profile image needs to be fetched + if 'profileImage' not in doc['settings']: + from functions_authentication import get_user_profile_image + try: + profile_image = get_user_profile_image() + doc['settings']['profileImage'] = profile_image + updated = True + except Exception as e: + log_event( + "Could not fetch profile image for existing user.", + extra={ + "user_id": user_id, + "error": str(e) + }, + level=logging.WARNING + ) + doc['settings']['profileImage'] = None + updated = True + + if updated: + cosmos_user_settings_container.upsert_item(body=doc) + return doc + except exceptions.CosmosResourceNotFoundError: + # Return a default structure if the user has no settings saved yet + doc = {"id": user_id, "settings": {}} + doc["settings"]["personal_model_endpoints"] = [] + doc["settings"]["showTutorialButtons"] = True + if should_sync_session_profile: + user = session.get("user", {}) + email = user.get("preferred_username") or user.get("email") + display_name = user.get("name") + if email: + doc["email"] = email + if display_name: + doc["display_name"] = display_name + + # Try to fetch profile image for new user from functions_authentication import get_user_profile_image try: profile_image = get_user_profile_image() doc['settings']['profileImage'] = profile_image - updated = True except Exception as e: log_event( - "Could not fetch profile image for existing user.", + "Could not fetch profile image for new user.", extra={ "user_id": user_id, "error": str(e) @@ -1086,39 +1165,6 @@ def get_user_settings(user_id): level=logging.WARNING ) doc['settings']['profileImage'] = None - updated = True - - if updated: - cosmos_user_settings_container.upsert_item(body=doc) - return doc - except exceptions.CosmosResourceNotFoundError: - # Return a default structure if the user has no settings saved yet - user = session.get("user", {}) - email = user.get("preferred_username") or user.get("email") - display_name = user.get("name") - doc = {"id": user_id, "settings": {}} - doc["settings"]["personal_model_endpoints"] = [] - doc["settings"]["showTutorialButtons"] = True - if email: - doc["email"] = email - if display_name: - doc["display_name"] = display_name - - # Try to fetch profile image for new user - from functions_authentication import get_user_profile_image - try: - profile_image = get_user_profile_image() - doc['settings']['profileImage'] = profile_image - except Exception as e: - log_event( - "Could not fetch profile image for new user.", - extra={ - "user_id": user_id, - "error": str(e) - }, - level=logging.WARNING - ) - doc['settings']['profileImage'] = None cosmos_user_settings_container.upsert_item(body=doc) return doc @@ -1134,7 +1180,7 @@ def get_user_settings(user_id): ) raise # Re-raise the exception to be handled by the route -def update_user_settings(user_id, settings_to_update): +def update_user_settings(user_id, settings_to_update, allow_cross_user=False): """ Updates or creates user settings in Cosmos DB, merging new settings into the existing 'settings' sub-dictionary and updating 'lastUpdated'. @@ -1147,8 +1193,21 @@ def update_user_settings(user_id, settings_to_update): Returns: bool: True if the update was successful, False otherwise. """ + actor_user_id = _authorize_user_settings_access( + user_id, + "update", + allow_cross_user=allow_cross_user, + ) sanitized_settings_to_update = sanitize_settings_for_logging(settings_to_update) - log_event("[UserSettings] Update Attempt", {"user_id": user_id, "settings_to_update": sanitized_settings_to_update}) + log_event( + "[UserSettings] Update Attempt", + { + "user_id": user_id, + "actor_user_id": actor_user_id, + "allow_cross_user": allow_cross_user, + "settings_to_update": sanitized_settings_to_update, + }, + ) try: diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py index e16d72423..4d31db45f 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py @@ -218,6 +218,235 @@ def build_fact_memory_citation(query_text, matched_facts, search_mode): } +def _normalize_requested_scope_ids(*scope_values): + """Normalize single-value and list-based scope ids into a de-duplicated list.""" + normalized_values = [] + for scope_value in scope_values: + if scope_value is None: + continue + + if isinstance(scope_value, (list, tuple, set)): + candidates = list(scope_value) + else: + candidates = [scope_value] + + for candidate in candidates: + normalized_candidate = str(candidate or '').strip() + if not normalized_candidate or normalized_candidate in normalized_values: + continue + normalized_values.append(normalized_candidate) + + return normalized_values + + +def _get_authorized_chat_scope_context( + user_id, + active_group_id=None, + active_group_ids=None, + active_public_workspace_id=None, + active_public_workspace_ids=None, +): + """Filter request-provided chat scopes down to the caller's current access.""" + requested_group_ids = _normalize_requested_scope_ids(active_group_ids, active_group_id) + allowed_group_ids = [] + for group_id in requested_group_ids: + group_doc = find_group_by_id(group_id) + if group_doc and get_user_role_in_group(group_doc, user_id): + allowed_group_ids.append(group_id) + + requested_public_workspace_ids = _normalize_requested_scope_ids( + active_public_workspace_ids, + active_public_workspace_id, + ) + visible_public_workspace_ids = set( + _normalize_requested_scope_ids(get_user_visible_public_workspace_ids_from_settings(user_id) or []) + ) + allowed_public_workspace_ids = [ + workspace_id + for workspace_id in requested_public_workspace_ids + if workspace_id in visible_public_workspace_ids + ] + + return { + 'active_group_ids': allowed_group_ids, + 'active_group_id': allowed_group_ids[0] if allowed_group_ids else None, + 'active_public_workspace_ids': allowed_public_workspace_ids, + 'active_public_workspace_id': ( + allowed_public_workspace_ids[0] if allowed_public_workspace_ids else None + ), + } + + +def _set_authorized_chat_request_context(user_id, conversation_id, scope_context): + """Persist the canonical request authorization context for downstream plugin checks.""" + authorized_context = { + 'user_id': user_id, + 'conversation_id': conversation_id, + 'active_group_ids': list(scope_context.get('active_group_ids') or []), + 'active_group_id': scope_context.get('active_group_id'), + 'active_public_workspace_ids': list(scope_context.get('active_public_workspace_ids') or []), + 'active_public_workspace_id': scope_context.get('active_public_workspace_id'), + } + authorized_context['fact_memory_scope_id'] = authorized_context['active_group_id'] or user_id + authorized_context['fact_memory_scope_type'] = ( + 'group' if authorized_context['active_group_id'] else 'user' + ) + + g.conversation_id = conversation_id + g.authorized_chat_context = authorized_context + return authorized_context + + +def _resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata(document_id, user_id=None, document_scope='personal', + active_group_id=None, active_group_ids=None, + active_public_workspace_id=None, + active_public_workspace_ids=None): + """Resolve selected-document metadata using the authorized chat scope model.""" + normalized_document_id = str(document_id or '').strip() + if not normalized_document_id or normalized_document_id == 'all': + return None + + normalized_scope = str(document_scope or 'personal').strip().lower() + authorized_group_ids = _normalize_requested_scope_ids(active_group_ids, active_group_id) + authorized_public_workspace_ids = _normalize_requested_scope_ids( + active_public_workspace_ids, + active_public_workspace_id, + ) + + resolution_queries = [] + + if normalized_scope in {'personal', 'workspace', 'all'} and user_id: + resolution_queries.append({ + 'source_hint': 'workspace', + 'cosmos_container': cosmos_user_documents_container, + 'query': """ + SELECT TOP 1 c.id, c.file_name, c.title, c.group_id, c.public_workspace_id + FROM c + WHERE c.id = @doc_id + AND ( + c.user_id = @user_id + OR ARRAY_CONTAINS(c.shared_user_ids, @user_id) + OR EXISTS(SELECT VALUE s FROM s IN c.shared_user_ids WHERE STARTSWITH(s, @user_id_prefix)) + ) + ORDER BY c.version DESC + """, + 'parameters': [ + {'name': '@doc_id', 'value': normalized_document_id}, + {'name': '@user_id', 'value': user_id}, + {'name': '@user_id_prefix', 'value': f"{user_id},"}, + ], + }) + + if normalized_scope in {'group', 'all'}: + for group_id in authorized_group_ids: + resolution_queries.append({ + 'source_hint': 'group', + 'cosmos_container': cosmos_group_documents_container, + 'query': """ + SELECT TOP 1 c.id, c.file_name, c.title, c.group_id, c.public_workspace_id + FROM c + WHERE c.id = @doc_id + AND ( + c.group_id = @group_id + OR ARRAY_CONTAINS(c.shared_group_ids, @group_id) + OR ARRAY_CONTAINS(c.shared_group_ids, @group_id_approved) + ) + ORDER BY c.version DESC + """, + 'parameters': [ + {'name': '@doc_id', 'value': normalized_document_id}, + {'name': '@group_id', 'value': group_id}, + {'name': '@group_id_approved', 'value': f"{group_id},approved"}, + ], + }) + + if normalized_scope in {'public', 'all'}: + for public_workspace_id in authorized_public_workspace_ids: + resolution_queries.append({ + 'source_hint': 'public', + 'cosmos_container': cosmos_public_documents_container, + 'query': """ + SELECT TOP 1 c.id, c.file_name, c.title, c.group_id, c.public_workspace_id + FROM c + WHERE c.id = @doc_id + AND c.public_workspace_id = @public_workspace_id + ORDER BY c.version DESC + """, + 'parameters': [ + {'name': '@doc_id', 'value': normalized_document_id}, + {'name': '@public_workspace_id', 'value': public_workspace_id}, + ], + }) + + for resolution_query in resolution_queries: + doc_results = list(resolution_query['cosmos_container'].query_items( + query=resolution_query['query'], + parameters=resolution_query['parameters'], + enable_cross_partition_query=True, + )) + if not doc_results: + continue + + doc_info = dict(doc_results[0]) + doc_info['source_hint'] = resolution_query['source_hint'] + return doc_info + + return None + + +def _create_personal_conversation(user_id, conversation_id=None): + """Create and persist a new personal conversation owned by the current user.""" + resolved_conversation_id = str(conversation_id or uuid.uuid4()) + conversation_item = { + 'id': resolved_conversation_id, + 'user_id': user_id, + 'last_updated': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), + 'title': 'New Conversation', + 'context': [], + 'tags': [], + 'strict': False, + 'chat_type': 'new' + } + cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) + + log_conversation_creation( + user_id=user_id, + conversation_id=resolved_conversation_id, + title='New Conversation', + workspace_type='personal' + ) + + conversation_item['added_to_activity_log'] = True + cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) + return conversation_item + + +def _authorize_personal_conversation_access(user_id, conversation_id): + """Load a personal conversation and ensure the caller owns it.""" + try: + conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( + item=conversation_id, + partition_key=conversation_id, + ) + except CosmosResourceNotFoundError as exc: + raise LookupError(f"Conversation {conversation_id} not found") from exc + + if conversation_item.get('user_id') != user_id: + raise PermissionError('You can only access your own conversations') + + return conversation_item + + +def _resolve_or_create_authorized_personal_conversation(user_id, conversation_id): + """Create new personal conversations server-side or load an authorized existing one.""" + if not conversation_id: + conversation_item = _create_personal_conversation(user_id) + return conversation_item, conversation_item['id'] + + conversation_item = _authorize_personal_conversation_access(user_id, conversation_id) + return conversation_item, conversation_id + + def build_instruction_memory_payload( scope_id, scope_type, @@ -5127,8 +5356,10 @@ def infer_tabular_source_context_from_document(source_doc, document_scope='perso def get_selected_workspace_tabular_file_contexts(selected_document_ids=None, selected_document_id=None, - document_scope='personal', active_group_id=None, - active_public_workspace_id=None): + document_scope='personal', user_id=None, + active_group_id=None, active_group_ids=None, + active_public_workspace_id=None, + active_public_workspace_ids=None): """Resolve explicitly selected workspace documents and return tabular source contexts.""" selected_ids = list(selected_document_ids or []) if not selected_ids and selected_document_id and selected_document_id != 'all': @@ -5144,33 +5375,26 @@ def get_selected_workspace_tabular_file_contexts(selected_document_ids=None, sel continue try: - doc_query = ( - "SELECT TOP 1 c.file_name, c.title, c.group_id, c.public_workspace_id " - "FROM c WHERE c.id = @doc_id " - "ORDER BY c.version DESC" + doc_info = _resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata( + doc_id, + user_id=user_id, + document_scope=document_scope, + active_group_id=active_group_id, + active_group_ids=active_group_ids, + active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=active_public_workspace_ids, ) - doc_params = [{"name": "@doc_id", "value": doc_id}] - - for source_hint, cosmos_container in get_document_containers_for_scope(document_scope): - doc_results = list(cosmos_container.query_items( - query=doc_query, - parameters=doc_params, - enable_cross_partition_query=True - )) - - if not doc_results: - continue + if not doc_info: + continue - doc_info = doc_results[0] - file_context = build_tabular_file_context( - doc_info.get('file_name') or doc_info.get('title'), - source_hint=source_hint, - group_id=doc_info.get('group_id') or active_group_id, - public_workspace_id=doc_info.get('public_workspace_id') or active_public_workspace_id, - ) - if file_context: - tabular_file_contexts.append(file_context) - break + file_context = build_tabular_file_context( + doc_info.get('file_name') or doc_info.get('title'), + source_hint=doc_info.get('source_hint', 'workspace'), + group_id=doc_info.get('group_id') or active_group_id, + public_workspace_id=doc_info.get('public_workspace_id') or active_public_workspace_id, + ) + if file_context: + tabular_file_contexts.append(file_context) except Exception as e: log_event( f"[Tabular SK Analysis] Failed to resolve selected document '{doc_id}': {e}", @@ -5182,7 +5406,10 @@ def get_selected_workspace_tabular_file_contexts(selected_document_ids=None, sel def collect_workspace_tabular_file_contexts(combined_documents=None, selected_document_ids=None, selected_document_id=None, document_scope='personal', - active_group_id=None, active_public_workspace_id=None): + user_id=None, active_group_id=None, + active_group_ids=None, + active_public_workspace_id=None, + active_public_workspace_ids=None): """Collect tabular source contexts from search results and explicit workspace selection.""" tabular_file_contexts = [] @@ -5200,8 +5427,11 @@ def collect_workspace_tabular_file_contexts(combined_documents=None, selected_do selected_document_ids=selected_document_ids, selected_document_id=selected_document_id, document_scope=document_scope, + user_id=user_id, active_group_id=active_group_id, + active_group_ids=active_group_ids, active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=active_public_workspace_ids, )) return dedupe_tabular_file_contexts(tabular_file_contexts) @@ -5209,15 +5439,21 @@ def collect_workspace_tabular_file_contexts(combined_documents=None, selected_do def collect_workspace_tabular_filenames(combined_documents=None, selected_document_ids=None, selected_document_id=None, document_scope='personal', - active_group_id=None, active_public_workspace_id=None): + user_id=None, active_group_id=None, + active_group_ids=None, + active_public_workspace_id=None, + active_public_workspace_ids=None): """Collect unique tabular filenames from search results and explicit workspace selection.""" tabular_file_contexts = collect_workspace_tabular_file_contexts( combined_documents=combined_documents, selected_document_ids=selected_document_ids, selected_document_id=selected_document_id, document_scope=document_scope, + user_id=user_id, active_group_id=active_group_id, + active_group_ids=active_group_ids, active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=active_public_workspace_ids, ) return {file_context['file_name'] for file_context in tabular_file_contexts} @@ -6031,22 +6267,19 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: active_group_id = data.get('active_group_id') active_group_ids = data.get('active_group_ids', []) - # Backwards compat: if new list not provided, wrap single ID - if not active_group_ids and active_group_id: - active_group_ids = [active_group_id] - # Permission validation: only keep groups user is a member of - validated_group_ids = [] - for gid in active_group_ids: - g_doc = find_group_by_id(gid) - if g_doc and get_user_role_in_group(g_doc, user_id): - validated_group_ids.append(gid) - active_group_ids = validated_group_ids - # Keep single ID for backwards compat in metadata/context - active_group_id = active_group_ids[0] if active_group_ids else data.get('active_group_id') active_public_workspace_id = data.get('active_public_workspace_id') # Extract active public workspace ID active_public_workspace_ids = data.get('active_public_workspace_ids', []) - if not active_public_workspace_ids and active_public_workspace_id: - active_public_workspace_ids = [active_public_workspace_id] + scope_context = _get_authorized_chat_scope_context( + user_id, + active_group_id=active_group_id, + active_group_ids=active_group_ids, + active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=active_public_workspace_ids, + ) + active_group_ids = scope_context['active_group_ids'] + active_group_id = scope_context['active_group_id'] + active_public_workspace_ids = scope_context['active_public_workspace_ids'] + active_public_workspace_id = scope_context['active_public_workspace_id'] frontend_gpt_model = data.get('model_deployment') top_n_results = data.get('top_n') # Extract top_n parameter from request classifications_to_send = data.get('classifications') # Extract classifications parameter from request @@ -6064,20 +6297,12 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: operation_type = 'Edit' if is_edit else 'Retry' debug_print(f"🔍 Chat API - {operation_type} detected! user_message_id={retry_user_message_id}, thread_id={retry_thread_id}, attempt={retry_thread_attempt}") - # Store conversation_id in Flask context for plugin logger access - g.conversation_id = conversation_id - - # Clear plugin invocations at start of message processing to ensure - # each message only shows citations for tools executed during that specific interaction - from semantic_kernel_plugins.plugin_invocation_logger import get_plugin_logger - plugin_logger = get_plugin_logger() - plugin_logger.clear_invocations_for_conversation(user_id, conversation_id) - # Validate chat_type if chat_type not in ('user', 'group'): chat_type = 'user' search_query = user_message # <--- ADD THIS LINE (Initialize search_query) + web_search_query_text = build_web_search_query_text(user_message) hybrid_citations_list = [] # <--- ADD THIS LINE (Initialize hybrid list) agent_citations_list = [] # <--- ADD THIS LINE (Initialize agent citations list) web_search_citations_list = [] @@ -6236,65 +6461,25 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: # --------------------------------------------------------------------- # 1) Load or create conversation # --------------------------------------------------------------------- - if not conversation_id: - conversation_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) - conversation_item = { - 'id': conversation_id, - 'user_id': user_id, - 'last_updated': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), - 'title': 'New Conversation', - 'context': [], - 'tags': [], - 'strict': False, - 'chat_type': 'new' - } - cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) - - # Log conversation creation - log_conversation_creation( - user_id=user_id, - conversation_id=conversation_id, - title='New Conversation', - workspace_type='personal' + try: + conversation_item, conversation_id = _resolve_or_create_authorized_personal_conversation( + user_id, + conversation_id, ) - - # Mark as logged to activity logs to prevent duplicate migration - conversation_item['added_to_activity_log'] = True - cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) - else: - try: - conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item(item=conversation_id, partition_key=conversation_id) - except CosmosResourceNotFoundError: - # If conversation ID is provided but not found, create a new one with that ID - # Or decide if you want to return an error instead - conversation_item = { - 'id': conversation_id, # Keep the provided ID if needed for linking - 'user_id': user_id, - 'last_updated': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), - 'title': 'New Conversation', # Or maybe fetch title differently? - 'context': [], - 'tags': [], - 'strict': False, - 'chat_type': 'new' - } - # Optionally log that a conversation was expected but not found - debug_print(f"Warning: Conversation ID {conversation_id} not found, creating new.") - cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) - - # Log conversation creation - log_conversation_creation( - user_id=user_id, - conversation_id=conversation_id, - title='New Conversation', - workspace_type='personal' - ) - - # Mark as logged to activity logs to prevent duplicate migration - conversation_item['added_to_activity_log'] = True - cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) - except Exception as e: - debug_print(f"Error reading conversation {conversation_id}: {e}") - return jsonify({'error': f'Error reading conversation: {str(e)}'}), 500 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Conversation not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403 + except Exception as e: + debug_print(f"Error reading conversation {conversation_id}: {e}") + return jsonify({'error': f'Error reading conversation: {str(e)}'}), 500 + + _set_authorized_chat_request_context(user_id, conversation_id, scope_context) + + # Clear plugin invocations at start of message processing to ensure + # each message only shows citations for tools executed during that specific interaction + plugin_logger = get_plugin_logger() + plugin_logger.clear_invocations_for_conversation(user_id, conversation_id) # Determine the actual chat context based on existing conversation or document usage # For existing conversations, use the chat_type from conversation metadata @@ -6404,21 +6589,16 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: # Get document details if specific document selected if selected_document_id and selected_document_id != "all": try: - # Use the appropriate documents container based on scope - if document_scope == 'group': - cosmos_container = cosmos_group_documents_container - elif document_scope == 'public': - cosmos_container = cosmos_public_documents_container - elif document_scope == 'personal': - cosmos_container = cosmos_user_documents_container - - doc_query = "SELECT c.file_name, c.title, c.document_id, c.group_id FROM c WHERE c.id = @doc_id" - doc_params = [{"name": "@doc_id", "value": selected_document_id}] - doc_results = list(cosmos_container.query_items( - query=doc_query, parameters=doc_params, enable_cross_partition_query=True - )) - if doc_results and 'workspace_search' in user_metadata: - doc_info = doc_results[0] + doc_info = _resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata( + selected_document_id, + user_id=user_id, + document_scope=document_scope, + active_group_id=active_group_id, + active_group_ids=active_group_ids, + active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=active_public_workspace_ids, + ) + if doc_info and 'workspace_search' in user_metadata: user_metadata['workspace_search']['document_name'] = doc_info.get('title') or doc_info.get('file_name') user_metadata['workspace_search']['document_filename'] = doc_info.get('file_name') except Exception as e: @@ -6802,7 +6982,11 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: fallback_search_parameters = build_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters( prior_grounded_document_refs ) - if fallback_search_parameters.get('document_ids'): + fallback_search_parameters = revalidate_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters( + user_id, + fallback_search_parameters, + ) + if fallback_search_parameters.get('document_ids') and fallback_search_parameters.get('doc_scope'): history_grounded_search_used = True effective_document_scope = fallback_search_parameters.get('doc_scope') or 'all' effective_selected_document_ids = list( @@ -6889,6 +7073,7 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: # Filter out inactive thread messages before summarizing message_texts_search = [] for msg in last_messages_asc: + role = msg.get('role', 'user') thread_info = msg.get('metadata', {}).get('thread_info', {}) active_thread = thread_info.get('active_thread') @@ -6896,8 +7081,15 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: if active_thread is False: debug_print(f"[THREAD] Skipping inactive thread message {msg.get('id')} from search summary") continue - - message_texts_search.append(f"{msg.get('role', 'user').upper()}: {msg.get('content', '')}") + + if role not in ('user', 'assistant'): + continue + + content = msg.get('content', '') + if role == 'assistant': + content = build_assistant_history_content_with_citations(msg, content) + + message_texts_search.append(f"{role.upper()}: {content}") if not message_texts_search: # No active messages to summarize @@ -7614,8 +7806,11 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: selected_document_ids=effective_selected_document_ids, selected_document_id=effective_selected_document_id, document_scope=effective_document_scope, + user_id=user_id, active_group_id=effective_active_group_id, + active_group_ids=effective_active_group_ids, active_public_workspace_id=effective_active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=effective_active_public_workspace_ids, ) workspace_tabular_files = { file_context['file_name'] for file_context in workspace_tabular_file_contexts @@ -7689,7 +7884,7 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: ) if web_search_enabled: - thought_tracker.add_thought('web_search', f"Searching the web for '{(search_query or user_message)[:50]}'") + thought_tracker.add_thought('web_search', f"Searching the web for '{web_search_query_text[:50]}'") perform_web_search( settings=settings, conversation_id=conversation_id, @@ -7700,7 +7895,7 @@ def result_requires_message_reload(result: Any) -> bool: document_scope=document_scope, active_group_id=active_group_id, active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, - search_query=search_query, + web_search_query_text=web_search_query_text, system_messages_for_augmentation=system_messages_for_augmentation, agent_citations_list=agent_citations_list, web_search_citations_list=web_search_citations_list, @@ -8906,9 +9101,32 @@ def chat_stream_api(): compatibility_mode = bool(data.get('image_generation')) or is_retry requested_conversation_id = str(data.get('conversation_id') or '').strip() or None + + if requested_conversation_id: + try: + _authorize_personal_conversation_access(user_id, requested_conversation_id) + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Conversation not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403 + except Exception as exc: + debug_print(f"[Streaming] Error authorizing conversation {requested_conversation_id}: {exc}") + return jsonify({'error': 'Failed to authorize conversation'}), 500 + + initial_scope_context = _get_authorized_chat_scope_context( + user_id, + active_group_id=data.get('active_group_id'), + active_group_ids=data.get('active_group_ids', []), + active_public_workspace_id=data.get('active_public_workspace_id'), + active_public_workspace_ids=data.get('active_public_workspace_ids', []), + ) finalized_conversation_id = requested_conversation_id or str(uuid.uuid4()) is_new_stream_conversation = requested_conversation_id is None data['conversation_id'] = finalized_conversation_id + data['active_group_ids'] = list(initial_scope_context['active_group_ids']) + data['active_group_id'] = initial_scope_context['active_group_id'] + data['active_public_workspace_ids'] = list(initial_scope_context['active_public_workspace_ids']) + data['active_public_workspace_id'] = initial_scope_context['active_public_workspace_id'] stream_session = CHAT_STREAM_REGISTRY.start_session(user_id, finalized_conversation_id) request_message = (data.get('message') or '').strip() @@ -9047,22 +9265,19 @@ def generate(publish_background_event=None): tags_filter = data.get('tags', []) # Extract tags filter active_group_id = data.get('active_group_id') active_group_ids = data.get('active_group_ids', []) - # Backwards compat: if new list not provided, wrap single ID - if not active_group_ids and active_group_id: - active_group_ids = [active_group_id] - # Permission validation: only keep groups user is a member of - validated_group_ids = [] - for gid in active_group_ids: - g_doc = find_group_by_id(gid) - if g_doc and get_user_role_in_group(g_doc, user_id): - validated_group_ids.append(gid) - active_group_ids = validated_group_ids - # Keep single ID for backwards compat in metadata/context - active_group_id = active_group_ids[0] if active_group_ids else data.get('active_group_id') active_public_workspace_id = data.get('active_public_workspace_id') # Extract active public workspace ID active_public_workspace_ids = data.get('active_public_workspace_ids', []) - if not active_public_workspace_ids and active_public_workspace_id: - active_public_workspace_ids = [active_public_workspace_id] + scope_context = _get_authorized_chat_scope_context( + user_id, + active_group_id=active_group_id, + active_group_ids=active_group_ids, + active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=active_public_workspace_ids, + ) + active_group_ids = scope_context['active_group_ids'] + active_group_id = scope_context['active_group_id'] + active_public_workspace_ids = scope_context['active_public_workspace_ids'] + active_public_workspace_id = scope_context['active_public_workspace_id'] frontend_gpt_model = data.get('model_deployment') frontend_model_id = data.get('model_id') frontend_model_endpoint_id = data.get('model_endpoint_id') @@ -9156,11 +9371,9 @@ def generate(publish_background_event=None): yield f"data: {json.dumps({'error': 'Image generation is not supported in streaming mode'})}\n\n" return - # Initialize Flask context - g.conversation_id = conversation_id + _set_authorized_chat_request_context(user_id, conversation_id, scope_context) # Clear plugin invocations - from semantic_kernel_plugins.plugin_invocation_logger import get_plugin_logger plugin_logger = get_plugin_logger() plugin_logger.clear_invocations_for_conversation(user_id, conversation_id) debug_print( @@ -9175,6 +9388,7 @@ def generate(publish_background_event=None): # Initialize variables search_query = user_message + web_search_query_text = build_web_search_query_text(user_message) hybrid_citations_list = [] agent_citations_list = [] web_search_citations_list = [] @@ -9323,37 +9537,18 @@ def generate(publish_background_event=None): # Load or create conversation (simplified) if is_new_stream_conversation: - conversation_item = { - 'id': conversation_id, - 'user_id': user_id, - 'last_updated': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), - 'title': 'New Conversation', - 'context': [], - 'tags': [], - 'strict': False, - 'chat_type': 'new' - } - cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) + conversation_item = _create_personal_conversation(user_id, conversation_id=conversation_id) debug_print(f"[Streaming] Created new conversation {conversation_id}") else: try: - conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( - item=conversation_id, partition_key=conversation_id - ) + conversation_item = _authorize_personal_conversation_access(user_id, conversation_id) debug_print(f"[Streaming] Loaded existing conversation {conversation_id}") - except CosmosResourceNotFoundError: - conversation_item = { - 'id': conversation_id, - 'user_id': user_id, - 'last_updated': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), - 'title': 'New Conversation', - 'context': [], - 'tags': [], - 'strict': False, - 'chat_type': 'new' - } - cosmos_conversations_container.upsert_item(conversation_item) - debug_print(f"[Streaming] Conversation {conversation_id} not found; created replacement") + except LookupError: + yield f"data: {json.dumps({'error': 'Conversation not found'})}\n\n" + return + except PermissionError: + yield f"data: {json.dumps({'error': 'Forbidden'})}\n\n" + return # Determine chat type actual_chat_type = 'personal_single_user' @@ -9402,21 +9597,16 @@ def generate(publish_background_event=None): # Get document details if specific document selected if selected_document_id and selected_document_id != "all": try: - # Use the appropriate documents container based on scope - if document_scope == 'group': - cosmos_container = cosmos_group_documents_container - elif document_scope == 'public': - cosmos_container = cosmos_public_documents_container - elif document_scope == 'personal': - cosmos_container = cosmos_user_documents_container - - doc_query = "SELECT c.file_name, c.title, c.document_id, c.group_id FROM c WHERE c.id = @doc_id" - doc_params = [{"name": "@doc_id", "value": selected_document_id}] - doc_results = list(cosmos_container.query_items( - query=doc_query, parameters=doc_params, enable_cross_partition_query=True - )) - if doc_results: - doc_info = doc_results[0] + doc_info = _resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata( + selected_document_id, + user_id=user_id, + document_scope=document_scope, + active_group_id=active_group_id, + active_group_ids=active_group_ids, + active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=active_public_workspace_ids, + ) + if doc_info: user_metadata['workspace_search']['document_name'] = doc_info.get('title') or doc_info.get('file_name') user_metadata['workspace_search']['document_filename'] = doc_info.get('file_name') except Exception as e: @@ -9744,7 +9934,11 @@ def publish_live_plugin_thought(thought_payload): fallback_search_parameters = build_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters( prior_grounded_document_refs ) - if fallback_search_parameters.get('document_ids'): + fallback_search_parameters = revalidate_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters( + user_id, + fallback_search_parameters, + ) + if fallback_search_parameters.get('document_ids') and fallback_search_parameters.get('doc_scope'): history_grounded_search_used = True effective_document_scope = fallback_search_parameters.get('doc_scope') or 'all' effective_selected_document_ids = list( @@ -10072,8 +10266,11 @@ def publish_live_plugin_thought(thought_payload): selected_document_ids=effective_selected_document_ids, selected_document_id=effective_selected_document_id, document_scope=effective_document_scope, + user_id=user_id, active_group_id=effective_active_group_id, + active_group_ids=effective_active_group_ids, active_public_workspace_id=effective_active_public_workspace_id, + active_public_workspace_ids=effective_active_public_workspace_ids, ) workspace_tabular_files = { file_context['file_name'] for file_context in workspace_tabular_file_contexts @@ -10160,7 +10357,7 @@ def publish_live_plugin_thought(thought_payload): debug_print( f"[Streaming] Starting web search augmentation for conversation_id={conversation_id}" ) - yield emit_thought('web_search', f"Searching the web for '{(search_query or user_message)[:50]}'") + yield emit_thought('web_search', f"Searching the web for '{web_search_query_text[:50]}'") perform_web_search( settings=settings, conversation_id=conversation_id, @@ -10171,7 +10368,7 @@ def publish_live_plugin_thought(thought_payload): document_scope=document_scope, active_group_id=active_group_id, active_public_workspace_id=active_public_workspace_id, - search_query=search_query, + web_search_query_text=web_search_query_text, system_messages_for_augmentation=system_messages_for_augmentation, agent_citations_list=agent_citations_list, web_search_citations_list=web_search_citations_list, @@ -11102,7 +11299,13 @@ def mask_message_api(message_id): # Get action: "mask_all", "mask_selection", or "unmask_all" action = data.get('action') selection = data.get('selection', {}) - user_display_name = data.get('display_name', 'Unknown User') + current_user = get_current_user_info() or {} + user_display_name = ( + current_user.get('displayName') + or current_user.get('email') + or current_user.get('userPrincipalName') + or 'Unknown User' + ) # Validate action if action not in ['mask_all', 'mask_selection', 'unmask_all']: @@ -11688,6 +11891,43 @@ def build_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters(grounded_refs): } +def revalidate_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters(user_id, search_parameters): + """Filter fallback search parameters to scopes the caller can still access.""" + normalized_parameters = dict(search_parameters or {}) + scope_types = set(normalized_parameters.get('scope_types') or []) + scope_context = _get_authorized_chat_scope_context( + user_id, + active_group_ids=normalized_parameters.get('active_group_ids') or [], + active_public_workspace_ids=normalized_parameters.get('active_public_workspace_ids') or [], + ) + allowed_group_ids = scope_context['active_group_ids'] + allowed_public_workspace_ids = scope_context['active_public_workspace_ids'] + + allowed_scope_types = [] + if 'personal' in scope_types: + allowed_scope_types.append('personal') + if allowed_group_ids: + allowed_scope_types.append('group') + if allowed_public_workspace_ids: + allowed_scope_types.append('public') + + normalized_parameters['active_group_ids'] = allowed_group_ids + normalized_parameters['active_group_id'] = scope_context['active_group_id'] + normalized_parameters['active_public_workspace_ids'] = allowed_public_workspace_ids + normalized_parameters['active_public_workspace_id'] = scope_context['active_public_workspace_id'] + normalized_parameters['scope_types'] = allowed_scope_types + + if not allowed_scope_types: + normalized_parameters['document_ids'] = [] + normalized_parameters['doc_scope'] = None + return normalized_parameters + + normalized_parameters['doc_scope'] = ( + allowed_scope_types[0] if len(allowed_scope_types) == 1 else 'all' + ) + return normalized_parameters + + def build_history_only_assessment_messages(history_segments, default_system_prompt=''): """Construct the prompt context used to decide whether history alone is sufficient.""" assessment_messages = [] @@ -12294,6 +12534,11 @@ def to_int(value: Any) -> Optional[int]: "completion_tokens": int(completion_tokens), } + +def build_web_search_query_text(user_message): + """Return the only chat content allowed to leave the app for external web search.""" + return str(user_message or "").strip() + def perform_web_search( *, settings, @@ -12305,7 +12550,7 @@ def perform_web_search( document_scope, active_group_id, active_public_workspace_id, - search_query, + web_search_query_text, system_messages_for_augmentation, agent_citations_list, web_search_citations_list, @@ -12320,7 +12565,10 @@ def perform_web_search( debug_print(f"[WebSearch] document_scope: {document_scope}") debug_print(f"[WebSearch] active_group_id: {active_group_id}") debug_print(f"[WebSearch] active_public_workspace_id: {active_public_workspace_id}") - debug_print(f"[WebSearch] search_query: {search_query[:100] if search_query else None}...") + debug_print( + "[WebSearch] web_search_query_text: " + f"{web_search_query_text[:100] if web_search_query_text else None}..." + ) enable_web_search = settings.get("enable_web_search") debug_print(f"[WebSearch] enable_web_search setting: {enable_web_search}") @@ -12328,15 +12576,13 @@ def perform_web_search( if not enable_web_search: debug_print("[WebSearch] Web search is DISABLED in settings, returning early") return True # Not an error, just disabled - - debug_print("[WebSearch] Web search is ENABLED, proceeding...") web_search_agent = settings.get("web_search_agent") or {} debug_print(f"[WebSearch] web_search_agent config present: {bool(web_search_agent)}") if web_search_agent: # Avoid logging sensitive data, just log structure debug_print(f"[WebSearch] web_search_agent keys: {list(web_search_agent.keys())}") - + other_settings = web_search_agent.get("other_settings") or {} debug_print(f"[WebSearch] other_settings keys: {list(other_settings.keys()) if other_settings else ''}") @@ -12369,16 +12615,8 @@ def perform_web_search( return False # Configuration error debug_print(f"[WebSearch] Agent ID is configured: {agent_id}") - - query_text = None - try: - query_text = search_query - debug_print(f"[WebSearch] Using search_query as query_text: {query_text[:100] if query_text else None}...") - except NameError: - query_text = None - debug_print("[WebSearch] search_query not defined, query_text is None") - query_text = (query_text or user_message or "").strip() + query_text = (web_search_query_text or user_message or "").strip() debug_print(f"[WebSearch] Final query_text after fallback: '{query_text[:100] if query_text else ''}'") if not query_text: @@ -12400,17 +12638,8 @@ def perform_web_search( debug_print(f"[WebSearch] Message history created with {len(message_history)} message(s)") try: - foundry_metadata = { - "conversation_id": conversation_id, - "user_id": user_id, - "message_id": user_message_id, - "chat_type": chat_type, - "document_scope": document_scope, - "group_id": active_group_id if chat_type == "group" else None, - "public_workspace_id": active_public_workspace_id, - "search_query": query_text, - } - debug_print(f"[WebSearch] Foundry metadata prepared: {json.dumps(foundry_metadata, default=str)}") + foundry_metadata = {} + debug_print("[WebSearch] Foundry metadata prepared: {}") debug_print("[WebSearch] Calling execute_foundry_agent...") debug_print(f"[WebSearch] foundry_settings keys: {list(foundry_settings.keys())}") diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py index a7e5e8a0d..b74508acf 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ def enhance_user_with_activity(user, force_refresh=False): # Update user settings with cached metrics settings_update = {'metrics': metrics_cache} - update_success = update_user_settings(user.get('id'), settings_update) + update_success = update_user_settings(user.get('id'), settings_update, allow_cross_user=True) if update_success: debug_print(f"Successfully cached metrics for user {user.get('id')}") @@ -2315,7 +2315,7 @@ def api_update_user_access(user_id): } } - success = update_user_settings(user_id, access_settings) + success = update_user_settings(user_id, access_settings, allow_cross_user=True) if success: # Log admin action @@ -2371,7 +2371,7 @@ def api_update_user_file_uploads(user_id): } } - success = update_user_settings(user_id, file_upload_settings) + success = update_user_settings(user_id, file_upload_settings, allow_cross_user=True) if success: # Log admin action @@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ def api_bulk_user_action(): for user_id in user_ids: try: - success = update_user_settings(user_id, update_settings) + success = update_user_settings(user_id, update_settings, allow_cross_user=True) if success: success_count += 1 else: @@ -5940,6 +5940,22 @@ def api_admin_get_approvals(): debug_print(traceback.format_exc()) return jsonify({'error': 'Failed to fetch approvals', 'details': str(e)}), 500 + def _get_authorized_route_approval(approval_id, group_id, require_approval_rights=False): + """Resolve the current user and return an authorized approval plus user context.""" + user = session.get('user', {}) + user_id = user.get('oid') or user.get('sub') + user_roles = user.get('roles', []) + user_email = user.get('preferred_username', user.get('email', 'unknown')) + user_name = user.get('name', user_email) + approval = get_authorized_approval( + approval_id, + group_id, + user_id, + user_roles, + require_approval_rights=require_approval_rights, + ) + return approval, user_id, user_roles, user_email, user_name + @app.route('/api/admin/control-center/approvals/', methods=['GET']) @swagger_route(security=get_auth_security()) @login_required @@ -5952,23 +5968,23 @@ def api_admin_get_approval_by_id(approval_id): group_id (str): Group ID (partition key) """ try: - user = session.get('user', {}) - user_id = user.get('oid') or user.get('sub') - group_id = request.args.get('group_id') if not group_id: return jsonify({'error': 'group_id query parameter is required'}), 400 - - # Get the approval - approval = cosmos_approvals_container.read_item( - item=approval_id, - partition_key=group_id + + approval, user_id, user_roles, _user_email, _user_name = _get_authorized_route_approval( + approval_id, + group_id, ) # Add can_approve field - approval['can_approve'] = (approval.get('requester_id') != user_id) + approval['can_approve'] = _can_user_approve(approval, user_id, user_roles) return jsonify(approval), 200 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Approval not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'You are not authorized to view this approval'}), 403 except Exception as e: debug_print(f"Error fetching approval {approval_id}: {e}") @@ -5989,17 +6005,18 @@ def api_admin_approve_request(approval_id): comment (str, optional): Approval comment """ try: - user = session.get('user', {}) - user_id = user.get('oid') or user.get('sub') - user_email = user.get('preferred_username', user.get('email', 'unknown')) - user_name = user.get('name', user_email) - data = request.get_json() group_id = data.get('group_id') comment = data.get('comment', '') if not group_id: return jsonify({'error': 'group_id is required'}), 400 + + approval, user_id, _user_roles, user_email, user_name = _get_authorized_route_approval( + approval_id, + group_id, + require_approval_rights=True, + ) # Approve the request approval = approve_request( @@ -6008,7 +6025,8 @@ def api_admin_approve_request(approval_id): approver_id=user_id, approver_email=user_email, approver_name=user_name, - comment=comment + comment=comment, + approval=approval, ) # Execute the approved action @@ -6020,6 +6038,10 @@ def api_admin_approve_request(approval_id): 'approval': approval, 'execution_result': execution_result }), 200 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Approval not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'You are not eligible to approve this request'}), 403 except Exception as e: debug_print(f"Error approving request: {e}") @@ -6038,11 +6060,6 @@ def api_admin_deny_request(approval_id): comment (str): Reason for denial (required) """ try: - user = session.get('user', {}) - user_id = user.get('oid') or user.get('sub') - user_email = user.get('preferred_username', user.get('email', 'unknown')) - user_name = user.get('name', user_email) - data = request.get_json() group_id = data.get('group_id') comment = data.get('comment', '') @@ -6052,6 +6069,12 @@ def api_admin_deny_request(approval_id): if not comment: return jsonify({'error': 'comment is required for denial'}), 400 + + approval, user_id, _user_roles, user_email, user_name = _get_authorized_route_approval( + approval_id, + group_id, + require_approval_rights=True, + ) # Deny the request approval = deny_request( @@ -6061,7 +6084,8 @@ def api_admin_deny_request(approval_id): denier_email=user_email, denier_name=user_name, comment=comment, - auto_denied=False + auto_denied=False, + approval=approval, ) return jsonify({ @@ -6069,6 +6093,10 @@ def api_admin_deny_request(approval_id): 'message': 'Request denied', 'approval': approval }), 200 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Approval not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'You are not eligible to deny this request'}), 403 except Exception as e: debug_print(f"Error denying request: {e}") @@ -6127,8 +6155,7 @@ def api_get_approvals(): approvals_with_permission = [] for approval in result.get('approvals', []): approval_copy = dict(approval) - # User can approve if they didn't create the request - approval_copy['can_approve'] = (approval.get('requester_id') != user_id) + approval_copy['can_approve'] = _can_user_approve(approval, user_id, user_roles) approvals_with_permission.append(approval_copy) return jsonify({ @@ -6157,23 +6184,23 @@ def api_get_approval_by_id(approval_id): group_id (str): Group ID (partition key) """ try: - user = session.get('user', {}) - user_id = user.get('oid') or user.get('sub') - group_id = request.args.get('group_id') if not group_id: return jsonify({'error': 'group_id query parameter is required'}), 400 - - # Get the approval - approval = cosmos_approvals_container.read_item( - item=approval_id, - partition_key=group_id + + approval, user_id, user_roles, _user_email, _user_name = _get_authorized_route_approval( + approval_id, + group_id, ) # Add can_approve field - approval['can_approve'] = (approval.get('requester_id') != user_id) + approval['can_approve'] = _can_user_approve(approval, user_id, user_roles) return jsonify(approval), 200 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Approval not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'You are not authorized to view this approval'}), 403 except Exception as e: debug_print(f"Error fetching approval {approval_id}: {e}") @@ -6193,17 +6220,18 @@ def api_approve_request(approval_id): comment (str, optional): Approval comment """ try: - user = session.get('user', {}) - user_id = user.get('oid') or user.get('sub') - user_email = user.get('preferred_username', user.get('email', 'unknown')) - user_name = user.get('name', user_email) - data = request.get_json() group_id = data.get('group_id') comment = data.get('comment', '') if not group_id: return jsonify({'error': 'group_id is required'}), 400 + + approval, user_id, _user_roles, user_email, user_name = _get_authorized_route_approval( + approval_id, + group_id, + require_approval_rights=True, + ) # Approve the request approval = approve_request( @@ -6212,7 +6240,8 @@ def api_approve_request(approval_id): approver_id=user_id, approver_email=user_email, approver_name=user_name, - comment=comment + comment=comment, + approval=approval, ) # Execute the approved action @@ -6224,6 +6253,10 @@ def api_approve_request(approval_id): 'approval': approval, 'execution_result': execution_result }), 200 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Approval not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'You are not eligible to approve this request'}), 403 except Exception as e: debug_print(f"Error approving request: {e}") @@ -6241,11 +6274,6 @@ def api_deny_request(approval_id): comment (str): Reason for denial (required) """ try: - user = session.get('user', {}) - user_id = user.get('oid') or user.get('sub') - user_email = user.get('preferred_username', user.get('email', 'unknown')) - user_name = user.get('name', user_email) - data = request.get_json() group_id = data.get('group_id') comment = data.get('comment', '') @@ -6255,6 +6283,12 @@ def api_deny_request(approval_id): if not comment: return jsonify({'error': 'comment is required for denial'}), 400 + + approval, user_id, _user_roles, user_email, user_name = _get_authorized_route_approval( + approval_id, + group_id, + require_approval_rights=True, + ) # Deny the request approval = deny_request( @@ -6264,7 +6298,8 @@ def api_deny_request(approval_id): denier_email=user_email, denier_name=user_name, comment=comment, - auto_denied=False + auto_denied=False, + approval=approval, ) return jsonify({ @@ -6272,6 +6307,10 @@ def api_deny_request(approval_id): 'message': 'Request denied', 'approval': approval }), 200 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Approval not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'You are not eligible to deny this request'}), 403 except Exception as e: debug_print(f"Error denying request: {e}") diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py index 23f1a0714..a99e7c54b 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py @@ -72,6 +72,22 @@ def _collect_child_message_documents(conversation_id, root_message_ids): return child_docs + +def _authorize_personal_conversation_read(user_id, conversation_id): + """Load a personal conversation and ensure the caller owns it.""" + try: + conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( + item=conversation_id, + partition_key=conversation_id, + ) + except CosmosResourceNotFoundError as exc: + raise LookupError(f"Conversation {conversation_id} not found") from exc + + if conversation_item.get('user_id') != user_id: + raise PermissionError('Forbidden') + + return conversation_item + def register_route_backend_conversations(app): @app.route('/api/get_messages', methods=['GET']) @@ -86,10 +102,7 @@ def api_get_messages(): if not conversation_id: return jsonify({'error': 'No conversation_id provided'}), 400 try: - conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( - item=conversation_id, - partition_key=conversation_id - ) + _authorize_personal_conversation_read(user_id, conversation_id) # Query all messages in cosmos_messages_container # We'll filter for active_thread in Python since Cosmos DB boolean queries can be tricky message_query = f""" @@ -209,7 +222,9 @@ def api_get_messages(): message['vision_analysis'] = vision_analysis return jsonify({'messages': messages}) - except CosmosResourceNotFoundError: + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403 + except LookupError: return jsonify({'messages': []}) except Exception as e: print(f"ERROR: Failed to get messages: {str(e)}") @@ -240,6 +255,8 @@ def api_get_image(image_id): conversation_id = '_'.join(parts[:-3]) debug_print(f"Serving image {image_id} from conversation {conversation_id}") + + _authorize_personal_conversation_read(user_id, conversation_id) # Query for the main image document and chunks message_query = f"SELECT * FROM c WHERE c.conversation_id = '{conversation_id}'" @@ -334,6 +351,11 @@ def api_get_image(image_id): ) else: return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid image format'}), 400 + + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403 + except LookupError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Image not found'}), 404 except Exception as e: print(f"ERROR: Failed to serve image {image_id}: {str(e)}") @@ -456,18 +478,21 @@ def delete_conversation(conversation_id): """ Delete a conversation. If archiving is enabled, copy it to archived_conversations first. """ + user_id = get_current_user_id() + if not user_id: + return jsonify({'error': 'User not authenticated'}), 401 + settings = get_settings() archiving_enabled = settings.get('enable_conversation_archiving', False) try: - conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( - item=conversation_id, - partition_key=conversation_id - ) - except CosmosResourceNotFoundError: + conversation_item = _authorize_personal_conversation_read(user_id, conversation_id) + except LookupError: return jsonify({ "error": f"Conversation {conversation_id} not found." }), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403 except Exception as e: return jsonify({ "error": str(e) diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py index b70d99806..c74375e0e 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ def get_file_content(): return jsonify({'error': 'Missing conversation_id or id'}), 400 try: - _ = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( + conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( item=conversation_id, partition_key=conversation_id ) @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ def get_file_content(): return jsonify({'error': 'Conversation not found'}), 404 except Exception as e: return jsonify({'error': f'Error reading conversation: {str(e)}'}), 500 + + if conversation_item.get('user_id') != user_id: + return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403 add_file_task_to_file_processing_log(document_id=file_id, user_id=user_id, content="Conversation exists, retrieving file content") try: @@ -919,12 +922,12 @@ def api_create_tag(): data = request.get_json() tag_name = data.get('tag_name') - color = data.get('color', '#0d6efd') # Default blue color + color = data.get('color') if not tag_name: return jsonify({'error': 'tag_name is required'}), 400 - from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tags + from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tag_color, validate_tags from functions_settings import get_user_settings, update_user_settings from datetime import datetime, timezone @@ -935,6 +938,9 @@ def api_create_tag(): return jsonify({'error': error_msg}), 400 normalized_tag = normalized_tags[0] + is_valid_color, color_error, normalized_color = validate_tag_color(color, normalized_tag) + if not is_valid_color: + return jsonify({'error': color_error}), 400 # Get existing tag definitions from settings user_settings = get_user_settings(user_id) @@ -954,7 +960,7 @@ def api_create_tag(): # Add new tag to existing tags (don't replace) personal_tags[normalized_tag] = { - 'color': color, + 'color': normalized_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } @@ -973,7 +979,7 @@ def api_create_tag(): 'message': f'Tag "{normalized_tag}" created successfully', 'tag': { 'name': normalized_tag, - 'color': color + 'color': normalized_color } }), 201 @@ -1157,7 +1163,7 @@ def api_update_tag(tag_name): debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Request data - new_name: {new_name}, new_color: {new_color}") from functions_documents import ( - normalize_tag, validate_tags, get_documents, + normalize_tag, validate_tag_color, validate_tags, get_documents, update_document, propagate_tags_to_chunks ) from functions_settings import get_user_settings, update_user_settings @@ -1267,6 +1273,10 @@ def api_update_tag(tag_name): # Handle color change only if new_color: debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Handling color change operation...") + is_valid_color, color_error, normalized_color = validate_tag_color(new_color, normalized_old_tag) + if not is_valid_color: + return jsonify({'error': color_error}), 400 + user_settings = get_user_settings(user_id) settings_dict = user_settings.get('settings', {}) tag_defs = settings_dict.get('tag_definitions', {}) @@ -1276,13 +1286,13 @@ def api_update_tag(tag_name): debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Looking for tag: {normalized_old_tag}") if normalized_old_tag in personal_tags: - debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Found tag, updating color to: {new_color}") - personal_tags[normalized_old_tag]['color'] = new_color + debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Found tag, updating color to: {normalized_color}") + personal_tags[normalized_old_tag]['color'] = normalized_color else: - debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Tag not found, creating new entry with color: {new_color}") + debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Tag not found, creating new entry with color: {normalized_color}") from datetime import datetime, timezone personal_tags[normalized_old_tag] = { - 'color': new_color, + 'color': normalized_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } @@ -1293,7 +1303,11 @@ def api_update_tag(tag_name): debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] Color change completed successfully") return jsonify({ - 'message': f'Tag color updated for "{normalized_old_tag}"' + 'message': f'Tag color updated for "{normalized_old_tag}"', + 'tag': { + 'name': normalized_old_tag, + 'color': normalized_color + } }), 200 debug_print(f"[UPDATE TAG] No updates specified!") diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py index 49167cc85..8eeb31694 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py @@ -5,6 +5,22 @@ from functions_settings import * from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security + +def _authorize_feedback_conversation(user_id, conversation_id): + """Load the target conversation and ensure the caller owns it.""" + try: + conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( + item=conversation_id, + partition_key=conversation_id, + ) + except CosmosResourceNotFoundError as exc: + raise LookupError(f"Conversation {conversation_id} not found") from exc + + if conversation_item.get("user_id") != user_id: + raise PermissionError("Forbidden") + + return conversation_item + def register_route_backend_feedback(app): @app.route("/feedback/submit", methods=["POST"]) @@ -18,7 +34,7 @@ def feedback_submit(): POST /feedback/submit JSON body: { messageId, conversationId, feedbackType, reason } """ - data = request.get_json() + data = request.get_json() or {} messageId = data.get("messageId") # This is the ID of the specific AI message conversationId = data.get("conversationId") # This is the ID of the conversation feedbackType = data.get("feedbackType") @@ -30,6 +46,16 @@ def feedback_submit(): if not messageId or not conversationId or not feedbackType: return jsonify({"error": "Missing required fields"}), 400 + if not user_id: + return jsonify({"error": "No user ID found in session"}), 403 + + try: + _authorize_feedback_conversation(user_id, conversationId) + except LookupError: + return jsonify({"error": "Conversation not found"}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({"error": "Forbidden", "message": "You do not have access to this conversation"}), 403 + ai_message_text = None user_prompt_text = None all_messages = [] # Initialize an empty list for messages @@ -51,10 +77,7 @@ def feedback_submit(): # --- END CORRECTED PART --- if not message_items: - # No messages found for this conversation ID, which is unexpected if feedback is given - # You might want to log this or handle it differently - print(f"Warning: No messages found for conversationId {conversationId} during feedback submission.") - # Keep ai_message_text and user_prompt_text as None initially + return jsonify({"error": "Assistant message not found"}), 404 all_messages = message_items # Assign the query results to all_messages @@ -70,6 +93,9 @@ def feedback_submit(): ai_msg_index = i break + if ai_msg_index == -1: + return jsonify({"error": "Assistant message not found"}), 404 + # Find the user message immediately preceding the AI message if ai_msg_index > 0: # Iterate backwards from the message before the AI's message @@ -87,21 +113,12 @@ def feedback_submit(): if all_messages[i].get("role") == "user": user_prompt_text = all_messages[i].get("content") break - - - except exceptions.CosmosResourceNotFoundError: - # This specific exception might not be raised by query_items if the container exists but no items match. - # A query returning empty is more likely. Handle general exceptions. - print(f"Error querying messages for conversation {conversationId}: Resource not found (unexpected).") - # Decide how to handle - maybe proceed with default text? except Exception as e: print(f"Error querying messages for conversation {conversationId}: {e}") - # Log the error, maybe return a 500 or proceed with default text - # For now, let the default text logic below handle it. - pass # Allow execution to continue to the default text part + return jsonify({"error": "Failed to load feedback target"}), 500 # Set default text if messages weren't found - if not ai_message_text: + if ai_message_text is None: ai_message_text = "[AI response text not found in cosmos_messages_container]" if not user_prompt_text: diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_group_documents.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_group_documents.py index d8f00a04c..e8a72cba7 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_group_documents.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_group_documents.py @@ -1046,12 +1046,12 @@ def api_create_group_tag(): data = request.get_json() tag_name = data.get('tag_name') - color = data.get('color', '#0d6efd') + color = data.get('color') if not tag_name: return jsonify({'error': 'tag_name is required'}), 400 - from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tags + from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tag_color, validate_tags from datetime import datetime, timezone try: @@ -1060,6 +1060,9 @@ def api_create_group_tag(): return jsonify({'error': error_msg}), 400 normalized_tag = normalized_tags[0] + is_valid_color, color_error, normalized_color = validate_tag_color(color, normalized_tag) + if not is_valid_color: + return jsonify({'error': color_error}), 400 tag_defs = group_doc.get('tag_definitions', {}) @@ -1067,7 +1070,7 @@ def api_create_group_tag(): return jsonify({'error': 'Tag already exists'}), 409 tag_defs[normalized_tag] = { - 'color': color, + 'color': normalized_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } group_doc['tag_definitions'] = tag_defs @@ -1077,7 +1080,7 @@ def api_create_group_tag(): 'message': f'Tag "{normalized_tag}" created successfully', 'tag': { 'name': normalized_tag, - 'color': color + 'color': normalized_color } }), 201 @@ -1248,7 +1251,7 @@ def api_update_group_tag(tag_name): new_name = data.get('new_name') new_color = data.get('color') - from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tags, update_document, propagate_tags_to_chunks + from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tag_color, validate_tags, update_document, propagate_tags_to_chunks try: normalized_old_tag = normalize_tag(tag_name) @@ -1309,14 +1312,18 @@ def api_update_group_tag(tag_name): }), 200 if new_color: + is_valid_color, color_error, normalized_color = validate_tag_color(new_color, normalized_old_tag) + if not is_valid_color: + return jsonify({'error': color_error}), 400 + tag_defs = group_doc.get('tag_definitions', {}) if normalized_old_tag in tag_defs: - tag_defs[normalized_old_tag]['color'] = new_color + tag_defs[normalized_old_tag]['color'] = normalized_color else: from datetime import datetime, timezone tag_defs[normalized_old_tag] = { - 'color': new_color, + 'color': normalized_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } @@ -1324,7 +1331,11 @@ def api_update_group_tag(tag_name): cosmos_groups_container.upsert_item(group_doc) return jsonify({ - 'message': f'Tag color updated for "{normalized_old_tag}"' + 'message': f'Tag color updated for "{normalized_old_tag}"', + 'tag': { + 'name': normalized_old_tag, + 'color': normalized_color + } }), 200 return jsonify({'error': 'No updates specified'}), 400 diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_group_prompts.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_group_prompts.py index ec87d4ec5..bd49da209 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_group_prompts.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_group_prompts.py @@ -2,10 +2,26 @@ from config import * from functions_authentication import * +from functions_group import require_active_group from functions_settings import * from functions_prompts import * from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security + +def _get_active_group_or_error(user_id): + try: + return require_active_group( + user_id, + allowed_roles=("Owner", "Admin", "DocumentManager", "User"), + ), None + except ValueError: + return None, (jsonify({"error": "No active group selected"}), 400) + except LookupError: + return None, (jsonify({"error": "Active group not found"}), 404) + except PermissionError: + return None, (jsonify({"error": "You are not a member of the active group"}), 403) + + def register_route_backend_group_prompts(app): @app.route('/api/group_prompts', methods=['GET']) @swagger_route(security=get_auth_security()) @@ -13,10 +29,10 @@ def register_route_backend_group_prompts(app): @user_required @enabled_required("enable_group_workspaces") def get_group_prompts(): - user_id = get_current_user_id() - active_group = get_user_settings(user_id)["settings"].get("activeGroupOid") - if not active_group: - return jsonify({"error":"No active group selected"}), 400 + user_id = get_current_user_id() + active_group, error_response = _get_active_group_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response try: items, total, page, page_size = list_prompts( @@ -41,10 +57,10 @@ def get_group_prompts(): @user_required @enabled_required("enable_group_workspaces") def create_group_prompt(): - user_id = get_current_user_id() - active_group = get_user_settings(user_id)["settings"].get("activeGroupOid") - if not active_group: - return jsonify({"error":"No active group selected"}), 400 + user_id = get_current_user_id() + active_group, error_response = _get_active_group_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response data = request.get_json() or {} name = data.get("name","").strip() @@ -71,10 +87,10 @@ def create_group_prompt(): @user_required @enabled_required("enable_group_workspaces") def get_group_prompt(prompt_id): - user_id = get_current_user_id() - active_group = get_user_settings(user_id)["settings"].get("activeGroupOid") - if not active_group: - return jsonify({"error":"No active group selected"}), 400 + user_id = get_current_user_id() + active_group, error_response = _get_active_group_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response try: item = get_prompt_doc( @@ -96,10 +112,10 @@ def get_group_prompt(prompt_id): @user_required @enabled_required("enable_group_workspaces") def update_group_prompt(prompt_id): - user_id = get_current_user_id() - active_group = get_user_settings(user_id)["settings"].get("activeGroupOid") - if not active_group: - return jsonify({"error":"No active group selected"}), 400 + user_id = get_current_user_id() + active_group, error_response = _get_active_group_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response data = request.get_json() or {} updates = {} @@ -135,10 +151,10 @@ def update_group_prompt(prompt_id): @user_required @enabled_required("enable_group_workspaces") def delete_group_prompt(prompt_id): - user_id = get_current_user_id() - active_group = get_user_settings(user_id)["settings"].get("activeGroupOid") - if not active_group: - return jsonify({"error":"No active group selected"}), 400 + user_id = get_current_user_id() + active_group, error_response = _get_active_group_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response try: success = delete_prompt_doc( diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_groups.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_groups.py index 0e35d211b..9186e4ce4 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_groups.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_groups.py @@ -163,10 +163,17 @@ def api_get_group_details(group_id): GET /api/groups/ Returns the full group details for that group. """ + user_info = get_current_user_info() + user_id = user_info["userId"] + group_doc = find_group_by_id(group_id) if not group_doc: return jsonify({"error": "Group not found"}), 404 + + if not get_user_role_in_group(group_doc, user_id): + return jsonify({"error": "You are not a member of this group"}), 403 + return jsonify(group_doc), 200 @app.route("/api/groups/", methods=["DELETE"]) diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_plugins.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_plugins.py index 115bf2828..b60f81894 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_plugins.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_plugins.py @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ validate_group_action_payload, ) from functions_keyvault import ( + resolve_secret_reference_for_context, SecretReturnType, redact_plugin_secret_values, retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name, @@ -230,17 +231,35 @@ def _redact_plugin_for_logging(plugin): return redact_plugin_secret_values(plugin) -def _resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test(value, field_name): +def _resolve_plugin_secret_context(plugin_manifest, fallback_scope_value, fallback_scope="user"): + """Infer the expected Key Vault scope for SQL test-connection secret resolution.""" + if not isinstance(plugin_manifest, dict): + return fallback_scope_value, fallback_scope + + plugin_scope = str(plugin_manifest.get("scope") or "").strip().lower() + if plugin_scope == "group" or plugin_manifest.get("is_group"): + return plugin_manifest.get("group_id"), "group" + if plugin_scope == "global" or plugin_manifest.get("is_global"): + return plugin_manifest.get("id") or fallback_scope_value, "global" + if plugin_scope == "user" or plugin_manifest.get("user_id"): + return plugin_manifest.get("user_id") or fallback_scope_value, "user" + return fallback_scope_value, fallback_scope + + +def _resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test(value, field_name, scope_value, scope): """Resolve a Key Vault reference for SQL test-connection flows.""" if not isinstance(value, str) or not value: return value if not validate_secret_name_dynamic(value): return value - resolved_value = retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name(value) - if validate_secret_name_dynamic(resolved_value): - raise ValueError(f"Unable to resolve stored Key Vault secret for SQL field '{field_name}'.") - return resolved_value + return resolve_secret_reference_for_context( + value, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action-addset"}, + context_label=f"SQL field '{field_name}'", + ) def _load_existing_plugin_for_sql_test(plugin_context, user_id): @@ -1093,9 +1112,21 @@ def test_sql_connection(): field_list = ', '.join(unresolved_fields) return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': f"Stored SQL secret could not be resolved for testing. Re-enter the {field_list}."}), 400 + plugin_scope_value, plugin_scope = _resolve_plugin_secret_context(existing_plugin, user_id) + try: - connection_string = _resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test(connection_string, 'connection_string') - password = _resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test(password, 'password') + connection_string = _resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test( + connection_string, + 'connection_string', + scope_value=plugin_scope_value, + scope=plugin_scope, + ) + password = _resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test( + password, + 'password', + scope_value=plugin_scope_value, + scope=plugin_scope, + ) except ValueError as exc: return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': str(exc)}), 400 diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_public_documents.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_public_documents.py index 3b7486bd2..f4396c241 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_public_documents.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_public_documents.py @@ -536,12 +536,12 @@ def api_create_public_workspace_tag(): data = request.get_json() tag_name = data.get('tag_name') - color = data.get('color', '#0d6efd') + color = data.get('color') if not tag_name: return jsonify({'error': 'tag_name is required'}), 400 - from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tags + from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tag_color, validate_tags from datetime import datetime, timezone try: @@ -550,6 +550,9 @@ def api_create_public_workspace_tag(): return jsonify({'error': error_msg}), 400 normalized_tag = normalized_tags[0] + is_valid_color, color_error, normalized_color = validate_tag_color(color, normalized_tag) + if not is_valid_color: + return jsonify({'error': color_error}), 400 tag_defs = ws_doc.get('tag_definitions', {}) @@ -557,7 +560,7 @@ def api_create_public_workspace_tag(): return jsonify({'error': 'Tag already exists'}), 409 tag_defs[normalized_tag] = { - 'color': color, + 'color': normalized_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } ws_doc['tag_definitions'] = tag_defs @@ -567,7 +570,7 @@ def api_create_public_workspace_tag(): 'message': f'Tag "{normalized_tag}" created successfully', 'tag': { 'name': normalized_tag, - 'color': color + 'color': normalized_color } }), 201 @@ -740,7 +743,7 @@ def api_update_public_workspace_tag(tag_name): new_name = data.get('new_name') new_color = data.get('color') - from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tags, update_document, propagate_tags_to_chunks + from functions_documents import normalize_tag, validate_tag_color, validate_tags, update_document, propagate_tags_to_chunks try: normalized_old_tag = normalize_tag(tag_name) @@ -801,14 +804,18 @@ def api_update_public_workspace_tag(tag_name): }), 200 if new_color: + is_valid_color, color_error, normalized_color = validate_tag_color(new_color, normalized_old_tag) + if not is_valid_color: + return jsonify({'error': color_error}), 400 + tag_defs = ws_doc.get('tag_definitions', {}) if normalized_old_tag in tag_defs: - tag_defs[normalized_old_tag]['color'] = new_color + tag_defs[normalized_old_tag]['color'] = normalized_color else: from datetime import datetime, timezone tag_defs[normalized_old_tag] = { - 'color': new_color, + 'color': normalized_color, 'created_at': datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() } @@ -816,7 +823,11 @@ def api_update_public_workspace_tag(tag_name): cosmos_public_workspaces_container.upsert_item(ws_doc) return jsonify({ - 'message': f'Tag color updated for "{normalized_old_tag}"' + 'message': f'Tag color updated for "{normalized_old_tag}"', + 'tag': { + 'name': normalized_old_tag, + 'color': normalized_color + } }), 200 return jsonify({'error': 'No updates specified'}), 400 diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_public_prompts.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_public_prompts.py index f125cbb32..75c3f678e 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_public_prompts.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_public_prompts.py @@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ from functions_prompts import * from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security + +def _get_active_public_workspace_or_error(user_id): + try: + return require_active_public_workspace( + user_id, + allowed_roles=("Owner", "Admin", "DocumentManager"), + ), None + except ValueError: + return None, (jsonify({'error': 'No active public workspace selected'}), 400) + except LookupError: + return None, (jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404) + except PermissionError: + return None, (jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403) + def register_route_backend_public_prompts(app): """ Backend routes for public-workspace–scoped prompts management @@ -20,15 +34,10 @@ def register_route_backend_public_prompts(app): @enabled_required('enable_public_workspaces') def api_list_public_prompts(): user_id = get_current_user_id() - settings = get_user_settings(user_id) - active_ws = settings['settings'].get('activePublicWorkspaceOid') - if not active_ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'No active public workspace selected'}), 400 - ws = find_public_workspace_by_id(active_ws) - if not ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404 - if not get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws, user_id): - return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403 + active_workspace_context, error_response = _get_active_public_workspace_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response + active_ws, _, _ = active_workspace_context try: items, total, page, page_size = list_prompts( @@ -54,15 +63,10 @@ def api_list_public_prompts(): @enabled_required('enable_public_workspaces') def api_create_public_prompt(): user_id = get_current_user_id() - settings = get_user_settings(user_id) - active_ws = settings['settings'].get('activePublicWorkspaceOid') - if not active_ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'No active public workspace selected'}), 400 - ws = find_public_workspace_by_id(active_ws) - if not ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404 - if not get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws, user_id): - return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403 + active_workspace_context, error_response = _get_active_public_workspace_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response + active_ws, _, _ = active_workspace_context data = request.get_json() or {} name = data.get('name','').strip() @@ -90,15 +94,10 @@ def api_create_public_prompt(): @enabled_required('enable_public_workspaces') def api_get_public_prompt(prompt_id): user_id = get_current_user_id() - settings = get_user_settings(user_id) - active_ws = settings['settings'].get('activePublicWorkspaceOid') - if not active_ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'No active public workspace selected'}), 400 - ws = find_public_workspace_by_id(active_ws) - if not ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404 - if not get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws, user_id): - return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403 + active_workspace_context, error_response = _get_active_public_workspace_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response + active_ws, _, _ = active_workspace_context try: item = get_prompt_doc( @@ -121,15 +120,10 @@ def api_get_public_prompt(prompt_id): @enabled_required('enable_public_workspaces') def api_update_public_prompt(prompt_id): user_id = get_current_user_id() - settings = get_user_settings(user_id) - active_ws = settings['settings'].get('activePublicWorkspaceOid') - if not active_ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'No active public workspace selected'}), 400 - ws = find_public_workspace_by_id(active_ws) - if not ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404 - if not get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws, user_id): - return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403 + active_workspace_context, error_response = _get_active_public_workspace_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response + active_ws, _, _ = active_workspace_context data = request.get_json() or {} updates = {} @@ -166,15 +160,10 @@ def api_update_public_prompt(prompt_id): @enabled_required('enable_public_workspaces') def api_delete_public_prompt(prompt_id): user_id = get_current_user_id() - settings = get_user_settings(user_id) - active_ws = settings['settings'].get('activePublicWorkspaceOid') - if not active_ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'No active public workspace selected'}), 400 - ws = find_public_workspace_by_id(active_ws) - if not ws: - return jsonify({'error': 'Workspace not found'}), 404 - if not get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws, user_id): - return jsonify({'error': 'Access denied'}), 403 + active_workspace_context, error_response = _get_active_public_workspace_or_error(user_id) + if error_response: + return error_response + active_ws, _, _ = active_workspace_context try: success = delete_prompt_doc( diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py index 9307bc3c3..8a7ade4ed 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py @@ -211,12 +211,20 @@ def api_create_public_workspace(): def api_get_public_workspace(ws_id): """ GET /api/public_workspaces/ - Returns full workspace document. + Returns a role-aware workspace payload. """ + info = get_current_user_info() + user_id = info["userId"] + ws = find_public_workspace_by_id(ws_id) if not ws: return jsonify({"error": "Workspace not found"}), 404 - return jsonify(ws), 200 + + role = get_user_role_in_public_workspace(ws, user_id) + if role: + return jsonify(build_public_workspace_member_payload(ws, user_id)), 200 + + return jsonify(build_public_workspace_public_summary(ws)), 200 @app.route("/api/public_workspaces/", methods=["PATCH", "PUT"]) @swagger_route(security=get_auth_security()) @@ -289,13 +297,11 @@ def api_set_active_public_workspace(): info = get_current_user_info() user_id = info["userId"] - ws = find_public_workspace_by_id(ws_id) - if not ws: + try: + update_active_public_workspace_for_user(user_id, ws_id) + except LookupError: return jsonify({"error": "Workspace not found"}), 404 - # Public workspaces are accessible to all authenticated users for chat. - # No membership check needed — any user can set a public workspace as active. - update_active_public_workspace_for_user(user_id, ws_id) return jsonify({"message": f"Active set to {ws_id}"}), 200 @app.route("/api/public_workspaces//requests", methods=["GET"]) diff --git a/application/single_app/route_backend_users.py b/application/single_app/route_backend_users.py index 459aa800c..eac97c37e 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_backend_users.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_backend_users.py @@ -2,9 +2,16 @@ from config import * from functions_authentication import * +from functions_group import update_active_group_for_user +from functions_public_workspaces import update_active_public_workspace_for_user from functions_settings import * from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security + +def _escape_graph_odata_literal(value): + return str(value or "").replace("'", "''") + + def register_route_backend_users(app): """ This route will expose GET /api/userSearch?query= which calls @@ -20,6 +27,8 @@ def api_user_search(): if not query: return jsonify([]), 200 + safe_query = _escape_graph_odata_literal(query) + token = get_valid_access_token() if not token: return jsonify({"error": "Could not acquire access token"}), 401 @@ -32,9 +41,9 @@ def api_user_search(): } filter_str = ( - f"startswith(displayName, '{query}') " - f"or startswith(mail, '{query}') " - f"or startswith(userPrincipalName, '{query}')" + f"startswith(displayName, '{safe_query}') " + f"or startswith(mail, '{safe_query}') " + f"or startswith(userPrincipalName, '{safe_query}')" ) params = { "$filter": filter_str, @@ -163,13 +172,54 @@ def user_settings(): invalid_keys = set(settings_to_update.keys()) - allowed_keys if invalid_keys: print(f"Warning: Received invalid settings keys: {invalid_keys}") - # Decide whether to ignore them or return an error - # To ignore: settings_to_update = {k: v for k, v in settings_to_update.items() if k in allowed_keys} - # To error: return jsonify({"error": f"Invalid settings keys provided: {', '.join(invalid_keys)}"}), 400 + settings_to_update = { + key: value + for key, value in settings_to_update.items() + if key in allowed_keys + } + if not settings_to_update: + return jsonify({"error": "No valid settings keys provided"}), 400 + + + settings_to_update = dict(settings_to_update) + active_group_updated = False + active_public_workspace_updated = False + + if "activeGroupOid" in settings_to_update: + requested_active_group = str(settings_to_update.pop("activeGroupOid") or "").strip() + if requested_active_group: + try: + update_active_group_for_user(requested_active_group, user_id=user_id) + active_group_updated = True + except LookupError: + return jsonify({"error": "Group not found"}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({"error": "You are not a member of this group"}), 403 + else: + settings_to_update["activeGroupOid"] = requested_active_group + if "activePublicWorkspaceOid" in settings_to_update: + requested_active_public_workspace = str( + settings_to_update.pop("activePublicWorkspaceOid") or "" + ).strip() + if requested_active_public_workspace: + try: + update_active_public_workspace_for_user( + user_id, + requested_active_public_workspace, + ) + active_public_workspace_updated = True + except LookupError: + return jsonify({"error": "Workspace not found"}), 404 + else: + settings_to_update["activePublicWorkspaceOid"] = requested_active_public_workspace # Call the updated function - it handles merging and timestamp - success = update_user_settings(user_id, settings_to_update) + success = True + if settings_to_update: + success = update_user_settings(user_id, settings_to_update) + elif active_group_updated or active_public_workspace_updated: + success = True if success: return jsonify({"message": "User settings updated successfully"}), 200 diff --git a/application/single_app/route_frontend_admin_settings.py b/application/single_app/route_frontend_admin_settings.py index 129dfcde6..0dc5cdd88 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_frontend_admin_settings.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_frontend_admin_settings.py @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ def is_valid_url(url): 'enable_web_search': enable_web_search, 'web_search_consent_accepted': web_search_consent_accepted, 'enable_web_search_user_notice': form_data.get('enable_web_search_user_notice') == 'on', - 'web_search_user_notice_text': form_data.get('web_search_user_notice_text', 'Your message will be sent to Microsoft Bing for web search. Only your current message is sent, not your conversation history.').strip(), + 'web_search_user_notice_text': form_data.get('web_search_user_notice_text', 'Your current message will be sent to Microsoft Bing for web search. Conversation history is not sent for web search, but any sensitive content you paste into this message may be sent.').strip(), 'web_search_agent': { 'agent_type': 'aifoundry', 'azure_openai_gpt_endpoint': form_data.get('web_search_foundry_endpoint', '').strip(), diff --git a/application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py b/application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py index d2b428fe2..b2e65be49 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py @@ -10,6 +10,22 @@ ) from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security + +def _authorize_frontend_personal_conversation_access(user_id, conversation_id): + """Load a personal conversation and ensure the caller owns it.""" + try: + conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( + item=conversation_id, + partition_key=conversation_id, + ) + except CosmosResourceNotFoundError as exc: + raise LookupError(f"Conversation {conversation_id} not found") from exc + + if conversation_item.get('user_id') != user_id: + raise PermissionError('Forbidden') + + return conversation_item + def register_route_frontend_conversations(app): @app.route('/conversations') @swagger_route(security=get_auth_security()) @@ -41,12 +57,11 @@ def view_conversation(conversation_id): if not user_id: return redirect(url_for('login')) try: - conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item( - item=conversation_id, - partition_key=conversation_id - ) - except Exception: + _authorize_frontend_personal_conversation_access(user_id, conversation_id) + except LookupError: return "Conversation not found", 404 + except PermissionError: + return "Forbidden", 403 message_query = f""" SELECT * FROM c @@ -70,9 +85,11 @@ def get_conversation_messages(conversation_id): return jsonify({'error': 'User not authenticated'}), 401 try: - _ = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item(conversation_id, conversation_id) - except CosmosResourceNotFoundError: + _authorize_frontend_personal_conversation_access(user_id, conversation_id) + except LookupError: return jsonify({'error': 'Conversation not found'}), 404 + except PermissionError: + return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden'}), 403 msg_query = f""" SELECT * FROM c diff --git a/application/single_app/route_frontend_group_workspaces.py b/application/single_app/route_frontend_group_workspaces.py index e92d5a980..6e3186f62 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_frontend_group_workspaces.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_frontend_group_workspaces.py @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ from config import * from functions_authentication import * -from functions_group import get_group_model_endpoints +from functions_group import get_group_model_endpoints, require_active_group, update_active_group_for_user from functions_settings import * from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security @@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ def group_workspaces(): settings = get_settings() user_settings = get_user_settings(user_id) public_settings = sanitize_settings_for_user(settings) - active_group_id = user_settings.get("settings", {}).get("activeGroupOid") + try: + active_group_id = require_active_group(user_id) + except (ValueError, LookupError, PermissionError): + active_group_id = None enable_document_classification = settings.get('enable_document_classification', False) enable_file_sharing = settings.get('enable_file_sharing', False) enable_extract_meta_data = settings.get('enable_extract_meta_data', False) @@ -97,7 +100,12 @@ def set_active_group(): group_id = request.form.get("group_id") if not user_id or not group_id: return "Missing user or group id", 400 - success = update_user_settings(user_id, {"activeGroupOid": group_id}) - if not success: - return "Failed to update user settings", 500 + + try: + update_active_group_for_user(group_id, user_id=user_id) + except LookupError: + return "Group not found", 404 + except PermissionError: + return "You are not a member of this group", 403 + return redirect(url_for('group_workspaces')) diff --git a/application/single_app/route_frontend_public_workspaces.py b/application/single_app/route_frontend_public_workspaces.py index 05d5b982a..fa1178d64 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_frontend_public_workspaces.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_frontend_public_workspaces.py @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from config import * from functions_authentication import * +from functions_public_workspaces import update_active_public_workspace_for_user from functions_settings import * from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security @@ -116,7 +117,10 @@ def set_active_public_workspace(): workspace_id = request.form.get("workspace_id") if not user_id or not workspace_id: return "Missing user or workspace id", 400 - success = update_user_settings(user_id, {"activePublicWorkspaceOid": workspace_id}) - if not success: - return "Failed to update user settings", 500 + + try: + update_active_public_workspace_for_user(user_id, workspace_id) + except LookupError: + return "Workspace not found", 404 + return redirect(url_for('public_workspaces')) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py b/application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py index 940d540ea..69b7ce35b 100644 --- a/application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py +++ b/application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ """ from flask import Blueprint, jsonify, request -from functions_authentication import login_required, get_current_user_id +from functions_authentication import admin_required, login_required, get_current_user_id from functions_appinsights import log_event from semantic_kernel_plugins.plugin_invocation_logger import get_plugin_logger from swagger_wrapper import swagger_route, get_auth_security @@ -122,10 +122,10 @@ def get_plugin_stats(): security=get_auth_security() ) @login_required +@admin_required def get_recent_invocations(): """Get the most recent plugin invocations across all users (admin only).""" try: - # Note: You might want to add admin role checking here plugin_logger = get_plugin_logger() limit = request.args.get('limit', 20, type=int) @@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ def get_plugin_specific_invocations(plugin_name): security=get_auth_security() ) @login_required +@admin_required def clear_plugin_logs(): """Clear plugin invocation logs (admin only or for testing).""" try: diff --git a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_loader.py b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_loader.py index f66cfca7e..14dcc0d37 100644 --- a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_loader.py +++ b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_loader.py @@ -36,7 +36,16 @@ from semantic_kernel_plugins.smart_http_plugin import SmartHttpPlugin from functions_debug import debug_print from flask import g -from functions_keyvault import SecretReturnType, keyvault_model_endpoint_get_helper, retrieve_secret_from_key_vault, retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name, validate_secret_name_dynamic +from functions_keyvault import ( + SQL_PLUGIN_SENSITIVE_ADDITIONAL_FIELDS, + SQL_PLUGIN_SENSITIVE_AUTH_FIELDS, + SecretReturnType, + keyvault_model_endpoint_get_helper, + resolve_secret_reference_for_context, + retrieve_secret_from_key_vault, + retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name, + validate_secret_name_dynamic, +) from functions_global_actions import get_global_actions from functions_global_agents import get_global_agents from functions_group_agents import get_group_agent, get_group_agents @@ -1595,6 +1604,27 @@ def create_chat_completion_service(): log_event(f"[SK Loader] load_single_agent_for_kernel completed - returning {len(agent_objs)} agents: {list(agent_objs.keys())}", level=logging.INFO) return kernel, agent_objs +def _get_plugin_secret_context(plugin_manifest): + """Infer the expected Key Vault scope for a plugin manifest.""" + if not isinstance(plugin_manifest, dict): + return None, None + + plugin_scope = str(plugin_manifest.get("scope") or "").strip().lower() + if plugin_scope == "group" or plugin_manifest.get("is_group"): + return plugin_manifest.get("group_id"), "group" + if plugin_scope == "global" or plugin_manifest.get("is_global"): + return plugin_manifest.get("id"), "global" + if plugin_scope == "user" or plugin_manifest.get("user_id"): + return plugin_manifest.get("user_id"), "user" + return plugin_manifest.get("id"), "global" + + +def _is_sql_sensitive_plugin_field(plugin_manifest, field_name): + """Return True when an additional field should resolve as a SQL secret.""" + plugin_type = str((plugin_manifest or {}).get("type") or "").strip().lower() + return plugin_type in {"sql_query", "sql_schema"} and field_name in SQL_PLUGIN_SENSITIVE_ADDITIONAL_FIELDS + + def resolve_key_vault_secrets_in_plugins(plugin_manifest, settings): """ Resolve any Key Vault secrets in a plugin manifest. @@ -1606,26 +1636,66 @@ def resolve_key_vault_secrets_in_plugins(plugin_manifest, settings): if not kv_name: raise ValueError("Key Vault name not configured in settings") - def resolve_value(value): - if isinstance(value, str) and validate_secret_name_dynamic(value): - resolved = retrieve_secret_from_key_vault_by_full_name(value) - if resolved: - return resolved - else: - raise ValueError(f"Failed to retrieve secret '{value}' from Key Vault '{kv_name}'") - return value - - resolved_manifest = {} - for k, v in plugin_manifest.items(): - debug_print(f"[SK Loader] Resolving plugin manifest key: {k} with value type: {type(v)}") - if isinstance(v, str): - resolved_manifest[k] = resolve_value(v) - elif isinstance(v, list): - resolved_manifest[k] = [resolve_value(item) for item in v] - elif isinstance(v, dict): - resolved_manifest[k] = {sub_k: resolve_value(sub_v) for sub_k, sub_v in v.items()} - else: - resolved_manifest[k] = v # Leave other types unchanged + scope_value, scope = _get_plugin_secret_context(plugin_manifest) + resolved_manifest = dict(plugin_manifest) + + auth = plugin_manifest.get("auth", {}) + if isinstance(auth, dict): + resolved_auth = dict(auth) + for auth_field in ("key", *SQL_PLUGIN_SENSITIVE_AUTH_FIELDS): + value = auth.get(auth_field) + if not isinstance(value, str) or not validate_secret_name_dynamic(value): + continue + try: + resolved_auth[auth_field] = resolve_secret_reference_for_context( + value, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action"}, + context_label=f"plugin auth field '{auth_field}'", + ) + except ValueError as exc: + log_event( + f"[SK Loader] Blocked plugin auth secret resolution for field '{auth_field}': {exc}", + extra={ + "plugin_name": plugin_manifest.get("name"), + "plugin_id": plugin_manifest.get("id"), + "scope": scope, + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + resolved_auth[auth_field] = "" + resolved_manifest["auth"] = resolved_auth + + additional_fields = plugin_manifest.get("additionalFields", {}) + if isinstance(additional_fields, dict): + resolved_additional_fields = dict(additional_fields) + for field_name, value in additional_fields.items(): + if not isinstance(value, str) or not validate_secret_name_dynamic(value): + continue + if not (field_name.endswith("__Secret") or _is_sql_sensitive_plugin_field(plugin_manifest, field_name)): + continue + try: + resolved_additional_fields[field_name] = resolve_secret_reference_for_context( + value, + scope_value=scope_value, + scope=scope, + allowed_sources={"action-addset"}, + context_label=f"plugin additional field '{field_name}'", + ) + except ValueError as exc: + log_event( + f"[SK Loader] Blocked plugin additionalField secret resolution for '{field_name}': {exc}", + extra={ + "plugin_name": plugin_manifest.get("name"), + "plugin_id": plugin_manifest.get("id"), + "scope": scope, + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + resolved_additional_fields[field_name] = "" + resolved_manifest["additionalFields"] = resolved_additional_fields + return resolved_manifest def load_plugins_for_kernel(kernel, plugin_manifests, settings, mode_label="global"): diff --git a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/fact_memory_plugin.py b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/fact_memory_plugin.py index 188d16fac..f38bd37ed 100644 --- a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/fact_memory_plugin.py +++ b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/fact_memory_plugin.py @@ -5,8 +5,12 @@ - Exposes methods for use as a Semantic Kernel plugin (does not need to derive from BasePlugin). - Read/inject logic is handled separately by orchestration utility. """ +import logging +from flask import g, has_request_context from typing import Optional, List +from functions_appinsights import log_event +from functions_authentication import get_current_user_id from semantic_kernel.functions import kernel_function from semantic_kernel_fact_memory_store import FactMemoryStore @@ -18,6 +22,82 @@ def __init__(self, store: Optional[FactMemoryStore] = None): self.store = store or FactMemoryStore() auto_wrap_plugin_functions(self, self.__class__.__name__) + def _get_authorized_fact_memory_scope(self) -> dict: + """Return the canonical request-scoped fact-memory authorization boundary.""" + if not has_request_context(): + raise PermissionError('Fact memory requires an active request context.') + + current_user_id = str(get_current_user_id() or '').strip() + if not current_user_id: + raise PermissionError('User not authenticated.') + + authorized_context = dict(getattr(g, 'authorized_chat_context', {}) or {}) + authorized_user_id = str(authorized_context.get('user_id') or current_user_id).strip() + if authorized_user_id != current_user_id: + authorized_user_id = current_user_id + + authorized_scope_id = str( + authorized_context.get('fact_memory_scope_id') + or authorized_context.get('active_group_id') + or current_user_id + ).strip() + authorized_scope_type = str( + authorized_context.get('fact_memory_scope_type') + or ('group' if authorized_context.get('active_group_id') else 'user') + ).strip().lower() + if authorized_scope_type not in {'user', 'group'}: + authorized_scope_type = 'user' + + authorized_conversation_id = str( + authorized_context.get('conversation_id') or getattr(g, 'conversation_id', '') or '' + ).strip() or None + + return { + 'user_id': authorized_user_id, + 'scope_id': authorized_scope_id, + 'scope_type': authorized_scope_type, + 'conversation_id': authorized_conversation_id, + } + + def _resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call( + self, + scope_type: str = '', + scope_id: str = '', + conversation_id: str = '', + ) -> dict: + """Normalize tool-call scope arguments against the authorized request scope.""" + authorized_scope = self._get_authorized_fact_memory_scope() + requested_scope_type = str(scope_type or '').strip().lower() + requested_scope_id = str(scope_id or '').strip() + requested_conversation_id = str(conversation_id or '').strip() + + if ( + (requested_scope_type and requested_scope_type != authorized_scope['scope_type']) + or (requested_scope_id and requested_scope_id != authorized_scope['scope_id']) + ): + log_event( + '[FactMemoryPlugin] Overriding mismatched fact-memory scope in tool call.', + extra={ + 'requested_scope_type': requested_scope_type, + 'requested_scope_id': requested_scope_id, + 'authorized_scope_type': authorized_scope['scope_type'], + 'authorized_scope_id': authorized_scope['scope_id'], + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + + if requested_conversation_id and requested_conversation_id != authorized_scope['conversation_id']: + log_event( + '[FactMemoryPlugin] Overriding mismatched fact-memory conversation_id in tool call.', + extra={ + 'requested_conversation_id': requested_conversation_id, + 'authorized_conversation_id': authorized_scope['conversation_id'], + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + + return authorized_scope + @kernel_function( description=""" Store a fact for the given agent, scope, and conversation. @@ -39,11 +119,16 @@ def set_fact(self, scope_type: str, scope_id: str, value: str, conversation_id: """ Store a fact for the given agent, scope, and conversation. """ - return self.store.set_fact( + authorized_scope = self._resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call( scope_type=scope_type, scope_id=scope_id, - value=value, conversation_id=conversation_id, + ) + return self.store.set_fact( + scope_type=authorized_scope['scope_type'], + scope_id=authorized_scope['scope_id'], + value=value, + conversation_id=authorized_scope['conversation_id'], agent_id=agent_id, memory_type=memory_type, ) @@ -56,8 +141,9 @@ def update_fact(self, scope_id: str, fact_id: str, value: str, memory_type: str """ Update a fact value by its unique id and scope_id partition key. """ + authorized_scope = self._resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call(scope_id=scope_id) update_kwargs = { - 'scope_id': scope_id, + 'scope_id': authorized_scope['scope_id'], 'fact_id': fact_id, 'value': value, } @@ -77,8 +163,9 @@ def delete_fact(self, scope_id: str, fact_id: str) -> bool: """ Delete a fact by its unique id and the scope_id which is the partition key. """ + authorized_scope = self._resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call(scope_id=scope_id) return self.store.delete_fact( - scope_id=scope_id, + scope_id=authorized_scope['scope_id'], fact_id=fact_id ) @@ -100,7 +187,11 @@ def get_facts(self, scope_type: str, scope_id: str,) -> List[dict]: """ Retrieve all facts for the user. Facts are persistent values that provide important context, background knowledge, or user preferences to the AI agent. Use this to get all facts that will be injected as context for the agent. """ - return self.store.get_facts( + authorized_scope = self._resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call( scope_type=scope_type, scope_id=scope_id, ) + return self.store.get_facts( + scope_type=authorized_scope['scope_type'], + scope_id=authorized_scope['scope_id'], + ) diff --git a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/log_analytics_plugin.py b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/log_analytics_plugin.py index f98c0efaa..7c5a69326 100644 --- a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/log_analytics_plugin.py +++ b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/log_analytics_plugin.py @@ -193,7 +193,6 @@ def _generate_metadata(self) -> Dict[str, Any]: "description": "Run a KQL (Kusto Query Language) query against the Log Analytics workspace and return the results. Results are chunked for LLMs if needed. Accepts an optional timespan parameter (timedelta, tuple, or hours).", "parameters": [ {"name": "query", "type": "string", "description": "The KQL query string to execute.", "required": True}, - {"name": "user_id", "type": "string", "description": "User ID for query history tracking (optional).", "required": False}, {"name": "timespan", "type": "any", "description": "Query timespan: timedelta, (start, end) tuple, or number of hours (optional).", "required": False} ], "returns": {"type": "list[object]", "description": "A list of result rows, each as a dictionary of column values."} @@ -210,8 +209,7 @@ def _generate_metadata(self) -> Dict[str, Any]: "name": "get_query_history", "description": "Return the last N queries run by this plugin instance for the current user. Useful for re-running or editing previous queries.", "parameters": [ - {"name": "limit", "type": "integer", "description": "Number of queries to return (default 20).", "required": False}, - {"name": "user_id", "type": "string", "description": "User ID for query history tracking (optional).", "required": False} + {"name": "limit", "type": "integer", "description": "Number of queries to return (default 20).", "required": False} ], "returns": {"type": "list[string]", "description": "A list of previous KQL queries, most recent last."} }, @@ -228,6 +226,21 @@ def _generate_metadata(self) -> Dict[str, Any]: def get_functions(self) -> List[str]: return [m["name"] for m in self._metadata["methods"]] + + def _get_authenticated_history_user_id(self) -> Optional[str]: + """Return the authenticated user id for query-history persistence.""" + try: + from application.single_app.functions_authentication import get_current_user_id + except ImportError: + from functions_authentication import get_current_user_id + + try: + user_id = str(get_current_user_id() or "").strip() + except Exception as exc: + logging.warning(f"[LA] Could not resolve authenticated user for query history: {exc}") + return None + + return user_id or None @plugin_function_logger("LogAnalyticsPlugin") @kernel_function(description="Return a dictionary of all tables and their schemas (column names and types, including Properties virtual columns) in the connected Azure Log Analytics workspace. This combines list_tables and get_table_schema for efficient schema discovery.") @@ -394,14 +407,13 @@ def col_name(col): return schema @plugin_function_logger("LogAnalyticsPlugin") - @kernel_function(description="Execute a KQL (Kusto Query Language) query against a specific table in the Log Analytics workspace and return the results as a list of rows (each as a dictionary of column values). Use this function after discovering available tables and their schemas to retrieve data. Accepts an optional timespan parameter to limit the query window as a timedelta, tuple of datetimes, or number of hours. Limitations on returns should be specified in the query (ex: take N). Always provide user_id to enable saving the query to Cosmos DB for user history tracking.") + @kernel_function(description="Execute a KQL (Kusto Query Language) query against a specific table in the Log Analytics workspace and return the results as a list of rows (each as a dictionary of column values). Use this function after discovering available tables and their schemas to retrieve data. Accepts an optional timespan parameter to limit the query window as a timedelta, tuple of datetimes, or number of hours. Limitations on returns should be specified in the query (ex: take N).") def run_query( self, query: str, - user_id: Optional[str] = None, timespan: Optional[Any] = None ) -> Any: - logging.debug(f"[LA] Running query: {query} with user_id={user_id}, timespan={timespan}") + logging.debug(f"[LA] Running query: {query} with timespan={timespan}") if not self._client: raise RuntimeError("Log Analytics client not initialized.") # Determine if this is a control command (starts with '.') @@ -477,9 +489,9 @@ def col_name(col): logging.error(f"[LA] Error processing query results: {e}") return {"error": "Failed to process query results."} finally: - # Save to Cosmos query history if user_id is provided - if user_id: - self._save_query_history_to_cosmos(user_id, query) + history_user_id = self._get_authenticated_history_user_id() + if history_user_id: + self._save_query_history_to_cosmos(history_user_id, query) @plugin_function_logger("LogAnalyticsPlugin") @kernel_function(description="Summarize a result set for LLM consumption, including row count and column names.") @@ -492,7 +504,8 @@ def summarize_results(self, results: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> str: @plugin_function_logger("LogAnalyticsPlugin") @kernel_function(description="Return the last N queries run by this plugin instance. They should be numbered for the user to allow easy selection.") - def get_query_history(self, limit: int = 20, user_id: Optional[str] = None) -> List[str]: + def get_query_history(self, limit: int = 20) -> List[str]: + user_id = self._get_authenticated_history_user_id() if not user_id: return [] return self._get_query_history_from_cosmos(user_id, limit) diff --git a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/tabular_processing_plugin.py b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/tabular_processing_plugin.py index 344d092a5..f76edff81 100644 --- a/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/tabular_processing_plugin.py +++ b/application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/tabular_processing_plugin.py @@ -15,11 +15,15 @@ import re import warnings import pandas +from flask import g, has_request_context from typing import Annotated, Dict, List, Optional, Set from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit from semantic_kernel.functions import kernel_function from semantic_kernel_plugins.plugin_invocation_logger import plugin_function_logger from functions_appinsights import log_event +from functions_authentication import get_current_user_id +from functions_group import find_group_by_id, get_user_role_in_group +from functions_public_workspaces import get_user_visible_public_workspace_ids_from_settings from config import ( CLIENTS, TABULAR_EXTENSIONS, @@ -187,6 +191,179 @@ def _get_blob_service_client(self): raise RuntimeError("Blob storage client not available. Enhanced citations must be enabled.") return client + def _get_authorized_chat_context(self) -> dict: + """Return the canonical request-scoped authorization context for tabular access.""" + if not has_request_context(): + raise PermissionError('Tabular processing requires an active request context.') + + current_user_id = str(get_current_user_id() or '').strip() + if not current_user_id: + raise PermissionError('User not authenticated.') + + authorized_context = dict(getattr(g, 'authorized_chat_context', {}) or {}) + authorized_user_id = str(authorized_context.get('user_id') or current_user_id).strip() + if authorized_user_id != current_user_id: + authorized_user_id = current_user_id + + authorized_conversation_id = str( + authorized_context.get('conversation_id') or getattr(g, 'conversation_id', '') or '' + ).strip() + if not authorized_conversation_id: + raise PermissionError('Conversation context unavailable for tabular processing.') + + active_group_ids = [ + str(group_id or '').strip() + for group_id in (authorized_context.get('active_group_ids') or []) + if str(group_id or '').strip() + ] + active_public_workspace_ids = [ + str(workspace_id or '').strip() + for workspace_id in (authorized_context.get('active_public_workspace_ids') or []) + if str(workspace_id or '').strip() + ] + + return { + 'user_id': authorized_user_id, + 'conversation_id': authorized_conversation_id, + 'active_group_ids': active_group_ids, + 'active_group_id': str(authorized_context.get('active_group_id') or '').strip() or None, + 'active_public_workspace_ids': active_public_workspace_ids, + 'active_public_workspace_id': ( + str(authorized_context.get('active_public_workspace_id') or '').strip() or None + ), + } + + def _resolve_authorized_scope_arguments( + self, + user_id: str, + conversation_id: str, + group_id: Optional[str] = None, + public_workspace_id: Optional[str] = None, + ) -> dict: + """Normalize tool-call scope arguments against the current authorized request context.""" + authorized_context = self._get_authorized_chat_context() + requested_user_id = str(user_id or '').strip() + requested_conversation_id = str(conversation_id or '').strip() + requested_group_id = str(group_id or '').strip() + requested_public_workspace_id = str(public_workspace_id or '').strip() + + if requested_user_id and requested_user_id != authorized_context['user_id']: + log_event( + '[TabularProcessingPlugin] Ignoring mismatched user_id in tool call.', + extra={ + 'requested_user_id': requested_user_id, + 'authorized_user_id': authorized_context['user_id'], + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + + if requested_conversation_id and requested_conversation_id != authorized_context['conversation_id']: + log_event( + '[TabularProcessingPlugin] Ignoring mismatched conversation_id in tool call.', + extra={ + 'requested_conversation_id': requested_conversation_id, + 'authorized_conversation_id': authorized_context['conversation_id'], + }, + level=logging.WARNING, + ) + + resolved_group_id = None + if requested_group_id: + if not self._is_authorized_group_scope( + authorized_context['user_id'], + requested_group_id, + authorized_context=authorized_context, + ): + raise PermissionError('Tabular processing cannot access that group scope.') + resolved_group_id = requested_group_id + + resolved_public_workspace_id = None + if requested_public_workspace_id: + if not self._is_authorized_public_workspace_scope( + authorized_context['user_id'], + requested_public_workspace_id, + authorized_context=authorized_context, + ): + raise PermissionError('Tabular processing cannot access that public workspace scope.') + resolved_public_workspace_id = requested_public_workspace_id + + authorized_context['user_id'] = authorized_context['user_id'] + authorized_context['conversation_id'] = authorized_context['conversation_id'] + authorized_context['group_id'] = resolved_group_id + authorized_context['public_workspace_id'] = resolved_public_workspace_id + return authorized_context + + def _is_authorized_group_scope( + self, + user_id: str, + group_id: str, + authorized_context: Optional[dict] = None, + ) -> bool: + """Return True when the current user may access the requested group scope.""" + normalized_group_id = str(group_id or '').strip() + if not normalized_group_id: + return False + + if authorized_context and normalized_group_id in set(authorized_context.get('active_group_ids') or []): + return True + + group_doc = find_group_by_id(normalized_group_id) + return bool(group_doc and get_user_role_in_group(group_doc, user_id)) + + def _is_authorized_public_workspace_scope( + self, + user_id: str, + public_workspace_id: str, + authorized_context: Optional[dict] = None, + ) -> bool: + """Return True when the current user may access the requested public workspace scope.""" + normalized_public_workspace_id = str(public_workspace_id or '').strip() + if not normalized_public_workspace_id: + return False + + if authorized_context and normalized_public_workspace_id in set( + authorized_context.get('active_public_workspace_ids') or [] + ): + return True + + visible_public_workspace_ids = set( + get_user_visible_public_workspace_ids_from_settings(user_id) or [] + ) + return normalized_public_workspace_id in visible_public_workspace_ids + + def _is_authorized_blob_location(self, container_name: str, blob_path: str, authorized_context: dict) -> bool: + """Ensure remembered blob locations still fall within the caller's authorized request scope.""" + source = self._infer_source_from_container(container_name) + blob_parts = [part for part in str(blob_path or '').split('/') if part] + if not source or not blob_parts: + return False + + if source == 'workspace': + return blob_parts[0] == authorized_context['user_id'] + + if source == 'chat': + return ( + len(blob_parts) >= 2 + and blob_parts[0] == authorized_context['user_id'] + and blob_parts[1] == authorized_context['conversation_id'] + ) + + if source == 'group': + return self._is_authorized_group_scope( + authorized_context['user_id'], + blob_parts[0], + authorized_context=authorized_context, + ) + + if source == 'public': + return self._is_authorized_public_workspace_scope( + authorized_context['user_id'], + blob_parts[0], + authorized_context=authorized_context, + ) + + return False + def _list_tabular_blobs(self, container_name: str, prefix: str) -> List[str]: """List all tabular file blobs under a given prefix.""" client = self._get_blob_service_client() @@ -2754,9 +2931,25 @@ def _resolve_blob_location(self, user_id: str, conversation_id: str, filename: s def _resolve_blob_location_with_fallback(self, user_id: str, conversation_id: str, filename: str, source: str, group_id: str = None, public_workspace_id: str = None) -> tuple: """Try primary source first, then fall back to other containers if blob not found.""" + authorized_context = self._resolve_authorized_scope_arguments( + user_id, + conversation_id, + group_id=group_id, + public_workspace_id=public_workspace_id, + ) + user_id = authorized_context['user_id'] + conversation_id = authorized_context['conversation_id'] + group_id = authorized_context['group_id'] + public_workspace_id = authorized_context['public_workspace_id'] source = source.lower().strip() + + if source == 'group' and not group_id: + group_id = authorized_context['active_group_id'] + if source == 'public' and not public_workspace_id: + public_workspace_id = authorized_context['active_public_workspace_id'] + override = self._get_resolved_blob_location_override(source, filename) - if override: + if override and self._is_authorized_blob_location(override[0], override[1], authorized_context): return override attempts = [] @@ -2811,6 +3004,29 @@ async def list_tabular_files( public_workspace_id: Annotated[Optional[str], "Public workspace ID (for public workspace documents)"] = None, ) -> Annotated[str, "JSON list of available tabular files"]: """List all tabular files available for the user across all accessible containers.""" + try: + authorized_context = self._resolve_authorized_scope_arguments( + user_id, + conversation_id, + group_id=group_id, + public_workspace_id=public_workspace_id, + ) + except PermissionError as exc: + log_event( + f"[TabularProcessingPlugin] Denied tabular file listing: {exc}", + level=logging.WARNING, + extra={ + 'requested_group_id': group_id, + 'requested_public_workspace_id': public_workspace_id, + }, + ) + return json.dumps({"error": str(exc)}) + + user_id = authorized_context['user_id'] + conversation_id = authorized_context['conversation_id'] + group_id = authorized_context['group_id'] + public_workspace_id = authorized_context['public_workspace_id'] + def _sync_work(): results = [] try: diff --git a/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo.png b/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo.png index ecf6e6521..a5b440e93 100644 Binary files a/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo.png and b/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo.png differ diff --git a/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo_dark.png b/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo_dark.png index 4f2819457..df9485a93 100644 Binary files a/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo_dark.png and b/application/single_app/static/images/custom_logo_dark.png differ diff --git a/application/single_app/static/js/admin/admin_agents.js b/application/single_app/static/js/admin/admin_agents.js index 5c1daed86..6f9c41458 100644 --- a/application/single_app/static/js/admin/admin_agents.js +++ b/application/single_app/static/js/admin/admin_agents.js @@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ let orchestrationSettings = {}; let agents = []; let selectedAgent = null; +function escapeHtml(text) { + const div = document.createElement('div'); + div.textContent = text ?? ''; + return div.innerHTML; +} + // --- Function Definitions --- async function loadAllAdminAgentData() { @@ -274,10 +280,13 @@ function renderAgentsTable() { const isSelected = selectedAgent && agent.name === selectedAgent; const tr = document.createElement('tr'); let selectedBadge = isSelected ? 'Selected' : ''; + const safeName = escapeHtml(agent.name || ''); + const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(agent.display_name || ''); + const safeDescription = escapeHtml(agent.description || ''); tr.innerHTML = ` - ${agent.name} - ${agent.display_name} - ${agent.description || ''} + ${safeName} + ${safeDisplayName} + ${safeDescription} ${selectedBadge} diff --git a/application/single_app/static/js/agent_templates_gallery.js b/application/single_app/static/js/agent_templates_gallery.js index 428ebf702..c0d06248a 100644 --- a/application/single_app/static/js/agent_templates_gallery.js +++ b/application/single_app/static/js/agent_templates_gallery.js @@ -142,7 +142,12 @@ function renderAccordion(accordion, templates, options = {}) { if (Array.isArray(template.actions_to_load) && template.actions_to_load.length) { const actionLine = document.createElement("p"); actionLine.className = "mb-0 text-muted small"; - actionLine.innerHTML = `Recommended actions: ${template.actions_to_load.join(", ")}`; + const actionLabel = document.createElement("strong"); + actionLabel.textContent = "Recommended actions:"; + actionLine.appendChild(actionLabel); + actionLine.appendChild( + document.createTextNode(` ${template.actions_to_load.map((action) => String(action)).join(", ")}`) + ); metaList.appendChild(actionLine); } diff --git a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-citations.js b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-citations.js index 9d751ffd9..4fa3f60ac 100644 --- a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-citations.js +++ b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-citations.js @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ export function showCitedTextPopup(citedText, fileName, pageNumber) {
-
Source: ${fileName}, Page: ${pageNumber}
+
@@ -205,11 +205,11 @@ export function showCitedTextPopup(citedText, fileName, pageNumber) {
`; document.body.appendChild(modalContainer); - } else { - const modalTitle = modalContainer.querySelector(".modal-title"); - if (modalTitle) { - modalTitle.textContent = `Source: ${fileName}, Page: ${pageNumber}`; - } + } + + const modalTitle = modalContainer.querySelector(".modal-title"); + if (modalTitle) { + modalTitle.textContent = `Source: ${fileName}, Page: ${pageNumber}`; } const citedTextContent = document.getElementById("cited-text-content"); diff --git a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-conversation-details.js b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-conversation-details.js index c8438617a..4bba53891 100644 --- a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-conversation-details.js +++ b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-conversation-details.js @@ -42,13 +42,14 @@ export async function showConversationDetails(conversationId) { } const metadata = await response.json(); + const safeConversationTitle = escapeHtml(metadata.title || 'Conversation Details'); // Update modal title with conversation title, pin icon, and hidden icon const pinIcon = metadata.is_pinned ? '' : ''; const hiddenIcon = metadata.is_hidden ? '' : ''; modalTitle.innerHTML = ` ${pinIcon}${hiddenIcon} - ${metadata.title || 'Conversation Details'} + ${safeConversationTitle} `; // Render the metadata @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ export async function showConversationDetails(conversationId) { Error loading conversation details
-

${error.message}

+

${escapeHtml(error.message || 'Unknown error')}

`; } @@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ export async function showConversationDetails(conversationId) { */ function renderConversationMetadata(metadata, conversationId) { const { context = [], tags = [], strict = false, classification = [], last_updated, chat_type = 'personal', is_pinned = false, is_hidden = false, scope_locked, locked_contexts = [], summary = null } = metadata; + const safeConversationId = escapeHtml(conversationId); // Organize tags by category const tagsByCategory = { @@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ function renderConversationMetadata(metadata, conversationId) {
Summary
- ${summary ? `Generated ${formatDate(summary.generated_at)}${summary.model_deployment ? ` · ${summary.model_deployment}` : ''}` : ''} + ${summary ? `Generated ${formatDate(summary.generated_at)}${summary.model_deployment ? ` · ${escapeHtml(summary.model_deployment)}` : ''}` : ''}
${renderSummaryContent(summary, conversationId)} @@ -118,7 +120,7 @@ function renderConversationMetadata(metadata, conversationId) {
- Conversation ID: ${conversationId} + Conversation ID: ${safeConversationId}
Last Updated: ${formatDate(last_updated)} @@ -256,17 +258,20 @@ function renderContextSection(context) { if (primary) { const displayName = primary.name || primary.id; const isGroupChat = primary.scope === 'group'; + const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(displayName); + const safePrimaryScope = escapeHtml(primary.scope); + const safePrimaryId = escapeHtml(primary.id); html += `
Primary Context:
- ${primary.scope} + ${safePrimaryScope} ${isGroupChat ? 'single-user' : ''} - ${displayName} + ${safeDisplayName}
- ${primary.name ? `
ID: ${primary.id}
` : ''} + ${primary.name ? `
ID: ${safePrimaryId}
` : ''}
`; @@ -281,11 +286,14 @@ function renderContextSection(context) { secondary.forEach(ctx => { const displayName = ctx.name || ctx.id; + const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(displayName); + const safeScope = escapeHtml(ctx.scope); + const safeContextId = escapeHtml(ctx.id); html += `
- ${ctx.scope} - ${displayName} - ${ctx.name ? `
ID: ${ctx.id}
` : ''} + ${safeScope} + ${safeDisplayName} + ${ctx.name ? `
ID: ${safeContextId}
` : ''}
`; }); @@ -305,15 +313,19 @@ function renderParticipantsSection(participants) { participants.forEach(participant => { const initials = (participant.name || 'U').slice(0, 2).toUpperCase(); const avatarId = `participant-avatar-${participant.user_id}`; + const safeAvatarId = escapeHtml(avatarId); + const safeInitials = escapeHtml(initials); + const safeParticipantName = escapeHtml(participant.name || 'Unknown User'); + const safeParticipantEmail = escapeHtml(participant.email || ''); html += `
-
- ${initials} +
+ ${safeInitials}
-
${participant.name || 'Unknown User'}
- ${participant.email || ''} +
${safeParticipantName}
+ ${safeParticipantEmail}
`; @@ -337,7 +349,7 @@ async function loadParticipantProfileImage(userId) { if (!avatarElement) return; try { - const response = await fetch(`/api/user/profile-image/${userId}`); + const response = await fetch(`/api/user/profile-image/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}`); if (!response.ok) throw new Error('Failed to load user profile image'); const userData = await response.json(); @@ -380,7 +392,7 @@ function renderModelsAndAgentsSection(models, agents) { if (models.length > 0) { html += '
Models:
'; models.forEach(model => { - html += `${model.value}`; + html += `${escapeHtml(model.value)}`; }); html += '
'; } @@ -388,7 +400,7 @@ function renderModelsAndAgentsSection(models, agents) { if (agents.length > 0) { html += '
Agents:
'; agents.forEach(agent => { - html += `${agent.value}`; + html += `${escapeHtml(agent.value)}`; }); html += '
'; } @@ -407,6 +419,11 @@ function renderDocumentsSection(documents) { const chunkCount = doc.chunk_ids ? doc.chunk_ids.length : 0; const documentTitle = doc.title || doc.document_id; const scopeName = doc.scope?.name || doc.scope?.id || 'Unknown'; + const safeClassification = escapeHtml(doc.classification || 'None'); + const safeDocumentId = escapeHtml(doc.document_id || 'Unknown Document'); + const safeDocumentTitle = escapeHtml(documentTitle); + const safeScopeName = escapeHtml(scopeName); + const safeScopeType = escapeHtml(doc.scope?.type || 'Unknown'); // Format document classification with custom colors const allCategories = window.classification_categories || []; @@ -415,15 +432,15 @@ function renderDocumentsSection(documents) { if (category) { const textClass = isColorLight(category.color) ? 'text-dark' : 'text-white'; - classificationHtml = `${doc.classification}`; + classificationHtml = `${safeClassification}`; } else { - classificationHtml = `${doc.classification}`; + classificationHtml = `${safeClassification}`; } html += `
-
${documentTitle}
+
${safeDocumentTitle}
${classificationHtml}
@@ -433,12 +450,12 @@ function renderDocumentsSection(documents) {
- ${doc.scope?.type} scope: ${scopeName} + ${safeScopeType} scope: ${safeScopeName}
${doc.title && doc.title !== doc.document_id ? `
- ID: ${doc.document_id} + ID: ${safeDocumentId}
` : ''}
@@ -455,7 +472,7 @@ function renderSemanticTagsSection(semanticTags) { let html = '
'; semanticTags.forEach(tag => { - html += `${tag.value}`; + html += `${escapeHtml(tag.value)}`; }); html += '
'; @@ -469,14 +486,26 @@ function renderWebSourcesSection(webSources) { let html = ''; webSources.forEach(source => { - html += ` -
- - ${source.value} - - -
- `; + const sourceValue = typeof source.value === 'string' ? source.value : ''; + const safeSourceText = escapeHtml(sourceValue); + const safeSourceUrl = sanitizeHttpUrl(sourceValue); + + if (safeSourceUrl) { + html += ` +
+ + ${safeSourceText} + + +
+ `; + } else { + html += ` +
+ ${safeSourceText || 'Invalid link'} +
+ `; + } }); return html; @@ -510,7 +539,7 @@ function formatScopeLockStatus(scopeLocked, lockedContexts) { return ctx.scope; }); return 'Locked' + - (names.length > 0 ? '
' + names.join(', ') + '' : ''); + (names.length > 0 ? '
' + names.map(name => escapeHtml(name)).join(', ') + '' : ''); } // false — unlocked return 'Unlocked'; @@ -525,14 +554,15 @@ function formatClassifications(classifications) { return classifications.map(label => { const category = allCategories.find(cat => cat.label === label); + const safeLabel = escapeHtml(label); if (category) { // Found category definition, apply custom color const textClass = isColorLight(category.color) ? 'text-dark' : 'text-white'; - return `${label}`; + return `${safeLabel}`; } else { // Label exists but no definition found (maybe deleted in admin) - return `${label}`; + return `${safeLabel}`; } }).join(' '); } @@ -587,12 +617,14 @@ function extractPageNumbers(chunkIds) { * @returns {string} HTML string */ function renderSummaryContent(summary, conversationId) { + const safeConversationId = escapeHtml(conversationId); + if (summary && summary.content) { return `

${escapeHtml(summary.content)}

@@ -608,13 +640,30 @@ function renderSummaryContent(summary, conversationId) { ${modelOptions}
`; } +function sanitizeHttpUrl(value) { + if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') { + return ''; + } + + try { + const parsed = new URL(value); + if (parsed.protocol === 'http:' || parsed.protocol === 'https:') { + return parsed.toString(); + } + } catch (error) { + return ''; + } + + return ''; +} + /** * Get available model options from the global #model-select dropdown * @returns {string} HTML option elements @@ -700,11 +749,11 @@ async function handleGenerateSummary(conversationId, modelDeployment) { * @returns {string} Escaped string */ function escapeHtml(str) { - if (!str) { + if (str === null || typeof str === 'undefined') { return ''; } const div = document.createElement('div'); - div.textContent = str; + div.textContent = String(str); return div.innerHTML; } diff --git a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-documents.js b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-documents.js index d0792db7e..b1fab7f08 100644 --- a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-documents.js +++ b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-documents.js @@ -1838,16 +1838,43 @@ document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() { icon = 'bi-globe'; } if (name) { - workspaceItems.push(`
  • ${name}
    • `); + workspaceItems.push({ icon, name }); } } if (listEl) { + listEl.textContent = ''; if (workspaceItems.length > 0) { const listLabel = scopeLocked === true ? 'Currently locked to:' : 'Will lock to:'; - listEl.innerHTML = `

    ${listLabel}

      ${workspaceItems.join('')}
    `; + const listLabelEl = document.createElement('p'); + listLabelEl.className = 'small text-muted mb-2'; + listLabelEl.textContent = listLabel; + + const listGroupEl = document.createElement('ul'); + listGroupEl.className = 'list-group list-group-flush'; + + workspaceItems.forEach(({ icon, name }) => { + const listItemEl = document.createElement('li'); + listItemEl.className = 'list-group-item'; + + const iconEl = document.createElement('i'); + iconEl.className = `bi ${icon} me-2`; + + const nameEl = document.createElement('span'); + nameEl.textContent = name; + + listItemEl.appendChild(iconEl); + listItemEl.appendChild(nameEl); + listGroupEl.appendChild(listItemEl); + }); + + listEl.appendChild(listLabelEl); + listEl.appendChild(listGroupEl); } else { - listEl.innerHTML = '

    No specific workspaces recorded.

    '; + const emptyStateEl = document.createElement('p'); + emptyStateEl.className = 'text-muted'; + emptyStateEl.textContent = 'No specific workspaces recorded.'; + listEl.appendChild(emptyStateEl); } } diff --git a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js index 66eaf0444..b96caf8d8 100644 --- a/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js +++ b/application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ export function showFileContentPopup(fileContent, filename, isTable, fileContent
    -
    Uploaded File: ${filename}
    +
    -
    -
    - `; - container.insertAdjacentHTML("beforeend", toastHtml); + const toastEl = document.createElement("div"); + toastEl.id = id; + toastEl.className = `toast align-items-center text-bg-${variant}`; + toastEl.setAttribute("role", "alert"); + toastEl.setAttribute("aria-live", "assertive"); + toastEl.setAttribute("aria-atomic", "true"); + + const contentEl = document.createElement("div"); + contentEl.className = "d-flex"; + + const bodyEl = document.createElement("div"); + bodyEl.className = "toast-body"; + bodyEl.textContent = String(message ?? ""); + + const closeButtonEl = document.createElement("button"); + closeButtonEl.type = "button"; + closeButtonEl.className = "btn-close btn-close-white me-2 m-auto"; + closeButtonEl.setAttribute("data-bs-dismiss", "toast"); + closeButtonEl.setAttribute("aria-label", "Close"); + + contentEl.appendChild(bodyEl); + contentEl.appendChild(closeButtonEl); + toastEl.appendChild(contentEl); + container.appendChild(toastEl); - const toastEl = document.getElementById(id); const bsToast = new bootstrap.Toast(toastEl, { delay: 5000 }); bsToast.show(); } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/application/single_app/static/js/control-center.js b/application/single_app/static/js/control-center.js index 3a95de45a..639e9466b 100644 --- a/application/single_app/static/js/control-center.js +++ b/application/single_app/static/js/control-center.js @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ class ControlCenter { renderUserAvatar(user) { if (user.profile_image) { return ` - ${this.escapeHtml(user.display_name || user.email)} `; } else { @@ -1293,13 +1293,17 @@ class ControlCenter { this.showToast(message, 'danger'); } - showToast(message, type = 'info') { + showToast(message, type = 'info', allowHtml = false) { + const safeMessage = allowHtml + ? String(message ?? '') + : this.escapeHtml(String(message ?? '')); + // Create toast HTML const toastHtml = ` @@ -5169,7 +5169,7 @@
    diff --git a/application/single_app/templates/chats.html b/application/single_app/templates/chats.html index f47936a83..95c4e3066 100644 --- a/application/single_app/templates/chats.html +++ b/application/single_app/templates/chats.html @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@
    diff --git a/application/single_app/templates/control_center.html b/application/single_app/templates/control_center.html index bff6f2e93..16b52ff43 100644 --- a/application/single_app/templates/control_center.html +++ b/application/single_app/templates/control_center.html @@ -3742,7 +3742,7 @@
    const ownershipResult = await ownershipResponse.json(); console.log('Ownership request created:', ownershipResult); - window.controlCenter.showToast(`Ownership transfer request submitted!

    Status: Pending Approval
    Approval ID: ${ownershipResult.approval_id}

    The request requires approval from the group owner or another admin.`, 'success'); + window.controlCenter.showToast(`Ownership transfer request submitted!

    Status: Pending Approval
    Approval ID: ${ownershipResult.approval_id}

    The request requires approval from the group owner or another admin.`, 'success', true); } else if (ownership === 'transfer') { // Transfer ownership to another user - create approval request @@ -3764,7 +3764,7 @@
    const transferResult = await transferResponse.json(); console.log('Transfer request created:', transferResult); - window.controlCenter.showToast(`Ownership transfer request submitted!

    Status: Pending Approval
    Approval ID: ${transferResult.approval_id}

    The request requires approval from the group owner or another admin.`, 'success'); + window.controlCenter.showToast(`Ownership transfer request submitted!

    Status: Pending Approval
    Approval ID: ${transferResult.approval_id}

    The request requires approval from the group owner or another admin.`, 'success', true); } else { // No ownership change @@ -4020,8 +4020,8 @@
    return ` -
    ${member.name || 'Unknown User'}
    - ${member.email || 'No email'} +
    ${GroupManager.escapeHtml(member.name || 'Unknown User')}
    + ${GroupManager.escapeHtml(member.email || 'No email')} ${member.role} diff --git a/docs/explanation/features/v0.241.022/BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_PR_GUARDRAILS.md b/docs/explanation/features/v0.241.022/BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_PR_GUARDRAILS.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a97413002 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/features/v0.241.022/BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_PR_GUARDRAILS.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +# Broken Access Control PR Guardrails + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.022** + +## Overview + +This feature adds a prevention-focused Broken Access Control guardrail for pull requests into Development. It is designed to catch new authorization regressions before they merge, especially when code changes introduce raw active-scope reads and writes, direct personal conversation reads, or plugin tool surfaces that trust caller-supplied scope ids. + +## Scope + +This change affects: + +- the repository instruction set in `.github/instructions/broken-access-control-prevention.instructions.md` +- the changed-file checker in `scripts/check_broken_access_control.py` +- the Development pull-request workflow in `.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml` +- the guardrail regression test in `functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py` + +## Technical Details + +### GitHub Instruction + +The new instruction file documents the repo's preferred authorization-boundary patterns for Python route and plugin code: + +- personal conversation ownership helpers such as `_authorize_personal_conversation_read(...)` and `_authorize_personal_conversation_access(...)` +- validated active-scope setters such as `update_active_group_for_user(...)` and `update_active_public_workspace_for_user(...)` +- validated active-scope readers such as `require_active_group(...)` and `require_active_public_workspace(...)` +- request-bound plugin scope normalization such as `_resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(...)`, `_resolve_blob_location_with_fallback(...)`, and `_resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call(...)` + +It also explicitly blocks the recurring BAC patterns that caused recent findings: + +- direct `update_user_settings(...)` writes for `activeGroupOid` and `activePublicWorkspaceOid` outside the approved validators +- raw backend or plugin reads of `activeGroupOid` or `activePublicWorkspaceOid` +- `@kernel_function` surfaces that expose scope ids without immediately rebinding them to the authorized request context +- direct personal conversation reads from request ids without a helper or explicit ownership check + +### Changed-File Checker + +`scripts/check_broken_access_control.py` follows the same custom-checker model already used for Swagger route validation and the XSS sink check in this repository. + +Key behaviors: + +- scans only Python files +- supports pull-request diff mode through `--base-sha` and `--head-sha` +- limits checks to added lines in CI when revision metadata is provided +- emits GitHub Actions error annotations for each blocking issue +- allows a narrow reviewed escape hatch with the suppression token `bac-check: ignore` + +### PR Workflow + +`.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml` adds a Development pull-request gate with two layers: + +- a blocking `broken-access-control-check` job that scans changed application Python files +- a non-blocking guardrail self-test step that runs when the checker, workflow, instruction, or feature doc changes + +This keeps the primary PR gate fast while still validating the guardrail itself when the guardrail code changes. + +## Local Usage + +Run the checker against full files from the repository root: + +```powershell +python scripts/check_broken_access_control.py --full-file application/single_app/route_backend_users.py +``` + +Run the guardrail self-test: + +```powershell +python functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py +``` + +## Reviewed Exceptions + +If a reviewed legacy exception is unavoidable, add the suppression token near the specific line and include a justification comment: + +```text +bac-check: ignore +``` + +That token should remain rare. New route and plugin code should use the shared authorization helpers instead. + +## Benefits + +- prevents common authorization regressions before merge +- gives non-local contributors a CI guardrail instead of relying only on editor instructions +- reinforces the helper patterns already used in the hardened chat, conversation, feedback, and plugin flows +- keeps the first pass lightweight without introducing a full security-lint stack + +## Validation + +Validation completed with: + +- `python functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py` +- targeted diagnostics on `scripts/check_broken_access_control.py` +- review of the Development PR workflow wiring in `.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml` \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/features/v0.241.022/XSS_PR_GUARDRAILS.md b/docs/explanation/features/v0.241.022/XSS_PR_GUARDRAILS.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b696daa71 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/features/v0.241.022/XSS_PR_GUARDRAILS.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +# XSS PR Guardrails + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.021** + +## Overview + +This feature adds a prevention-focused XSS guardrail for pull requests into Development. It is designed to catch new browser-side sink regressions before they merge, especially when code arrives from contributors who are not using the local Copilot or CLAUDE instruction set. + +## Scope + +This change affects: + +- the repository instruction set in `.github/instructions/xss-prevention.instructions.md` +- the changed-file checker in `scripts/check_xss_sinks.py` +- the Development pull-request workflow in `.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml` +- the guardrail regression test in `functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py` + +## Technical Details + +### GitHub Instruction + +The new instruction file documents the repo's preferred safe browser-rendering patterns: + +- `createElement(...)` +- `textContent` +- `setAttribute(...)` +- `dataset` +- `addEventListener(...)` +- `DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(...))` + +It also explicitly blocks the sink patterns that caused the recurring XSS findings: + +- dynamic `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `insertAdjacentHTML`, and jQuery `.html(...)` +- inline event handlers such as `onclick`, `onerror`, and `onload` +- dynamic interpolation into `href`, `src`, `title`, `style`, and `data-*` +- `javascript:` URLs +- `Markup(...)` in Python on untrusted content +- Jinja `|safe` on untrusted content +- `marked.parse(...)` rendered without DOMPurify + +### Changed-File Checker + +`scripts/check_xss_sinks.py` follows the same custom-checker model already used for Swagger route validation in this repository. + +Key behaviors: + +- Scans only supported source files: `.js`, `.html`, and `.py` +- Supports pull-request diff mode through `--base-sha` and `--head-sha` +- Limits checks to added lines in CI when revision metadata is provided +- Emits GitHub Actions error annotations for each blocking issue +- Allows a narrow reviewed escape hatch with the suppression token `xss-check: ignore` + +### PR Workflow + +`.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml` adds a Development pull-request gate with two layers: + +- a blocking `xss-sink-check` job that scans changed application files +- a non-blocking guardrail self-test step that runs when the checker, workflow, instruction, or feature doc changes + +This keeps the primary PR gate fast while still validating the guardrail itself when the guardrail code changes. + +## Local Usage + +Run the checker against full files from the repository root: + +```powershell +python scripts/check_xss_sinks.py --full-file application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-messages.js +``` + +Run the guardrail self-test: + +```powershell +python functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py +``` + +## Reviewed Exceptions + +If a reviewed legacy exception is unavoidable, add the suppression token near the specific line and include a justification comment: + +```text +xss-check: ignore +``` + +That token should remain rare. New rendering code should use the safe DOM patterns instead. + +## Benefits + +- Prevents common XSS sink regressions before merge +- Gives non-local contributors a CI guardrail instead of relying only on editor instructions +- Reinforces the safe rendering patterns already used in the hardened chat, workspace, and Control Center flows +- Keeps the first pass lightweight without introducing a full frontend lint stack + +## Validation + +Validation completed with: + +- `python functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py` +- targeted diagnostics on `scripts/check_xss_sinks.py` +- review of the Development PR workflow wiring in `.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml` \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/AGENT_TEMPLATE_GALLERY_ACTIONS_TO_LOAD_XSS_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/AGENT_TEMPLATE_GALLERY_ACTIONS_TO_LOAD_XSS_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a54f08c1d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/AGENT_TEMPLATE_GALLERY_ACTIONS_TO_LOAD_XSS_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# Agent Template Gallery Actions To Load XSS Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.020** + +## Overview + +This fix closes finding **f045**, a stored XSS in the agent template gallery. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.020"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +- The gallery renderer in `application/single_app/static/js/agent_templates_gallery.js` built the `Recommended actions` line with `innerHTML` and interpolated `template.actions_to_load` directly into that sink. +- The submission path stored `actions_to_load` values without a shared normalizer, so malformed payloads could survive into storage and later reach the gallery renderer. +- The admin review UI already rendered `actions_to_load` safely with `textContent`, which made malicious entries look inert during review while still leaving the gallery path vulnerable. + +## Root Cause Analysis + +- The gallery mixed trusted label markup with untrusted action names inside a single `innerHTML` assignment. +- Template helper code normalized `actions_to_load` ad hoc instead of through one shared helper, so read and write paths could drift and invalid shapes were not rejected consistently. + +## Technical Details + +### Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/static/js/agent_templates_gallery.js` +- `application/single_app/functions_agent_templates.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py` +- `ui_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py` + +### Code Changes Summary + +- Replaced the gallery `actions_to_load` `innerHTML` sink with DOM node creation and a text node for the untrusted action names. +- Added `_normalize_actions_to_load(...)` in `functions_agent_templates.py` and reused it from `_sanitize_template(...)`, `_base_template_from_payload(...)`, and `update_agent_template(...)`. +- Write paths now reject non-list `actions_to_load` payloads and non-string entries with `ValueError`, while read sanitization still coerces stored values into a safe list of trimmed strings. +- Added a focused functional regression for the sink removal and the shared normalizer, plus a Playwright regression that renders malicious action labels through the actual gallery module. + +## Validation + +### Testing Approach + +- Functional regression: `functional_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py` +- UI regression: `ui_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py` +- Targeted backend compile check: `python -m py_compile application/single_app/functions_agent_templates.py` + +### Expected Results + +- Malicious `actions_to_load` values render as literal text in the gallery. +- The gallery does not create attacker-controlled `img` or `svg` nodes. +- Backend template helpers reject invalid `actions_to_load` write shapes and normalize read output consistently. + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- A stored `actions_to_load` payload could reach the gallery through `innerHTML` and execute in any viewer's browser. +- Invalid `actions_to_load` payload shapes could be coerced inconsistently by create and update code. + +After: + +- The gallery renders `actions_to_load` through text nodes only. +- Shared backend normalization keeps the field shape consistent across read, create, and update flows. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/AUTHORIZATION_STATE_CONFUSION_SETTINGS_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/AUTHORIZATION_STATE_CONFUSION_SETTINGS_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d7088f30f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/AUTHORIZATION_STATE_CONFUSION_SETTINGS_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +# Authorization State Confusion Settings Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.011** + +## Overview + +This follow-up hardening closes the remaining authorization-state confusion gap left after the earlier group and chat authorization fixes. The original execution-verified group prompt exploit path was already closed by the active-group and group-prompt hardening in version **0.241.007**. This version completes the settings-boundary remediation by hardening `activePublicWorkspaceOid` writes, filtering unsupported settings keys, and routing public prompt scope resolution through a shared validator. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.011"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +The application still treated part of the user settings document as an authorization-adjacent state bag: + +- `POST /api/user/settings` accepted `activePublicWorkspaceOid` as a normal settings value and could persist any caller-supplied workspace id without validating that the workspace existed. +- The backend and frontend public-workspace setters used the same unvalidated persistence path. +- The invalid-key check in `/api/user/settings` logged unknown keys but still allowed the original payload shape to flow into the generic settings merge helper. +- Public prompt routes reloaded `activePublicWorkspaceOid` directly from stored settings instead of using a shared active-workspace validator. + +That no longer reproduced the original group prompt exploit, but it preserved the same root-cause pattern: authorization-sensitive state could still bypass centralized validation if a route treated it like an ordinary preference write. + +## Root Cause + +- Authorization-sensitive settings were not handled consistently at the write boundary. +- `activeGroupOid` had a dedicated validator, but `activePublicWorkspaceOid` did not. +- The generic settings route still tolerated unsupported keys after only printing a warning. +- Public workspace routes duplicated active-scope checks instead of sharing a canonical resolver. + +## Technical Changes + +### Active Public Workspace Write Validation + +Changes implemented: + +- Hardened `update_active_public_workspace_for_user(user_id, ws_id)` to normalize the value, allow explicit clearing, and fail closed with `LookupError` when the workspace does not exist. +- Switched the helper to use the live `functions_settings` module object for persistence so the write path does not depend on transitive star imports. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py` + +Security outcome: + +Caller-supplied public workspace ids no longer persist silently when they do not resolve to a real workspace. + +### Shared Active Public Workspace Resolver + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `require_active_public_workspace(user_id, allowed_roles=...)` to re-load the stored active public workspace, verify it still exists, and verify the current user still holds an allowed role. +- Added `_get_active_public_workspace_or_error(user_id)` in the public prompt route module to translate resolver failures into stable `400` / `404` / `403` responses. +- Updated all public prompt CRUD routes to use the shared resolver instead of reading `activePublicWorkspaceOid` directly from raw settings. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_public_prompts.py` + +Security outcome: + +Public prompt operations now depend on a single canonical active-workspace validation path instead of repeated direct settings reads. + +### Settings Route Boundary Hardening + +Changes implemented: + +- Updated `POST /api/user/settings` to route `activePublicWorkspaceOid` through `update_active_public_workspace_for_user(...)`, mirroring the existing `activeGroupOid` handling. +- Updated the invalid-key handling so unsupported settings keys are stripped before persistence and the route returns `400` with `No valid settings keys provided` when nothing valid remains. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_users.py` + +Security outcome: + +The generic settings route no longer blindly merges arbitrary unsupported keys into the persisted user settings document. + +### Setter Route Alignment + +Changes implemented: + +- Updated `PATCH /api/public_workspaces/setActive` to use `update_active_public_workspace_for_user(...)` as the only persistence path. +- Updated `/set_active_public_workspace` to use the same helper instead of writing `activePublicWorkspaceOid` directly through `update_user_settings(...)`. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py` +- `application/single_app/route_frontend_public_workspaces.py` + +Security outcome: + +All current active-public-workspace selection paths now share the same validation boundary before user settings are updated. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_users.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py` +- `application/single_app/route_frontend_public_workspaces.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_public_prompts.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` +- `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py` +- `functional_tests/test_multimedia_support_reorganization.py` + +## Validation + +Testing approach: + +- Extended the existing authorization hardening regression to cover the validated public-workspace write path, shared public prompt resolver adoption, and invalid-key filtering in `/api/user/settings`. +- Updated version-pinned functional tests to the current `config.py` version so the version bump remains internally consistent. +- Validated the touched Python files with targeted compile checks and reran the authorization hardening functional test after each implementation slice. + +Validation performed for this implementation: + +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_users.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_frontend_public_workspaces.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_public_prompts.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- `activePublicWorkspaceOid` could be written through multiple routes without shared validation. +- `/api/user/settings` accepted unsupported keys after only logging a warning. +- Public prompt routes trusted the stored active public workspace setting through direct reads. + +After: + +- Every active-public-workspace setter route uses the same validated helper. +- `/api/user/settings` strips unsupported keys and rejects payloads that contain no valid settings keys. +- Public prompt routes resolve the active public workspace through a shared helper that revalidates existence and access. + +## User Experience Impact + +Normal valid workspace selection and prompt flows stay the same. The visible behavior changes are the intended secure outcomes: + +- Invalid public workspace ids now fail with `404` instead of being silently stored. +- Unsupported settings payloads now fail with `400` when they contain no valid settings keys. +- Public prompt routes now return the expected scoped `400` / `404` / `403` responses when the stored active workspace is missing, stale, or unauthorized. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_IDOR_HARDENING_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_IDOR_HARDENING_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3d546eab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_IDOR_HARDENING_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +# Broken Access Control IDOR Hardening Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.010** + +## Overview + +This fix closes three authenticated broken-access-control paths that remained open after the earlier authorization hardening pass: + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.010"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +The application authenticated users at route entry, but later code paths still trusted identifiers supplied by the client request or by the LLM tool call. That created three horizontal authorization gaps: + +- `/api/chat` and `/api/chat/stream` could read and continue another user's conversation when the caller knew its id. +- Tabular blob resolution could be steered toward another scope by forged tool-call parameters. +- Fact-memory reads and writes could be redirected to another user's or group's partition by forged tool-call parameters. + +## Root Cause + +- Route entry authentication was present. +- Sensitive later-stage operations reused caller-controlled identifiers. +- Server-side code treated prompt or tool-call arguments as if they were authorization decisions. +- Plugin execution relied on prompt guidance rather than a canonical request-scoped authorization context. + +## Technical Changes + +### Personal Conversation Ownership Enforcement + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `_authorize_personal_conversation_access(...)` to load a personal conversation and fail closed when the current user does not own it. +- Added `_create_personal_conversation(...)` and `_resolve_or_create_authorized_personal_conversation(...)` so new conversations are created server-side only when the request did not supply an id. +- Updated `/api/chat` to return `404` for unknown caller-supplied conversation ids and `403` for foreign conversations instead of creating a replacement conversation under the attacker-controlled id. +- Updated `/api/chat/stream` to authorize a caller-supplied conversation id before `CHAT_STREAM_REGISTRY.start_session(...)` is created. +- Updated the streaming generator to reuse the same ownership check before loading an existing conversation. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` + +Security outcome: + +Personal chat requests can no longer read from or write into another user's conversation by supplying a foreign `conversation_id`. + +### Canonical Chat Scope Filtering + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `_normalize_requested_scope_ids(...)` and `_get_authorized_chat_scope_context(...)`. +- Filtered `active_group_id`, `active_group_ids`, `active_public_workspace_id`, and `active_public_workspace_ids` to the current user's real access at request entry. +- Removed the prior fallback that restored the raw request `active_group_id` when the validated list was empty. +- Reused the same scope-filtering helper inside `revalidate_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters(...)` so request-entry scope filtering and fallback-history scope filtering now follow the same authorization boundary. +- Added `_set_authorized_chat_request_context(...)` to persist the canonical user, conversation, group, public workspace, and fact-memory scope context for downstream plugin authorization. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` + +Security outcome: + +Caller-controlled scope ids no longer survive request normalization when the caller lacks access to those scopes. + +### Tabular Processing Plugin Scope Binding + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `_get_authorized_chat_context(...)` and `_resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(...)` to `TabularProcessingPlugin`. +- Bound tabular tool execution to the authenticated request user and authorized conversation context. +- Rejected forged `group_id` and `public_workspace_id` values that are not currently authorized for the user. +- Stopped trusting remembered blob-path overrides unless the remembered blob location still resolves inside the current request's authorized scope. +- Updated `list_tabular_files(...)` to fail closed when the request tries to enumerate an unauthorized group or public workspace. +- Updated `_resolve_blob_location_with_fallback(...)` so all blob reads now pass through the request-scoped authorization boundary before blob existence checks or downloads begin. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/tabular_processing_plugin.py` + +Security outcome: + +Tabular tool calls can no longer pivot into another user's workspace, another conversation's chat upload path, another group's blob prefix, or another public workspace's blob prefix by forging tool-call scope parameters. + +### Fact Memory Plugin Scope Binding + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `_get_authorized_fact_memory_scope(...)` and `_resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call(...)` to `FactMemoryPlugin`. +- Derived the fact-memory scope from the canonical request authorization context instead of the LLM tool call. +- Updated `set_fact(...)`, `update_fact(...)`, `delete_fact(...)`, and `get_facts(...)` to use only the authorized request scope when calling `FactMemoryStore`. +- Overrode forged `scope_id`, `scope_type`, and `conversation_id` values with the request-authorized values and logged the mismatch for diagnostics. + +Files involved: + +- `application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/fact_memory_plugin.py` + +Security outcome: + +Fact memory can no longer be read, written, updated, or deleted across users or groups by forging tool-call scope ids. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` +- `application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/tabular_processing_plugin.py` +- `application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/fact_memory_plugin.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` + +## Validation + +Testing approach: + +- Extended the existing security authorization regression test to cover personal conversation ownership enforcement, request-entry scope canonicalization, tabular plugin request-scope binding, fact-memory request-scope binding, and the new fix document/version target. +- Validated the touched Python files with targeted `py_compile` runs during implementation. + +Validation performed for this implementation: + +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/tabular_processing_plugin.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/fact_memory_plugin.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- `/api/chat` and `/api/chat/stream` trusted caller-supplied personal conversation ids. +- Request scope normalization could still preserve raw single-value group or public workspace ids. +- Tabular tool calls trusted prompt-controlled scope ids for blob resolution. +- Fact-memory tool calls trusted prompt-controlled scope ids for Cosmos partition access. + +After: + +- Personal conversation access is bound to the authenticated owner. +- Request scope ids are canonicalized against current group membership and visible public workspace access before downstream processing. +- Tabular blob access is bound to the canonical request user and currently authorized group/public scopes. +- Fact-memory access is bound to the canonical request scope. + +## User Experience Impact + +Normal authorized chat, tabular analysis, and fact-memory behavior stays the same. The visible changes are the expected security-correct outcomes: + +- Unauthorized personal conversation ids now fail with `403` or `404`. +- Unauthorized group and public workspace scope ids are dropped from chat request context. +- Unauthorized tabular tool calls return a scoped authorization error instead of silently reading another scope. +- Fact-memory tool calls now operate only on the caller's authorized scope. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CHAT_SCOPE_LOCK_AND_CONVERSATION_DETAILS_XSS_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CHAT_SCOPE_LOCK_AND_CONVERSATION_DETAILS_XSS_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4f3b3bcbc --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CHAT_SCOPE_LOCK_AND_CONVERSATION_DETAILS_XSS_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +# Chat Scope-Lock And Conversation Details XSS Fix + +Fixed in version: **0.241.019** + +## Issue + +Stored group and public workspace names, along with conversation metadata fields, were being inserted into chat modal HTML with raw string interpolation. A malicious workspace name or metadata value could render executable markup in the scope-lock picker or the conversation-details modal. + +## Root Cause + +The affected chat renderers mixed trusted static markup with untrusted names and metadata inside template-string HTML. The scope-lock modal built list items with raw `${name}` interpolation, and the conversation-details modal rendered multiple metadata fields and source links without consistently escaping or normalizing them. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-documents.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-conversation-details.js` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py` +- `ui_tests/test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py` + +## Code Changes Summary + +- Replaced the scope-lock modal workspace list HTML assembly with DOM node creation and `textContent` assignment. +- Escaped dynamic conversation-details fields before they are injected into modal HTML. +- Normalized web source links so only valid `http` and `https` URLs remain clickable. +- Added focused functional and UI regressions for both modal surfaces. + +## Testing Approach + +- Functional regression: `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py` +- UI regression: `ui_tests/test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py` +- Targeted diagnostics on both touched chat modules after editing. + +## Impact + +- Workspace names, conversation titles, participant labels, document labels, semantic tags, scope-lock names, and summary metadata now render as inert text in the affected chat modals. +- Unsafe web source payloads no longer create clickable `javascript:` links. + +## Validation + +- Before: malicious workspace names and conversation metadata could create executable DOM in chat modal surfaces. +- After: the same values are encoded before rendering, and non-HTTP web sources are downgraded to plain text. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CHAT_SELECTED_DOCUMENT_METADATA_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CHAT_SELECTED_DOCUMENT_METADATA_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aec2717a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CHAT_SELECTED_DOCUMENT_METADATA_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +# Chat Selected Document Metadata Authorization Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.017** + +## Overview + +This fix closes finding **f046** for chat-selected document metadata resolution. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.017"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +- `/api/chat` accepted a caller-selected document id and looked up document metadata by raw id in the requested container. +- `/api/chat/stream` repeated the same raw lookup path. +- The selected tabular document helper in `route_backend_chats.py` also resolved explicit document selections by raw id across all-scope containers. +- That allowed document name and filename metadata from unauthorized personal, group, or public documents to enter chat metadata and tabular analysis context when the caller knew the document id. + +## Root Cause Analysis + +Authentication existed at route entry, but selected-document metadata resolution was not itself an authorization boundary. + +- Personal selected documents were not constrained to the caller's owner or shared-user access. +- Group selected documents were not constrained to the caller's active authorized groups. +- Public selected documents were not constrained to the caller's visible public workspaces. +- Three separate selected-document lookup sites could drift because they did not share one scope-aware resolver. + +## Technical Details + +### Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py` +- `functional_tests/test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py` + +### Code Changes Summary + +- Added `_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata(...)` in `route_backend_chats.py`. +- Personal document resolution now allows only: + - owner access via `c.user_id = @user_id` + - direct shared-user access via `ARRAY_CONTAINS(c.shared_user_ids, @user_id)` + - prefixed shared-user access via `STARTSWITH(s, @user_id_prefix)` +- Group document resolution now allows only: + - direct group ownership via `c.group_id = @group_id` + - raw shared-group entries via `ARRAY_CONTAINS(c.shared_group_ids, @group_id)` + - approved shared-group entries via `ARRAY_CONTAINS(c.shared_group_ids, @group_id_approved)` +- Public document resolution now allows only documents in authorized visible public workspace ids. +- Rewired `/api/chat`, `/api/chat/stream`, and `get_selected_workspace_tabular_file_contexts(...)` to use the shared resolver instead of raw id-only Cosmos lookups. +- Updated the existing tabular all-scope regression to pass authorized group and public workspace ids into the selected-document helper path. + +## Validation + +### Testing Approach + +- Extended the existing all-scope tabular regression so it exercises the new authorization-aware selected-document path. +- Added a focused functional regression for personal foreign denial, personal shared allow, group raw shared allow, group approved shared allow, public visible allow, and public hidden deny. +- Validated the touched chat route module with targeted compile checks. + +### Validation Results + +- `python -m pytest functional_tests/test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py -q` +- `python -m pytest functional_tests/test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py -q` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` +- `python -m py_compile functional_tests/test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py` +- `python -m py_compile functional_tests/test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py` + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- Selected document metadata lookups trusted caller-supplied document ids after authentication. +- Unauthorized document titles and filenames could be resolved into chat metadata or selected tabular context if the caller knew the document id. + +After: + +- Selected document metadata resolution is scoped to the caller's authorized personal, group, or public access. +- Chat and streaming metadata enrichment plus the selected tabular helper now share the same authorization-aware resolver. + +## User Experience Impact + +Authorized selected documents continue to work as before. The visible behavior change is the intended secure outcome: unauthorized selected document ids no longer resolve metadata into chat state or tabular analysis context. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CITATION_AND_FILE_MODAL_FILENAME_XSS_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CITATION_AND_FILE_MODAL_FILENAME_XSS_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f2a62a13 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CITATION_AND_FILE_MODAL_FILENAME_XSS_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# CITATION_AND_FILE_MODAL_FILENAME_XSS_FIX.md + +# Citation And File Modal Filename XSS Fix + +Fixed in version: **0.241.018** + +## Issue Description + +Chat citation and uploaded-file popups built their modal header markup with attacker-controlled filenames on first render. The follow-up update path already used `textContent`, but the initial `innerHTML` assignment still allowed stored filename payloads to break into executable HTML. + +## Root Cause Analysis + +- `chat-citations.js` interpolated `fileName` directly inside the initial citation modal `
    ` element. +- `chat-input-actions.js` interpolated `filename` directly inside the initial uploaded-file modal `
    ` element. +- Both modals only switched to `textContent` on later renders, leaving the first open vulnerable. + +## Technical Details + +### Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-citations.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js` +- `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_modal_filename_fix.py` +- `ui_tests/test_chat_modal_filename_escaping.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` + +### Code Changes Summary + +- Replaced first-render filename interpolation in the citation modal shell with an empty title element. +- Replaced first-render filename interpolation in the uploaded-file modal shell with an empty title element. +- Set both modal titles after creation with `textContent` so attacker-controlled filenames stay inert on the initial display as well as subsequent displays. +- Added functional and Playwright regression coverage for both modal title flows. + +### Testing Approach + +- Functional regression coverage verifies the first-render modal HTML no longer contains inline filename interpolation and that both flows use `textContent` for title updates. +- UI regression coverage loads the chat page, calls the affected modal functions with malicious filenames, and confirms the payloads render as text with no injected DOM nodes or script execution. + +## Impact Analysis + +- Normal citation and uploaded-file modal titles continue to render the same user-visible text. +- The fix only changes how the modal title is populated; modal behavior and download actions are otherwise unchanged. + +## Validation + +### Before + +- Opening a citation or uploaded-file popup for the first time could inject a malicious filename into modal header HTML. + +### After + +- Both modal shells are static on first render. +- Both modal titles populate through `textContent`, keeping malicious filenames inert on every open. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CONTROL_CENTER_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_MEMBERS_XSS_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CONTROL_CENTER_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_MEMBERS_XSS_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a618304e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/CONTROL_CENTER_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_MEMBERS_XSS_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +# Control Center Public Workspace Members XSS Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.016** + +## Overview + +This fix closes finding `f008`, a stored XSS in the Control Center public workspace members modal. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.016"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +- The Control Center members modal loaded workspace member records from `/api/admin/control-center/public-workspaces//members`. +- `WorkspaceManager.loadWorkspaceMembers()` rendered `member.displayName` and `member.email` into `row.innerHTML` without escaping. +- A low-privilege authenticated user could persist malicious member metadata through public workspace membership flows and later trigger script execution when an admin opened the members modal. + +## Root Cause Analysis + +- The modal renderer treated stored member identity fields as trusted HTML. +- The same module already had safe rendering patterns using `textContent` and `escapeHtml()`, but this modal path still used direct HTML interpolation. +- The backend returns member metadata verbatim from storage, so the browser renderer must treat those values as untrusted input. + +## Technical Details + +### Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/static/js/workspace-manager.js` +- `ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` + +### Code Changes Summary + +- Replaced the vulnerable `row.innerHTML` path in `WorkspaceManager.loadWorkspaceMembers()` with explicit DOM node creation. +- Bound `displayName` and `email` through `textContent`, which keeps stored markup inert. +- Preserved the existing role badge mapping and styling by continuing to use the local `roleConfig` map for trusted badge classes and text. +- Added a focused Playwright regression that injects malicious member `displayName` and `email` payloads into the members modal API response and verifies they render as literal text instead of executable DOM. + +### Impact Analysis + +This is a narrow browser-side fix. It does not change authorization, persistence, or the members API contract. It only hardens how existing member metadata is rendered into the Control Center modal. + +## Validation + +### Testing Approach + +- Validated the changed JavaScript file with workspace diagnostics. +- Added a focused UI regression for the exact modal and payload shape involved in the finding. +- Recompiled the new UI test file and the version-updated `config.py` with `py_compile`. +- Ran the new UI regression and the adjacent Control Center escaping regressions. + +### Validation Results + +- `python -m py_compile ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py application/single_app/config.py` +- `pytest ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py -q` +- `pytest ui_tests/test_control_center_group_members_escaping.py ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py -q` + +The UI tests skipped in the current environment because the authenticated UI test variables were not set, which is the expected fallback behavior for these Playwright checks. + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- Stored member `displayName` and `email` values were inserted into the modal row with `innerHTML`. +- Malicious payloads such as `` or `` could become real DOM nodes in an admin session. + +After: + +- The members modal renders member identity fields with DOM text nodes only. +- Stored markup is displayed as text and no longer becomes executable DOM inside the Control Center members modal. + +## User Experience Improvements + +Administrators still see the same member names, emails, and role badges in the modal. Suspicious markup now renders as text instead of executing in the browser. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/FEEDBACK_AND_PLUGIN_LOG_ACCESS_CONTROL_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/FEEDBACK_AND_PLUGIN_LOG_ACCESS_CONTROL_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7819e0b42 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/FEEDBACK_AND_PLUGIN_LOG_ACCESS_CONTROL_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +# Feedback And Plugin Log Access Control Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.013** + +## Overview + +This change closes two authenticated access-control gaps in the user feedback and plugin logging surfaces. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.013"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +### Feedback Submission Ownership Enforcement (`f038`) + +- `POST /feedback/submit` accepted caller-supplied `conversationId` and `messageId` values. +- The route queried the message container by that conversation id without checking whether the authenticated user owned the target conversation. +- When the target assistant message was found, the route copied prompt and response content into a new feedback row under the attacker's user id. +- The copied content could later be read back through the user's own feedback listing. + +### Plugin Log Clear Authorization (`f039`) + +- `POST /api/plugins/clear-logs` was protected only by authentication. +- Any authenticated user could trigger `clear_history()` on the shared in-memory plugin invocation logger. +- That wiped the global plugin invocation history for all users instead of only the caller's data. + +## Root Cause + +- Route entry authentication existed, but object-level or role-based authorization at the sensitive operation boundary was missing. +- The feedback route trusted caller-controlled identifiers after login. +- The plugin log clear route relied on a comment noting admin-only intent, but did not enforce the required admin role. + +## Technical Changes + +### Feedback Conversation Authorization + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `_authorize_feedback_conversation(...)` to `application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py`. +- The helper loads the target personal conversation and fails closed when the current user does not own it. +- `feedback_submit()` now returns `404` for missing conversations and `403` for foreign-owned conversations before any message query runs. + +Security outcome: + +Feedback submission is now bound to the authenticated user's own conversation scope. + +### Feedback Target Message Validation + +Changes implemented: + +- `feedback_submit()` now requires the target assistant message to exist inside the authorized conversation. +- Missing assistant messages now return `404` instead of falling through to placeholder text and feedback persistence. +- Feedback rows are no longer written when the target conversation or assistant message is invalid. + +Security outcome: + +The route no longer creates cross-tenant or invalid feedback records that can later surface copied content in the caller's feedback history. + +### Plugin Clear-Logs Admin Gate + +Changes implemented: + +- Imported `admin_required` in `application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py`. +- Added `@admin_required` to `clear_plugin_logs()` while preserving the existing `@login_required` and Swagger decorator chain. +- The success response and App Insights logging remain unchanged for authorized administrators. + +Security outcome: + +Only administrators can clear the shared plugin invocation history. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py` +- `application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_feedback_submission_authorization.py` +- `functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py` + +## Validation + +Testing approach: + +- Added an isolated feedback authorization regression using fake Cosmos containers and a Flask test app. +- Added an isolated plugin logging authorization regression using a fake shared logger and a Flask test app. +- Recompiled the touched Python modules and new functional tests with `py_compile`. + +Validation performed for this implementation: + +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py` +- `python -m py_compile functional_tests/test_feedback_submission_authorization.py` +- `python -m py_compile functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_feedback_submission_authorization.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py` + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- Authenticated users could submit feedback against a foreign conversation and persist copied prompt and response content into their own feedback history. +- Any authenticated user could clear the shared plugin invocation history. + +After: + +- Feedback submission now requires ownership of the target conversation and existence of the target assistant message before a feedback row is created. +- `clear-logs` now requires the `Admin` role and preserves the prior `401` contract for unauthenticated requests. + +## User Experience Impact + +Normal feedback submission and admin plugin log maintenance continue to work. The visible changes are the expected secure outcomes: + +- Users now receive `403` or `404` responses when they try to submit feedback for a conversation or assistant message they do not legitimately own. +- Non-admin users now receive `403 Forbidden` when they attempt to clear plugin logs. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/KEY_VAULT_PLUGIN_SECRET_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/KEY_VAULT_PLUGIN_SECRET_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..784bb03ad --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/KEY_VAULT_PLUGIN_SECRET_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +# Key Vault Plugin Secret Scope Enforcement Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.011** + +## Header Information + +Issue description: +This fix closes a broken-access-control path where plugin-related Key Vault secret references were treated as valid based on format alone. An authenticated user could submit or retain a full secret name from another scope, and later runtime/plugin flows could resolve or delete that foreign secret through the application's Key Vault identity. + +Root cause analysis: +The plugin Key Vault helpers validated only the `{scope_value}--{source}--{scope}--{name}` format and did not verify that the provided reference matched the caller's expected scope and source. The runtime plugin loader and SQL test-connection flow also dereferenced stored secret names without checking ownership context first. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` was updated to `VERSION = "0.241.011"` for this fix. + +## Technical Details + +Files modified: +- `application/single_app/functions_keyvault.py` +- `application/single_app/semantic_kernel_loader.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_plugins.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py` + +Code changes summary: +- Added explicit parsing for dynamic Key Vault secret references and a shared scope/source matcher in `functions_keyvault.py`. +- Hardened plugin save-time handling so user-supplied full secret names are preserved only when they match the expected plugin scope and source. +- Prevented poisoned existing references from surviving an edit round-trip through the `Stored_In_KeyVault` trigger path unless they still match the expected context. +- Hardened plugin delete-time cleanup so mismatched stored references are logged and skipped instead of being deleted through the app Key Vault identity. +- Added `resolve_secret_reference_for_context(...)` and reused it for scope-aware resolution. +- Hardened `resolve_key_vault_secrets_in_plugins(...)` so runtime plugin loading resolves only plugin secret-bearing fields and blanks fields whose references fail scope validation instead of dereferencing them. +- Hardened `_resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test(...)` so SQL connection tests resolve only same-scope `action-addset` secrets. + +Testing approach: +- Added a focused functional regression test covering secret-reference parsing, save-time rejection of cross-scope references, runtime loader non-resolution, SQL test-route scope binding, delete-path scope checks, and the versioned fix-document target. +- Validated the touched Python modules with targeted `py_compile` runs after each implementation slice. + +Impact analysis: +This change is narrow and low-risk for legitimate plugin flows because it does not change how unrelated global or infrastructure secrets are retrieved. It only tightens plugin secret preservation, resolution, and deletion to the scope already known by the surrounding action/plugin helpers. + +## Validation + +Test results: +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/functions_keyvault.py application/single_app/semantic_kernel_loader.py application/single_app/route_backend_plugins.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py` + +Before/after comparison: +- Before: a well-formed full secret name from another user, group, or global scope could be stored or retained in a plugin manifest and later be resolved or deleted via the application's Key Vault identity. +- After: plugin secret references must match the expected scope and source before they are preserved, resolved, or deleted, and runtime/plugin test flows fail closed when they encounter a mismatched stored reference. + +User experience improvements: +Legitimate stored plugin secrets continue to work. When a stored reference is no longer valid for the current scope, the app now asks the user to re-enter the secret instead of silently dereferencing or deleting the wrong Key Vault secret. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/LOG_ANALYTICS_PLUGIN_USER_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/LOG_ANALYTICS_PLUGIN_USER_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..50da455ab --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/LOG_ANALYTICS_PLUGIN_USER_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +# Log Analytics Plugin User Scope Enforcement Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.012** + +## Header Information + +Issue description: +This fix closes a broken-access-control path where the Log Analytics plugin exposed a caller-controlled `user_id` parameter for query-history reads and writes. In the affected flow, an LLM-chosen `user_id` could be forwarded into `get_user_settings(...)` and `update_user_settings(...)`, enabling cross-user query-history access and writes. + +Root cause analysis: +The plugin schema and Python method signatures treated `user_id` as a tool-call argument instead of binding it to the authenticated session on the server. The shared user-settings helpers also had no default request-time cross-user authorization check, so any caller that passed another user's id could read or write that user's settings document unless the route performed its own guard. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` was updated to `VERSION = "0.241.012"` for this fix. + +## Technical Details + +Files modified: +- `application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/log_analytics_plugin.py` +- `application/single_app/functions_settings.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_log_analytics_plugin_user_scope_enforcement.py` +- `functional_tests/test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py` +- `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` +- `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py` +- `functional_tests/test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py` +- `functional_tests/test_multimedia_support_reorganization.py` + +Code changes summary: +- Removed `user_id` from the Log Analytics plugin metadata and method signatures for `run_query(...)` and `get_query_history(...)`. +- Added `_get_authenticated_history_user_id()` so query-history persistence and reads resolve the authenticated user on the server instead of trusting tool-call parameters. +- Added `_authorize_user_settings_access(...)` and `_should_sync_session_profile(...)` in `functions_settings.py`. +- Hardened `get_user_settings(...)` and `update_user_settings(...)` with an explicit `allow_cross_user=False` default and request-time cross-user denial. +- Prevented cross-user `get_user_settings(...)` calls from mutating the target document with the current session user's email, display name, or profile image. +- Updated the reviewed Control Center admin paths to use `allow_cross_user=True` explicitly for legitimate administrative writes. + +Testing approach: +- Added a focused functional regression test covering Log Analytics tool-surface removal of `user_id`, shared-helper default-deny behavior, explicit Control Center bypass call sites, and the versioned fix-document target. +- Recompiled the touched Python modules after each edit slice to catch parse errors in the plugin and helper layers. + +Impact analysis: +Normal self-scoped settings reads and writes are unchanged. The only behavior change is that cross-user settings access now requires an explicit opt-in at reviewed privileged call sites. For the Log Analytics plugin, query history remains available to the authenticated user, but the model can no longer steer reads or writes into another user's settings document. + +## Validation + +Test results: +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/log_analytics_plugin.py application/single_app/functions_settings.py application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_log_analytics_plugin_user_scope_enforcement.py` + +Before/after comparison: +- Before: the Log Analytics plugin exposed `user_id` in its tool surface, and shared settings helpers allowed cross-user reads/writes when called with another user's id. +- After: the plugin binds query history to the authenticated user, shared settings helpers default-deny cross-user request-time access, and the reviewed Control Center admin flows opt into a privileged bypass explicitly. + +User experience improvements: +Regular users continue to see their own Log Analytics query history with no prompt changes required. Administrative settings operations still work, but the privilege boundary is now explicit in code instead of being implicit and easy to reuse accidentally. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_AUTHORIZATION_FOLLOW_UP_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_AUTHORIZATION_FOLLOW_UP_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc69e722c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_AUTHORIZATION_FOLLOW_UP_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +# Personal Conversation Authorization Follow-Up Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.012** + +## Overview + +This follow-up hardening closes the remaining personal-conversation authorization gaps that were still open after the earlier read-side fix. The prior change blocked unauthorized message and image reads in the backend conversation API. This pass extends the same ownership boundary to conversation deletion, file-content retrieval, frontend conversation rendering, and the browser-side error path that now receives explicit authorization failures. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.012"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +Several personal-conversation routes still trusted a caller-supplied `conversation_id` after authentication: + +- `DELETE /api/conversations/` could still delete a foreign conversation if the caller knew its id. +- `POST /api/get_file_content` verified that a conversation existed, but not that the authenticated user owned it. +- `GET /conversation/` and `GET /conversation//messages` still rendered personal conversation data in the frontend route module without an ownership check. +- Once the frontend message route starts returning real `403` and `404` responses, the browser chat loader also needs to handle those non-success payloads explicitly instead of assuming a `messages` array is always present. + +## Root Cause + +- Route entry authentication was present. +- Multiple personal-conversation flows still treated the conversation id as sufficient authorization. +- The backend and frontend route modules enforced ownership inconsistently. +- The browser loader assumed success JSON even when the server now correctly returns authorization failures. + +## Technical Changes + +### Conversation Delete Authorization + +Changes implemented: + +- Updated `delete_conversation(...)` in `application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py` to resolve the current user before any destructive work begins. +- Reused the existing local conversation-authorization helper in that module so ownership is verified before message deletion, thought deletion, archival, or conversation deletion executes. +- Preserved the existing not-found response shape and added an explicit `403 Forbidden` response for foreign conversations. + +Security outcome: + +Authenticated users can no longer delete another user's personal conversation by supplying a foreign conversation id. + +### File Content Authorization + +Changes implemented: + +- Updated `get_file_content(...)` in `application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py` to verify `conversation_item['user_id'] == user_id` before querying message content or reading blob-backed file data. +- Preserved the existing `404` contract for missing conversations and added an explicit `403 Forbidden` response for foreign conversations. + +Security outcome: + +Authenticated users can no longer retrieve another user's uploaded chat file content by supplying a foreign conversation id and file id. + +### Frontend Conversation Route Authorization + +Changes implemented: + +- Added a small local helper in `application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py` to load a personal conversation and enforce ownership. +- Updated both `view_conversation(...)` and `get_conversation_messages(...)` to fail closed for foreign conversations before rendering HTML or returning JSON. +- Preserved the route-appropriate response shapes: `404` for missing conversations and `403` for foreign conversations. + +Security outcome: + +The live chat UI can no longer render another user's personal conversation through the frontend route module when the caller knows the conversation id. + +### Chat Loader Error Handling + +Changes implemented: + +- Updated `loadMessages(...)` in `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-messages.js` to parse the response payload first, check `response.ok`, and surface controlled error states for `403` and `404` responses. +- Added user-facing messages for forbidden and missing conversations and escaped the rendered error text before injecting it into the chat panel. + +User experience outcome: + +When the server correctly rejects a foreign or missing conversation, the browser now shows a controlled message instead of failing on a missing `data.messages` payload. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py` +- `application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py` +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-messages.js` +- `functional_tests/test_personal_conversation_followup_authorization.py` +- `ui_tests/test_chat_messages_authorization_error.py` + +## Validation + +Testing approach: + +- Added a focused functional regression that verifies foreign delete, file-content, and frontend conversation reads fail closed while owner flows still work. +- Added a focused UI regression that stubs a forbidden conversation-message response and verifies the chat loader renders the expected error state. +- Validated the touched Python files with targeted `py_compile` runs after implementation. + +Validation performed for this implementation: + +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_personal_conversation_followup_authorization.py` + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- Foreign users could still delete personal conversations. +- Foreign users could still retrieve chat file content. +- Frontend personal-conversation routes still rendered data based only on the conversation id. +- The browser loader assumed message-route success and could not present a controlled error state for authorization failures. + +After: + +- Personal conversation deletion is bound to the authenticated owner. +- Chat file-content retrieval is bound to the authenticated owner. +- Frontend personal-conversation rendering now enforces the same ownership boundary as the backend. +- The browser handles `403` and `404` message-load failures with a controlled, escaped error state. + +## User Experience Impact + +Normal owner access stays the same. The visible changes are the expected secure outcomes: + +- Foreign delete and file-content requests now return `403`. +- Frontend conversation routes now return `403` for foreign conversations instead of rendering data. +- The chat UI now displays a clear access-denied or not-found message when a conversation cannot be loaded. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_READ_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_READ_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f42a69ecc --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_READ_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +# Personal Conversation Read Authorization Fix + +Finding reference: **f024** — `GET /api/get_messages` returns full message history of any conversation without ownership check. + +## Overview + +This fix closes an authenticated broken-object-level-authorization gap in the personal conversation read APIs and hardens the adjacent image retrieval path that exposed the same conversation data boundary. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.011"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +- `GET /api/get_messages` trusted the caller-supplied `conversation_id`, loaded the conversation record, and returned the full message history without confirming that the authenticated user owned that conversation. +- `GET /api/image/` reconstructed `conversation_id` from `image_id` and served image content from that conversation without an ownership check. +- Both routes were protected only by authentication and role decorators, which do not provide object-level authorization for a specific conversation resource. +- This note tracks the execution-verified remediation for the adjacent image-read path hardened in the same change set. + +## Root Cause + +- Route entry authentication was present. +- The read handlers trusted conversation identifiers derived from request input. +- Existing sibling handlers in the same route module enforced `conversation_item['user_id'] == user_id`, but these two read paths omitted that check. + +## Technical Changes + +### Personal Conversation Read Authorization Helper + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `_authorize_personal_conversation_read(...)` to `route_backend_conversations.py`. +- The helper loads the personal conversation and fails closed when the current user does not own it. +- The helper returns a `LookupError` for missing conversations and a `PermissionError` for foreign-owned conversations so the caller can preserve endpoint-specific response contracts. + +Security outcome: + +Personal conversation reads now pass through a single explicit ownership gate before any message or image query executes. + +### Message History Authorization + +Changes implemented: + +- Updated `api_get_messages` to authorize the conversation before querying `cosmos_messages_container`. +- Foreign conversation access now returns `403 Forbidden`. +- Missing conversations preserve the prior empty-message payload contract. + +Security outcome: + +Authenticated users can no longer read another user's personal chat transcript by supplying a leaked `conversation_id`. + +### Image Retrieval Authorization + +Changes implemented: + +- Updated `api_get_image` to authorize the reconstructed `conversation_id` before querying image records. +- Foreign conversation image reads now return `403 Forbidden`. +- Missing conversations and missing images continue to return `404` for that endpoint. + +Security outcome: + +Authenticated users can no longer fetch inline or chunked image content from another user's personal conversation by supplying a foreign image id. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py` +- `functional_tests/test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` + +## Validation + +Testing approach: + +- Added a focused functional regression that registers the conversation routes with in-memory containers and verifies owner success plus foreign-user `403` behavior for both message and image read paths. +- Verified that foreign requests fail before the message container is queried. +- Preserved the legacy missing-conversation and missing-image response contracts in the regression coverage. + +Validation performed for this implementation: + +- `python functional_tests/test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py` +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py` +- `python -m py_compile functional_tests/test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py` \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PLUGIN_LOG_RECENT_INVOCATIONS_ADMIN_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PLUGIN_LOG_RECENT_INVOCATIONS_ADMIN_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..355d93d0a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PLUGIN_LOG_RECENT_INVOCATIONS_ADMIN_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +# Plugin Log Recent Invocations Admin Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.014** + +## Overview + +This follow-up hardening closes the adjacent plugin logging route that still exposed cross-user invocation history behind authentication only. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` now reports `VERSION = "0.241.014"` for this fix. + +## Issue Description + +- `GET /api/plugins/invocations/recent` returned the most recent plugin invocations across all users. +- The route was documented in code as admin-only, but it was protected only by `@login_required`. +- Any authenticated non-admin user could read recent cross-user plugin invocation data if they knew the endpoint existed. + +## Root Cause + +- Route entry authentication existed. +- The destructive `clear-logs` path was hardened, but the adjacent cross-user read path still relied on an inline comment instead of an enforced admin-role check. + +## Technical Changes + +### Admin Gate For Recent Invocation Feed + +Changes implemented: + +- Added `@admin_required` to `get_recent_invocations()` in `application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py`. +- Preserved the existing `@login_required` behavior so unauthenticated requests still receive `401 Unauthorized`. +- Left the successful admin response shape unchanged. + +Security outcome: + +Only administrators can access the cross-user recent invocation feed. + +### Focused Regression Coverage + +Changes implemented: + +- Extended `functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py` to cover both plugin logging admin-only endpoints. +- Added coverage for unauthenticated `401`, non-admin `403`, and admin `200` behavior on `/api/plugins/invocations/recent`. +- Verified non-admin requests fail before the logger's `get_recent_invocations()` method is called. + +Security outcome: + +The plugin logging admin surface now has regression coverage for both the shared clear operation and the shared recent-history feed. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py` +- `functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` + +## Validation + +Testing approach: + +- Recompiled the hardened route and the extended regression test. +- Executed the focused plugin logging admin authorization regression after the route change and again after the version and documentation updates. + +Validation performed for this implementation: + +- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_plugin_logging.py` +- `python -m py_compile functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py` +- `python functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py` + +## Before And After + +Before: + +- Any authenticated user could read the cross-user recent invocation feed. +- The route's admin-only intent existed only as a comment. + +After: + +- Unauthenticated requests still return `401 Unauthorized`. +- Non-admin authenticated users now receive `403 Forbidden`. +- Administrators retain access to the recent shared invocation feed. + +## User Experience Impact + +Normal admin troubleshooting flows remain unchanged. The visible change is the expected secure outcome: non-admin users can no longer access the cross-user recent plugin invocation history. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_DETAILS_DISCLOSURE_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_DETAILS_DISCLOSURE_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..33d64be0d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_DETAILS_DISCLOSURE_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +# Public Workspace Details Disclosure Fix + +## Overview + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.013** + +This fix closes an authorization disclosure in `GET /api/public_workspaces/` where any authenticated user could receive the full Cosmos DB workspace document. The route now returns a role-aware projection instead of the raw document. + +## Issue Description + +Non-member callers could enumerate public workspace ids through the discovery flow and then request the workspace details endpoint to receive sensitive fields that were meant to stay restricted to workspace members or managers. + +Affected data included: + +* `pendingDocumentManagers` +* `admins` +* `documentManagers` +* `metrics` +* owner and manager email data beyond what the public directory needed + +## Root Cause Analysis + +The backend route returned `jsonify(ws)` directly from the stored Cosmos DB document. That bypassed the more restrictive role checks already used elsewhere in the same module for pending requests, workspace statistics, and member management. + +The public directory only needed a small public subset of the workspace record, but the shared route contract had grown into a raw document read without response shaping. + +## Technical Details + +### Files Modified + +* `application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py` +* `application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py` +* `application/single_app/static/js/public/manage_public_workspace.js` +* `application/single_app/static/js/public/public_directory.js` +* `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` +* `application/single_app/config.py` + +### Code Changes Summary + +* Added explicit response-shaping helpers for public workspace details. +* Updated `GET /api/public_workspaces/` to return: + * a public-safe summary for non-members + * a member payload for `Owner`, `Admin`, and `DocumentManager` callers +* Added `userRole` and `isMember` to the member-facing contract so the manage page no longer infers permissions from raw `admins` or `documentManagers` arrays. +* Updated the public directory to use owner display name only instead of falling back to owner email. +* Added a regression test to lock down the projected payload and prevent a return to `jsonify(ws)`. + +### Impact Analysis + +* Non-members can still view public workspace summary information needed by the public directory and landing page flows. +* Member-only data such as `pendingDocumentManagers` is no longer disclosed to non-members. +* Existing member workflows continue to work through the explicit `userRole` contract. + +## Validation + +### Testing Approach + +* Updated `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` to validate the projected response shape. +* Confirmed that the shared authorization hardening test still covers the separate history-grounded fallback protections in chat routes. + +### Expected Results + +* Non-members receive only public workspace summary fields. +* Members receive the fields needed by the manage page, including `userRole`. +* Sensitive manager-only arrays and metrics are absent from non-member responses. + +## Related References + +* Functional regression: `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` +* Backend route: `application/single_app/route_backend_public_workspaces.py` +* Shared helpers: `application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py` \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_TAG_COLOR_XSS_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_TAG_COLOR_XSS_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b1e028f90 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_TAG_COLOR_XSS_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_TAG_COLOR_XSS_FIX.md + +# Public Workspace Tag Color XSS Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.022** + +## Issue Description + +Public workspace tag colors could be stored as arbitrary strings and later interpolated into browser `style` attributes and inline handler arguments in the tag-folder grid, tag badges, and tag-management UI. + +## Root Cause Analysis + +- `application/single_app/functions_documents.py` returned stored tag colors without a defensive fallback for already-persisted invalid values. +- Personal, group, and public tag create and update routes accepted caller-provided colors without shared validation and normalization. +- `application/single_app/static/js/public/public_workspace.js` rendered tag-owned UI fragments with HTML string interpolation, including dynamic `style=` values and inline `onclick` handlers. + +## Technical Details + +### Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/functions_documents.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_group_documents.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_public_documents.py` +- `application/single_app/static/js/public/public_workspace.js` +- `functional_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py` +- `ui_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py` + +### Code Changes Summary + +- Added shared tag-color normalization, validation, and safe fallback helpers in `functions_documents.py`. +- Applied color validation to personal, group, and public tag create and update routes so new writes persist normalized hex values only. +- Added read-time fallback in shared tag-definition reads so previously stored invalid colors resolve to deterministic safe colors instead of reaching the browser unchanged. +- Rebuilt the affected public workspace tag UI surfaces with DOM-created nodes, `textContent`, and event listeners so tag color values no longer flow through inline HTML or handler interpolation. + +### Testing Approach + +- `functional_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py` verifies the shared helper layer, all three tag-route surfaces, the public workspace DOM-safe renderer snippets, and the presence of the versioned fix artifacts. +- `ui_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py` exercises the public workspace page with a malicious tag-color payload and asserts the grid, management list, selection list, and selected-tag chip rendering stay inert. + +## Impact Analysis + +- Newly created and updated tags keep working with normalized color values. +- Previously stored invalid tag colors now fall back to safe deterministic colors instead of breaking rendering or reaching executable sinks. +- Public workspace tag folders, badges, and management controls retain their existing behavior while removing the stored XSS path. + +## Validation + +### Before + +- Stored tag colors could flow from persistence into HTML `style` attributes and inline handler arguments in the public workspace UI. +- Existing malformed colors already in storage remained live input to the browser renderers. + +### After + +- Tag colors are validated and normalized before write persistence. +- Shared tag reads repair previously stored invalid colors with safe fallback values. +- Public workspace tag rendering uses DOM APIs and event listeners instead of string-built `style=` and `onclick=` sinks. + +## Version Alignment + +- `application/single_app/config.py` is aligned to `VERSION = "0.241.022"` for this fix set. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/SECURITY_AUTHORIZATION_HARDENING_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/SECURITY_AUTHORIZATION_HARDENING_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5d9056d60 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/SECURITY_AUTHORIZATION_HARDENING_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +# Security Authorization Hardening Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.007** + +## Overview + +This hardening pass closed a set of authenticated authorization gaps where route entry authentication existed, but later operations still trusted caller-controlled ids or stale stored scope values. The changes were intentionally concentrated at shared helper boundaries so the application could reject unauthorized cross-scope requests consistently without adding broad latency across unrelated flows. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` was updated to `VERSION = "0.241.007"` for this fix. + +## Root Cause Pattern + +The underlying issue was not missing session authentication. Users were authenticated, but several later-stage operations relied on one of the following unsafe assumptions: + +- A caller-supplied identifier was treated as trustworthy after login. +- A value stored earlier in user settings was reused without checking whether access still existed. +- Eligibility logic existed for list views or normal paths but was not enforced again on direct detail or mutation routes. +- Untrusted stored metadata was rendered into HTML without escaping. + +The remediation strategy was therefore to revalidate authorization at the point where the sensitive operation actually happens, not just at route entry. + +## Remediation By Finding + +### Search Filter Literal Hardening + +Issue: +Azure AI Search filter construction interpolated raw ids directly into single-quoted OData expressions. A maliciously crafted document id, group id, public workspace id, or shared-id value could alter the meaning of the filter. + +Root cause: +Filter fragments were built with direct f-string interpolation instead of a shared escaping helper. + +Changes implemented: +- Added `_escape_odata_literal(value)`. +- Added `_build_odata_eq(field_name, value)`. +- Added `_build_odata_any_eq(collection_field, iterator_name, value)`. +- Replaced raw interpolation for `document_id`, `user_id`, `group_id`, `shared_group_ids`, `shared_user_ids`, and `public_workspace_id` filter clauses. + +Files involved: +- `application/single_app/functions_search.py` + +Security outcome: +The search layer now preserves the intended filter semantics even when ids contain embedded quote characters. + +Performance impact: +Negligible. The change is string escaping and helper reuse only. + +### Active Group Selection Hardening + +Issue: +Both the generic user settings update path and the frontend active-group setter could persist an arbitrary `activeGroupOid` value without verifying that the current user was still a member of that group. + +Root cause: +Active group updates were treated like a normal preference write instead of an authorization-sensitive context change. + +Changes implemented: +- Hardened `update_active_group_for_user(group_id, user_id=None)` to enforce membership through `assert_group_role(...)` before writing settings. +- Hardened `require_active_group(user_id, allowed_roles=...)` to revalidate stored active group membership before returning it. +- Updated `POST /api/user/settings` so `activeGroupOid` is routed through `update_active_group_for_user(...)` and returns `404` for missing groups or `403` for non-membership. +- Updated the frontend `/set_active_group` flow to use the same validated helper instead of writing settings directly. + +Files involved: +- `application/single_app/functions_group.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_users.py` +- `application/single_app/route_frontend_group_workspaces.py` + +Security outcome: +Users can no longer pivot into another group's active context by writing or submitting an arbitrary group id. + +Behavioral change: +Stale group selections now fail fast instead of being silently persisted and reused later. + +### Group Scope Authorization Enforcement + +Issue: +Group prompt routes trusted the stored active group, and the group details route returned full group data without confirming the caller remained a member. + +Root cause: +The code assumed that once an active group had been selected, downstream group-scoped operations could reuse it safely. + +Changes implemented: +- Added `_get_active_group_or_error(user_id)` in the group prompt route module. +- Switched all group prompt CRUD routes to the validated active-group helper path. +- Added explicit membership enforcement in `api_get_group_details(group_id)` before returning the full group document. + +Files involved: +- `application/single_app/route_backend_group_prompts.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_groups.py` +- `application/single_app/functions_group.py` + +Security outcome: +Direct requests into group prompt and group detail routes now depend on current membership rather than previously stored state alone. + +Behavioral change: +Unauthorized group detail requests now return `403` instead of exposing the group document. + +### Approval Authorization Enforcement + +Issue: +Approval-related views had policy logic, but direct read, approve, and deny operations did not consistently enforce that policy for the specific approval being accessed. + +Root cause: +Eligibility checks were not centralized and were not consistently reused between list, detail, and mutation flows. + +Changes implemented: +- Added `get_authorized_approval(approval_id, group_id, user_id, user_roles, require_approval_rights=False)`. +- Used `_can_user_view(...)` for read access and `_can_user_approve(...)` for mutation eligibility. +- Updated both admin and general approval GET-by-id endpoints to load approvals through the shared authorization helper. +- Updated approve and deny endpoints to require approval rights explicitly and to pass the already authorized approval document into `approve_request(...)` and `deny_request(...)`. +- Updated `can_approve` output to reflect the real approval policy instead of a requester-only shortcut. + +Files involved: +- `application/single_app/functions_approvals.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py` + +Security outcome: +Knowing an approval id is no longer enough to read or act on that approval unless the caller is actually authorized for that approval record. + +Performance impact: +Low. The route now performs the authorization check up front and reuses the loaded approval document during mutation to avoid redundant reads. + +### History-Grounded Fallback Revalidation + +Issue: +When workspace search was disabled or unavailable, follow-up chat flows could rebuild search scope from prior grounded references without checking whether the user still had access to those group or public workspace scopes. + +Root cause: +The existing helper translated prior grounded refs into search parameters correctly, but it did not serve as an authorization boundary. + +Changes implemented: +- Added `revalidate_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters(user_id, search_parameters)`. +- Filtered `active_group_ids` by current group membership. +- Filtered `active_public_workspace_ids` by currently visible public workspace ids. +- Cleared `document_ids` and `doc_scope` when all prior scope had been revoked. +- Inserted the revalidation step at both history-grounded fallback call sites before the search reuse path is enabled. + +Files involved: +- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` + +Security outcome: +Previously grounded references no longer revive access to group or public documents after authorization changes. + +Behavioral change: +Some follow-up requests may now lose prior grounded reuse if the user's access changed since the earlier conversation turn. That is the intended secure behavior. + +## Defense-In-Depth Hardening Outside The Finding-Mapped Items + +These changes were part of the same hardening pass but are not tied to the `f` findings listed above. + +### Control Center Public Workspace Escaping + +Issue: +The Control Center public workspace row renderer and adjacent activity-log summary strings contained raw interpolation into HTML-building paths. + +Changes implemented: +- Escaped public workspace `name`, `description`, `id`, `ownerName`, and `ownerEmail` before row rendering. +- Escaped `profile_image` when written into avatar markup. +- Escaped activity-log summary fields for login method, conversation titles and ids, file names and file types, token type, and model name. + +Files involved: +- `application/single_app/static/js/control-center.js` + +Outcome: +Untrusted metadata in the Control Center admin UI now renders as inert text instead of raw HTML. + +### CSP Hardening Status + +The broader CSP tightening work was deliberately not implemented in this pass. The current changes reduce exposure at the specific rendering sinks that were validated, but CSP remains a separate hardening track. + +## Files Modified In The Hardening Pass + +- `application/single_app/functions_search.py` +- `application/single_app/functions_group.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_users.py` +- `application/single_app/route_frontend_group_workspaces.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_group_prompts.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_groups.py` +- `application/single_app/functions_approvals.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_control_center.py` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` +- `application/single_app/static/js/control-center.js` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py` +- `ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py` + +## Validation And Regression Coverage + +Testing approach: +- Added a functional regression test covering OData escaping, active-group validation, approval authorization, history fallback revalidation, Control Center escaping, documentation presence, and version bump checks. +- Added a Playwright UI regression that stubs malicious public workspace metadata and verifies the Control Center renders it as inert text. +- Validated the new tests through `py_compile`, direct functional execution, and targeted `pytest` execution. + +Test results from this implementation pass: +- `functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py`: passed. +- `ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py`: collected under `pytest` and skipped when authenticated UI environment variables were not present, which is the intended fallback behavior for local non-UI environments. + +Regression guarantees provided by the new tests: +- Search filter helper coverage fails if raw OData interpolation is reintroduced. +- Active-group coverage fails if membership validation is bypassed on settings or frontend setter paths. +- Approval coverage fails if direct approval authorization stops using the shared helper. +- Chat fallback coverage fails if revoked scope ids continue to survive reuse. +- Control Center coverage fails if malicious workspace metadata is rendered into real DOM elements. + +## Performance And Latency Notes + +The runtime impact of these changes is intentionally low. + +- Search hardening is string escaping only. +- Active-group and group-scope hardening adds targeted membership validation only where the active group is written or consumed as an authorization-sensitive context. +- Approval hardening centralizes checks and reuses the loaded approval record during mutation. +- History fallback revalidation performs small scope-filtering checks only on the fallback path, not on every normal search. +- Control Center escaping is local output encoding in already-rendered admin UI paths. + +In practice, these changes should not create a user-visible latency increase outside of the specific protected operations, and even there the cost is bounded and appropriate for the security value gained. + +## Before And After + +Before: +- Authenticated users could attempt to widen Azure AI Search filters with crafted literals. +- Caller-controlled or stale active-group ids could influence later group-scoped operations. +- Group prompt and detail flows could trust stored context more than current authorization. +- Approval detail and mutation routes could be reached without a single shared per-approval authorization boundary. +- Prior grounded references could continue to influence follow-up search scope after access changed. +- Control Center workspace metadata could be injected into HTML-building paths. + +After: +- Sensitive ids are escaped before entering OData filters. +- Active group writes and reads both validate membership. +- Group prompt and group detail flows fail closed when the user lacks current access. +- Approval reads and mutations share a single explicit authorization path. +- History-grounded fallback only reuses scopes the caller can still access. +- Control Center metadata is rendered safely as text. + +## User Experience Impact + +Normal authorized workflows stay the same. The user-visible changes are limited to security-correct behavior: + +- Unauthorized or stale cross-scope requests now fail explicitly with `403` or `404` responses. +- Group-scoped UI flows do not silently persist invalid active-group state. +- Follow-up grounded search reuse may stop when prior access has been revoked. +- Control Center administrators see suspicious workspace metadata rendered as text instead of interpreted markup. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_ADMIN_RENDERING_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_ADMIN_RENDERING_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1802dd7b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_ADMIN_RENDERING_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# Stored XSS Admin Rendering Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.010** + +## Header Information + +Issue description: +This hardening addresses the stored-XSS finding, where several admin-facing rendering paths still inserted user-controlled workspace, member, or agent metadata into HTML with `innerHTML`, allowing stored content to execute script in an administrator's browser session. + +Root cause analysis: +The affected admin UI flows relied on template-string HTML assembly without consistently escaping untrusted text first. A related issue in the Control Center toast helper also treated all toast messages as HTML, which made any attacker-controlled value passed into a toast another potential browser-side sink. This version closes the group-member and agent-rendering portions of the finding set and adds safer default behavior for the shared Control Center toast sink used alongside those admin flows. + +Version implemented: +`config.py` was updated to `VERSION = "0.241.010"` for this fix. + +## Technical Details + +Files modified: +- `application/single_app/templates/control_center.html` +- `application/single_app/static/js/control-center.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/admin/admin_agents.js` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py` +- `ui_tests/test_control_center_group_members_escaping.py` + +Code changes summary: +- Escaped `member.name` and `member.email` before injecting the group-members modal rows in the Control Center. +- Hardened `ControlCenter.showToast()` so toast content is escaped by default and only renders HTML when a caller explicitly opts in with `allowHtml=true`. +- Updated the two ownership-transfer success toasts that intentionally use `
    ` formatting to opt into HTML explicitly. +- Added a local `escapeHtml()` helper to the admin agents table module and routed `agent.name`, `agent.display_name`, and `agent.description` through it before row rendering. + +Testing approach: +- Added a functional regression test that checks the affected source files for the required escaping and toast-hardening patterns. +- Added a Playwright UI regression that injects malicious group-member metadata into the Control Center group-members modal and verifies the values render as inert text without creating executable DOM nodes. + +Impact analysis: +The change is low-risk and low-latency. It does not alter authorization logic or data storage. It only changes how admin UI code renders previously stored values into the browser. + +## Validation + +Test results: +- The functional regression is designed to fail if raw member or agent fields are reintroduced into admin HTML renderers. +- The UI regression is designed to fail if malicious group-member metadata creates DOM nodes or sets the injected `window.__controlCenterMember*Xss` flags. + +Before/after comparison: +- Before: attacker-controlled member or agent names could be stored and later rendered into admin HTML sinks, enabling stored XSS in an administrator session. +- After: the admin UI paths now escape stored values before HTML insertion, and Control Center toasts no longer interpret arbitrary message content as HTML by default. + +User experience improvements: +Administrators still see the same names and descriptions, but suspicious markup now displays as text instead of executing in the browser. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_AGENT_AND_MEMBER_RENDERING_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_AGENT_AND_MEMBER_RENDERING_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..10a67fa39 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_AGENT_AND_MEMBER_RENDERING_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# STORED_XSS_AGENT_AND_MEMBER_RENDERING_FIX.md + +# Stored XSS Agent And Member Rendering Fix + +Fixed in version: **0.241.017** + +## Issue Description + +Stored and reflected browser-side XSS risks existed in chat agent display-name rendering and in group/public workspace member-management surfaces that interpolated untrusted display names and emails into HTML or inline JavaScript. + +## Root Cause Analysis + +- Chat message rendering in `chat-messages.js` inserted `agent_display_name` into HTML without encoding in both the sender header and metadata drawer. +- Public and group workspace member-management scripts built HTML rows, option elements, summaries, and search-result buttons from raw `displayName` and `email` values. +- The public workspace search-result renderer embedded user data inside an inline `onclick` handler. +- `/api/userSearch` built a Microsoft Graph OData filter from the raw query string, allowing apostrophes to break the literal context. + +## Technical Details + +### Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-messages.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/public/manage_public_workspace.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/group/manage_group.js` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_users.py` +- `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_workspace_rendering_fix.py` +- `ui_tests/test_public_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py` +- `ui_tests/test_group_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` + +### Code Changes Summary + +- Escaped `agent_display_name` before insertion into the chat sender header and message metadata drawer. +- Escaped public and group workspace member-management display names and emails before using them in table rows, request lists, ownership-transfer options, bulk-remove summaries, and CSV validation previews. +- Replaced the public workspace inline `selectUserForAdd(...)` handler with delegated click handling using `data-*` attributes. +- Added `_escape_graph_odata_literal(...)` to escape apostrophes before building the Microsoft Graph `$filter` expression for `/api/userSearch`. +- Added functional and Playwright regression coverage for the affected browser workflows. + +### Testing Approach + +- Static functional regression coverage verifies the escaped chat, group, public, and OData filter code paths. +- UI regression tests mock malicious payloads in public and group workspace member-management flows and assert that the payloads render as inert text with no DOM execution. + +## Impact Analysis + +- The fix preserves existing display behavior for normal names and emails. +- Search-result selection still populates the add-member form with the original string values. +- The OData fix only changes escaping behavior for embedded apostrophes and does not alter successful prefix-search behavior for normal queries. + +## Validation + +### Before + +- Untrusted agent display names could render in chat HTML without encoding. +- Untrusted member display names and emails could render inside group/public workspace HTML and inline event handler attributes. +- Apostrophes in `/api/userSearch` could break the Microsoft Graph filter literal. + +### After + +- Chat and member-management surfaces HTML-encode untrusted display names and emails before insertion. +- The public search-result selection flow no longer embeds untrusted data inside inline JavaScript. +- `/api/userSearch` escapes apostrophes using the repo's established OData literal rule. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_SHARE_ACTIVITY_AND_MASKING_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_SHARE_ACTIVITY_AND_MASKING_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0c5b11be1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/STORED_XSS_SHARE_ACTIVITY_AND_MASKING_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +# Stored XSS Share Activity And Masking Fix + +Fixed in version: **0.241.020** + +## Issue + +Several remaining stored XSS paths were still present after earlier chat and workspace hardening. Personal and group document share modals rehydrated attacker-controlled names through inline button handlers and toast HTML, the manage-group activity timeline rendered document names into HTML and raw JSON into a modal with `innerHTML`, and chat masking metadata trusted a client-supplied display name while the renderer interpolated it into attributes. + +## Root Cause + +The affected surfaces still mixed trusted markup with untrusted values inside template-string HTML and inline event handlers. The masking API also accepted `display_name` from browser JSON instead of deriving it from the authenticated user on the server. + +## Files Modified + +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-toast.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/workspace/workspace-documents-sharing.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/workspace/group-documents-sharing.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/group/manage_group.js` +- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-messages.js` +- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py` +- `application/single_app/config.py` +- `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py` +- `ui_tests/test_document_share_modal_escaping.py` + +## Code Changes Summary + +- Replaced the shared chat toast HTML insertion with DOM creation and `textContent` assignment. +- Removed inline add/remove handlers from personal and group share modal results, switched both renderers to DOM-safe text nodes, and hardened their local toast helpers. +- Escaped group activity timeline descriptions, stored activity objects via jQuery data instead of serialized HTML attributes, and rendered the raw-activity modal with `textContent`. +- Rebuilt masked chat spans with DOM nodes instead of interpolated HTML attributes. +- Derived the masking display name from `get_current_user_info()` on the server instead of trusting request JSON. + +## Testing Approach + +- Functional regression: `functional_tests/test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py` +- UI regression: `ui_tests/test_document_share_modal_escaping.py` +- Targeted diagnostics on each touched JavaScript file plus `py_compile` on `route_backend_chats.py`. + +## Impact + +- Stored group names, user names, emails, descriptions, activity file names, and masked-range display names now render as inert text in the remaining live browser sinks covered by findings f022, f042, and the residual masking portion of f037. +- The masking audit trail now reflects the authenticated server-side user instead of attacker-controlled browser input. + +## Validation + +- Before: share modals could rehydrate attacker markup through inline button handlers and toast bodies, activity rows and raw JSON modal views could inject HTML, and masking metadata could store a forged display name. +- After: those surfaces use DOM-safe text rendering, delegated click handling, and server-derived masking identity. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/UPLOADED_FILE_PREVIEW_XSS_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/UPLOADED_FILE_PREVIEW_XSS_FIX.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d9ad3bb81 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/UPLOADED_FILE_PREVIEW_XSS_FIX.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +# UPLOADED_FILE_PREVIEW_XSS_FIX.md + +# Uploaded File Preview XSS Fix + +Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.022** + +## Issue Description + +Uploaded file preview content in the chat modal rendered attacker-controlled file bodies through dynamic HTML sinks. Plain-text previews used `innerHTML` with a `
    ` wrapper, modern CSV previews assembled table markup as HTML strings, and legacy table payloads were inserted directly into the modal body.
+
+## Root Cause Analysis
+
+- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js` used `fileContentElement.innerHTML` for both plain-text and tabular preview bodies.
+- CSV preview rendering escaped cell text but still concatenated untrusted content into HTML strings before injecting it into the DOM.
+- Legacy HTML table payloads from older stored previews were treated as trusted markup instead of untrusted file content.
+
+## Technical Details
+
+### Files Modified
+
+- `application/single_app/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js`
+- `functional_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py`
+- `ui_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py`
+- `application/single_app/config.py`
+
+### Code Changes Summary
+
+- Replaced preview-body `innerHTML` updates with DOM construction and `textContent` assignments.
+- Rebuilt CSV previews with DOM-created table elements so headers and cells stay inert even when they contain attacker-controlled strings.
+- Tightened legacy detection to full-table HTML payloads only.
+- Legacy HTML table payloads now render as inert preformatted text instead of executable markup.
+- Replaced the blob download button injection with a DOM-created anchor element.
+
+### Testing Approach
+
+- `functional_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py` verifies the preview renderer no longer uses the removed file-content HTML sinks and that the fix documentation and version stay in sync.
+- `ui_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py` exercises plain-text, CSV, and legacy table preview flows in the browser and asserts no injected `img`, `svg`, or `script` nodes appear.
+
+## Impact Analysis
+
+- Plain-text uploads still display with preserved whitespace in the modal.
+- CSV-backed previews still render as visible tables for current uploads.
+- Older HTML-backed table previews remain readable, but they no longer render as live HTML.
+
+## Validation
+
+### Before
+
+- Opening an uploaded file preview could inject stored file content into the modal DOM.
+- A CSV value beginning with HTML-like text could be misclassified and routed toward the unsafe HTML path.
+
+### After
+
+- Uploaded file preview bodies render through safe DOM APIs.
+- CSV cells remain visible as text, including cells that begin with HTML-like payloads.
+- Legacy HTML table payloads now render as inert preformatted text.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/WEB_SEARCH_EGRESS_HARDENING_FIX.md b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/WEB_SEARCH_EGRESS_HARDENING_FIX.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8ead72f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/explanation/fixes/v0.241.022/WEB_SEARCH_EGRESS_HARDENING_FIX.md
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+# Web Search Egress Hardening Fix
+
+Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.008**
+
+## Overview
+
+This fix hardens the Bing Grounding web-search boundary so external web search only receives the current user message, not a history-derived rewrite or summarized conversation context. It also corrects the admin and user-facing disclosure text so the UI now matches the implemented data egress behavior.
+
+Version implemented:
+`config.py` was updated to `VERSION = "0.241.008"` for this fix.
+
+## Issue Description
+
+The web-search path previously reused the general-purpose `search_query` variable from chat processing. That variable supports internal workspace search behavior, including history-grounded follow-up rewrites and an optional summarized-history branch.
+
+That reuse created two problems:
+
+- The external web-search call could send a query derived from recent conversation context instead of only the user's current typed message.
+- The default disclosure text incorrectly told users that only the current message was sent, even when the backend could derive a history-based query.
+
+## Root Cause
+
+The root cause was a missing boundary between:
+
+- Internal search-query construction for workspace and follow-up retrieval behavior.
+- External web-search egress to the Azure AI Foundry agent that fronts Bing grounding.
+
+Because both behaviors shared the same variable and call path, history-derived internal context could cross the external web-search boundary.
+
+## Technical Changes
+
+### External Web Search Query Separation
+
+The backend now uses a dedicated helper, `build_web_search_query_text(user_message)`, to define the only chat content allowed to leave the app for external web search.
+
+Changes implemented:
+
+- Added `build_web_search_query_text(user_message)` in `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py`.
+- Updated both `/api/chat` and `/api/chat/stream` to pass `web_search_query_text` into `perform_web_search(...)`.
+- Stopped `perform_web_search(...)` from reading the generic internal `search_query` variable.
+- Updated web-search thought text to reflect the explicit outbound query value.
+
+Files involved:
+
+- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py`
+
+Security outcome:
+
+External web search is now current-message-only, even when internal workspace-search logic still uses history-derived search behavior.
+
+### Foundry Metadata Minimization
+
+The web-search boundary previously attached a metadata payload containing identifiers and context fields such as conversation id, user id, scope, and the search query itself.
+
+Changes implemented:
+
+- Replaced the previous `foundry_metadata` payload with an empty metadata dictionary for the web-search invocation path.
+
+Files involved:
+
+- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py`
+
+Security outcome:
+
+The Foundry web-search invocation no longer sends the previous identifier metadata blob by default.
+
+### Search Summary Hardening
+
+The optional summarized-history branch for internal search could summarize raw stored messages, including persisted system augmentation content.
+
+Changes implemented:
+
+- Filtered the search-summary input to `user` and `assistant` roles only.
+- Reused `build_assistant_history_content_with_citations(...)` for assistant turns so the summary path follows the same bounded history shape used elsewhere in chat history preparation.
+
+Files involved:
+
+- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py`
+
+Security outcome:
+
+Persisted system augmentation messages are no longer part of the optional search-summary input.
+
+### Disclosure Text Corrections
+
+The default web-search notice text and admin-facing copy now match the implemented boundary.
+
+Changes implemented:
+
+- Updated the default `web_search_user_notice_text`.
+- Updated the admin settings default and textarea placeholder text.
+- Updated the chat banner fallback text.
+- Updated the admin consent modal warning text.
+
+Files involved:
+
+- `application/single_app/functions_settings.py`
+- `application/single_app/route_frontend_admin_settings.py`
+- `application/single_app/templates/admin_settings.html`
+- `application/single_app/templates/chats.html`
+
+User-facing outcome:
+
+Users and administrators now see copy that states the current message is sent for web search, conversation history is not sent for web search, and sensitive content pasted into that message may still be sent.
+
+## Files Modified
+
+- `application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py`
+- `application/single_app/functions_settings.py`
+- `application/single_app/route_frontend_admin_settings.py`
+- `application/single_app/templates/admin_settings.html`
+- `application/single_app/templates/chats.html`
+- `application/single_app/config.py`
+- `functional_tests/test_web_search_current_message_only.py`
+- `ui_tests/test_web_search_notice_copy.py`
+
+## Validation
+
+Testing approach:
+
+- Added a functional regression test for the outbound web-search boundary.
+- Added a lightweight Playwright UI regression for the updated admin disclosure copy.
+- Validated the touched Python files with targeted `py_compile` runs.
+
+Validation results from this implementation pass:
+
+- `functional_tests/test_web_search_current_message_only.py`: passed.
+- `ui_tests/test_web_search_notice_copy.py`: passed in collection/execution and skipped cleanly in the current environment because authenticated UI environment variables were not present.
+- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py`: passed.
+- `python -m py_compile application/single_app/functions_settings.py application/single_app/route_frontend_admin_settings.py`: passed.
+
+## Before And After
+
+Before:
+
+- External web search could reuse a history-derived internal `search_query`.
+- The optional search-summary branch included raw stored-message roles beyond `user` and `assistant`.
+- The default notice text claimed only the current message was sent, even though the backend could derive a history-based outbound query.
+- The Foundry web-search call included a larger metadata payload than necessary.
+
+After:
+
+- External web search only uses the current user message.
+- Internal history-based search behavior remains separate from the external web-search boundary.
+- The search-summary branch excludes persisted system augmentation messages.
+- The admin and user-facing notice text matches the implemented behavior.
+- The Foundry web-search call no longer includes the previous identifier metadata blob by default.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/explanation/release_notes.md b/docs/explanation/release_notes.md
index bdc10fe41..28a1c7dcb 100644
--- a/docs/explanation/release_notes.md
+++ b/docs/explanation/release_notes.md
@@ -4,9 +4,147 @@ This page tracks notable Simple Chat releases and organizes the detailed change
 
 For feature-focused and fix-focused drill-downs by version, see [Features by Version](/explanation/features/) and [Fixes by Version](/explanation/fixes/).
 
-### **(v0.241.007)**
-
-#### Bug Fixes
+### **(v0.241.022)**
+
+*   **Uploaded File Preview Body XSS Hardening (`f044`)**
+    *   Fixed the uploaded-file preview modal so stored file bodies no longer reach the preview pane through raw HTML sinks.
+    *   Plain-text previews now render as inert preformatted text, CSV-backed previews are built with DOM text nodes, and legacy HTML-backed table payloads now fall back to inert text instead of live markup.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for the hardened preview path.
+    *   (Ref: `chat-input-actions.js`, `test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py`, `test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py`, `UPLOADED_FILE_PREVIEW_XSS_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Public Workspace Tag Color XSS Hardening (`f043`)**
+    *   Fixed the public workspace tag surfaces so stored tag colors no longer reach folder-grid actions, tag badges, tag management rows, or selected-tag chips through inline handler or style interpolation.
+    *   Shared tag helper paths now normalize and validate tag colors on create and update across personal, group, and public routes, and previously stored invalid colors fall back to safe deterministic values on read.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for the hardened public tag rendering path.
+    *   (Ref: `functions_documents.py`, `route_backend_documents.py`, `route_backend_group_documents.py`, `route_backend_public_documents.py`, `public_workspace.js`, `test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py`, `test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py`, `PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_TAG_COLOR_XSS_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Agent Template Gallery Actions Escaping (`f045`)**
+    *   Fixed the agent template gallery so stored `actions_to_load` values no longer reach the recommended-actions row through a raw HTML sink.
+    *   Agent template helper paths now normalize `actions_to_load` consistently on read, create, and update flows, and invalid write payload shapes are rejected before they can persist.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for the hardened gallery path.
+    *   (Ref: `agent_templates_gallery.js`, `functions_agent_templates.py`, `test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py`, `test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py`, `AGENT_TEMPLATE_GALLERY_ACTIONS_TO_LOAD_XSS_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Stored XSS Share, Activity, and Masking Hardening (`f022`, `f042`, residual `f037`)**
+    *   Fixed the remaining stored-XSS share-modal flows so attacker-controlled user names, group names, descriptions, emails, and toast content no longer render through inline handlers or raw HTML sinks.
+    *   Hardened the group activity timeline and raw-activity modal so stored activity metadata and serialized activity JSON now render as inert text instead of executable markup.
+    *   Rebuilt masked-range rendering with DOM APIs and bound masking display names to the authenticated server-side user instead of trusting browser-supplied identity fields.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for the hardened sharing, activity, and masking paths.
+    *   (Ref: `chat-toast.js`, `workspace-documents-sharing.js`, `group-documents-sharing.js`, `manage_group.js`, `chat-messages.js`, `route_backend_chats.py`, `test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py`, `test_document_share_modal_escaping.py`, `STORED_XSS_SHARE_ACTIVITY_AND_MASKING_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Chat Scope Picker and Conversation Details XSS Hardening (`f021`)**
+    *   Fixed the chat scope-lock picker so stored group and public workspace names no longer reach the locked-workspaces modal through raw HTML interpolation.
+    *   Hardened the conversation-details modal so attacker-controlled titles, context names, participant labels, document labels, semantic tags, classifications, and scope-lock names render as inert text, and invalid web-source values no longer produce active `javascript:` links.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for the affected chat modal surfaces.
+    *   (Ref: `chat-documents.js`, `chat-conversation-details.js`, `test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py`, `test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py`, `CHAT_SCOPE_LOCK_AND_CONVERSATION_DETAILS_XSS_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Chat Citation and Uploaded File Modal Filename XSS Hardening (`f020`)**
+    *   Fixed the first-render chat citation modal so attacker-controlled document filenames returned from citation APIs no longer reach the modal header as raw HTML on the first open.
+    *   The uploaded-file preview modal now uses the same safe title-population path, closing the adjacent filename sink before it can regress into the same stored-XSS family.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for both modal title flows.
+    *   (Ref: `chat-citations.js`, `chat-input-actions.js`, `test_stored_xss_chat_modal_filename_fix.py`, `test_chat_modal_filename_escaping.py`, `CITATION_AND_FILE_MODAL_FILENAME_XSS_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Stored XSS Agent and Member Rendering Hardening (`f009`, `f010`)**
+    *   Fixed the stored-XSS sink in chat message rendering so agent display names no longer reach the sender header, image header, or metadata drawer as raw HTML.
+    *   Public and group workspace member-management views now escape untrusted member display names and emails before rendering member rows, pending requests, ownership-transfer options, bulk-remove summaries, user-search results, and CSV validation previews, and the public member search no longer embeds untrusted values inside an inline `onclick` handler.
+    *   `/api/userSearch` now escapes Microsoft Graph OData filter literals before composing the `$filter` expression, so apostrophes in search input cannot break the backend Graph query.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for the hardened chat, workspace member-management, and Graph filter paths.
+    *   (Ref: `chat-messages.js`, `manage_public_workspace.js`, `manage_group.js`, `route_backend_users.py`, `test_stored_xss_chat_workspace_rendering_fix.py`, `test_public_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py`, `test_group_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py`, `STORED_XSS_AGENT_AND_MEMBER_RENDERING_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Chat Selected Document Metadata Authorization Fix (`f046`)**
+    *   Fixed chat selected-document metadata resolution so `/api/chat`, `/api/chat/stream`, and the selected tabular document helper no longer trust caller-supplied document ids after authentication.
+    *   Personal selected documents now resolve only for the owner or a legitimately shared user, group selected documents now honor authorized owner and shared-group access, and public selected documents now resolve only inside the caller's visible public workspaces.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage for the shared selected-document resolver and updated the existing all-scope tabular regression so the hardened lookup path stays covered.
+    *   (Ref: `route_backend_chats.py`, `test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py`, `test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py`, `CHAT_SELECTED_DOCUMENT_METADATA_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Control Center Public Workspace Members XSS Fix (`f008`)**
+    *   Fixed a stored XSS in the Control Center public workspace members modal where stored member `displayName` and `email` values were rendered into an admin-facing HTML sink.
+    *   The members modal now builds the member row with DOM text nodes instead of injecting those fields through `innerHTML`, so malicious stored markup renders as inert text while the existing role badge styling remains unchanged.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage for the affected modal and documented the hardened sink under the current version line.
+    *   (Ref: `workspace-manager.js`, `test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py`, `test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py`, `CONTROL_CENTER_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_MEMBERS_XSS_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Plugin Log Recent Feed Admin Authorization Follow-Up**
+    *   Fixed the adjacent plugin logging route so `/api/plugins/invocations/recent` now enforces the `Admin` role instead of exposing the cross-user recent invocation feed to any authenticated user.
+    *   Unauthenticated requests still return `401 Unauthorized`, non-admin users now receive `403 Forbidden`, and the admin response payload remains unchanged for legitimate troubleshooting flows.
+    *   Extended the focused plugin logging regression coverage so both admin-only plugin logging endpoints are exercised under unauthenticated, non-admin, and admin conditions.
+    *   (Ref: `route_plugin_logging.py`, `test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py`, `PLUGIN_LOG_RECENT_INVOCATIONS_ADMIN_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Public Workspace Details Projection Hardening (`f034`)**
+    *   Fixed `GET /api/public_workspaces/` so authenticated non-members no longer receive the full public workspace Cosmos document.
+    *   The route now returns a minimal public summary for non-members and a member-aware payload with explicit `userRole` and `isMember` fields for authorized workspace members, which preserves the manage-page UX without exposing manager lists, pending requests, or other member-only metadata.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage to lock down the new payload contract and verify the public directory and non-member workspace page continue to behave correctly.
+    *   (Ref: `route_backend_public_workspaces.py`, `functions_public_workspaces.py`, `manage_public_workspace.js`, `public_directory.js`, `test_security_authorization_hardening.py`, `test_public_workspace_projection_non_member_ui.py`, `PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_DETAILS_DISCLOSURE_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Approval Route Authorization Guard Consolidation (`f033`)**
+    *   Hardened the approval detail, approve, and deny endpoints so both the admin and non-admin route variants now resolve requests through one shared authorization helper before returning approval data or executing destructive approval actions.
+    *   This reduces the chance of future drift between approval handlers while preserving the existing `403 Forbidden` behavior for callers who are not allowed to view or approve a request.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage to ensure the approval routes continue using the shared authorization path.
+    *   (Ref: `route_backend_control_center.py`, `functions_approvals.py`, `test_security_authorization_hardening.py`)
+
+*   **Feedback Submission Ownership Enforcement (`f038`)**
+    *   Fixed the user feedback submission route so caller-supplied `conversationId` and `messageId` values must resolve inside the authenticated user's own conversation before any feedback row is created.
+    *   Foreign conversation ids now return `403 Forbidden`, missing assistant targets now return `404 Not Found`, and invalid submissions no longer persist copied prompt or AI response content into the caller's feedback history.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage for owner success, foreign-conversation rejection before message lookup, and missing-target rejection without feedback persistence.
+    *   (Ref: `route_backend_feedback.py`, `test_feedback_submission_authorization.py`, `FEEDBACK_AND_PLUGIN_LOG_ACCESS_CONTROL_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Plugin Log Clear Admin Authorization (`f039`)**
+    *   Fixed the destructive plugin log clear endpoint so only administrators can wipe the shared in-memory plugin invocation history.
+    *   Unauthenticated requests still return `401 Unauthorized`, non-admin authenticated users now receive `403 Forbidden`, and admin behavior remains unchanged for legitimate maintenance flows.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage for unauthenticated, non-admin, and admin clear-log requests against the shared logger state.
+    *   (Ref: `route_plugin_logging.py`, `test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py`, `FEEDBACK_AND_PLUGIN_LOG_ACCESS_CONTROL_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Authorization State Confusion Settings Hardening**
+    *   Completed the remaining settings-boundary hardening so active public workspace selection now validates server-side before it is persisted, instead of accepting arbitrary caller-supplied workspace ids through generic settings updates.
+    *   Public workspace selection routes now share the same validated helper path, and public prompt operations now resolve the active workspace through a canonical authorization check instead of trusting raw stored settings values.
+    *   The generic user-settings update route also now drops unsupported settings keys and returns a client error when a payload contains no valid settings keys, reducing the chance that authorization-sensitive state can bypass dedicated validators in future changes.
+    *   (Ref: `functions_public_workspaces.py`, `route_backend_users.py`, `route_backend_public_workspaces.py`, `route_frontend_public_workspaces.py`, `route_backend_public_prompts.py`, `AUTHORIZATION_STATE_CONFUSION_SETTINGS_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Key Vault Plugin Secret Scope Enforcement (`f013`)**
+    *   Fixed a plugin Key Vault authorization gap where well-formed full secret names could be stored or replayed across user, group, or global scopes and later resolved with the application's Key Vault identity.
+    *   Plugin secret save, runtime resolution, SQL connection-test resolution, and delete cleanup now verify that stored secret references match the expected scope and source before any Key Vault operation is attempted.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage and versioned fix documentation for the hardened plugin secret boundary.
+    *   (Ref: `functions_keyvault.py`, `semantic_kernel_loader.py`, `route_backend_plugins.py`, `test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py`, `KEY_VAULT_PLUGIN_SECRET_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Log Analytics Query History User Scope Enforcement (`f016`)**
+    *   Fixed the Log Analytics plugin so query history now binds to the authenticated user on the server instead of accepting an LLM-controlled `user_id` parameter.
+    *   Shared user-settings reads and writes now deny cross-user request access by default unless a reviewed privileged path explicitly opts into a cross-user bypass, and the Control Center admin flows have been updated to use that bypass intentionally.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage and versioned fix documentation for the plugin surface change and the shared user-settings authorization boundary.
+    *   (Ref: `log_analytics_plugin.py`, `functions_settings.py`, `route_backend_control_center.py`, `test_log_analytics_plugin_user_scope_enforcement.py`, `LOG_ANALYTICS_PLUGIN_USER_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Personal Conversation Authorization (`f025`, `f027`)**
+    *   Closed personal-conversation authorization gaps so conversation deletion, chat file-content retrieval, and frontend conversation rendering verify ownership before returning or destroying data.
+    *   The chat message loader also now handles `403 Forbidden` and `404 Not Found` conversation-message responses explicitly, so the browser shows a controlled error state instead of assuming every message load succeeds.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus a separate follow-up fix document under the current release line.
+    *   (Ref: `route_backend_conversations.py`, `route_backend_documents.py`, `route_frontend_conversations.py`, `chat-messages.js`, `test_personal_conversation_followup_authorization.py`, `test_chat_messages_authorization_error.py`, `PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_AUTHORIZATION_FOLLOW_UP_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Personal Conversation Read Authorization Hardening**
+    *   Fixed authenticated personal conversation read paths so message history and inline image retrieval now verify conversation ownership before returning content.
+    *   Requests that use leaked or foreign conversation identifiers now return `403 Forbidden` instead of disclosing another user's transcript or image content, while the existing missing-resource response contracts remain unchanged.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage and versioned fix documentation for the hardened conversation read boundary.
+    *   (Ref: `f024`, `route_backend_conversations.py`, `test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py`, `PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_READ_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Broken Access Control IDOR Hardening**
+    *   Closed the authenticated authorization gaps by enforcing personal conversation ownership in chat, binding tabular blob access to the current authorized request context, and binding fact-memory operations to that same canonical scope.
+    *   Request group and public workspace scope is now canonicalized before downstream processing so forged or stale scope identifiers do not survive into plugin execution or grounded-history fallback reuse.
+    *   Added focused regression coverage and versioned fix documentation for the hardened chat and plugin authorization boundary.
+    *   (Ref: `route_backend_chats.py`, `tabular_processing_plugin.py`, `fact_memory_plugin.py`, `test_security_authorization_hardening.py`, `BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_IDOR_HARDENING_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Stored XSS Admin Rendering Hardening**
+    *   Closed the admin-side stored-XSS findings by escaping stored member and agent metadata before Control Center and Admin Settings HTML row rendering.
+    *   Control Center toast rendering now escapes message content by default and requires an explicit opt-in for the small number of admin success messages that intentionally include formatted HTML.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage plus versioned fix documentation for the hardened admin rendering sinks.
+    *   (Ref: `control_center.html`, `control-center.js`, `admin_agents.js`, `test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py`, `test_control_center_group_members_escaping.py`, `STORED_XSS_ADMIN_RENDERING_FIX.md`)
+
+*   **Web Search Data Egress Hardening**
+    *   Fixed the Bing-grounding web-search path so external web search now sends only the user's current message instead of a query derived from prior conversation context.
+    *   Updated the admin consent copy and user notice text to match the implemented behavior and warn that sensitive content pasted into the current message may still be sent when web search is used.
+    *   Reduced outbound web-search invocation metadata and added focused functional and UI regression coverage for the boundary and disclosure text changes.
+    *   (Ref: `route_backend_chats.py`, `functions_settings.py`, `route_frontend_admin_settings.py`, `admin_settings.html`, `chats.html`, `test_web_search_current_message_only.py`, `test_web_search_notice_copy.py`)
+
+*   **Authorization Boundary Hardening Across Search, Groups, Approvals, and History Fallback**
+    *   Hardened several authenticated workflows that previously trusted caller-supplied identifiers or stale stored scope values, so active group selection, group-scoped prompt access, approval actions, and history-grounded follow-up reuse now revalidate the current user's authorization before proceeding.
+    *   Azure AI Search filter construction now escapes OData literals for document, user, group, shared, and public workspace identifiers, and the Control Center public workspace view now renders untrusted workspace metadata as inert text instead of raw HTML.
+    *   Added focused functional and UI regression coverage for the authorization and escaping paths, plus versioned fix documentation for the full hardening pass.
+    *   (Ref: `functions_search.py`, `functions_group.py`, `route_backend_users.py`, `route_backend_group_prompts.py`, `route_backend_control_center.py`, `route_backend_chats.py`, `control-center.js`, `test_security_authorization_hardening.py`, `test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py`)
 
 *   **Global Agent Scope Gate Fallback**
     *   Fixed per-user Semantic Kernel chats so selecting a global agent no longer silently falls back to the standard GPT model when personal agents are disabled for the tenant.
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..63f20e032
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py
+"""
+Functional test for agent template gallery actions_to_load XSS hardening.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.020
+
+This test ensures the gallery renders actions_to_load as inert text and that
+agent template helpers normalize the field consistently before read and write
+paths use it.
+"""
+
+import ast
+import os
+import sys
+from typing import Any, List
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+GALLERY_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    'application',
+    'single_app',
+    'static',
+    'js',
+    'agent_templates_gallery.js',
+)
+HELPERS_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    'application',
+    'single_app',
+    'functions_agent_templates.py',
+)
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app', 'config.py')
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    'docs',
+    'explanation',
+    'fixes',
+    'v0.241.020',
+    'AGENT_TEMPLATE_GALLERY_ACTIONS_TO_LOAD_XSS_FIX.md',
+)
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.strip().startswith('VERSION = '):
+            return line.split('=', 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError('VERSION assignment not found in config.py')
+
+
+def load_helper(function_name):
+    source = read_file_text(HELPERS_FILE)
+    parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=HELPERS_FILE)
+    selected_node = next(
+        (
+            node
+            for node in parsed.body
+            if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name
+        ),
+        None,
+    )
+    assert selected_node is not None, f'Expected helper {function_name} in {HELPERS_FILE}'
+
+    module = ast.Module(body=[selected_node], type_ignores=[])
+    namespace = {
+        'Any': Any,
+        'List': List,
+    }
+    exec(compile(module, HELPERS_FILE, 'exec'), namespace)
+    return namespace[function_name]
+
+
+def test_gallery_renders_actions_with_text_nodes():
+    """Verify actions_to_load no longer reaches innerHTML in the gallery."""
+    print('🔍 Testing gallery actions_to_load rendering...')
+
+    source = read_file_text(GALLERY_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        'const actionLabel = document.createElement("strong");',
+        'actionLabel.textContent = "Recommended actions:";',
+        'document.createTextNode(` ${template.actions_to_load.map((action) => String(action)).join(", ")}`)',
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f'Missing gallery hardening snippets: {missing}'
+
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        'actionLine.innerHTML = `Recommended actions: ${template.actions_to_load.join(", ")}`;',
+    ]
+    present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source]
+    assert not present, f'Unexpected unsafe gallery rendering snippets found: {present}'
+
+    print('✅ Gallery actions_to_load rendering passed')
+
+
+def test_actions_normalizer_trims_values_and_rejects_invalid_write_shapes():
+    """Verify the shared normalizer handles read and write normalization correctly."""
+    print('🔍 Testing shared actions_to_load normalizer...')
+
+    normalize_actions = load_helper('_normalize_actions_to_load')
+
+    assert normalize_actions(None) == []
+    assert normalize_actions('') == []
+    assert normalize_actions([' action-a ', ' ', 'action-b ']) == ['action-a', 'action-b']
+    assert normalize_actions('not-a-list') == []
+    assert normalize_actions(['action-a', 3]) == ['action-a', '3']
+
+    try:
+        normalize_actions('not-a-list', strict=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        assert 'actions_to_load must be an array of strings' in str(exc)
+    else:
+        raise AssertionError('Expected strict writes to reject non-list actions_to_load values')
+
+    try:
+        normalize_actions(['action-a', 3], strict=True)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        assert 'actions_to_load entries must be strings' in str(exc)
+    else:
+        raise AssertionError('Expected strict writes to reject non-string actions_to_load entries')
+
+    print('✅ Shared actions_to_load normalizer passed')
+
+
+def test_template_helpers_use_the_shared_actions_normalizer():
+    """Verify create, update, and read paths all use the same normalizer."""
+    print('🔍 Testing template helper integration markers...')
+
+    source = read_file_text(HELPERS_FILE)
+    required_snippets = [
+        "cleaned['actions_to_load'] = _normalize_actions_to_load(cleaned.get('actions_to_load'))",
+        "actions = _normalize_actions_to_load(payload.get('actions_to_load'), strict=True)",
+        "payload['actions_to_load'] = _normalize_actions_to_load(payload['actions_to_load'], strict=True)",
+        "payload['actions_to_load'] = _normalize_actions_to_load(doc.get('actions_to_load'))",
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f'Missing template helper normalization snippets: {missing}'
+
+    print('✅ Template helper integration markers passed')
+
+
+def test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist():
+    """Verify the fix note and current version stay in sync for this change."""
+    print('🔍 Testing fix documentation and version...')
+
+    assert read_config_version() == '0.241.022'
+    assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f'Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}'
+
+    fix_doc = read_file_text(FIX_DOC)
+    assert 'Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.020**' in fix_doc
+    assert 'functional_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_to_load_xss_fix.py' in fix_doc
+    assert 'ui_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py' in fix_doc
+
+    print('✅ Fix documentation and version passed')
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    tests = [
+        test_gallery_renders_actions_with_text_nodes,
+        test_actions_normalizer_trims_values_and_rejects_invalid_write_shapes,
+        test_template_helpers_use_the_shared_actions_normalizer,
+        test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...')
+        test()
+
+    print(f'\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed')
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py b/functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..06ef64346
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py
+"""
+Functional test for Broken Access Control PR guardrail checker.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures the changed-file BAC checker flags the repo's target
+authorization-regression patterns, allows the approved helper-based patterns,
+and stays wired into the repo instruction and PR workflow.
+"""
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+CHECKER_FILE = ROOT_DIR / 'scripts' / 'check_broken_access_control.py'
+WORKFLOW_FILE = ROOT_DIR / '.github' / 'workflows' / 'broken-access-control-check.yml'
+INSTRUCTION_FILE = ROOT_DIR / '.github' / 'instructions' / 'broken-access-control-prevention.instructions.md'
+FEATURE_DOC = ROOT_DIR / 'docs' / 'explanation' / 'features' / 'v0.241.022' / 'BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL_PR_GUARDRAILS.md'
+CONFIG_FILE = ROOT_DIR / 'application' / 'single_app' / 'config.py'
+
+
+def read_text(path: Path) -> str:
+    """Read a UTF-8 text file from the repository."""
+    return path.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+
+
+def load_checker_module():
+    """Import the checker module from disk without mutating sys.path."""
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('check_broken_access_control', CHECKER_FILE)
+    assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None, 'Expected a module spec for check_broken_access_control.py'
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    sys.modules[spec.name] = module
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+def read_config_version() -> str:
+    """Extract the current application version from config.py."""
+    for line in read_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith('VERSION = '):
+            return line.split('=', 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError('VERSION assignment not found in config.py')
+
+
+def issue_messages(module, relative_path: str, source_text: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Return the issue messages emitted for one in-memory Python source string."""
+    issues = module.inspect_source(ROOT_DIR / relative_path, source_text)
+    return [issue.message for issue in issues]
+
+
+def test_checker_flags_direct_active_scope_writes_and_raw_backend_reads() -> None:
+    """Verify direct active scope writes and backend raw-setting reads are rejected."""
+    module = load_checker_module()
+
+    write_source = """
+def persist_scope(user_id, group_id):
+    update_user_settings(user_id, {'activeGroupOid': group_id})
+""".strip()
+    write_messages = issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/route_backend_example.py',
+        write_source,
+    )
+    assert any('Do not persist activeGroupOid' in message for message in write_messages), write_messages
+
+    read_source = """
+def list_group_documents(settings):
+    active_group_id = settings.get('settings', {}).get('activeGroupOid')
+    return active_group_id
+""".strip()
+    read_messages = issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/route_backend_group_documents.py',
+        read_source,
+    )
+    assert any('Avoid reading activeGroupOid from raw settings' in message for message in read_messages), read_messages
+
+
+def test_checker_enforces_kernel_scope_normalization_and_conversation_auth_helpers() -> None:
+    """Verify kernel tool surfaces and direct conversation reads need approved auth helpers."""
+    module = load_checker_module()
+
+    unsafe_kernel_source = """
+class UnsafePlugin:
+    @kernel_function(name='unsafe')
+    def unsafe(self, user_id: str, conversation_id: str, group_id: str = ''):
+        return {'user_id': user_id, 'conversation_id': conversation_id, 'group_id': group_id}
+""".strip()
+    kernel_messages = issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/unsafe_plugin.py',
+        unsafe_kernel_source,
+    )
+    assert any('Kernel functions that expose' in message for message in kernel_messages), kernel_messages
+    assert any('user_id' in message for message in kernel_messages), kernel_messages
+    assert any('conversation_id' in message for message in kernel_messages), kernel_messages
+    assert any('group_id' in message for message in kernel_messages), kernel_messages
+
+    unsafe_conversation_source = """
+def get_file_content(user_id, conversation_id):
+    conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item(item=conversation_id, partition_key=conversation_id)
+    return conversation_item
+""".strip()
+    conversation_messages = issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py',
+        unsafe_conversation_source,
+    )
+    assert any('Avoid direct personal conversation reads' in message for message in conversation_messages), conversation_messages
+
+
+def test_checker_allows_approved_helpers_and_reviewed_suppressions() -> None:
+    """Verify approved helper patterns and reviewed suppressions stay allowed."""
+    module = load_checker_module()
+
+    allowed_write_source = """
+def update_active_group_for_user(group_id, user_id):
+    update_user_settings(user_id, {'activeGroupOid': group_id})
+""".strip()
+    assert issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/functions_group.py',
+        allowed_write_source,
+    ) == []
+
+    allowed_read_source = """
+def require_active_group(settings):
+    return settings.get('settings', {}).get('activeGroupOid')
+""".strip()
+    assert issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/functions_group.py',
+        allowed_read_source,
+    ) == []
+
+    safe_kernel_source = """
+class SafePlugin:
+    @kernel_function(name='safe')
+    def safe(self, user_id: str, conversation_id: str, group_id: str = ''):
+        authorized_context = self._resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(
+            user_id,
+            conversation_id,
+            group_id=group_id,
+        )
+        return authorized_context
+""".strip()
+    assert issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/safe_plugin.py',
+        safe_kernel_source,
+    ) == []
+
+    safe_conversation_source = """
+def api_get_messages(user_id, conversation_id):
+    _authorize_personal_conversation_read(user_id, conversation_id)
+    conversation_item = cosmos_conversations_container.read_item(item=conversation_id, partition_key=conversation_id)
+    return conversation_item
+""".strip()
+    assert issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py',
+        safe_conversation_source,
+    ) == []
+
+    suppressed_source = """
+def load_scope(settings):
+    # bac-check: ignore reviewed legacy compatibility shim
+    return settings.get('settings', {}).get('activePublicWorkspaceOid')
+""".strip()
+    assert issue_messages(
+        module,
+        'application/single_app/route_backend_public_documents.py',
+        suppressed_source,
+    ) == []
+
+
+def test_checker_assets_and_version_are_wired_into_repo() -> None:
+    """Verify the new workflow, instruction, feature doc, and version bump landed together."""
+    assert CHECKER_FILE.exists(), f'Expected checker script at {CHECKER_FILE}'
+    assert WORKFLOW_FILE.exists(), f'Expected workflow file at {WORKFLOW_FILE}'
+    assert INSTRUCTION_FILE.exists(), f'Expected instruction file at {INSTRUCTION_FILE}'
+    assert FEATURE_DOC.exists(), f'Expected feature document at {FEATURE_DOC}'
+    assert read_config_version() == '0.241.022'
+
+    workflow_source = read_text(WORKFLOW_FILE)
+    assert 'scripts/check_broken_access_control.py' in workflow_source
+    assert 'functional_tests/test_broken_access_control_guardrails_checker.py' in workflow_source
+
+    instruction_source = read_text(INSTRUCTION_FILE)
+    assert 'bac-check: ignore' in instruction_source
+    assert 'update_active_group_for_user(...)' in instruction_source
+    assert '_resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(...)' in instruction_source
+
+    feature_doc_source = read_text(FEATURE_DOC)
+    assert 'Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.022**' in feature_doc_source
+    assert 'scripts/check_broken_access_control.py' in feature_doc_source
+    assert '.github/workflows/broken-access-control-check.yml' in feature_doc_source
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    tests = [
+        test_checker_flags_direct_active_scope_writes_and_raw_backend_reads,
+        test_checker_enforces_kernel_scope_normalization_and_conversation_auth_helpers,
+        test_checker_allows_approved_helpers_and_reviewed_suppressions,
+        test_checker_assets_and_version_are_wired_into_repo,
+    ]
+    results = []
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...')
+        try:
+            test()
+            print('✅ PASS')
+            results.append(True)
+        except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - standalone script reporting
+            print(f'❌ FAIL: {exc}')
+            results.append(False)
+
+    success = all(results)
+    print(f'\n📊 Results: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed')
+    sys.exit(0 if success else 1)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py b/functional_tests/test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ce9be4473
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# test_chat_selected_document_metadata_authorization.py
+"""
+Functional test for chat selected-document metadata authorization.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.017; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures chat selected-document metadata resolution only returns
+documents the current caller can access across personal, group, and public
+scopes, and that the shared resolver remains wired into both chat handlers and
+the tabular selected-document helper.
+"""
+
+import ast
+import copy
+import os
+import sys
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+ROUTE_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app', 'route_backend_chats.py')
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app', 'config.py')
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    'docs',
+    'explanation',
+    'fixes',
+    'v0.241.017',
+    'CHAT_SELECTED_DOCUMENT_METADATA_AUTHORIZATION_FIX.md',
+)
+TARGET_FUNCTIONS = {
+    '_normalize_requested_scope_ids',
+    '_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata',
+}
+
+
+class AccessAwareMockContainer:
+    """Minimal Cosmos query stub that applies the resolver's access rules."""
+
+    def __init__(self, documents=None):
+        self.documents = {
+            document['id']: copy.deepcopy(document)
+            for document in (documents or [])
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _project(document):
+        return {
+            'id': document.get('id'),
+            'file_name': document.get('file_name'),
+            'title': document.get('title'),
+            'group_id': document.get('group_id'),
+            'public_workspace_id': document.get('public_workspace_id'),
+        }
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _matches_personal(document, user_id, user_id_prefix):
+        shared_user_ids = [str(value) for value in document.get('shared_user_ids', [])]
+        return (
+            document.get('user_id') == user_id
+            or user_id in shared_user_ids
+            or any(value.startswith(user_id_prefix) for value in shared_user_ids)
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _matches_group(document, group_id, group_id_approved):
+        shared_group_ids = [str(value) for value in document.get('shared_group_ids', [])]
+        return (
+            document.get('group_id') == group_id
+            or group_id in shared_group_ids
+            or group_id_approved in shared_group_ids
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _matches_public(document, public_workspace_id):
+        return document.get('public_workspace_id') == public_workspace_id
+
+    def query_items(self, query, parameters, enable_cross_partition_query=True):
+        del query, enable_cross_partition_query
+
+        parameter_map = {
+            parameter.get('name'): parameter.get('value')
+            for parameter in parameters
+        }
+        document = self.documents.get(parameter_map.get('@doc_id'))
+        if not document:
+            return []
+
+        if '@user_id' in parameter_map:
+            if self._matches_personal(
+                document,
+                parameter_map.get('@user_id'),
+                parameter_map.get('@user_id_prefix', ''),
+            ):
+                return [self._project(document)]
+            return []
+
+        if '@group_id' in parameter_map:
+            if self._matches_group(
+                document,
+                parameter_map.get('@group_id'),
+                parameter_map.get('@group_id_approved'),
+            ):
+                return [self._project(document)]
+            return []
+
+        if '@public_workspace_id' in parameter_map:
+            if self._matches_public(document, parameter_map.get('@public_workspace_id')):
+                return [self._project(document)]
+            return []
+
+        return []
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith('VERSION = '):
+            return line.split('=', 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError('VERSION assignment not found in config.py')
+
+
+def extract_function_source(source_text, function_name):
+    parsed = ast.parse(source_text, filename=ROUTE_FILE)
+    for node in ast.walk(parsed):
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name:
+            return ast.get_source_segment(source_text, node)
+    raise AssertionError(f'Function {function_name} not found in route_backend_chats.py')
+
+
+def load_helpers():
+    """Load the selected-document resolver without importing the full Flask app."""
+    source = read_file_text(ROUTE_FILE)
+    parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=ROUTE_FILE)
+    selected_nodes = []
+
+    for node in parsed.body:
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name in TARGET_FUNCTIONS:
+            selected_nodes.append(node)
+
+    assert len(selected_nodes) == len(TARGET_FUNCTIONS), (
+        f'Expected helper set {sorted(TARGET_FUNCTIONS)}, '
+        f'found {[node.name for node in selected_nodes]}'
+    )
+
+    module = ast.Module(body=selected_nodes, type_ignores=[])
+    namespace = {
+        'cosmos_user_documents_container': AccessAwareMockContainer(),
+        'cosmos_group_documents_container': AccessAwareMockContainer(),
+        'cosmos_public_documents_container': AccessAwareMockContainer(),
+    }
+    exec(compile(module, ROUTE_FILE, 'exec'), namespace)
+    return namespace, source
+
+
+def test_personal_foreign_document_is_not_resolved():
+    """Verify personal selected-document metadata denies unrelated documents."""
+    print('🔍 Testing personal foreign selected-document rejection...')
+
+    helpers, _ = load_helpers()
+    helpers['cosmos_user_documents_container'] = AccessAwareMockContainer([
+        {
+            'id': 'personal-foreign',
+            'file_name': 'Foreign Workbook.xlsx',
+            'user_id': 'other-user',
+            'shared_user_ids': [],
+        },
+    ])
+
+    resolved_document = helpers['_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata'](
+        'personal-foreign',
+        user_id='current-user',
+        document_scope='personal',
+    )
+
+    assert resolved_document is None
+
+
+def test_personal_shared_document_is_resolved():
+    """Verify personal selected-document metadata still honors shared-user access."""
+    print('🔍 Testing personal shared selected-document resolution...')
+
+    helpers, _ = load_helpers()
+    helpers['cosmos_user_documents_container'] = AccessAwareMockContainer([
+        {
+            'id': 'personal-shared',
+            'file_name': 'Shared Workbook.xlsx',
+            'title': 'Shared Workbook',
+            'user_id': 'other-user',
+            'shared_user_ids': ['current-user,approved'],
+        },
+    ])
+
+    resolved_document = helpers['_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata'](
+        'personal-shared',
+        user_id='current-user',
+        document_scope='personal',
+    )
+
+    assert resolved_document == {
+        'id': 'personal-shared',
+        'file_name': 'Shared Workbook.xlsx',
+        'title': 'Shared Workbook',
+        'group_id': None,
+        'public_workspace_id': None,
+        'source_hint': 'workspace',
+    }
+
+
+def test_group_raw_shared_document_is_resolved():
+    """Verify group selected-document metadata allows raw shared-group entries."""
+    print('🔍 Testing group raw-shared selected-document resolution...')
+
+    helpers, _ = load_helpers()
+    helpers['cosmos_group_documents_container'] = AccessAwareMockContainer([
+        {
+            'id': 'group-raw-shared',
+            'file_name': 'Group Raw Shared.xlsx',
+            'group_id': 'source-group',
+            'shared_group_ids': ['active-group'],
+        },
+    ])
+
+    resolved_document = helpers['_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata'](
+        'group-raw-shared',
+        document_scope='group',
+        active_group_ids=['active-group'],
+    )
+
+    assert resolved_document == {
+        'id': 'group-raw-shared',
+        'file_name': 'Group Raw Shared.xlsx',
+        'title': None,
+        'group_id': 'source-group',
+        'public_workspace_id': None,
+        'source_hint': 'group',
+    }
+
+
+def test_group_approved_shared_document_is_resolved():
+    """Verify group selected-document metadata allows approved shared-group entries."""
+    print('🔍 Testing group approved selected-document resolution...')
+
+    helpers, _ = load_helpers()
+    helpers['cosmos_group_documents_container'] = AccessAwareMockContainer([
+        {
+            'id': 'group-approved-shared',
+            'file_name': 'Group Approved Shared.xlsx',
+            'group_id': 'source-group',
+            'shared_group_ids': ['active-group,approved'],
+        },
+    ])
+
+    resolved_document = helpers['_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata'](
+        'group-approved-shared',
+        document_scope='group',
+        active_group_ids=['active-group'],
+    )
+
+    assert resolved_document == {
+        'id': 'group-approved-shared',
+        'file_name': 'Group Approved Shared.xlsx',
+        'title': None,
+        'group_id': 'source-group',
+        'public_workspace_id': None,
+        'source_hint': 'group',
+    }
+
+
+def test_public_visible_document_is_resolved():
+    """Verify public selected-document metadata resolves visible workspaces only."""
+    print('🔍 Testing visible public selected-document resolution...')
+
+    helpers, _ = load_helpers()
+    helpers['cosmos_public_documents_container'] = AccessAwareMockContainer([
+        {
+            'id': 'public-visible',
+            'file_name': 'Visible Public Workbook.xlsx',
+            'public_workspace_id': 'workspace-visible',
+        },
+    ])
+
+    resolved_document = helpers['_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata'](
+        'public-visible',
+        document_scope='public',
+        active_public_workspace_ids=['workspace-visible'],
+    )
+
+    assert resolved_document == {
+        'id': 'public-visible',
+        'file_name': 'Visible Public Workbook.xlsx',
+        'title': None,
+        'group_id': None,
+        'public_workspace_id': 'workspace-visible',
+        'source_hint': 'public',
+    }
+
+
+def test_public_hidden_document_is_not_resolved():
+    """Verify public selected-document metadata rejects hidden workspaces."""
+    print('🔍 Testing hidden public selected-document rejection...')
+
+    helpers, _ = load_helpers()
+    helpers['cosmos_public_documents_container'] = AccessAwareMockContainer([
+        {
+            'id': 'public-hidden',
+            'file_name': 'Hidden Public Workbook.xlsx',
+            'public_workspace_id': 'workspace-hidden',
+        },
+    ])
+
+    resolved_document = helpers['_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata'](
+        'public-hidden',
+        document_scope='public',
+        active_public_workspace_ids=['workspace-visible'],
+    )
+
+    assert resolved_document is None
+
+
+def test_route_uses_shared_selected_document_resolver_everywhere():
+    """Verify both chat handlers and tabular helper share the same resolver."""
+    print('🔍 Testing shared selected-document resolver wiring...')
+
+    _, source = load_helpers()
+    tabular_helper_source = extract_function_source(
+        source,
+        'get_selected_workspace_tabular_file_contexts',
+    )
+
+    assert source.count('_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata(') >= 4
+    assert 'doc_info = _resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata(' in tabular_helper_source
+    assert read_config_version() == '0.241.022'
+    assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    tests = [
+        test_personal_foreign_document_is_not_resolved,
+        test_personal_shared_document_is_resolved,
+        test_group_raw_shared_document_is_resolved,
+        test_group_approved_shared_document_is_resolved,
+        test_public_visible_document_is_resolved,
+        test_public_hidden_document_is_not_resolved,
+        test_route_uses_shared_selected_document_resolver_everywhere,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...')
+        test()
+
+    print(f'\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed')
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py b/functional_tests/test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..11ff3b51b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# test_conversations_read_ownership_authorization.py
+"""
+Functional test for personal conversation read authorization hardening.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.011; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures authenticated users can only read messages and images from
+their own personal conversations, and that foreign conversation reads fail with
+403 without querying the message container.
+"""
+
+import copy
+import importlib
+import os
+import sys
+import types
+
+from flask import Flask, jsonify
+import werkzeug
+
+if not hasattr(werkzeug, '__version__'):
+    werkzeug.__version__ = '3'
+
+sys.path.append(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), '..', 'application', 'single_app'))
+
+
+class DummyNotFoundError(Exception):
+    """Raised when a fake Cosmos item is not found."""
+
+
+class FakeConversationContainer:
+    """In-memory conversation container for route authorization tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self, items=None):
+        self.items = {}
+        for item in items or []:
+            self.items[item['id']] = copy.deepcopy(item)
+
+    def read_item(self, item=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        item_id = item if item is not None else args[0]
+        if item_id not in self.items:
+            raise DummyNotFoundError(item_id)
+        return copy.deepcopy(self.items[item_id])
+
+
+class FakeMessageContainer:
+    """In-memory message container that tracks query attempts."""
+
+    def __init__(self, items=None):
+        self.items = [copy.deepcopy(item) for item in (items or [])]
+        self.query_count = 0
+
+    def query_items(self, query=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        self.query_count += 1
+        matching_items = [
+            copy.deepcopy(item)
+            for item in self.items
+            if item.get('conversation_id') == partition_key
+        ]
+        matching_items.sort(key=lambda item: item.get('timestamp', ''))
+        return matching_items
+
+
+def _passthrough_decorator(*args, **kwargs):
+    """Return the wrapped function unchanged for decorator stubs."""
+    if args and callable(args[0]) and len(args) == 1 and not kwargs:
+        return args[0]
+    return lambda func: func
+
+
+def _install_route_import_stubs():
+    """Install lightweight module stubs so the route module imports in isolation."""
+    stub_modules = {}
+
+    config_module = types.ModuleType('config')
+    config_module.cosmos_conversations_container = None
+    config_module.cosmos_messages_container = None
+    config_module.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+    stub_modules['config'] = config_module
+
+    auth_module = types.ModuleType('functions_authentication')
+    auth_module.login_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.user_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.get_current_user_id = lambda: None
+    auth_module.jsonify = jsonify
+    stub_modules['functions_authentication'] = auth_module
+
+    settings_module = types.ModuleType('functions_settings')
+    settings_module.get_settings = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['functions_settings'] = settings_module
+
+    metadata_module = types.ModuleType('functions_conversation_metadata')
+    metadata_module.get_conversation_metadata = lambda *args, **kwargs: {}
+    metadata_module.update_conversation_with_metadata = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_conversation_metadata'] = metadata_module
+
+    unread_module = types.ModuleType('functions_conversation_unread')
+    unread_module.clear_conversation_unread = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    unread_module.normalize_conversation_unread_state = lambda item: item
+    stub_modules['functions_conversation_unread'] = unread_module
+
+    notifications_module = types.ModuleType('functions_notifications')
+    notifications_module.mark_chat_response_notifications_read_for_conversation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_notifications'] = notifications_module
+
+    debug_module = types.ModuleType('functions_debug')
+    debug_module.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_debug'] = debug_module
+
+    artifacts_module = types.ModuleType('functions_message_artifacts')
+    artifacts_module.filter_assistant_artifact_items = lambda items: items
+    stub_modules['functions_message_artifacts'] = artifacts_module
+
+    swagger_module = types.ModuleType('swagger_wrapper')
+    swagger_module.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    swagger_module.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['swagger_wrapper'] = swagger_module
+
+    activity_module = types.ModuleType('functions_activity_logging')
+    activity_module.log_conversation_creation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    activity_module.log_conversation_deletion = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    activity_module.log_conversation_archival = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_activity_logging'] = activity_module
+
+    thoughts_module = types.ModuleType('functions_thoughts')
+    thoughts_module.archive_thoughts_for_conversation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    thoughts_module.delete_thoughts_for_conversation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_thoughts'] = thoughts_module
+
+    for module_name, module in stub_modules.items():
+        sys.modules[module_name] = module
+
+
+def _load_route_backend_conversations_module():
+    """Import the route module after installing lightweight dependency stubs."""
+    _install_route_import_stubs()
+    if 'route_backend_conversations' in sys.modules:
+        del sys.modules['route_backend_conversations']
+    return importlib.import_module('route_backend_conversations')
+
+
+def build_test_app(test_user_id, conversation_items, message_items):
+    """Register the conversation routes with fake auth and fake Cosmos containers."""
+    route_backend_conversations = _load_route_backend_conversations_module()
+
+    conversation_container = FakeConversationContainer(conversation_items)
+    message_container = FakeMessageContainer(message_items)
+
+    route_backend_conversations.cosmos_conversations_container = conversation_container
+    route_backend_conversations.cosmos_messages_container = message_container
+    route_backend_conversations.login_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_conversations.user_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_conversations.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    route_backend_conversations.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    route_backend_conversations.get_current_user_id = lambda: test_user_id
+    route_backend_conversations.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    route_backend_conversations.filter_assistant_artifact_items = lambda items: items
+    route_backend_conversations.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config['TESTING'] = True
+    route_backend_conversations.register_route_backend_conversations(app)
+
+    return app, message_container, (lambda: None)
+
+
+def test_owner_can_read_messages():
+    """Verify an owner can read their own conversation history."""
+    print("🔍 Testing owner message read access...")
+
+    app, message_container, restore = build_test_app(
+        'user-owner',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'user_id': 'user-owner',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-1',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'role': 'user',
+                'content': 'Owner message',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:00Z',
+                'metadata': {},
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    try:
+        with app.test_client() as client:
+            response = client.get('/api/get_messages?conversation_id=conversation-owner')
+
+        payload = response.get_json()
+        if response.status_code != 200:
+            print(f"❌ Expected 200, got {response.status_code}: {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if len(payload.get('messages', [])) != 1:
+            print(f"❌ Expected one message, got {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if message_container.query_count != 1:
+            print(f"❌ Expected one message query, got {message_container.query_count}")
+            return False
+
+        print("✅ Owner message read returned expected payload")
+        return True
+    finally:
+        restore()
+
+
+def test_foreign_messages_return_forbidden_before_query():
+    """Verify foreign conversation message reads fail closed before querying messages."""
+    print("🔍 Testing foreign message read rejection...")
+
+    app, message_container, restore = build_test_app(
+        'user-attacker',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'user_id': 'user-victim',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-victim',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'role': 'user',
+                'content': 'Victim message',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:00Z',
+                'metadata': {},
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    try:
+        with app.test_client() as client:
+            response = client.get('/api/get_messages?conversation_id=conversation-victim')
+
+        payload = response.get_json()
+        if response.status_code != 403:
+            print(f"❌ Expected 403, got {response.status_code}: {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+            print(f"❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if message_container.query_count != 0:
+            print(f"❌ Message container should not be queried, got {message_container.query_count}")
+            return False
+
+        print("✅ Foreign message read was blocked before querying messages")
+        return True
+    finally:
+        restore()
+
+
+def test_missing_conversation_preserves_empty_message_history_response():
+    """Verify missing conversations still return the legacy empty message payload."""
+    print("🔍 Testing missing conversation message response...")
+
+    app, message_container, restore = build_test_app('user-owner', [], [])
+
+    try:
+        with app.test_client() as client:
+            response = client.get('/api/get_messages?conversation_id=missing-conversation')
+
+        payload = response.get_json()
+        if response.status_code != 200:
+            print(f"❌ Expected 200, got {response.status_code}: {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if payload != {'messages': []}:
+            print(f"❌ Expected empty messages payload, got {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if message_container.query_count != 0:
+            print(f"❌ Message container should not be queried, got {message_container.query_count}")
+            return False
+
+        print("✅ Missing conversation preserves the legacy empty payload")
+        return True
+    finally:
+        restore()
+
+
+def test_owner_can_read_image():
+    """Verify an owner can fetch inline image content from their own conversation."""
+    print("🔍 Testing owner image read access...")
+
+    image_id = 'conversation-owner_image_20260505_random'
+    app, message_container, restore = build_test_app(
+        'user-owner',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'user_id': 'user-owner',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': image_id,
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'role': 'image',
+                'content': '',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:00Z',
+                'metadata': {},
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    try:
+        with app.test_client() as client:
+            response = client.get(f'/api/image/{image_id}')
+
+        if response.status_code != 200:
+            print(f"❌ Expected 200, got {response.status_code}: {response.get_data(as_text=True)}")
+            return False
+
+        if response.mimetype != 'image/png':
+            print(f"❌ Expected image/png, got {response.mimetype}")
+            return False
+
+        if message_container.query_count != 1:
+            print(f"❌ Expected one image query, got {message_container.query_count}")
+            return False
+
+        print("✅ Owner image read returned binary image data")
+        return True
+    finally:
+        restore()
+
+
+def test_foreign_image_return_forbidden_before_query():
+    """Verify foreign conversation image reads fail closed before querying messages."""
+    print("🔍 Testing foreign image read rejection...")
+
+    image_id = 'conversation-victim_image_20260505_random'
+    app, message_container, restore = build_test_app(
+        'user-attacker',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'user_id': 'user-victim',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': image_id,
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'role': 'image',
+                'content': '',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:00Z',
+                'metadata': {},
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    try:
+        with app.test_client() as client:
+            response = client.get(f'/api/image/{image_id}')
+
+        payload = response.get_json()
+        if response.status_code != 403:
+            print(f"❌ Expected 403, got {response.status_code}: {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+            print(f"❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if message_container.query_count != 0:
+            print(f"❌ Message container should not be queried, got {message_container.query_count}")
+            return False
+
+        print("✅ Foreign image read was blocked before querying messages")
+        return True
+    finally:
+        restore()
+
+
+def test_missing_image_preserves_not_found_response():
+    """Verify missing images still return the existing not-found contract."""
+    print("🔍 Testing missing image response...")
+
+    image_id = 'conversation-owner_image_20260505_random'
+    app, message_container, restore = build_test_app(
+        'user-owner',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'user_id': 'user-owner',
+            }
+        ],
+        [],
+    )
+
+    try:
+        with app.test_client() as client:
+            response = client.get(f'/api/image/{image_id}')
+
+        payload = response.get_json()
+        if response.status_code != 404:
+            print(f"❌ Expected 404, got {response.status_code}: {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if payload.get('error') != 'Image not found':
+            print(f"❌ Expected Image not found error, got {payload}")
+            return False
+
+        if message_container.query_count != 1:
+            print(f"❌ Expected one image query, got {message_container.query_count}")
+            return False
+
+        print("✅ Missing image preserves the not-found response")
+        return True
+    finally:
+        restore()
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    tests = [
+        test_owner_can_read_messages,
+        test_foreign_messages_return_forbidden_before_query,
+        test_missing_conversation_preserves_empty_message_history_response,
+        test_owner_can_read_image,
+        test_foreign_image_return_forbidden_before_query,
+        test_missing_image_preserves_not_found_response,
+    ]
+
+    print('🧪 Running conversation read ownership authorization tests...')
+    print('=' * 60)
+
+    results = []
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...')
+        results.append(test())
+
+    success = all(results)
+    print('\n' + '=' * 60)
+    print(f'📊 Test Results: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed')
+
+    sys.exit(0 if success else 1)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_feedback_submission_authorization.py b/functional_tests/test_feedback_submission_authorization.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c6b3a0441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_feedback_submission_authorization.py
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# test_feedback_submission_authorization.py
+"""
+Functional test for feedback submission authorization hardening.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.013; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures feedback submission only accepts assistant messages from
+the authenticated user's own conversation, rejects foreign conversation ids
+before querying messages, and does not persist feedback rows when the target
+assistant message is missing.
+"""
+
+import copy
+import importlib
+import os
+import sys
+import types
+import uuid
+
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from flask import Flask, jsonify, request, session
+import werkzeug
+
+
+if not hasattr(werkzeug, '__version__'):
+    werkzeug.__version__ = '3'
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+sys.path.append(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app'))
+
+
+class DummyNotFoundError(Exception):
+    """Raised when a fake Cosmos item is not found."""
+
+
+class FakeConversationContainer:
+    """In-memory conversation container for feedback authorization tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self, items=None):
+        self.items = {}
+        for item in items or []:
+            self.items[item['id']] = copy.deepcopy(item)
+
+    def read_item(self, item=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        item_id = item if item is not None else args[0]
+        if item_id not in self.items:
+            raise DummyNotFoundError(item_id)
+        return copy.deepcopy(self.items[item_id])
+
+
+class FakeMessageContainer:
+    """In-memory message container that tracks feedback target lookups."""
+
+    def __init__(self, items=None):
+        self.items = [copy.deepcopy(item) for item in (items or [])]
+        self.query_count = 0
+
+    def query_items(self, query=None, parameters=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        self.query_count += 1
+        matching_items = [
+            copy.deepcopy(item)
+            for item in self.items
+            if item.get('conversation_id') == partition_key
+        ]
+        matching_items.sort(key=lambda item: item.get('timestamp', ''))
+        return matching_items
+
+
+class FakeFeedbackContainer:
+    """In-memory feedback container that tracks persisted feedback rows."""
+
+    def __init__(self, items=None):
+        self.items = {}
+        for item in items or []:
+            self.items[item['id']] = copy.deepcopy(item)
+
+    def upsert_item(self, item):
+        self.items[item['id']] = copy.deepcopy(item)
+        return copy.deepcopy(item)
+
+
+def _passthrough_decorator(*args, **kwargs):
+    """Return the wrapped function unchanged for decorator stubs."""
+    if args and callable(args[0]) and len(args) == 1 and not kwargs:
+        return args[0]
+    return lambda func: func
+
+
+def _install_route_import_stubs():
+    """Install lightweight module stubs so the feedback route imports in isolation."""
+    stub_modules = {}
+
+    config_module = types.ModuleType('config')
+    config_module.cosmos_conversations_container = None
+    config_module.cosmos_messages_container = None
+    config_module.cosmos_feedback_container = None
+    config_module.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+    config_module.exceptions = types.SimpleNamespace(CosmosResourceNotFoundError=DummyNotFoundError)
+    config_module.datetime = datetime
+    config_module.request = request
+    config_module.session = session
+    config_module.jsonify = jsonify
+    config_module.uuid = uuid
+    stub_modules['config'] = config_module
+
+    auth_module = types.ModuleType('functions_authentication')
+    auth_module.login_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.user_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.feedback_admin_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.jsonify = jsonify
+    stub_modules['functions_authentication'] = auth_module
+
+    settings_module = types.ModuleType('functions_settings')
+    settings_module.enabled_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    settings_module.get_settings = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['functions_settings'] = settings_module
+
+    swagger_module = types.ModuleType('swagger_wrapper')
+    swagger_module.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    swagger_module.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['swagger_wrapper'] = swagger_module
+
+    for module_name, module in stub_modules.items():
+        sys.modules[module_name] = module
+
+
+def _load_route_backend_feedback_module():
+    """Import the feedback route module after installing lightweight stubs."""
+    _install_route_import_stubs()
+    if 'route_backend_feedback' in sys.modules:
+        del sys.modules['route_backend_feedback']
+    return importlib.import_module('route_backend_feedback')
+
+
+def build_test_app(test_user_id, conversation_items, message_items, roles=None):
+    """Register feedback routes with fake auth and fake Cosmos containers."""
+    route_backend_feedback = _load_route_backend_feedback_module()
+
+    conversation_container = FakeConversationContainer(conversation_items)
+    message_container = FakeMessageContainer(message_items)
+    feedback_container = FakeFeedbackContainer()
+
+    route_backend_feedback.cosmos_conversations_container = conversation_container
+    route_backend_feedback.cosmos_messages_container = message_container
+    route_backend_feedback.cosmos_feedback_container = feedback_container
+    route_backend_feedback.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+    route_backend_feedback.login_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_feedback.user_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_feedback.feedback_admin_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_feedback.enabled_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    route_backend_feedback.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    route_backend_feedback.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config['TESTING'] = True
+    app.secret_key = 'test-secret'
+    route_backend_feedback.register_route_backend_feedback(app)
+
+    def create_client():
+        client = app.test_client()
+        with client.session_transaction() as flask_session:
+            flask_session['user'] = {
+                'oid': test_user_id,
+                'roles': roles or ['User'],
+            }
+        return client
+
+    return create_client, message_container, feedback_container
+
+
+def test_owner_feedback_submission_saves_authorized_content():
+    """Verify owners can submit feedback for assistant messages in their own conversation."""
+    print('🔍 Testing owner feedback submission success...')
+
+    create_client, message_container, feedback_container = build_test_app(
+        'user-owner',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'user_id': 'user-owner',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-user',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'role': 'user',
+                'content': 'Owner prompt',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:00Z',
+            },
+            {
+                'id': 'message-assistant',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'role': 'assistant',
+                'content': 'Owner response',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:01Z',
+            },
+        ],
+    )
+
+    client = create_client()
+    response = client.post(
+        '/feedback/submit',
+        json={
+            'messageId': 'message-assistant',
+            'conversationId': 'conversation-owner',
+            'feedbackType': 'positive',
+            'reason': '',
+        },
+    )
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 200 or not payload.get('success'):
+        print(f'❌ Expected successful feedback save, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+
+    if message_container.query_count != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Expected one message query, got {message_container.query_count}')
+        return False
+
+    if len(feedback_container.items) != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Expected one feedback row, got {len(feedback_container.items)}')
+        return False
+
+    saved_feedback = next(iter(feedback_container.items.values()))
+    if saved_feedback.get('userId') != 'user-owner':
+        print(f'❌ Expected feedback to belong to owner, got {saved_feedback}')
+        return False
+    if saved_feedback.get('prompt') != 'Owner prompt':
+        print(f'❌ Expected owner prompt to be copied, got {saved_feedback}')
+        return False
+    if saved_feedback.get('aiResponse') != 'Owner response':
+        print(f'❌ Expected owner response to be copied, got {saved_feedback}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Owner feedback submission saved the authorized conversation content')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_foreign_feedback_submission_returns_forbidden_before_query():
+    """Verify foreign conversation ids fail closed before any message query executes."""
+    print('🔍 Testing foreign feedback submission rejection...')
+
+    create_client, message_container, feedback_container = build_test_app(
+        'user-attacker',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'user_id': 'user-victim',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-victim-user',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'role': 'user',
+                'content': 'Victim prompt',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:00Z',
+            },
+            {
+                'id': 'message-victim-assistant',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'role': 'assistant',
+                'content': 'Victim response',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:01Z',
+            },
+        ],
+    )
+
+    client = create_client()
+    response = client.post(
+        '/feedback/submit',
+        json={
+            'messageId': 'message-victim-assistant',
+            'conversationId': 'conversation-victim',
+            'feedbackType': 'negative',
+            'reason': 'Probe',
+        },
+    )
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 403:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 403, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if message_container.query_count != 0:
+        print(f'❌ Message container should not be queried, got {message_container.query_count}')
+        return False
+    if feedback_container.items:
+        print(f'❌ No feedback should be written on foreign submission, got {feedback_container.items}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Foreign feedback submission was blocked before querying messages')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_missing_assistant_message_returns_not_found_without_persisting_feedback():
+    """Verify missing assistant targets do not create placeholder feedback rows."""
+    print('🔍 Testing missing assistant message rejection...')
+
+    create_client, message_container, feedback_container = build_test_app(
+        'user-owner',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'user_id': 'user-owner',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-user',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'role': 'user',
+                'content': 'Owner prompt',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:00Z',
+            },
+            {
+                'id': 'message-assistant',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'role': 'assistant',
+                'content': 'Owner response',
+                'timestamp': '2026-05-05T12:00:01Z',
+            },
+        ],
+    )
+
+    client = create_client()
+    response = client.post(
+        '/feedback/submit',
+        json={
+            'messageId': 'message-missing',
+            'conversationId': 'conversation-owner',
+            'feedbackType': 'negative',
+            'reason': 'Missing target',
+        },
+    )
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 404:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 404, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Assistant message not found':
+        print(f'❌ Expected missing assistant error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if message_container.query_count != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Expected one message query, got {message_container.query_count}')
+        return False
+    if feedback_container.items:
+        print(f'❌ No feedback should be written for a missing assistant message, got {feedback_container.items}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Missing assistant messages are rejected without persisting feedback')
+    return True
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    tests = [
+        test_owner_feedback_submission_saves_authorized_content,
+        test_foreign_feedback_submission_returns_forbidden_before_query,
+        test_missing_assistant_message_returns_not_found_without_persisting_feedback,
+    ]
+
+    print('🧪 Running feedback submission authorization tests...')
+    print('=' * 60)
+
+    results = []
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...')
+        results.append(test())
+
+    success = all(results)
+    print('\n' + '=' * 60)
+    print(f'📊 Test Results: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed')
+
+    sys.exit(0 if success else 1)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py b/functional_tests/test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..65c82cd3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+# test_keyvault_plugin_secret_scope_enforcement.py
+"""
+Functional test for Key Vault plugin secret scope enforcement.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.011; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures plugin Key Vault references are validated against the
+expected scope and source before they are preserved, resolved, or deleted.
+It also verifies the runtime plugin loader and SQL test-connection flow do
+not dereference cross-scope secret references.
+"""
+
+import ast
+import logging
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+KEYVAULT_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "functions_keyvault.py")
+PLUGIN_ROUTE_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_backend_plugins.py")
+SK_LOADER_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "semantic_kernel_loader.py")
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py")
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "docs",
+    "explanation",
+    "fixes",
+    "v0.241.011",
+    "KEY_VAULT_PLUGIN_SECRET_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md",
+)
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8-sig") as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("VERSION = "):
+            return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py")
+
+
+def load_functions(file_path, function_names, namespace=None):
+    source = read_file_text(file_path)
+    parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=file_path)
+    selected_nodes = [
+        node for node in parsed.body
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name in function_names
+    ]
+    assert len(selected_nodes) == len(function_names), (
+        f"Expected functions {sorted(function_names)} in {file_path}, "
+        f"found {[node.name for node in selected_nodes]}"
+    )
+    module = ast.Module(body=selected_nodes, type_ignores=[])
+    exec_namespace = dict(namespace or {})
+    exec(compile(module, file_path, "exec"), exec_namespace)
+    return exec_namespace, source
+
+
+def extract_function_source(source_text, function_name):
+    parsed = ast.parse(source_text)
+    for node in ast.walk(parsed):
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name:
+            return ast.get_source_segment(source_text, node)
+    raise AssertionError(f"Function {function_name} not found")
+
+
+def test_secret_reference_context_matching_rejects_cross_scope_values():
+    """Verify full secret names must match the expected scope and source."""
+    print("🔍 Testing Key Vault secret reference context matching...")
+
+    namespace, _ = load_functions(
+        KEYVAULT_FILE,
+        {"clean_name_for_keyvault", "_normalize_allowed_sources", "parse_secret_name_dynamic", "secret_reference_matches_context"},
+        {
+            "re": re,
+            "supported_scopes": ["global", "user", "group"],
+            "supported_sources": ["action", "action-addset", "agent", "model-endpoint", "other"],
+        },
+    )
+
+    matches_context = namespace["secret_reference_matches_context"]
+    valid_reference = "user-123--action-addset--user--plugin-connection-string"
+
+    assert matches_context(valid_reference, scope_value="user-123", scope="user", allowed_sources={"action-addset"})
+    assert not matches_context(valid_reference, scope_value="user-456", scope="user", allowed_sources={"action-addset"})
+    assert not matches_context(valid_reference, scope_value="user-123", scope="user", allowed_sources={"action"})
+    assert not matches_context(valid_reference, scope_value="user-123", scope="group", allowed_sources={"action-addset"})
+
+    print("✅ Key Vault secret reference context matching passed")
+
+
+def test_store_plugin_secret_reference_rejects_cross_scope_secret_names():
+    """Verify user-supplied cross-scope plugin references are rejected at save time."""
+    print("🔍 Testing plugin save-time secret reference rejection...")
+
+    namespace, _ = load_functions(
+        KEYVAULT_FILE,
+        {
+            "clean_name_for_keyvault",
+            "_normalize_allowed_sources",
+            "parse_secret_name_dynamic",
+            "secret_reference_matches_context",
+            "_log_secret_reference_context_mismatch",
+            "_get_nested_dict_value",
+            "_set_nested_dict_value",
+            "_get_existing_secret_reference",
+            "validate_secret_name_dynamic",
+            "_store_plugin_secret_reference",
+        },
+        {
+            "log_event": lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
+            "logging": logging,
+            "re": re,
+            "supported_scopes": ["global", "user", "group"],
+            "supported_sources": ["action", "action-addset", "agent", "model-endpoint", "other"],
+            "ui_trigger_word": "Stored_In_KeyVault",
+            "build_full_secret_name": lambda *args, **kwargs: "unused",
+            "store_secret_in_key_vault": lambda *args, **kwargs: "unused",
+        },
+    )
+
+    store_reference = namespace["_store_plugin_secret_reference"]
+    plugin_manifest = {
+        "auth": {
+            "type": "key",
+            "key": "other-user--action--user--foreign-plugin",
+        }
+    }
+
+    try:
+        store_reference(
+            plugin_manifest,
+            existing_plugin=None,
+            path=("auth", "key"),
+            secret_name="local-plugin",
+            scope_value="current-user",
+            source="action",
+            scope="user",
+        )
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        assert "does not match the expected scope" in str(exc)
+    else:
+        raise AssertionError("Expected cross-scope plugin secret reference to be rejected")
+
+    print("✅ Plugin save-time secret reference rejection passed")
+
+
+def test_runtime_plugin_loader_blanks_secret_fields_on_scope_mismatch():
+    """Verify the runtime loader refuses to resolve foreign plugin secret references."""
+    print("🔍 Testing runtime plugin secret resolution hardening...")
+
+    namespace, _ = load_functions(
+        SK_LOADER_FILE,
+        {"_get_plugin_secret_context", "_is_sql_sensitive_plugin_field", "resolve_key_vault_secrets_in_plugins"},
+        {
+            "SQL_PLUGIN_SENSITIVE_AUTH_FIELDS": {"client_secret"},
+            "SQL_PLUGIN_SENSITIVE_ADDITIONAL_FIELDS": {"connection_string", "password"},
+            "validate_secret_name_dynamic": lambda value: isinstance(value, str) and value.startswith("ref-"),
+            "resolve_secret_reference_for_context": lambda *args, **kwargs: (_ for _ in ()).throw(ValueError("scope mismatch")),
+            "log_event": lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
+            "logging": logging,
+            "debug_print": lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
+        },
+    )
+
+    resolve_manifest = namespace["resolve_key_vault_secrets_in_plugins"]
+    plugin_manifest = {
+        "id": "plugin-1",
+        "name": "sql-plugin",
+        "user_id": "current-user",
+        "type": "sql_query",
+        "auth": {"type": "key", "key": "ref-auth"},
+        "additionalFields": {"connection_string": "ref-connection"},
+    }
+
+    resolved_manifest = resolve_manifest(plugin_manifest, {"key_vault_name": "kv-demo"})
+    assert resolved_manifest["auth"]["key"] == ""
+    assert resolved_manifest["additionalFields"]["connection_string"] == ""
+
+    print("✅ Runtime plugin secret resolution hardening passed")
+
+
+def test_sql_secret_resolution_helper_binds_expected_scope_and_source():
+    """Verify SQL test-connection resolution delegates to the scope-aware Key Vault helper."""
+    print("🔍 Testing SQL test-connection secret resolution helper...")
+
+    captured = {}
+
+    def fake_resolver(value, scope_value=None, scope=None, allowed_sources=None, context_label=None):
+        captured.update({
+            "value": value,
+            "scope_value": scope_value,
+            "scope": scope,
+            "allowed_sources": allowed_sources,
+            "context_label": context_label,
+        })
+        return "resolved-secret"
+
+    namespace, _ = load_functions(
+        PLUGIN_ROUTE_FILE,
+        {"_resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test"},
+        {
+            "validate_secret_name_dynamic": lambda value: True,
+            "resolve_secret_reference_for_context": fake_resolver,
+        },
+    )
+
+    resolve_sql_secret = namespace["_resolve_secret_value_for_sql_test"]
+    resolved_value = resolve_sql_secret(
+        "user-123--action-addset--user--plugin-connection-string",
+        "connection_string",
+        scope_value="user-123",
+        scope="user",
+    )
+
+    assert resolved_value == "resolved-secret"
+    assert captured["scope_value"] == "user-123"
+    assert captured["scope"] == "user"
+    assert captured["allowed_sources"] == {"action-addset"}
+    assert captured["context_label"] == "SQL field 'connection_string'"
+
+    print("✅ SQL test-connection secret resolution helper passed")
+
+
+def test_delete_and_loader_paths_include_scope_checks():
+    """Verify the delete and runtime loader paths include explicit scope validation hooks."""
+    print("🔍 Testing delete and loader source enforcement markers...")
+
+    keyvault_source = read_file_text(KEYVAULT_FILE)
+    loader_source = read_file_text(SK_LOADER_FILE)
+
+    delete_source = extract_function_source(keyvault_source, "keyvault_plugin_delete_helper")
+    assert delete_source.count("secret_reference_matches_context(") >= 2
+    assert delete_source.count("continue") >= 2
+
+    loader_source_segment = extract_function_source(loader_source, "resolve_key_vault_secrets_in_plugins")
+    assert "resolve_secret_reference_for_context(" in loader_source_segment
+    assert "resolved_auth[auth_field] = \"\"" in loader_source_segment
+    assert "resolved_additional_fields[field_name] = \"\"" in loader_source_segment
+
+    print("✅ Delete and loader source enforcement markers passed")
+
+
+def test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist():
+    """Verify the config version bump and fix documentation landed for this change."""
+    print("🔍 Testing Key Vault scope enforcement documentation and version...")
+
+    assert read_config_version() == "0.241.022"
+    assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}"
+
+    print("✅ Key Vault scope enforcement documentation and version passed")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    tests = [
+        test_secret_reference_context_matching_rejects_cross_scope_values,
+        test_store_plugin_secret_reference_rejects_cross_scope_secret_names,
+        test_runtime_plugin_loader_blanks_secret_fields_on_scope_mismatch,
+        test_sql_secret_resolution_helper_binds_expected_scope_and_source,
+        test_delete_and_loader_paths_include_scope_checks,
+        test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...")
+        test()
+
+    print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed")
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_log_analytics_plugin_user_scope_enforcement.py b/functional_tests/test_log_analytics_plugin_user_scope_enforcement.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..032d20124
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_log_analytics_plugin_user_scope_enforcement.py
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+# test_log_analytics_plugin_user_scope_enforcement.py
+"""
+Functional test for Log Analytics plugin user-scope enforcement.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.012; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures the Log Analytics plugin no longer exposes a caller-controlled
+`user_id` parameter, query history binds to the authenticated user on the
+server, shared user-settings helpers deny cross-user access by default, and
+the reviewed Control Center admin flows opt into an explicit cross-user bypass.
+"""
+
+import ast
+import logging
+import os
+import sys
+import types
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+LOG_ANALYTICS_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "semantic_kernel_plugins",
+    "log_analytics_plugin.py",
+)
+SETTINGS_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "functions_settings.py")
+CONTROL_CENTER_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_backend_control_center.py")
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py")
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "docs",
+    "explanation",
+    "fixes",
+    "v0.241.012",
+    "LOG_ANALYTICS_PLUGIN_USER_SCOPE_ENFORCEMENT_FIX.md",
+)
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8-sig") as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("VERSION = "):
+            return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py")
+
+
+def load_functions(file_path, function_names, namespace=None):
+    source = read_file_text(file_path)
+    parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=file_path)
+    selected_nodes = [
+        node for node in parsed.body
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name in function_names
+    ]
+    assert len(selected_nodes) == len(function_names), (
+        f"Expected functions {sorted(function_names)} in {file_path}, "
+        f"found {[node.name for node in selected_nodes]}"
+    )
+    module = ast.Module(body=selected_nodes, type_ignores=[])
+    exec_namespace = dict(namespace or {})
+    exec(compile(module, file_path, "exec"), exec_namespace)
+    return exec_namespace, source
+
+
+def get_method_arg_names(file_path, method_name):
+    source = read_file_text(file_path)
+    parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=file_path)
+    for node in ast.walk(parsed):
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == method_name:
+            return [argument.arg for argument in node.args.args]
+    raise AssertionError(f"Method {method_name} not found in {file_path}")
+
+
+def extract_function_source(source_text, function_name):
+    parsed = ast.parse(source_text)
+    for node in ast.walk(parsed):
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name:
+            return ast.get_source_segment(source_text, node)
+    raise AssertionError(f"Function {function_name} not found")
+
+
+def test_log_analytics_plugin_no_longer_exposes_user_id():
+    """Verify the tool surface and runtime logic bind query history to the authenticated user."""
+    print("🔍 Testing Log Analytics plugin user-scope binding...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(LOG_ANALYTICS_FILE)
+    metadata_source = extract_function_source(source, "_generate_metadata")
+    run_query_source = extract_function_source(source, "run_query")
+    history_source = extract_function_source(source, "get_query_history")
+
+    assert "User ID for query history tracking" not in metadata_source
+    assert get_method_arg_names(LOG_ANALYTICS_FILE, "run_query") == ["self", "query", "timespan"]
+    assert get_method_arg_names(LOG_ANALYTICS_FILE, "get_query_history") == ["self", "limit"]
+    assert "history_user_id = self._get_authenticated_history_user_id()" in run_query_source
+    assert "self._save_query_history_to_cosmos(history_user_id, query)" in run_query_source
+    assert "user_id = self._get_authenticated_history_user_id()" in history_source
+
+    print("✅ Log Analytics plugin user-scope binding passed")
+
+
+def test_user_settings_helpers_deny_cross_user_access_without_bypass():
+    """Verify shared settings helpers default-deny cross-user access during request context."""
+    print("🔍 Testing shared user-settings access control...")
+
+    fake_auth_module = types.ModuleType("functions_authentication")
+    fake_auth_module.get_current_user_id = lambda: "actor-user"
+    original_auth_module = sys.modules.get("functions_authentication")
+    sys.modules["functions_authentication"] = fake_auth_module
+
+    try:
+        namespace, source = load_functions(
+            SETTINGS_FILE,
+            {"_authorize_user_settings_access", "_should_sync_session_profile"},
+            {
+                "has_request_context": lambda: True,
+                "log_event": lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
+                "logging": logging,
+            },
+        )
+
+        authorize_access = namespace["_authorize_user_settings_access"]
+        should_sync_profile = namespace["_should_sync_session_profile"]
+
+        assert authorize_access("actor-user", "read") == "actor-user"
+
+        try:
+            authorize_access("target-user", "update")
+        except PermissionError as exc:
+            assert "another user" in str(exc)
+        else:
+            raise AssertionError("Expected cross-user settings update to raise PermissionError")
+
+        assert authorize_access("target-user", "update", allow_cross_user=True) is None
+        assert should_sync_profile("actor-user", "actor-user") is True
+        assert should_sync_profile("target-user", "actor-user") is False
+        assert should_sync_profile("target-user", "actor-user", allow_cross_user=True) is False
+
+        assert "def get_user_settings(user_id, allow_cross_user=False):" in source
+        assert "def update_user_settings(user_id, settings_to_update, allow_cross_user=False):" in source
+    finally:
+        if original_auth_module is None:
+            sys.modules.pop("functions_authentication", None)
+        else:
+            sys.modules["functions_authentication"] = original_auth_module
+
+    print("✅ Shared user-settings access control passed")
+
+
+def test_control_center_cross_user_updates_opt_into_bypass():
+    """Verify the reviewed admin routes explicitly opt into cross-user settings writes."""
+    print("🔍 Testing Control Center admin bypass call sites...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(CONTROL_CENTER_FILE)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "update_user_settings(user.get('id'), settings_update, allow_cross_user=True)",
+        "update_user_settings(user_id, access_settings, allow_cross_user=True)",
+        "update_user_settings(user_id, file_upload_settings, allow_cross_user=True)",
+        "update_user_settings(user_id, update_settings, allow_cross_user=True)",
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing explicit Control Center bypass snippets: {missing}"
+
+    print("✅ Control Center admin bypass call sites passed")
+
+
+def test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist():
+    """Verify the config version bump and fix document landed for the f016 pass."""
+    print("🔍 Testing f016 documentation and version...")
+
+    assert read_config_version() == "0.241.022"
+    assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}"
+
+    print("✅ f016 documentation and version passed")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    tests = [
+        test_log_analytics_plugin_no_longer_exposes_user_id,
+        test_user_settings_helpers_deny_cross_user_access_without_bypass,
+        test_control_center_cross_user_updates_opt_into_bypass,
+        test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...")
+        test()
+
+    print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed")
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_multimedia_support_reorganization.py b/functional_tests/test_multimedia_support_reorganization.py
index 23abfef55..68bda79ea 100644
--- a/functional_tests/test_multimedia_support_reorganization.py
+++ b/functional_tests/test_multimedia_support_reorganization.py
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # test_multimedia_support_reorganization.py
 """
 Functional test for multimedia support reorganization and shared speech guidance.
-Version: 0.241.010
+Version: 0.241.016
 Implemented in: 0.241.010
 
 This test ensures that:
@@ -250,11 +250,11 @@ def test_version_update():
         with open(config_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as file_handle:
             content = file_handle.read()
 
-        if 'VERSION = "0.241.010"' not in content:
-            print("❌ Version not updated to 0.241.010")
+        if 'VERSION = "0.241.016"' not in content:
+            print("❌ Version not updated to 0.241.016")
             return False
 
-        print("✅ Version successfully updated to 0.241.010")
+        print("✅ Version successfully updated to 0.241.016")
         return True
 
     except Exception as exc:
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_personal_conversation_followup_authorization.py b/functional_tests/test_personal_conversation_followup_authorization.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e6659db82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_personal_conversation_followup_authorization.py
@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# test_personal_conversation_followup_authorization.py
+"""
+Functional test for personal conversation authorization follow-up.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.012; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures destructive, file-content, and frontend personal
+conversation routes enforce ownership, and the chat message loader handles
+authorization failures cleanly.
+"""
+
+import copy
+import importlib
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import traceback
+import types
+
+import werkzeug
+from flask import Flask, jsonify, request
+
+
+if not hasattr(werkzeug, '__version__'):
+    werkzeug.__version__ = '3'
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+CHAT_MESSAGES_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    'application',
+    'single_app',
+    'static',
+    'js',
+    'chat',
+    'chat-messages.js',
+)
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app', 'config.py')
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    'docs',
+    'explanation',
+    'fixes',
+    'v0.241.012',
+    'PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_AUTHORIZATION_FOLLOW_UP_FIX.md',
+)
+
+sys.path.append(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app'))
+
+
+class DummyNotFoundError(Exception):
+    """Raised when a fake Cosmos item is not found."""
+
+
+class FakeConversationContainer:
+    """In-memory conversation container for authorization tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self, items=None):
+        self.items = {}
+        self.deleted_ids = []
+        for item in items or []:
+            self.items[item['id']] = copy.deepcopy(item)
+
+    def read_item(self, item=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        item_id = item if item is not None else args[0]
+        if item_id not in self.items:
+            raise DummyNotFoundError(item_id)
+        return copy.deepcopy(self.items[item_id])
+
+    def delete_item(self, item=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        item_id = item if item is not None else args[0]
+        if item_id not in self.items:
+            raise DummyNotFoundError(item_id)
+        self.deleted_ids.append(item_id)
+        del self.items[item_id]
+
+
+class FakeMessageContainer:
+    """In-memory message container that tracks query and delete attempts."""
+
+    def __init__(self, items=None):
+        self.items = [copy.deepcopy(item) for item in (items or [])]
+        self.query_count = 0
+        self.deleted_ids = []
+
+    def query_items(self, query=None, parameters=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        self.query_count += 1
+        conversation_id = partition_key
+        file_id = None
+
+        for parameter in parameters or []:
+            if parameter.get('name') == '@conversation_id':
+                conversation_id = parameter.get('value')
+            elif parameter.get('name') == '@file_id':
+                file_id = parameter.get('value')
+
+        matching_items = []
+        for item in self.items:
+            if conversation_id and item.get('conversation_id') != conversation_id:
+                continue
+            if file_id and item.get('id') != file_id:
+                continue
+            matching_items.append(copy.deepcopy(item))
+
+        matching_items.sort(key=lambda item: item.get('timestamp', ''))
+        return matching_items
+
+    def delete_item(self, item=None, partition_key=None, *args, **kwargs):
+        item_id = item if item is not None else args[0]
+        self.deleted_ids.append(item_id)
+        self.items = [existing_item for existing_item in self.items if existing_item.get('id') != item_id]
+
+
+def _passthrough_decorator(*args, **kwargs):
+    """Return the wrapped function unchanged for decorator stubs."""
+    if args and callable(args[0]) and len(args) == 1 and not kwargs:
+        return args[0]
+    return lambda func: func
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8-sig') as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith('VERSION = '):
+            return line.split('=', 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError('VERSION assignment not found in config.py')
+
+
+def _install_route_backend_conversations_stubs():
+    """Install lightweight import stubs for route_backend_conversations."""
+    stub_modules = {}
+
+    config_module = types.ModuleType('config')
+    config_module.cosmos_conversations_container = None
+    config_module.cosmos_messages_container = None
+    config_module.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+    stub_modules['config'] = config_module
+
+    auth_module = types.ModuleType('functions_authentication')
+    auth_module.login_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.user_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.get_current_user_id = lambda: None
+    auth_module.jsonify = jsonify
+    stub_modules['functions_authentication'] = auth_module
+
+    settings_module = types.ModuleType('functions_settings')
+    settings_module.get_settings = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['functions_settings'] = settings_module
+
+    metadata_module = types.ModuleType('functions_conversation_metadata')
+    metadata_module.get_conversation_metadata = lambda *args, **kwargs: {}
+    metadata_module.update_conversation_with_metadata = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_conversation_metadata'] = metadata_module
+
+    unread_module = types.ModuleType('functions_conversation_unread')
+    unread_module.clear_conversation_unread = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    unread_module.normalize_conversation_unread_state = lambda item: item
+    stub_modules['functions_conversation_unread'] = unread_module
+
+    notifications_module = types.ModuleType('functions_notifications')
+    notifications_module.mark_chat_response_notifications_read_for_conversation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_notifications'] = notifications_module
+
+    debug_module = types.ModuleType('functions_debug')
+    debug_module.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_debug'] = debug_module
+
+    artifacts_module = types.ModuleType('functions_message_artifacts')
+    artifacts_module.filter_assistant_artifact_items = lambda items: items
+    stub_modules['functions_message_artifacts'] = artifacts_module
+
+    swagger_module = types.ModuleType('swagger_wrapper')
+    swagger_module.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    swagger_module.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['swagger_wrapper'] = swagger_module
+
+    activity_module = types.ModuleType('functions_activity_logging')
+    activity_module.log_conversation_creation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    activity_module.log_conversation_deletion = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    activity_module.log_conversation_archival = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_activity_logging'] = activity_module
+
+    thoughts_module = types.ModuleType('functions_thoughts')
+    thoughts_module.archive_thoughts_for_conversation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    thoughts_module.delete_thoughts_for_conversation = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_thoughts'] = thoughts_module
+
+    for module_name, module in stub_modules.items():
+        sys.modules[module_name] = module
+
+
+def _load_route_backend_conversations_module():
+    _install_route_backend_conversations_stubs()
+    if 'route_backend_conversations' in sys.modules:
+        del sys.modules['route_backend_conversations']
+    return importlib.import_module('route_backend_conversations')
+
+
+def build_delete_test_app(test_user_id, conversation_items, message_items):
+    """Register conversation routes with fake containers for delete-route tests."""
+    route_backend_conversations = _load_route_backend_conversations_module()
+
+    conversation_container = FakeConversationContainer(conversation_items)
+    message_container = FakeMessageContainer(message_items)
+
+    route_backend_conversations.cosmos_conversations_container = conversation_container
+    route_backend_conversations.cosmos_messages_container = message_container
+    route_backend_conversations.login_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_conversations.user_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_conversations.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    route_backend_conversations.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    route_backend_conversations.get_current_user_id = lambda: test_user_id
+    route_backend_conversations.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    route_backend_conversations.filter_assistant_artifact_items = lambda items: items
+    route_backend_conversations.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config['TESTING'] = True
+    route_backend_conversations.register_route_backend_conversations(app)
+
+    return app, conversation_container, message_container
+
+
+def _install_route_backend_documents_stubs():
+    """Install lightweight import stubs for route_backend_documents."""
+    stub_modules = {}
+
+    config_module = types.ModuleType('config')
+    config_module.cosmos_conversations_container = None
+    config_module.cosmos_messages_container = None
+    config_module.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+    config_module.CLIENTS = {}
+    config_module.json = json
+    config_module.traceback = traceback
+    stub_modules['config'] = config_module
+
+    auth_module = types.ModuleType('functions_authentication')
+    auth_module.login_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.user_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.enabled_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.file_upload_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.get_current_user_id = lambda: None
+    auth_module.jsonify = jsonify
+    auth_module.request = request
+    stub_modules['functions_authentication'] = auth_module
+
+    documents_module = types.ModuleType('functions_documents')
+    documents_module.add_file_task_to_file_processing_log = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_documents'] = documents_module
+
+    settings_module = types.ModuleType('functions_settings')
+    settings_module.get_settings = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['functions_settings'] = settings_module
+
+    group_module = types.ModuleType('functions_group')
+    group_module.get_user_groups = lambda *args, **kwargs: []
+    stub_modules['functions_group'] = group_module
+
+    public_module = types.ModuleType('functions_public_workspaces')
+    public_module.get_user_visible_public_workspace_ids_from_settings = lambda *args, **kwargs: []
+    stub_modules['functions_public_workspaces'] = public_module
+
+    cache_module = types.ModuleType('utils_cache')
+    cache_module.invalidate_personal_search_cache = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['utils_cache'] = cache_module
+
+    debug_module = types.ModuleType('functions_debug')
+    debug_module.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_debug'] = debug_module
+
+    activity_module = types.ModuleType('functions_activity_logging')
+    activity_module.log_document_upload = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    activity_module.log_document_metadata_update_transaction = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_activity_logging'] = activity_module
+
+    swagger_module = types.ModuleType('swagger_wrapper')
+    swagger_module.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    swagger_module.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['swagger_wrapper'] = swagger_module
+
+    for module_name, module in stub_modules.items():
+        sys.modules[module_name] = module
+
+
+def _load_route_backend_documents_module():
+    _install_route_backend_documents_stubs()
+    if 'route_backend_documents' in sys.modules:
+        del sys.modules['route_backend_documents']
+    return importlib.import_module('route_backend_documents')
+
+
+def build_file_content_test_app(test_user_id, conversation_items, message_items):
+    """Register document routes with fake containers for file-content tests."""
+    route_backend_documents = _load_route_backend_documents_module()
+
+    conversation_container = FakeConversationContainer(conversation_items)
+    message_container = FakeMessageContainer(message_items)
+
+    route_backend_documents.cosmos_conversations_container = conversation_container
+    route_backend_documents.cosmos_messages_container = message_container
+    route_backend_documents.get_current_user_id = lambda: test_user_id
+    route_backend_documents.login_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_documents.user_required = lambda func: func
+    route_backend_documents.enabled_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    route_backend_documents.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    route_backend_documents.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    route_backend_documents.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    route_backend_documents.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config['TESTING'] = True
+    route_backend_documents.register_route_backend_documents(app)
+
+    return app, message_container
+
+
+def _install_route_frontend_conversations_stubs():
+    """Install lightweight import stubs for route_frontend_conversations."""
+    stub_modules = {}
+
+    config_module = types.ModuleType('config')
+    config_module.cosmos_conversations_container = None
+    config_module.cosmos_messages_container = None
+    config_module.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+    stub_modules['config'] = config_module
+
+    auth_module = types.ModuleType('functions_authentication')
+    auth_module.login_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.user_required = _passthrough_decorator
+    auth_module.get_current_user_id = lambda: None
+    auth_module.jsonify = jsonify
+    auth_module.redirect = lambda location: f'redirect:{location}'
+    auth_module.url_for = lambda endpoint: f'/{endpoint}'
+    auth_module.render_template = lambda template_name, **kwargs: (
+        f"rendered:{template_name}:{kwargs.get('conversation_id', '')}"
+    )
+    stub_modules['functions_authentication'] = auth_module
+
+    debug_module = types.ModuleType('functions_debug')
+    debug_module.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_debug'] = debug_module
+
+    chat_module = types.ModuleType('functions_chat')
+    chat_module.sort_messages_by_thread = lambda items: items
+    stub_modules['functions_chat'] = chat_module
+
+    artifacts_module = types.ModuleType('functions_message_artifacts')
+    artifacts_module.build_message_artifact_payload_map = lambda *args, **kwargs: {}
+    artifacts_module.filter_assistant_artifact_items = lambda items: items
+    stub_modules['functions_message_artifacts'] = artifacts_module
+
+    swagger_module = types.ModuleType('swagger_wrapper')
+    swagger_module.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    swagger_module.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['swagger_wrapper'] = swagger_module
+
+    for module_name, module in stub_modules.items():
+        sys.modules[module_name] = module
+
+
+def _load_route_frontend_conversations_module():
+    _install_route_frontend_conversations_stubs()
+    if 'route_frontend_conversations' in sys.modules:
+        del sys.modules['route_frontend_conversations']
+    return importlib.import_module('route_frontend_conversations')
+
+
+def build_frontend_conversation_test_app(test_user_id, conversation_items, message_items):
+    """Register frontend conversation routes with fake containers."""
+    route_frontend_conversations = _load_route_frontend_conversations_module()
+
+    conversation_container = FakeConversationContainer(conversation_items)
+    message_container = FakeMessageContainer(message_items)
+
+    route_frontend_conversations.cosmos_conversations_container = conversation_container
+    route_frontend_conversations.cosmos_messages_container = message_container
+    route_frontend_conversations.get_current_user_id = lambda: test_user_id
+    route_frontend_conversations.login_required = lambda func: func
+    route_frontend_conversations.user_required = lambda func: func
+    route_frontend_conversations.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    route_frontend_conversations.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    route_frontend_conversations.debug_print = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    route_frontend_conversations.filter_assistant_artifact_items = lambda items: items
+    route_frontend_conversations.sort_messages_by_thread = lambda items: items
+    route_frontend_conversations.CosmosResourceNotFoundError = DummyNotFoundError
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config['TESTING'] = True
+    route_frontend_conversations.register_route_frontend_conversations(app)
+
+    return app, message_container
+
+
+def test_foreign_delete_returns_forbidden_before_message_work():
+    """Verify foreign conversation deletes fail before any message work executes."""
+    print('🔍 Testing foreign delete rejection...')
+
+    app, conversation_container, message_container = build_delete_test_app(
+        'user-attacker',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'user_id': 'user-victim',
+                'title': 'Victim Conversation',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-victim',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'content': 'Victim content',
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    with app.test_client() as client:
+        response = client.delete('/api/conversations/conversation-victim')
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 403:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 403, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if message_container.query_count != 0:
+        print(f'❌ Expected no message query, got {message_container.query_count}')
+        return False
+    if 'conversation-victim' not in conversation_container.items:
+        print('❌ Conversation should not have been deleted for a foreign user')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Foreign delete was blocked before destructive work')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_owner_delete_succeeds_and_removes_records():
+    """Verify owners can still delete their own conversations."""
+    print('🔍 Testing owner delete success...')
+
+    app, conversation_container, message_container = build_delete_test_app(
+        'user-owner',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'user_id': 'user-owner',
+                'title': 'Owner Conversation',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-owner',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'content': 'Owner content',
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    with app.test_client() as client:
+        response = client.delete('/api/conversations/conversation-owner')
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 200 or payload != {'success': True}:
+        print(f'❌ Expected successful delete, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if 'conversation-owner' in conversation_container.items:
+        print('❌ Owner conversation should have been deleted')
+        return False
+    if 'message-owner' not in message_container.deleted_ids:
+        print(f'❌ Expected message delete, got {message_container.deleted_ids}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Owner delete removed the conversation and its messages')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_foreign_file_content_returns_forbidden_before_query():
+    """Verify foreign file-content reads fail before the message query executes."""
+    print('🔍 Testing foreign file-content rejection...')
+
+    app, message_container = build_file_content_test_app(
+        'user-attacker',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'user_id': 'user-victim',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'file-victim',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'filename': 'victim.txt',
+                'file_content': 'Victim file content',
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    with app.test_client() as client:
+        response = client.post(
+            '/api/get_file_content',
+            json={
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'file_id': 'file-victim',
+            },
+        )
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 403:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 403, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if message_container.query_count != 0:
+        print(f'❌ Expected no file-content query, got {message_container.query_count}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Foreign file-content read was blocked before querying messages')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_owner_file_content_succeeds():
+    """Verify owners can still read their own uploaded file content."""
+    print('🔍 Testing owner file-content success...')
+
+    app, message_container = build_file_content_test_app(
+        'user-owner',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'user_id': 'user-owner',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'file-owner',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'filename': 'owner.txt',
+                'file_content': 'Owner file content',
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    with app.test_client() as client:
+        response = client.post(
+            '/api/get_file_content',
+            json={
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-owner',
+                'file_id': 'file-owner',
+            },
+        )
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 200:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 200, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('file_content') != 'Owner file content':
+        print(f'❌ Unexpected owner file-content payload: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if message_container.query_count != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Expected one file-content query, got {message_container.query_count}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Owner file-content read returned the expected content')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_frontend_routes_reject_foreign_conversation_reads():
+    """Verify frontend conversation routes fail closed for foreign conversations."""
+    print('🔍 Testing frontend conversation rejection...')
+
+    app, message_container = build_frontend_conversation_test_app(
+        'user-attacker',
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'user_id': 'user-victim',
+            }
+        ],
+        [
+            {
+                'id': 'message-victim',
+                'conversation_id': 'conversation-victim',
+                'role': 'user',
+                'content': 'Victim message',
+            }
+        ],
+    )
+
+    with app.test_client() as client:
+        view_response = client.get('/conversation/conversation-victim')
+        messages_response = client.get('/conversation/conversation-victim/messages')
+
+    messages_payload = messages_response.get_json()
+    if view_response.status_code != 403:
+        print(f'❌ Expected frontend view 403, got {view_response.status_code}')
+        return False
+    if messages_response.status_code != 403:
+        print(f'❌ Expected frontend messages 403, got {messages_response.status_code}: {messages_payload}')
+        return False
+    if messages_payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {messages_payload}')
+        return False
+    if message_container.query_count != 0:
+        print(f'❌ Expected no frontend message query, got {message_container.query_count}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Frontend conversation routes reject foreign reads before querying messages')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_chat_loader_handles_non_ok_message_responses():
+    """Verify the chat loader has an explicit non-success response path."""
+    print('🔍 Testing chat loader non-success handling...')
+
+    source = read_file_text(CHAT_MESSAGES_FILE)
+    required_snippets = [
+        'const data = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));',
+        'if (!response.ok) {',
+        'error.status = response.status;',
+        'if (error?.status === 403) {',
+        'errorMessage = "You do not have access to this conversation.";',
+        'showToast(errorMessage, "danger");',
+        '${escapeHtml(errorMessage)}',
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    if missing:
+        print(f'❌ Missing chat loader snippets: {missing}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Chat loader non-success handling passed')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist():
+    """Verify the follow-up fix document exists under the current version."""
+    print('🔍 Testing follow-up fix documentation and version...')
+
+    if read_config_version() != '0.241.022':
+        print(f'❌ Expected config version 0.241.022, got {read_config_version()}')
+        return False
+    if not os.path.exists(FIX_DOC):
+        print(f'❌ Expected follow-up fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Follow-up fix documentation and version passed')
+    return True
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    tests = [
+        test_foreign_delete_returns_forbidden_before_message_work,
+        test_owner_delete_succeeds_and_removes_records,
+        test_foreign_file_content_returns_forbidden_before_query,
+        test_owner_file_content_succeeds,
+        test_frontend_routes_reject_foreign_conversation_reads,
+        test_chat_loader_handles_non_ok_message_responses,
+        test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist,
+    ]
+
+    print('🧪 Running personal conversation authorization follow-up tests...')
+    print('=' * 60)
+
+    results = []
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...')
+        results.append(test())
+
+    success = all(results)
+    print('\n' + '=' * 60)
+    print(f'📊 Test Results: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed')
+
+    sys.exit(0 if success else 1)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py b/functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..349312a7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# test_plugin_logging_clear_logs_authorization.py
+"""
+Functional test for plugin logging admin authorization hardening.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.013; 0.241.014; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures only admins can clear the shared plugin invocation history
+or read the cross-user recent invocation feed, non-admin users receive a
+forbidden response without mutating logger state, and unauthenticated
+requests still receive the existing unauthorized response.
+"""
+
+import copy
+import importlib
+import os
+import sys
+import types
+
+from flask import Flask, jsonify, request, session
+import werkzeug
+
+
+if not hasattr(werkzeug, '__version__'):
+    werkzeug.__version__ = '3'
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+sys.path.append(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app'))
+
+
+class FakePluginLogger:
+    """In-memory plugin logger for authorization tests."""
+
+    def __init__(self, invocations=None):
+        self.invocations = [FakeInvocation(item) for item in (invocations or [])]
+        self.clear_calls = 0
+        self.recent_calls = 0
+
+    def get_recent_invocations(self, limit=50):
+        self.recent_calls += 1
+        return self.invocations[-limit:] if self.invocations else []
+
+    def clear_history(self):
+        self.clear_calls += 1
+        self.invocations.clear()
+
+
+class FakeInvocation:
+    """Simple plugin invocation object matching the route's response contract."""
+
+    def __init__(self, payload):
+        self.payload = copy.deepcopy(payload)
+
+    def to_dict(self):
+        return copy.deepcopy(self.payload)
+
+
+def _install_route_import_stubs():
+    """Install lightweight dependency stubs for route_plugin_logging."""
+    stub_modules = {}
+
+    auth_module = types.ModuleType('functions_authentication')
+
+    def login_required(func):
+        def decorated_function(*args, **kwargs):
+            if 'user' not in session:
+                is_api_request = (
+                    request.accept_mimetypes.accept_json and
+                    not request.accept_mimetypes.accept_html
+                ) or request.path.startswith('/api/')
+
+                if is_api_request:
+                    return jsonify({'error': 'Unauthorized', 'message': 'Authentication required'}), 401
+                return 'Unauthorized', 401
+
+            return func(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        decorated_function.__name__ = func.__name__
+        return decorated_function
+
+    def admin_required(func):
+        def decorated_function(*args, **kwargs):
+            user = session.get('user', {})
+            if 'roles' not in user or 'Admin' not in user['roles']:
+                is_api_request = (
+                    request.accept_mimetypes.accept_json and
+                    not request.accept_mimetypes.accept_html
+                ) or request.path.startswith('/api/')
+
+                if is_api_request:
+                    return jsonify({'error': 'Forbidden', 'message': 'Insufficient permissions (Admin role required)'}), 403
+                return 'Forbidden', 403
+
+            return func(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        decorated_function.__name__ = func.__name__
+        return decorated_function
+
+    auth_module.login_required = login_required
+    auth_module.admin_required = admin_required
+    auth_module.get_current_user_id = lambda: (session.get('user', {}) or {}).get('oid')
+    stub_modules['functions_authentication'] = auth_module
+
+    appinsights_module = types.ModuleType('functions_appinsights')
+    appinsights_module.log_event = lambda *args, **kwargs: None
+    stub_modules['functions_appinsights'] = appinsights_module
+
+    plugin_logger_module = types.ModuleType('semantic_kernel_plugins.plugin_invocation_logger')
+    plugin_logger_module._plugin_logger = None
+    plugin_logger_module.get_plugin_logger = lambda: plugin_logger_module._plugin_logger
+    stub_modules['semantic_kernel_plugins.plugin_invocation_logger'] = plugin_logger_module
+
+    swagger_module = types.ModuleType('swagger_wrapper')
+    swagger_module.swagger_route = lambda **kwargs: (lambda func: func)
+    swagger_module.get_auth_security = lambda: {}
+    stub_modules['swagger_wrapper'] = swagger_module
+
+    for module_name, module in stub_modules.items():
+        sys.modules[module_name] = module
+
+
+def _load_route_plugin_logging_module():
+    """Import the plugin logging route module after installing stubs."""
+    _install_route_import_stubs()
+    if 'route_plugin_logging' in sys.modules:
+        del sys.modules['route_plugin_logging']
+    return importlib.import_module('route_plugin_logging')
+
+
+def build_test_app(invocations=None):
+    """Register the plugin logging blueprint with a fake shared logger."""
+    route_plugin_logging = _load_route_plugin_logging_module()
+    fake_logger = FakePluginLogger(invocations=invocations)
+
+    route_plugin_logging.get_plugin_logger = lambda: fake_logger
+
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config['TESTING'] = True
+    app.secret_key = 'test-secret'
+    app.register_blueprint(route_plugin_logging.bpl)
+
+    def create_client(user=None):
+        client = app.test_client()
+        if user is not None:
+            with client.session_transaction() as flask_session:
+                flask_session['user'] = user
+        return client
+
+    return create_client, fake_logger
+
+
+def test_unauthenticated_clear_logs_returns_unauthorized():
+    """Verify the existing unauthenticated response contract is preserved."""
+    print('🔍 Testing unauthenticated clear-logs rejection...')
+
+    create_client, fake_logger = build_test_app(invocations=[{'id': 'invocation-1'}])
+    client = create_client()
+    response = client.post('/api/plugins/clear-logs', headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 401:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 401, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Unauthorized':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Unauthorized error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if fake_logger.clear_calls != 0 or len(fake_logger.invocations) != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Logger state should remain unchanged, got clear_calls={fake_logger.clear_calls}, invocations={fake_logger.invocations}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Unauthenticated clear-logs requests preserve the existing 401 contract')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_unauthenticated_recent_invocations_returns_unauthorized():
+    """Verify the recent invocations endpoint preserves the existing unauthenticated contract."""
+    print('🔍 Testing unauthenticated recent-invocations rejection...')
+
+    create_client, fake_logger = build_test_app(invocations=[{'id': 'invocation-1'}])
+    client = create_client()
+    response = client.get('/api/plugins/invocations/recent?limit=5', headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 401:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 401, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Unauthorized':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Unauthorized error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if fake_logger.recent_calls != 0:
+        print(f'❌ get_recent_invocations should not run for unauthenticated users, got {fake_logger.recent_calls}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Unauthenticated recent-invocations requests preserve the existing 401 contract')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_non_admin_clear_logs_returns_forbidden_and_preserves_history():
+    """Verify non-admin users cannot clear the shared plugin history."""
+    print('🔍 Testing non-admin clear-logs rejection...')
+
+    create_client, fake_logger = build_test_app(
+        invocations=[
+            {'id': 'invocation-1'},
+            {'id': 'invocation-2'},
+        ]
+    )
+    client = create_client(user={'oid': 'user-attacker', 'roles': ['User']})
+    response = client.post('/api/plugins/clear-logs', headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 403:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 403, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if fake_logger.clear_calls != 0:
+        print(f'❌ clear_history should not run for a non-admin, got {fake_logger.clear_calls}')
+        return False
+    if len(fake_logger.invocations) != 2:
+        print(f'❌ Logger history should be preserved, got {fake_logger.invocations}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Non-admin clear-logs requests are rejected without mutating history')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_non_admin_recent_invocations_returns_forbidden_without_reading_history():
+    """Verify non-admin users cannot read the cross-user recent invocation feed."""
+    print('🔍 Testing non-admin recent-invocations rejection...')
+
+    create_client, fake_logger = build_test_app(
+        invocations=[
+            {'id': 'invocation-1', 'plugin_name': 'PluginA'},
+            {'id': 'invocation-2', 'plugin_name': 'PluginB'},
+        ]
+    )
+    client = create_client(user={'oid': 'user-attacker', 'roles': ['User']})
+    response = client.get('/api/plugins/invocations/recent?limit=5', headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 403:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 403, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('error') != 'Forbidden':
+        print(f'❌ Expected Forbidden error, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if fake_logger.recent_calls != 0:
+        print(f'❌ get_recent_invocations should not run for a non-admin, got {fake_logger.recent_calls}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Non-admin recent-invocations requests are rejected before reading history')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_admin_clear_logs_succeeds_and_empties_history():
+    """Verify admins can still clear the shared plugin invocation history."""
+    print('🔍 Testing admin clear-logs success...')
+
+    create_client, fake_logger = build_test_app(
+        invocations=[
+            {'id': 'invocation-1'},
+            {'id': 'invocation-2'},
+        ]
+    )
+    client = create_client(user={'oid': 'user-admin', 'roles': ['Admin']})
+    response = client.post('/api/plugins/clear-logs', headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 200:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 200, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('previous_count') != 2:
+        print(f'❌ Expected previous_count=2, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if fake_logger.clear_calls != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Expected one clear_history call, got {fake_logger.clear_calls}')
+        return False
+    if fake_logger.invocations:
+        print(f'❌ Expected empty invocation history after admin clear, got {fake_logger.invocations}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Admin clear-logs requests still clear the shared history')
+    return True
+
+
+def test_admin_recent_invocations_succeeds_and_returns_feed():
+    """Verify admins can still read the cross-user recent invocation feed."""
+    print('🔍 Testing admin recent-invocations success...')
+
+    create_client, fake_logger = build_test_app(
+        invocations=[
+            {'id': 'invocation-1', 'plugin_name': 'PluginA'},
+            {'id': 'invocation-2', 'plugin_name': 'PluginB'},
+        ]
+    )
+    client = create_client(user={'oid': 'user-admin', 'roles': ['Admin']})
+    response = client.get('/api/plugins/invocations/recent?limit=1', headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
+
+    payload = response.get_json()
+    if response.status_code != 200:
+        print(f'❌ Expected 200, got {response.status_code}: {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('total_count') != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Expected total_count=1, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if payload.get('invocations', [{}])[0].get('id') != 'invocation-2':
+        print(f'❌ Expected the most recent invocation in the response, got {payload}')
+        return False
+    if fake_logger.recent_calls != 1:
+        print(f'❌ Expected one get_recent_invocations call, got {fake_logger.recent_calls}')
+        return False
+
+    print('✅ Admin recent-invocations requests still return the shared feed')
+    return True
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    tests = [
+        test_unauthenticated_clear_logs_returns_unauthorized,
+        test_unauthenticated_recent_invocations_returns_unauthorized,
+        test_non_admin_clear_logs_returns_forbidden_and_preserves_history,
+        test_non_admin_recent_invocations_returns_forbidden_without_reading_history,
+        test_admin_clear_logs_succeeds_and_empties_history,
+        test_admin_recent_invocations_succeeds_and_returns_feed,
+    ]
+
+    print('🧪 Running plugin logging admin authorization tests...')
+    print('=' * 60)
+
+    results = []
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...')
+        results.append(test())
+
+    success = all(results)
+    print('\n' + '=' * 60)
+    print(f'📊 Test Results: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed')
+
+    sys.exit(0 if success else 1)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a6da1597
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+# test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py
+"""
+Functional test for public workspace tag color stored XSS hardening.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures tag colors are validated on write, repaired on read,
+and rendered through DOM-safe public workspace UI paths.
+"""
+
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+FUNCTIONS_DOCUMENTS_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "functions_documents.py",
+)
+ROUTE_FILES = {
+    "personal": os.path.join(
+        ROOT_DIR,
+        "application",
+        "single_app",
+        "route_backend_documents.py",
+    ),
+    "group": os.path.join(
+        ROOT_DIR,
+        "application",
+        "single_app",
+        "route_backend_group_documents.py",
+    ),
+    "public": os.path.join(
+        ROOT_DIR,
+        "application",
+        "single_app",
+        "route_backend_public_documents.py",
+    ),
+}
+PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "public",
+    "public_workspace.js",
+)
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py")
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "docs",
+    "explanation",
+    "fixes",
+    "v0.241.022",
+    "PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_TAG_COLOR_XSS_FIX.md",
+)
+UI_TEST = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "ui_tests",
+    "test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py",
+)
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("VERSION = "):
+            return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py")
+
+
+def assert_required_snippets(file_path, required_snippets):
+    source = read_file_text(file_path)
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing required snippets in {file_path}: {missing}"
+    return source
+
+
+def test_shared_tag_color_helpers_harden_storage_and_read_paths():
+    """Verify the shared tag helper layer validates and repairs stored colors."""
+    print("🔍 Testing shared tag color helper hardening...")
+
+    source = assert_required_snippets(
+        FUNCTIONS_DOCUMENTS_FILE,
+        [
+            "TAG_COLOR_PATTERN = re.compile(r'^#?(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{3}|[0-9a-fA-F]{6})$')",
+            "def normalize_tag_color(color):",
+            "def get_safe_tag_color(color, tag_name):",
+            "def validate_tag_color(color, tag_name):",
+            "safe_color = get_safe_tag_color(color, tag_name)",
+            "stored_tag_def['color'] = get_safe_tag_color(stored_tag_def.get('color'), tag_name)",
+        ],
+    )
+
+    assert source.count("'color': get_safe_tag_color(tag_def.get('color'), tag_name)") >= 2, (
+        "Expected get_workspace_tags() to repair stored colors for used and unused tag definitions."
+    )
+
+    print("✅ Shared tag color helper hardening passed")
+
+
+def test_tag_routes_validate_and_return_normalized_colors():
+    """Verify personal, group, and public tag routes all validate and persist safe colors."""
+    print("🔍 Testing tag route color validation coverage...")
+
+    route_expectations = {
+        ROUTE_FILES["personal"]: [
+            "validate_tag_color(color, normalized_tag)",
+            "validate_tag_color(new_color, normalized_old_tag)",
+            "'color': normalized_color,",
+            "'message': f'Tag color updated for \"{normalized_old_tag}\"'",
+        ],
+        ROUTE_FILES["group"]: [
+            "validate_tag_color(color, normalized_tag)",
+            "validate_tag_color(new_color, normalized_old_tag)",
+            "'color': normalized_color,",
+            "'message': f'Tag color updated for \"{normalized_old_tag}\"'",
+        ],
+        ROUTE_FILES["public"]: [
+            "validate_tag_color(color, normalized_tag)",
+            "validate_tag_color(new_color, normalized_old_tag)",
+            "'color': normalized_color,",
+            "'message': f'Tag color updated for \"{normalized_old_tag}\"'",
+        ],
+    }
+
+    for file_path, required_snippets in route_expectations.items():
+        assert_required_snippets(file_path, required_snippets)
+
+    print("✅ Tag route color validation coverage passed")
+
+
+def test_public_workspace_tag_renderers_use_dom_safe_color_application():
+    """Verify public workspace tag renderers use DOM APIs instead of HTML/event interpolation."""
+    print("🔍 Testing public workspace tag renderer hardening...")
+
+    source = assert_required_snippets(
+        PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_JS,
+        [
+            "const publicHexColorPattern = /^#?(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{3}|[0-9a-fA-F]{6})$/;",
+            "function normalizePublicHexColor(color, fallback = '#6c757d') {",
+            "function createPublicTagBadgeElement(tagName, color, className = 'tag-badge') {",
+            "cards.appendChild(createPublicFolderCard(item, canManageTags));",
+            "renderPublicTagBadges(doc.tags || [], detailsRow.querySelector('.public-doc-tag-badges'));",
+            "applyPublicBackgroundColor(colorSwatch, tag.color);",
+            "const badge = createPublicTagBadgeElement(tag.name, tag.color, 'badge me-2');",
+            "const badge = createPublicTagBadgeElement(tagName, getPublicTagColorByName(tagName), 'badge me-1');",
+        ],
+    )
+
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        'onclick="changePublicTagColor(',
+        'onclick="renamePublicTag(',
+        'onclick="deletePublicTag(',
+        'onclick="window.editPublicTagInModal(',
+        'onclick="window.deletePublicTagFromModal(',
+        'onclick="window.removePublicDocSelectedTag(',
+        'style="background-color:${tag.color};color:${textColor};"',
+        'style="background-color:${color};color:${textColor};"',
+        'function renderPublicTagBadges(tags, maxDisplay = 3) {',
+    ]
+    present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source]
+    assert not present, f"Unexpected unsafe tag renderer snippets found: {present}"
+
+    forbidden_patterns = [
+        r'onclick="[^\"]*(changePublicTagColor|editPublicTagInModal|deletePublicTagFromModal|removePublicDocSelectedTag|renamePublicTag|deletePublicTag)',
+        r'style="[^\"]*\$\{(tag\.color|color|textColor)',
+    ]
+    for pattern in forbidden_patterns:
+        assert not re.search(pattern, source), f"Unsafe tag rendering pattern still present: {pattern}"
+
+    print("✅ Public workspace tag renderer hardening passed")
+
+
+def test_fix_artifacts_and_version_are_in_sync():
+    """Verify versioned regression artifacts landed for this fix."""
+    print("🔍 Testing fix artifacts and version alignment...")
+
+    assert read_config_version() == "0.241.022"
+    assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}"
+    assert os.path.exists(UI_TEST), f"Expected UI regression test at {UI_TEST}"
+
+    fix_doc_source = read_file_text(FIX_DOC)
+    assert "Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.022**" in fix_doc_source
+    assert "functional_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_xss_fix.py" in fix_doc_source
+    assert "ui_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py" in fix_doc_source
+
+    print("✅ Fix artifacts and version alignment passed")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    tests = [
+        test_shared_tag_color_helpers_harden_storage_and_read_paths,
+        test_tag_routes_validate_and_return_normalized_colors,
+        test_public_workspace_tag_renderers_use_dom_safe_color_application,
+        test_fix_artifacts_and_version_are_in_sync,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...")
+        test()
+
+    print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed")
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py b/functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00cd18287
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_security_authorization_hardening.py
@@ -0,0 +1,577 @@
+# test_security_authorization_hardening.py
+"""
+Functional test for security authorization hardening.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.007; 0.241.010; 0.241.011; 0.241.013; 0.241.014; 0.241.022
+
+This test ensures Azure AI Search filter literals are escaped, active group
+selection validates membership, approval routes enforce per-approval
+authorization, history-grounded fallback revalidates scope before reuse,
+chat routes reject foreign conversation and scope ids, tabular and fact-memory
+plugins bind to canonical request authorization, and Control Center public
+workspace rendering escapes untrusted text.
+"""
+
+import ast
+import os
+import sys
+from typing import Any, Dict, List
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+SEARCH_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "functions_search.py")
+GROUP_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "functions_group.py")
+PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "functions_public_workspaces.py",
+)
+USERS_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_backend_users.py")
+BACKEND_PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "route_backend_public_workspaces.py",
+)
+FRONTEND_GROUP_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_frontend_group_workspaces.py")
+FRONTEND_PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "route_frontend_public_workspaces.py",
+)
+PUBLIC_PROMPTS_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "route_backend_public_prompts.py",
+)
+GROUP_PROMPTS_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_backend_group_prompts.py")
+GROUPS_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_backend_groups.py")
+APPROVALS_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "functions_approvals.py")
+CONTROL_CENTER_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_backend_control_center.py")
+CHATS_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "route_backend_chats.py")
+TABULAR_PLUGIN_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "semantic_kernel_plugins",
+    "tabular_processing_plugin.py",
+)
+FACT_MEMORY_PLUGIN_FILE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "semantic_kernel_plugins",
+    "fact_memory_plugin.py",
+)
+CONTROL_CENTER_JS = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "static", "js", "control-center.js")
+PUBLIC_DIRECTORY_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "public",
+    "public_directory.js",
+)
+MANAGE_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "public",
+    "manage_public_workspace.js",
+)
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py")
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "docs",
+    "explanation",
+    "fixes",
+    "v0.241.020",
+    "PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_DETAILS_DISCLOSURE_FIX.md",
+)
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("VERSION = "):
+            return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py")
+
+
+def load_functions(file_path, function_names, namespace=None):
+    source = read_file_text(file_path)
+    parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=file_path)
+    selected_nodes = [
+        node for node in parsed.body
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name in function_names
+    ]
+    assert len(selected_nodes) == len(function_names), (
+        f"Expected functions {sorted(function_names)} in {file_path}, "
+        f"found {[node.name for node in selected_nodes]}"
+    )
+    module = ast.Module(body=selected_nodes, type_ignores=[])
+    exec_namespace = dict(namespace or {})
+    exec(compile(module, file_path, "exec"), exec_namespace)
+    return exec_namespace, source
+
+
+def extract_function_source(source_text, function_name):
+    parsed = ast.parse(source_text)
+    for node in ast.walk(parsed):
+        if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name:
+            return ast.get_source_segment(source_text, node)
+    raise AssertionError(f"Function {function_name} not found")
+
+
+def test_search_odata_helpers_escape_literals():
+    """Verify OData helper functions escape injected quotes before filter assembly."""
+    print("🔍 Testing OData literal escaping helpers...")
+
+    namespace, source = load_functions(
+        SEARCH_FILE,
+        {"_escape_odata_literal", "_build_odata_eq", "_build_odata_any_eq"},
+        {"Any": Any},
+    )
+    build_eq = namespace["_build_odata_eq"]
+    build_any = namespace["_build_odata_any_eq"]
+
+    malicious_document_id = "doc' or '1'='1"
+    assert build_eq("document_id", malicious_document_id) == "document_id eq 'doc'' or ''1''=''1'"
+    assert build_any("shared_user_ids", "u", "user'1,approved") == (
+        "shared_user_ids/any(u: u eq 'user''1,approved')"
+    )
+
+    assert "document_id eq '{document_ids[0]}'" not in source
+    assert "shared_group_ids/any(g: g eq '{gid},approved')" not in source
+
+    print("✅ OData escaping helpers passed")
+
+
+def test_active_group_updates_and_group_routes_require_membership():
+    """Verify active-group writes and group-scoped routes use membership validation helpers."""
+    print("🔍 Testing active-group and group route authorization hardening...")
+
+    functions_group_source = read_file_text(GROUP_FILE)
+    users_source = read_file_text(USERS_FILE)
+    frontend_group_source = read_file_text(FRONTEND_GROUP_FILE)
+    group_prompts_source = read_file_text(GROUP_PROMPTS_FILE)
+    groups_source = read_file_text(GROUPS_FILE)
+
+    assert "assert_group_role(" in functions_group_source
+    assert "DocumentManager" in functions_group_source and "User" in functions_group_source
+    assert "update_active_group_for_user(requested_active_group, user_id=user_id)" in users_source
+    assert "update_active_group_for_user(group_id, user_id=user_id)" in frontend_group_source
+    assert "require_active_group(" in group_prompts_source
+    assert 'get_user_settings(user_id)["settings"].get("activeGroupOid")' not in group_prompts_source
+
+    group_details_source = extract_function_source(groups_source, "api_get_group_details")
+    assert "get_user_role_in_group(group_doc, user_id)" in group_details_source
+    assert "You are not a member of this group" in group_details_source
+
+    print("✅ Active-group and group route authorization hardening passed")
+
+
+def test_active_public_workspace_updates_validate_workspace_existence():
+    """Verify active public workspace writes now flow through the validated helper path."""
+    print("🔍 Testing active public workspace settings validation...")
+
+    public_workspace_source = read_file_text(PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE)
+    users_source = read_file_text(USERS_FILE)
+    backend_public_workspace_source = read_file_text(BACKEND_PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE)
+    frontend_public_workspace_source = read_file_text(FRONTEND_PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE)
+    public_prompts_source = read_file_text(PUBLIC_PROMPTS_FILE)
+
+    assert "workspace_doc = find_public_workspace_by_id(normalized_workspace_id)" in public_workspace_source
+    assert 'raise LookupError("Workspace not found")' in public_workspace_source
+    assert "def require_active_public_workspace(" in public_workspace_source
+    assert 'functions_settings.update_user_settings(' in public_workspace_source
+    assert "update_active_public_workspace_for_user(" in users_source
+    assert "requested_active_public_workspace" in users_source
+    assert 'return jsonify({"error": "Workspace not found"}), 404' in users_source
+    assert "No valid settings keys provided" in users_source
+    assert backend_public_workspace_source.count("update_active_public_workspace_for_user(user_id, ws_id)") == 1
+    assert "update_user_settings(user_id, {\"activePublicWorkspaceOid\": workspace_id})" not in frontend_public_workspace_source
+    assert frontend_public_workspace_source.count("update_active_public_workspace_for_user(user_id, workspace_id)") == 1
+    assert "require_active_public_workspace(" in public_prompts_source
+    assert "settings['settings'].get('activePublicWorkspaceOid')" not in public_prompts_source
+
+    print("✅ Active public workspace settings validation passed")
+
+
+def test_public_workspace_details_route_limits_non_member_payloads():
+    """Verify workspace detail responses stay projected by caller role."""
+    print("🔍 Testing public workspace detail payload projection...")
+
+    namespace, _ = load_functions(
+        PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE,
+        {
+            "get_user_role_in_public_workspace",
+            "build_public_workspace_public_summary",
+            "build_public_workspace_member_payload",
+        },
+    )
+    build_public_summary = namespace["build_public_workspace_public_summary"]
+    build_member_payload = namespace["build_public_workspace_member_payload"]
+
+    workspace_doc = {
+        "id": "workspace-1",
+        "name": "Shared Workspace",
+        "description": "Public summary",
+        "owner": {
+            "userId": "owner-1",
+            "displayName": "Workspace Owner",
+            "email": "owner@example.com",
+        },
+        "admins": [
+            "admin-legacy-1",
+            {"userId": "admin-1", "displayName": "Admin User", "email": "admin@example.com"},
+        ],
+        "documentManagers": [{"userId": "manager-1", "displayName": "Manager", "email": "manager@example.com"}],
+        "pendingDocumentManagers": [{"userId": "pending-1", "displayName": "Pending", "email": "pending@example.com"}],
+        "metrics": {"document_metrics": {"total_documents": 5}},
+        "retention_policy": {"conversation_retention_days": 30},
+        "status": "active",
+        "heroColor": "#112233",
+    }
+
+    public_summary = build_public_summary(workspace_doc)
+    assert public_summary == {
+        "id": "workspace-1",
+        "name": "Shared Workspace",
+        "description": "Public summary",
+        "owner": {"displayName": "Workspace Owner"},
+        "status": "active",
+        "heroColor": "#112233",
+        "userRole": None,
+        "isMember": False,
+    }, public_summary
+
+    owner_payload = build_member_payload(workspace_doc, "owner-1")
+    assert owner_payload["userRole"] == "Owner"
+    assert owner_payload["isMember"] is True
+    assert owner_payload["owner"]["email"] == "owner@example.com"
+    assert owner_payload["retention_policy"] == {"conversation_retention_days": 30}
+    assert "admins" not in owner_payload
+    assert "documentManagers" not in owner_payload
+    assert "pendingDocumentManagers" not in owner_payload
+    assert "metrics" not in owner_payload
+
+    manager_payload = build_member_payload(workspace_doc, "manager-1")
+    assert manager_payload["userRole"] == "DocumentManager"
+    assert "retention_policy" not in manager_payload
+
+    admin_payload = build_member_payload(workspace_doc, "admin-1")
+    assert admin_payload["userRole"] == "Admin"
+    assert admin_payload["retention_policy"] == {"conversation_retention_days": 30}
+
+    backend_route_source = extract_function_source(
+        read_file_text(BACKEND_PUBLIC_WORKSPACES_FILE),
+        "api_get_public_workspace",
+    )
+    assert "build_public_workspace_member_payload(ws, user_id)" in backend_route_source
+    assert "build_public_workspace_public_summary(ws)" in backend_route_source
+    assert "return jsonify(ws), 200" not in backend_route_source
+
+    public_directory_source = read_file_text(PUBLIC_DIRECTORY_JS)
+    assert "workspace.owner?.displayName || workspace.owner?.email" not in public_directory_source
+    assert "workspace.owner?.displayName || 'Unknown'" in public_directory_source
+
+    manage_workspace_source = read_file_text(MANAGE_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_JS)
+    assert "const isMember = Boolean(ws.isMember);" in manage_workspace_source
+    assert "currentUserRole = ws.userRole || null;" in manage_workspace_source
+    assert "const admins = ws.admins || [];" not in manage_workspace_source
+    assert "const docMgrs = ws.documentManagers || [];" not in manage_workspace_source
+
+    print("✅ Public workspace detail payload projection passed")
+
+
+def test_approval_access_helper_enforces_visibility_and_eligibility():
+    """Verify approval access helper distinguishes view from approve rights."""
+    print("🔍 Testing approval access authorization helper...")
+
+    namespace, _ = load_functions(
+        APPROVALS_FILE,
+        {"_can_user_view", "_can_user_approve", "get_authorized_approval"},
+        {
+            "Dict": Dict,
+            "Any": Any,
+            "List": List,
+            "TYPE_DELETE_USER_DOCUMENTS": "delete_user_documents",
+        },
+    )
+    approval_doc = {
+        "id": "approval-1",
+        "group_id": "group-1",
+        "request_type": "delete_documents",
+        "requester_id": "requester-1",
+        "group_owner_id": "owner-1",
+    }
+    namespace["get_approval_by_id"] = lambda approval_id, group_id: approval_doc if approval_id == "approval-1" else None
+    get_authorized_approval = namespace["get_authorized_approval"]
+
+    assert get_authorized_approval("approval-1", "group-1", "owner-1", [], True) == approval_doc
+
+    try:
+        get_authorized_approval("approval-1", "group-1", "viewer-1", [], True)
+    except PermissionError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        raise AssertionError("Expected ineligible approver lookup to raise PermissionError")
+
+    route_source = read_file_text(CONTROL_CENTER_FILE)
+    assert "def _get_authorized_route_approval(" in route_source
+    assert route_source.count("get_authorized_approval(") == 1
+    assert route_source.count("_get_authorized_route_approval(") >= 7
+    assert "approval=approval" in route_source
+
+    print("✅ Approval access authorization helper passed")
+
+
+def test_history_fallback_revalidation_filters_revoked_scope():
+    """Verify grounded fallback scope is filtered to the caller's current access."""
+    print("🔍 Testing history-grounded fallback revalidation...")
+
+    namespace, _ = load_functions(
+        CHATS_FILE,
+        {
+            "_normalize_requested_scope_ids",
+            "_get_authorized_chat_scope_context",
+            "build_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters",
+            "revalidate_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters",
+        },
+    )
+    namespace["find_group_by_id"] = lambda group_id: {"id": group_id}
+    namespace["get_user_role_in_group"] = (
+        lambda group_doc, user_id: "User"
+        if user_id == "user-1" and group_doc.get("id") == "group-allowed"
+        else None
+    )
+    namespace["get_user_visible_public_workspace_ids_from_settings"] = (
+        lambda user_id: ["workspace-allowed"]
+    )
+
+    build_params = namespace["build_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters"]
+    revalidate = namespace["revalidate_prior_grounded_document_search_parameters"]
+
+    mixed_parameters = build_params([
+        {"document_id": "doc-personal", "scope": "personal", "scope_id": "user-1", "user_id": "user-1"},
+        {"document_id": "doc-group", "scope": "group", "scope_id": "group-allowed", "group_id": "group-allowed"},
+        {"document_id": "doc-public", "scope": "public", "scope_id": "workspace-allowed", "public_workspace_id": "workspace-allowed"},
+        {"document_id": "doc-revoked-group", "scope": "group", "scope_id": "group-revoked", "group_id": "group-revoked"},
+    ])
+    filtered_parameters = revalidate("user-1", mixed_parameters)
+
+    assert filtered_parameters["active_group_ids"] == ["group-allowed"]
+    assert filtered_parameters["active_public_workspace_ids"] == ["workspace-allowed"]
+    assert filtered_parameters["doc_scope"] == "all"
+
+    revoked_only_parameters = build_params([
+        {"document_id": "doc-revoked-group", "scope": "group", "scope_id": "group-revoked", "group_id": "group-revoked"},
+        {"document_id": "doc-revoked-public", "scope": "public", "scope_id": "workspace-revoked", "public_workspace_id": "workspace-revoked"},
+    ])
+    revoked_only_parameters = revalidate("user-1", revoked_only_parameters)
+
+    assert revoked_only_parameters["document_ids"] == []
+    assert revoked_only_parameters["doc_scope"] is None
+
+    print("✅ History-grounded fallback revalidation passed")
+
+
+def test_chat_route_enforces_conversation_ownership_and_scope_canonicalization():
+    """Verify chat helpers reject foreign conversation ids and drop unauthorized request scopes."""
+    print("🔍 Testing chat conversation ownership and scope canonicalization...")
+
+    class DummyNotFoundError(Exception):
+        pass
+
+    class DummyConversationContainer:
+        def __init__(self, item=None, exc=None):
+            self.item = item
+            self.exc = exc
+
+        def read_item(self, item, partition_key):
+            assert item == partition_key
+            if self.exc:
+                raise self.exc
+            return dict(self.item)
+
+    namespace, source = load_functions(
+        CHATS_FILE,
+        {
+            "_normalize_requested_scope_ids",
+            "_get_authorized_chat_scope_context",
+            "_authorize_personal_conversation_access",
+        },
+        {
+            "CosmosResourceNotFoundError": DummyNotFoundError,
+            "cosmos_conversations_container": DummyConversationContainer({"id": "conv-1", "user_id": "user-1"}),
+        },
+    )
+    namespace["find_group_by_id"] = lambda group_id: {"id": group_id}
+    namespace["get_user_role_in_group"] = (
+        lambda group_doc, user_id: "User"
+        if user_id == "user-1" and group_doc.get("id") == "group-allowed"
+        else None
+    )
+    namespace["get_user_visible_public_workspace_ids_from_settings"] = lambda user_id: ["workspace-allowed"]
+
+    scope_context = namespace["_get_authorized_chat_scope_context"](
+        "user-1",
+        active_group_id="group-revoked",
+        active_group_ids=["group-allowed", "group-revoked"],
+        active_public_workspace_id="workspace-revoked",
+        active_public_workspace_ids=["workspace-allowed", "workspace-revoked"],
+    )
+    assert scope_context["active_group_ids"] == ["group-allowed"]
+    assert scope_context["active_group_id"] == "group-allowed"
+    assert scope_context["active_public_workspace_ids"] == ["workspace-allowed"]
+    assert scope_context["active_public_workspace_id"] == "workspace-allowed"
+
+    authorize_conversation = namespace["_authorize_personal_conversation_access"]
+    authorized_item = authorize_conversation("user-1", "conv-1")
+    assert authorized_item["user_id"] == "user-1"
+
+    namespace["cosmos_conversations_container"] = DummyConversationContainer({"id": "conv-1", "user_id": "user-2"})
+    try:
+        authorize_conversation("user-1", "conv-1")
+    except PermissionError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        raise AssertionError("Expected foreign conversation ownership to raise PermissionError")
+
+    namespace["cosmos_conversations_container"] = DummyConversationContainer(exc=DummyNotFoundError())
+    try:
+        authorize_conversation("user-1", "missing-conv")
+    except LookupError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        raise AssertionError("Expected missing conversation to raise LookupError")
+
+    assert "active_group_ids[0] if active_group_ids else data.get('active_group_id')" not in source
+    assert "active_public_workspace_ids = [active_public_workspace_id]" not in extract_function_source(source, "chat_api")
+    assert source.find("_authorize_personal_conversation_access(user_id, requested_conversation_id)") < source.find(
+        "CHAT_STREAM_REGISTRY.start_session(user_id, finalized_conversation_id)"
+    )
+
+    print("✅ Chat conversation ownership and scope canonicalization passed")
+
+
+def test_tabular_plugin_binds_request_scopes_before_blob_access():
+    """Verify the tabular plugin validates request context before using tool-call scope ids."""
+    print("🔍 Testing tabular plugin request-scope binding...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(TABULAR_PLUGIN_FILE)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "def _get_authorized_chat_context(self) -> dict:",
+        "def _resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(",
+        "authorized_context = self._resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(",
+        "override and self._is_authorized_blob_location(",
+        "return json.dumps({\"error\": str(exc)})",
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing tabular authorization snippets: {missing}"
+
+    assert "Tabular processing cannot access that group scope." in source
+    assert "Tabular processing cannot access that public workspace scope." in source
+    assert "requested_user_id and requested_user_id != authorized_context['user_id']" in source
+    assert "requested_conversation_id and requested_conversation_id != authorized_context['conversation_id']" in source
+
+    print("✅ Tabular plugin request-scope binding passed")
+
+
+def test_fact_memory_plugin_uses_authorized_request_scope():
+    """Verify the fact-memory plugin no longer forwards raw tool-call scope ids to the store."""
+    print("🔍 Testing fact-memory request-scope binding...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(FACT_MEMORY_PLUGIN_FILE)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "def _get_authorized_fact_memory_scope(self) -> dict:",
+        "def _resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call(",
+        "scope_type=authorized_scope['scope_type']",
+        "scope_id=authorized_scope['scope_id']",
+        "conversation_id=authorized_scope['conversation_id']",
+        "[FactMemoryPlugin] Overriding mismatched fact-memory scope in tool call.",
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing fact-memory authorization snippets: {missing}"
+
+    print("✅ Fact-memory request-scope binding passed")
+
+
+def test_control_center_workspace_renderer_escapes_untrusted_fields():
+    """Verify the Control Center workspace row renderer escapes untrusted metadata."""
+    print("🔍 Testing Control Center public workspace escaping...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(CONTROL_CENTER_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "this.escapeHtml(workspace.name || 'Unnamed Workspace')",
+        "this.escapeHtml(workspace.description || 'No description')",
+        "this.escapeHtml(ownerName)",
+        "this.escapeHtml(ownerEmail)",
+        "this.escapeHtml(log.document?.file_name || 'Unknown')",
+        "this.escapeHtml(log.conversation?.title || 'Untitled')",
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing escaped Control Center snippets: {missing}"
+
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        "${workspace.name || 'Unnamed Workspace'}",
+        "${workspace.description || 'No description'}",
+        "${ownerName}",
+        "${ownerEmail}",
+    ]
+    present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source]
+    assert not present, f"Unexpected unescaped Control Center snippets found: {present}"
+
+    print("✅ Control Center public workspace escaping passed")
+
+
+def test_security_fix_documentation_and_version_bump_exist():
+    """Verify the fix doc exists and config version was bumped for this security pass."""
+    print("🔍 Testing security fix documentation and version bump...")
+
+    assert read_config_version() == "0.241.022"
+    assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}"
+
+    fix_doc_text = read_file_text(FIX_DOC)
+    assert "/api/public_workspaces/" in fix_doc_text
+    assert "pendingDocumentManagers" in fix_doc_text
+    assert "userRole" in fix_doc_text
+
+    print("✅ Security fix documentation and version bump passed")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    tests = [
+        test_search_odata_helpers_escape_literals,
+        test_active_group_updates_and_group_routes_require_membership,
+        test_active_public_workspace_updates_validate_workspace_existence,
+        test_public_workspace_details_route_limits_non_member_payloads,
+        test_approval_access_helper_enforces_visibility_and_eligibility,
+        test_history_fallback_revalidation_filters_revoked_scope,
+        test_chat_route_enforces_conversation_ownership_and_scope_canonicalization,
+        test_tabular_plugin_binds_request_scopes_before_blob_access,
+        test_fact_memory_plugin_uses_authorized_request_scope,
+        test_control_center_workspace_renderer_escapes_untrusted_fields,
+        test_security_fix_documentation_and_version_bump_exist,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...")
+        test()
+
+    print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed")
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..34a5d3267
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+# test_stored_xss_admin_rendering_fix.py
+"""
+Functional test for stored XSS admin rendering hardening.
+Version: 0.241.016
+Implemented in: 0.241.010
+
+This test ensures Control Center member rendering, public workspace member
+modal rendering, and admin agent rendering keep user-controlled names inert,
+and that Control Center toast messages escape by default unless a caller
+explicitly opts into HTML.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+CONTROL_CENTER_TEMPLATE = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "templates",
+    "control_center.html",
+)
+CONTROL_CENTER_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "control-center.js",
+)
+ADMIN_AGENTS_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "admin",
+    "admin_agents.js",
+)
+WORKSPACE_MANAGER_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "workspace-manager.js",
+)
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py")
+LEGACY_FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "docs",
+    "explanation",
+    "fixes",
+    "v0.241.012",
+    "STORED_XSS_ADMIN_RENDERING_FIX.md",
+)
+NEW_FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "docs",
+    "explanation",
+    "fixes",
+    "v0.241.016",
+    "CONTROL_CENTER_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_MEMBERS_XSS_FIX.md",
+)
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("VERSION = "):
+            return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py")
+
+
+def test_control_center_member_rows_escape_untrusted_fields():
+    """Verify group-member modal rows escape member names and emails."""
+    print("🔍 Testing Control Center group-member row escaping...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(CONTROL_CENTER_TEMPLATE)
+
+    assert "${GroupManager.escapeHtml(member.name || 'Unknown User')}" in source
+    assert "${GroupManager.escapeHtml(member.email || 'No email')}" in source
+    assert "${member.name || 'Unknown User'}" not in source
+    assert "${member.email || 'No email'}" not in source
+
+    print("✅ Control Center group-member row escaping passed")
+
+
+def test_control_center_toasts_escape_by_default():
+    """Verify Control Center toasts require explicit opt-in for HTML."""
+    print("🔍 Testing Control Center toast escaping defaults...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(CONTROL_CENTER_JS)
+
+    assert "showToast(message, type = 'info', allowHtml = false)" in source
+    assert "const safeMessage = allowHtml" in source
+    assert "this.escapeHtml(String(message ?? ''))" in source
+    assert "${safeMessage}" in source
+    assert source.count("showToast(`Ownership transfer request submitted!

    Status: Pending Approval") == 0
+
+    template_source = read_file_text(CONTROL_CENTER_TEMPLATE)
+    assert template_source.count("'success', true") >= 2
+    assert "window.controlCenter.showToast(`Successfully added ${displayName} as ${role}`, 'success');" in template_source
+
+    print("✅ Control Center toast escaping defaults passed")
+
+
+def test_admin_agent_table_escapes_agent_fields():
+    """Verify the admin agent table escapes user-controlled agent fields."""
+    print("🔍 Testing admin agent table escaping...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(ADMIN_AGENTS_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "function escapeHtml(text) {",
+        "const safeName = escapeHtml(agent.name || '')",
+        "const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(agent.display_name || '')",
+        "const safeDescription = escapeHtml(agent.description || '')",
+        "${safeName}",
+        "${safeDisplayName}",
+        "${safeDescription}",
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing admin agent escaping snippets: {missing}"
+
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        "${agent.name}",
+        "${agent.display_name}",
+        "${agent.description || ''}",
+    ]
+    present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source]
+    assert not present, f"Unexpected unescaped admin agent snippets found: {present}"
+
+    print("✅ Admin agent table escaping passed")
+
+
+def test_workspace_members_modal_uses_text_nodes_for_untrusted_fields():
+    """Verify the workspace members modal renders stored member metadata as text."""
+    print("🔍 Testing workspace members modal escaping...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(WORKSPACE_MANAGER_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "const nameCell = document.createElement('td');",
+        "const displayNameElement = document.createElement('div');",
+        "const emailElement = document.createElement('div');",
+        "displayNameElement.textContent = displayName;",
+        "emailElement.textContent = email;",
+        "row.appendChild(nameCell);",
+        "row.appendChild(roleCell);",
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing workspace members modal hardening snippets: {missing}"
+
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        "
    ${displayName}
    ",
+        '
    ${email}
    ',
+    ]
+    present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source]
+    assert not present, f"Unexpected unescaped workspace members modal snippets found: {present}"
+
+    print("✅ Workspace members modal escaping passed")
+
+
+def test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist():
+    """Verify the new version and fix documentation landed for this change."""
+    print("🔍 Testing stored XSS fix documentation and version...")
+
+    assert read_config_version() == "0.241.016"
+    assert os.path.exists(LEGACY_FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {LEGACY_FIX_DOC}"
+    assert os.path.exists(NEW_FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {NEW_FIX_DOC}"
+
+    print("✅ Stored XSS fix documentation and version passed")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    tests = [
+        test_control_center_member_rows_escape_untrusted_fields,
+        test_control_center_toasts_escape_by_default,
+        test_admin_agent_table_escapes_agent_fields,
+        test_workspace_members_modal_uses_text_nodes_for_untrusted_fields,
+        test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...")
+        test()
+
+    print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed")
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_modal_filename_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_modal_filename_fix.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd427d64d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_modal_filename_fix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# test_stored_xss_chat_modal_filename_fix.py
+"""
+Functional test for chat modal filename XSS hardening.
+Version: 0.241.018
+Implemented in: 0.241.018
+
+This test ensures chat citation and uploaded-file modal titles render
+attacker-controlled filenames as inert text on first display.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+CHAT_CITATIONS_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "chat",
+    "chat-citations.js",
+)
+CHAT_INPUT_ACTIONS_JS = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "application",
+    "single_app",
+    "static",
+    "js",
+    "chat",
+    "chat-input-actions.js",
+)
+CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py")
+FIX_DOC = os.path.join(
+    ROOT_DIR,
+    "docs",
+    "explanation",
+    "fixes",
+    "v0.241.018",
+    "CITATION_AND_FILE_MODAL_FILENAME_XSS_FIX.md",
+)
+
+
+def read_file_text(file_path):
+    with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file_handle:
+        return file_handle.read()
+
+
+def read_config_version():
+    for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("VERSION = "):
+            return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"')
+    raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py")
+
+
+def test_citation_modal_title_uses_text_content_for_filename():
+    """Verify the citation modal never injects fileName into first-render HTML."""
+    print("🔍 Testing citation modal title escaping...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(CHAT_CITATIONS_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        '            
    ',
+        '    modalTitle.textContent = `Source: ${fileName}, Page: ${pageNumber}`;',
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing citation modal hardening snippets: {missing}"
+
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        '            
    Source: ${fileName}, Page: ${pageNumber}
    ',
+    ]
+    present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source]
+    assert not present, f"Unexpected inline filename interpolation found: {present}"
+
+    print("✅ Citation modal title escaping passed")
+
+
+def test_uploaded_file_modal_title_uses_text_content_for_filename():
+    """Verify the uploaded-file modal never injects filename into first-render HTML."""
+    print("🔍 Testing uploaded-file modal title escaping...")
+
+    source = read_file_text(CHAT_INPUT_ACTIONS_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        '            
    ',
+        '    modalTitle.textContent = `Uploaded File: ${filename}`;',
+    ]
+    missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source]
+    assert not missing, f"Missing uploaded-file modal hardening snippets: {missing}"
+
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        '            
    Uploaded File: ${filename}
    ',
+    ]
+    present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source]
+    assert not present, f"Unexpected inline filename interpolation found: {present}"
+
+    print("✅ Uploaded-file modal title escaping passed")
+
+
+def test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist():
+    """Verify the version bump and fix documentation landed for this change."""
+    print("🔍 Testing chat modal filename fix documentation and version...")
+
+    assert read_config_version() == "0.241.018"
+    assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}"
+
+    print("✅ Chat modal filename fix documentation and version passed")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    tests = [
+        test_citation_modal_title_uses_text_content_for_filename,
+        test_uploaded_file_modal_title_uses_text_content_for_filename,
+        test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist,
+    ]
+
+    for test in tests:
+        print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...")
+        test()
+
+    print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed")
+    sys.exit(0)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd32d3a66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py
+"""
+Functional test for chat scope-lock and conversation-details XSS hardening.
+Version: 0.241.022
+Implemented in: 0.241.019
+
+This test ensures stored workspace and conversation metadata values are encoded
+before the scope-lock modal and conversation-details modal render HTML.
+"""
+
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+ROOT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+CHAT_DOCUMENTS_JS = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "static" / "js" / "chat" / "chat-documents.js"
+CHAT_CONVERSATION_DETAILS_JS = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "static" / "js" / "chat" / "chat-conversation-details.js"
+CONFIG_FILE = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "config.py"
+FIX_DOC = ROOT_DIR / "docs" / "explanation" / "fixes" / "v0.241.020" / "CHAT_SCOPE_LOCK_AND_CONVERSATION_DETAILS_XSS_FIX.md"
+
+
+def read_text(path: Path) -> str:
+    """Read a UTF-8 text file from the repository."""
+    return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def read_version() -> str:
+    """Extract the application version from config.py."""
+    for line in read_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines():
+        if line.strip().startswith('VERSION = '):
+            return line.split('"')[1]
+    raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment was not found in config.py")
+
+
+def test_scope_lock_modal_renders_workspace_names_with_text_nodes() -> None:
+    """Verify the scope-lock modal no longer interpolates workspace names into HTML."""
+    source = read_text(CHAT_DOCUMENTS_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "workspaceItems.push({ icon, name });",
+        "nameEl.textContent = name;",
+        "listItemEl.appendChild(nameEl);",
+        "listGroupEl.appendChild(listItemEl);",
+    ]
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        "workspaceItems.push(`
  • ${name}
    • `);",
+        "listEl.innerHTML = `
    ${listLabel}
      ${workspaceItems.join('')}
    `;",
+    ]
+
+    for snippet in required_snippets:
+        assert snippet in source, f"Expected safe scope-lock rendering snippet: {snippet}"
+
+    for snippet in forbidden_snippets:
+        assert snippet not in source, f"Unexpected unsafe scope-lock rendering snippet: {snippet}"
+
+
+def test_conversation_details_modal_escapes_untrusted_metadata_fields() -> None:
+    """Verify the conversation-details renderer escapes the user-controlled fields in this fix."""
+    source = read_text(CHAT_CONVERSATION_DETAILS_JS)
+
+    required_snippets = [
+        "const safeConversationTitle = escapeHtml(metadata.title || 'Conversation Details');",
+        "escapeHtml(error.message || 'Unknown error')",
+        "const safeConversationId = escapeHtml(conversationId);",
+        "const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(displayName);",
+        "const safeParticipantName = escapeHtml(participant.name || 'Unknown User');",
+        "const safeDocumentTitle = escapeHtml(documentTitle);",
+        "const safeClassification = escapeHtml(doc.classification || 'None');",
+        "const safeSourceUrl = sanitizeHttpUrl(sourceValue);",
+        "href=\"${escapeHtml(safeSourceUrl)}\"",
+        "names.map(name => escapeHtml(name)).join(', ')",
+    ]
+    forbidden_snippets = [
+        "${metadata.title || 'Conversation Details'}",
+        "${displayName}",
+        "
    ${participant.name || 'Unknown User'}
    ",
+        "title=\"${documentTitle}\">${documentTitle}
    ", + "${doc.scope?.type} scope: ${scopeName}", + "${tag.value}", + "", + "names.join(', ')", + ] + + for snippet in required_snippets: + assert snippet in source, f"Expected safe conversation-details snippet: {snippet}" + + for snippet in forbidden_snippets: + assert snippet not in source, f"Unexpected unsafe conversation-details snippet: {snippet}" + + +def test_fix_documentation_and_version_are_in_sync() -> None: + """Verify the version bump and fix documentation were added together.""" + version = read_version() + assert version == "0.241.022", f"Expected config.py version 0.241.022, found {version}" + assert FIX_DOC.exists(), f"Expected fix documentation file at {FIX_DOC}" + + fix_doc = read_text(FIX_DOC) + assert "Fixed in version: **0.241.019**" in fix_doc + assert "functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_scope_and_conversation_details_fix.py" in fix_doc + assert "ui_tests/test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py" in fix_doc + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + tests = [ + test_scope_lock_modal_renders_workspace_names_with_text_nodes, + test_conversation_details_modal_escapes_untrusted_metadata_fields, + test_fix_documentation_and_version_are_in_sync, + ] + results = [] + + for test in tests: + print(f"\nRunning {test.__name__}...") + try: + test() + print("PASS") + results.append(True) + except Exception as error: + print(f"FAIL: {error}") + results.append(False) + + success = all(results) + print(f"\nResults: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed") + sys.exit(0 if success else 1) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_workspace_rendering_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_workspace_rendering_fix.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..93aa10cee --- /dev/null +++ b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_chat_workspace_rendering_fix.py @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +# test_stored_xss_chat_workspace_rendering_fix.py +""" +Functional test for stored XSS chat and workspace rendering hardening. +Version: 0.241.017 +Implemented in: 0.241.017 + +This test ensures chat agent display names, workspace member display names, +and Graph user search filters are safely encoded before HTML or OData +insertion. +""" + +import ast +import os +import sys + + +ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) +CHAT_MESSAGES_JS = os.path.join( + ROOT_DIR, + "application", + "single_app", + "static", + "js", + "chat", + "chat-messages.js", +) +MANAGE_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_JS = os.path.join( + ROOT_DIR, + "application", + "single_app", + "static", + "js", + "public", + "manage_public_workspace.js", +) +MANAGE_GROUP_JS = os.path.join( + ROOT_DIR, + "application", + "single_app", + "static", + "js", + "group", + "manage_group.js", +) +USERS_ROUTE = os.path.join( + ROOT_DIR, + "application", + "single_app", + "route_backend_users.py", +) +CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py") +FIX_DOC = os.path.join( + ROOT_DIR, + "docs", + "explanation", + "fixes", + "v0.241.017", + "STORED_XSS_AGENT_AND_MEMBER_RENDERING_FIX.md", +) + + +def read_file_text(file_path): + with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file_handle: + return file_handle.read() + + +def read_config_version(): + for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines(): + if line.startswith("VERSION = "): + return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"') + raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py") + + +def load_function(file_path, function_name): + source = read_file_text(file_path) + parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=file_path) + selected_node = next( + ( + node + for node in parsed.body + if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name + ), + None, + ) + assert selected_node is not None, f"Expected function {function_name} in {file_path}" + module = ast.Module(body=[selected_node], type_ignores=[]) + namespace = {} + exec(compile(module, file_path, "exec"), namespace) + return namespace[function_name] + + +def test_chat_agent_display_name_is_escaped_before_html_rendering(): + """Verify chat agent display names are escaped in both HTML sinks.""" + print("🔍 Testing chat agent display name escaping...") + + source = read_file_text(CHAT_MESSAGES_JS) + + required_snippets = [ + "senderLabel = escapeHtml(agentDisplayName);", + "${escapeHtml(metadata.agent_display_name)}", + ] + missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source] + assert not missing, f"Missing chat escaping snippets: {missing}" + + forbidden_snippets = [ + "senderLabel = agentDisplayName;", + "${metadata.agent_display_name}", + ] + present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source] + assert not present, f"Unexpected unescaped chat snippets found: {present}" + + print("✅ Chat agent display name escaping passed") + + +def test_public_workspace_member_renderers_escape_untrusted_fields(): + """Verify public workspace member-management renderers escape display names and emails.""" + print("🔍 Testing public workspace member rendering escaping...") + + source = read_file_text(MANAGE_PUBLIC_WORKSPACE_JS) + + required_snippets = [ + 'const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(m.displayName || "(no name)");', + 'const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(req.displayName || "(no name)");', + 'const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(u.displayName || "(no name)");', + 'data-user-name="${safeDisplayName}"', + 'membersList += `
  • • ${safeName} (${safeEmail})
    • `;', + '$(document).on("click", ".select-user-btn", function () {', + "${escapeHtml(row.displayName || '')} (${escapeHtml(row.email || '')})", + ] + missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source] + assert not missing, f"Missing public workspace escaping snippets: {missing}" + + forbidden_snippets = [ + 'onclick="selectUserForAdd(', + '${u.displayName || "(no name)"}', + '${req.displayName}', + '
  • • ${member.name} (${member.email})
    • ', + ] + present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source] + assert not present, f"Unexpected unescaped public workspace snippets found: {present}" + + print("✅ Public workspace member rendering escaping passed") + + +def test_group_workspace_member_renderers_escape_untrusted_fields(): + """Verify group workspace member-management renderers escape display names and emails.""" + print("🔍 Testing group workspace member rendering escaping...") + + source = read_file_text(MANAGE_GROUP_JS) + + required_snippets = [ + 'const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(m.displayName || "(no name)");', + 'const safeDisplayName = escapeHtml(u.displayName || "(no name)");', + 'data-user-name="${safeDisplayName}"', + 'membersList += `
  • • ${safeName} (${safeEmail})
    • `;', + "${escapeHtml(row.displayName || '')} (${escapeHtml(row.email || '')})", + ] + missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source] + assert not missing, f"Missing group workspace escaping snippets: {missing}" + + forbidden_snippets = [ + '${u.displayName || "(no name)"}', + '${u.email || ""}', + '
  • • ${member.name} (${member.email})
    • ', + '', + ] + present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source] + assert not present, f"Unexpected unescaped group workspace snippets found: {present}" + + print("✅ Group workspace member rendering escaping passed") + + +def test_user_search_filter_escapes_odata_literals(): + """Verify /api/userSearch escapes apostrophes before building the Graph filter.""" + print("🔍 Testing Graph user search OData literal escaping...") + + escape_helper = load_function(USERS_ROUTE, "_escape_graph_odata_literal") + assert escape_helper("o'hare") == "o''hare" + assert escape_helper("") == "" + + source = read_file_text(USERS_ROUTE) + assert "safe_query = _escape_graph_odata_literal(query)" in source + assert "startswith(displayName, '{safe_query}')" in source + assert "startswith(mail, '{safe_query}')" in source + assert "startswith(userPrincipalName, '{safe_query}')" in source + assert "startswith(displayName, '{query}')" not in source + + print("✅ Graph user search OData literal escaping passed") + + +def test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist(): + """Verify the version bump and fix documentation landed for this change.""" + print("🔍 Testing stored XSS rendering fix documentation and version...") + + assert read_config_version() == "0.241.017" + assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}" + + print("✅ Stored XSS rendering fix documentation and version passed") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + tests = [ + test_chat_agent_display_name_is_escaped_before_html_rendering, + test_public_workspace_member_renderers_escape_untrusted_fields, + test_group_workspace_member_renderers_escape_untrusted_fields, + test_user_search_filter_escapes_odata_literals, + test_fix_documentation_and_version_exist, + ] + + for test in tests: + print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...") + test() + + print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed") + sys.exit(0) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41ac8fe61 --- /dev/null +++ b/functional_tests/test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +# test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py +""" +Functional test for stored XSS sharing, activity, and masking hardening. +Version: 0.241.022 +Implemented in: 0.241.020 + +This test ensures document-sharing modals, group activity rendering, and chat +masking metadata render attacker-controlled values as inert text and derive +masking identity from the authenticated server-side user. +""" + +import sys +from pathlib import Path + + +ROOT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +CHAT_TOAST_JS = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "static" / "js" / "chat" / "chat-toast.js" +CHAT_MESSAGES_JS = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "static" / "js" / "chat" / "chat-messages.js" +GROUP_MANAGE_JS = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "static" / "js" / "group" / "manage_group.js" +GROUP_SHARE_JS = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "static" / "js" / "workspace" / "group-documents-sharing.js" +WORKSPACE_SHARE_JS = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "static" / "js" / "workspace" / "workspace-documents-sharing.js" +CHAT_ROUTE = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "route_backend_chats.py" +CONFIG_FILE = ROOT_DIR / "application" / "single_app" / "config.py" +FIX_DOC = ROOT_DIR / "docs" / "explanation" / "fixes" / "v0.241.020" / "STORED_XSS_SHARE_ACTIVITY_AND_MASKING_FIX.md" + + +def read_text(path: Path) -> str: + """Read a UTF-8 text file from the repository.""" + return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def read_version() -> str: + """Extract the application version from config.py.""" + for line in read_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines(): + if line.strip().startswith('VERSION = '): + return line.split('"')[1] + raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment was not found in config.py") + + +def assert_required_snippets(source: str, required_snippets: list[str], description: str) -> None: + """Assert that all required snippets exist in the target source text.""" + missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source] + assert not missing, f"Missing {description} snippets: {missing}" + + +def assert_forbidden_snippets(source: str, forbidden_snippets: list[str], description: str) -> None: + """Assert that forbidden snippets were removed from the target source text.""" + present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source] + assert not present, f"Unexpected {description} snippets still present: {present}" + + +def test_chat_toast_uses_text_nodes_for_messages() -> None: + """Verify the shared chat toast helper no longer interpolates raw HTML messages.""" + source = read_text(CHAT_TOAST_JS) + + assert_required_snippets( + source, + [ + 'const toastEl = document.createElement("div");', + 'bodyEl.textContent = String(message ?? "");', + 'container.appendChild(toastEl);', + ], + "chat toast hardening", + ) + assert_forbidden_snippets( + source, + [ + 'container.insertAdjacentHTML("beforeend", toastHtml);', + '${message}', + ], + "unsafe chat toast rendering", + ) + + +def test_document_share_modals_use_safe_rendering_and_delegated_clicks() -> None: + """Verify personal and group share modals no longer rehydrate attacker HTML.""" + workspace_source = read_text(WORKSPACE_SHARE_JS) + group_source = read_text(GROUP_SHARE_JS) + + assert_required_snippets( + workspace_source, + [ + "const userSearchResultsBody = document.querySelector('#userSearchResultsTable tbody');", + "const sharedUsersList = document.getElementById('sharedUsersList');", + "const addButton = e.target.closest('.user-search-add-btn');", + "const removeButton = e.target.closest('.shared-user-remove-btn');", + "displayNameCell.textContent = user.displayName || '';", + "emailCell.textContent = user.email || '';", + "toastBody.textContent = String(message ?? '');", + "tbody.replaceChildren(...userRows);", + "sharedUsersList.replaceChildren(...userRows);", + ], + "workspace share hardening", + ) + assert_forbidden_snippets( + workspace_source, + [ + 'onclick="addUserToDocument(', + 'onclick="removeUserFromDocument(', + 'toast.innerHTML = `', + ], + "unsafe workspace share rendering", + ) + + assert_required_snippets( + group_source, + [ + "const groupSearchResultsBody = document.querySelector('#groupSearchResultsTable tbody');", + "const sharedGroupsList = document.getElementById('sharedGroupsList');", + "const addButton = e.target.closest('.group-search-add-btn');", + "const removeButton = e.target.closest('.shared-group-remove-btn');", + "nameCell.textContent = group.name || '';", + "descriptionCell.textContent = group.description || '';", + "toastBody.textContent = String(message ?? '');", + "tbody.replaceChildren(...groupRows);", + "sharedGroupsList.replaceChildren(...groupRows);", + ], + "group share hardening", + ) + assert_forbidden_snippets( + group_source, + [ + 'onclick="addGroupToDocument(', + 'onclick="removeGroupFromDocument(', + 'toast.innerHTML = `', + ], + "unsafe group share rendering", + ) + + +def test_group_activity_timeline_uses_safe_text_rendering() -> None: + """Verify activity rows and the raw-activity modal no longer use unsafe HTML sinks.""" + source = read_text(GROUP_MANAGE_JS) + + assert_required_snippets( + source, + [ + 'const safeDescription = escapeHtml(description);', + "const activityTimeline = $('#activityTimeline');", + "activityTimeline.find('.activity-item').each(function(index) {", + "$(this).data('activity', activities[index]);", + '
    ', + "code.textContent = JSON.stringify(activity ?? {}, null, 2) || '{}';", + 'modalBody.replaceChildren(pre);', + ], + "group activity hardening", + ) + assert_forbidden_snippets( + source, + [ + 'data-activity=\'${activityJson.replace(/\'/g, "'")}\'', + 'onclick="showRawActivity(this)"', + 'modalBody.innerHTML = `
    ${JSON.stringify(activity, null, 2)}
    `;', + '

    ${description}

    ', + ], + "unsafe group activity rendering", + ) + + +def test_masking_renderer_and_backend_identity_are_hardened() -> None: + """Verify masked spans render safely and the backend ignores client-supplied display names.""" + chat_messages_source = read_text(CHAT_MESSAGES_JS) + chat_route_source = read_text(CHAT_ROUTE) + + assert_required_snippets( + chat_messages_source, + [ + "const fragment = document.createDocumentFragment();", + "fragment.appendChild(document.createTextNode(content.substring(lastIndex, range.start)));", + "const maskedSpan = document.createElement('span');", + "maskedSpan.setAttribute('data-display-name', String(range.display_name ?? ''));", + "maskedSpan.title = `Masked by ${String(range.display_name ?? 'Unknown User')} on ${timestamp}`;", + 'messageText.replaceChildren(fragment);', + ], + "chat masking renderer hardening", + ) + assert_forbidden_snippets( + chat_messages_source, + [ + 'messageText.innerHTML = htmlContent;', + 'data-display-name="${range.display_name}"', + 'title="Masked by ${range.display_name} on ${timestamp}"', + ], + "unsafe chat masking rendering", + ) + + assert_required_snippets( + chat_route_source, + [ + 'current_user = get_current_user_info() or {}', + "current_user.get('displayName')", + "current_user.get('email')", + "current_user.get('userPrincipalName')", + ], + "masking backend identity hardening", + ) + assert_forbidden_snippets( + chat_route_source, + [ + "user_display_name = data.get('display_name', 'Unknown User')", + ], + "client-controlled masking display name", + ) + + +def test_fix_documentation_and_version_are_in_sync() -> None: + """Verify the version bump and fix documentation landed together.""" + version = read_version() + assert version == "0.241.022", f"Expected config.py version 0.241.022, found {version}" + assert FIX_DOC.exists(), f"Expected fix documentation file at {FIX_DOC}" + + fix_doc = read_text(FIX_DOC) + assert "Fixed in version: **0.241.020**" in fix_doc + assert "functional_tests/test_stored_xss_share_activity_and_masking_fix.py" in fix_doc + assert "ui_tests/test_document_share_modal_escaping.py" in fix_doc + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + tests = [ + test_chat_toast_uses_text_nodes_for_messages, + test_document_share_modals_use_safe_rendering_and_delegated_clicks, + test_group_activity_timeline_uses_safe_text_rendering, + test_masking_renderer_and_backend_identity_are_hardened, + test_fix_documentation_and_version_are_in_sync, + ] + results = [] + + for test in tests: + print(f"\nRunning {test.__name__}...") + try: + test() + print("PASS") + results.append(True) + except Exception as error: + print(f"FAIL: {error}") + results.append(False) + + success = all(results) + print(f"\nResults: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed") + sys.exit(0 if success else 1) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/functional_tests/test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py b/functional_tests/test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py index f966e9c0c..be42e9c62 100644 --- a/functional_tests/test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py +++ b/functional_tests/test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py @@ -2,12 +2,13 @@ # test_tabular_all_scope_group_source_context.py """ Functional test for all-scope tabular group source context handling. -Version: 0.240.049 -Implemented in: 0.240.032; 0.240.041; 0.240.042; 0.240.043; 0.240.048; 0.240.049 +Version: 0.241.017 +Implemented in: 0.240.032; 0.240.041; 0.240.042; 0.240.043; 0.240.048; 0.240.049; 0.241.016 This test ensures mixed-scope workspace search keeps per-file group/public source metadata so tabular analysis can open group and public workbooks even -when chat document scope is set to all. +when chat document scope is set to all, while selected-document resolution only +uses documents the current chat scope is authorized to access. """ import ast @@ -19,6 +20,8 @@ ROUTE_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app', 'route_backend_chats.py') CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app', 'config.py') TARGET_FUNCTIONS = { + '_normalize_requested_scope_ids', + '_resolve_chat_selected_document_metadata', 'is_tabular_filename', 'get_document_containers_for_scope', 'build_tabular_file_context', @@ -146,6 +149,8 @@ def test_selected_tabular_document_lookup_checks_all_scope_containers(): selected_contexts = helpers['get_selected_workspace_tabular_file_contexts']( selected_document_ids=['group-doc-123', 'public-doc-456'], document_scope='all', + active_group_ids=['93aa364a-99ee-4cfd-8e4d-f37d175f00f5'], + active_public_workspace_ids=['public-456'], ) assert selected_contexts == [ @@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ def test_route_uses_context_aware_tabular_analysis_and_version_bump(): ] missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source] assert not missing, f'Missing route integration snippets: {missing}' - assert read_config_version() == '0.240.049' + assert read_config_version() == '0.241.017' print('✅ Route integration and version bump passed') return True diff --git a/functional_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py b/functional_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f7055bde3 --- /dev/null +++ b/functional_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +# test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py +""" +Functional test for uploaded file preview XSS hardening. +Version: 0.241.022 +Implemented in: 0.241.022 + +This test ensures uploaded file preview rendering no longer injects raw file +content into modal HTML and that current tabular previews build their DOM with +text nodes instead of untrusted HTML interpolation. +""" + +import os +import sys + + +ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) +CHAT_INPUT_ACTIONS_JS = os.path.join( + ROOT_DIR, + "application", + "single_app", + "static", + "js", + "chat", + "chat-input-actions.js", +) +CONFIG_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, "application", "single_app", "config.py") +FIX_DOC = os.path.join( + ROOT_DIR, + "docs", + "explanation", + "fixes", + "v0.241.022", + "UPLOADED_FILE_PREVIEW_XSS_FIX.md", +) + + +def read_file_text(file_path): + with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file_handle: + return file_handle.read() + + +def read_config_version(): + for line in read_file_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines(): + if line.strip().startswith("VERSION = "): + return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"') + raise AssertionError("VERSION assignment not found in config.py") + + +def test_uploaded_file_preview_uses_safe_rendering_boundaries(): + """Verify the preview modal no longer feeds file content into dynamic HTML sinks.""" + print("🔍 Testing uploaded file preview rendering boundaries...") + + source = read_file_text(CHAT_INPUT_ACTIONS_JS) + + required_snippets = [ + 'downloadBtnContainer.replaceChildren();', + 'const downloadLink = document.createElement("a");', + 'const isLegacyHtmlTableContent = /^$/i.test(trimmedContent);', + 'renderPreformattedText(fileContentElement, fileContent);', + 'const tableWrapper = buildCsvTableElement(fileContent);', + 'headerCell.textContent = header;', + 'cellElement.textContent = cell;', + 'pre.textContent = String(text ?? "");', + ] + missing = [snippet for snippet in required_snippets if snippet not in source] + assert not missing, f"Missing uploaded file preview hardening snippets: {missing}" + + forbidden_snippets = [ + 'fileContentElement.innerHTML = `
    ${tableHTML}
    `;', + 'fileContentElement.innerHTML = `
    ${fileContent}
    `;', + 'fileContentElement.innerHTML = `
    ${fileContent}
    `;', + '!fileContent.trim().startsWith(\'<\')', + ] + present = [snippet for snippet in forbidden_snippets if snippet in source] + assert not present, f"Unexpected unsafe uploaded file preview snippets found: {present}" + + print("✅ Uploaded file preview rendering boundaries passed") + + +def test_fix_documentation_and_version_are_in_sync(): + """Verify the fix note and current config version landed together.""" + print("🔍 Testing uploaded file preview fix documentation and version...") + + assert read_config_version() == "0.241.022" + + assert os.path.exists(FIX_DOC), f"Expected fix documentation at {FIX_DOC}" + fix_doc = read_file_text(FIX_DOC) + assert "Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.022**" in fix_doc + assert "legacy html table payloads now render as inert preformatted text" in fix_doc.lower() + assert "functional_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_xss_fix.py" in fix_doc + assert "ui_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py" in fix_doc + + print("✅ Uploaded file preview fix documentation and version passed") + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + tests = [ + test_uploaded_file_preview_uses_safe_rendering_boundaries, + test_fix_documentation_and_version_are_in_sync, + ] + + for test in tests: + print(f"\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...") + test() + + print(f"\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed") + sys.exit(0) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/functional_tests/test_web_search_current_message_only.py b/functional_tests/test_web_search_current_message_only.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..722b37373 --- /dev/null +++ b/functional_tests/test_web_search_current_message_only.py @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +# test_web_search_current_message_only.py +""" +Functional test for current-message-only web search egress. +Version: 0.241.008 +Implemented in: 0.241.008 + +This test ensures external web search uses only the current user message, +keeps history-derived internal search rewrites out of the outbound web-search +boundary, and does not send the previous Foundry identifier metadata blob. +""" + +import ast +import os +import sys + + +ROOT_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) +ROUTE_FILE = os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, 'application', 'single_app', 'route_backend_chats.py') + + +def read_file_text(file_path): + with open(file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as file_handle: + return file_handle.read() + + +def extract_function_source(source_text, function_name): + parsed = ast.parse(source_text, filename=ROUTE_FILE) + for node in ast.walk(parsed): + if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name: + return ast.get_source_segment(source_text, node) + raise AssertionError(f'Function {function_name} not found in route_backend_chats.py') + + +def load_helper(function_name): + source = read_file_text(ROUTE_FILE) + parsed = ast.parse(source, filename=ROUTE_FILE) + selected_nodes = [ + node for node in parsed.body + if isinstance(node, ast.FunctionDef) and node.name == function_name + ] + assert len(selected_nodes) == 1, f'Expected helper {function_name} to exist exactly once' + + module = ast.Module(body=selected_nodes, type_ignores=[]) + namespace = {} + exec(compile(module, ROUTE_FILE, 'exec'), namespace) + return namespace[function_name] + + +def test_web_search_query_helper_uses_only_current_message(): + """Verify the outbound web-search helper only normalizes the current turn.""" + print('🔍 Testing outbound web-search query helper...') + + helper = load_helper('build_web_search_query_text') + assert helper(' current turn only ') == 'current turn only' + assert helper('') == '' + assert helper(None) == '' + + print('✅ Outbound web-search query helper passed') + return True + + +def test_perform_web_search_uses_explicit_outbound_query_and_empty_metadata(): + """Verify the web-search boundary uses the explicit outbound query and no metadata blob.""" + print('🔍 Testing perform_web_search outbound boundary...') + + source = read_file_text(ROUTE_FILE) + perform_source = extract_function_source(source, 'perform_web_search') + + assert 'web_search_query_text,' in perform_source + assert 'query_text = (web_search_query_text or user_message or "").strip()' in perform_source + assert 'foundry_metadata = {}' in perform_source + + metadata_block = perform_source.split('foundry_metadata = {}', 1)[1].split( + 'debug_print("[WebSearch] Foundry metadata prepared: {}")', 1 + )[0] + + forbidden_snippets = [ + '"conversation_id": conversation_id', + '"user_id": user_id', + '"message_id": user_message_id', + '"chat_type": chat_type', + '"document_scope": document_scope', + '"group_id": active_group_id if chat_type == "group" else None', + '"public_workspace_id": active_public_workspace_id', + '"search_query": query_text', + ] + for snippet in forbidden_snippets: + assert snippet not in metadata_block, f'Unexpected outbound metadata snippet present: {snippet}' + + print('✅ perform_web_search outbound boundary passed') + return True + + +def test_chat_routes_pass_explicit_outbound_web_query(): + """Verify both chat handlers pass the dedicated outbound web-search query.""" + print('🔍 Testing chat route web-search call-site separation...') + + source = read_file_text(ROUTE_FILE) + + assert source.count('web_search_query_text = build_web_search_query_text(user_message)') >= 2 + assert source.count('web_search_query_text=web_search_query_text') >= 2 + assert 'search_query=search_query' not in source + + # Internal workspace-search rewrites still exist, but they should no longer + # be able to flow into the outbound web-search boundary. + assert 'search_query = rewritten_search_query' in source + assert "Based on the recent conversation about:" in source + + print('✅ Chat route web-search call-site separation passed') + return True + + +def test_search_summary_filters_out_system_messages(): + """Verify the optional search-summary branch excludes persisted system augmentation content.""" + print('🔍 Testing search-summary role filtering...') + + source = read_file_text(ROUTE_FILE) + assert "if role not in ('user', 'assistant'):" in source + assert "content = build_assistant_history_content_with_citations(msg, content)" in source + + print('✅ Search-summary role filtering passed') + return True + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + tests = [ + test_web_search_query_helper_uses_only_current_message, + test_perform_web_search_uses_explicit_outbound_query_and_empty_metadata, + test_chat_routes_pass_explicit_outbound_web_query, + test_search_summary_filters_out_system_messages, + ] + + for test in tests: + print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...') + test() + + print(f'\n📊 Results: {len(tests)}/{len(tests)} tests passed') + sys.exit(0) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py b/functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..95bc930f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +# test_xss_guardrails_checker.py +""" +Functional test for XSS PR guardrail checker. +Version: 0.241.022 +Implemented in: 0.241.021 + +This test ensures the changed-file XSS checker flags the repo's target sink +patterns, allows the approved safe rendering patterns, and stays wired into +the repo instruction and PR workflow. +""" + +import importlib.util +import os +import sys +from pathlib import Path + + +ROOT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +CHECKER_FILE = ROOT_DIR / 'scripts' / 'check_xss_sinks.py' +WORKFLOW_FILE = ROOT_DIR / '.github' / 'workflows' / 'xss-sink-check.yml' +INSTRUCTION_FILE = ROOT_DIR / '.github' / 'instructions' / 'xss-prevention.instructions.md' +FEATURE_DOC = ROOT_DIR / 'docs' / 'explanation' / 'features' / 'v0.241.021' / 'XSS_PR_GUARDRAILS.md' +CONFIG_FILE = ROOT_DIR / 'application' / 'single_app' / 'config.py' + + +def read_text(path: Path) -> str: + """Read a UTF-8 text file from the repository.""" + return path.read_text(encoding='utf-8') + + +def load_checker_module(): + """Import the checker module from disk without touching sys.path.""" + spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('check_xss_sinks', CHECKER_FILE) + assert spec is not None and spec.loader is not None, 'Expected a module spec for check_xss_sinks.py' + module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) + sys.modules[spec.name] = module + spec.loader.exec_module(module) + return module + + +def read_config_version() -> str: + """Extract the current application version from config.py.""" + for line in read_text(CONFIG_FILE).splitlines(): + if line.strip().startswith('VERSION = '): + return line.split('=', 1)[1].strip().strip('"') + raise AssertionError('VERSION assignment not found in config.py') + + +def issue_messages(module, file_name: str, source_text: str) -> list[str]: + """Return the issue messages emitted for one in-memory source string.""" + issues = module.inspect_source(Path(file_name), source_text) + return [issue.message for issue in issues] + + +def test_checker_flags_dynamic_html_sinks_and_attribute_interpolation() -> None: + """Verify dynamic HTML sinks and attribute interpolation are rejected.""" + module = load_checker_module() + + js_source = """ +const row = document.createElement('tr'); +row.innerHTML = `${userName}`; +""".strip() + messages = issue_messages(module, 'sample.js', js_source) + + assert any('innerHTML/outerHTML' in message for message in messages), messages + assert any('data-* attributes' in message for message in messages), messages + + +def test_checker_flags_marked_parse_inline_handlers_and_server_side_bypasses() -> None: + """Verify the checker covers client and server bypass markers.""" + module = load_checker_module() + + js_source = """ +const html = marked.parse(markdown); +button.setAttribute('onclick', 'runDanger()'); +""".strip() + js_messages = issue_messages(module, 'sample.js', js_source) + assert any('DOMPurify.sanitize' in message for message in js_messages), js_messages + assert any('inline event-handler APIs' in message for message in js_messages), js_messages + + py_source = """ +from markupsafe import Markup +safe_markup = Markup(user_supplied_html) +""".strip() + py_messages = issue_messages(module, 'sample.py', py_source) + assert any('Markup(...)' in message for message in py_messages), py_messages + + html_source = """ +
    {{ user_bio|safe }}
    +""".strip() + html_messages = issue_messages(module, 'sample.html', html_source) + assert any("Jinja '|safe'" in message for message in html_messages), html_messages + + +def test_checker_allows_safe_dom_patterns_static_shells_and_reviewed_suppressions() -> None: + """Verify the checker allows the repo's preferred safe rendering patterns.""" + module = load_checker_module() + + safe_js_source = """ +const row = document.createElement('tr'); +const nameCell = document.createElement('td'); +nameCell.textContent = userName; +const actionButton = document.createElement('button'); +actionButton.dataset.userName = userName; +actionButton.addEventListener('click', handleClick); +modal.innerHTML = '
    '; +const renderedHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(markdown)); +""".strip() + assert issue_messages(module, 'safe.js', safe_js_source) == [] + + suppressed_js_source = """ +// xss-check: ignore reviewed legacy shell with static allowlist +container.innerHTML = htmlFromReviewedBoundary; +""".strip() + assert issue_messages(module, 'suppressed.js', suppressed_js_source) == [] + + +def test_checker_assets_and_version_are_wired_into_repo() -> None: + """Verify the new workflow, instruction, doc, and version bump landed together.""" + assert CHECKER_FILE.exists(), f'Expected checker script at {CHECKER_FILE}' + assert WORKFLOW_FILE.exists(), f'Expected workflow file at {WORKFLOW_FILE}' + assert INSTRUCTION_FILE.exists(), f'Expected instruction file at {INSTRUCTION_FILE}' + assert FEATURE_DOC.exists(), f'Expected feature document at {FEATURE_DOC}' + assert read_config_version() == '0.241.022' + + workflow_source = read_text(WORKFLOW_FILE) + assert 'scripts/check_xss_sinks.py' in workflow_source + assert 'functional_tests/test_xss_guardrails_checker.py' in workflow_source + + instruction_source = read_text(INSTRUCTION_FILE) + assert 'xss-check: ignore' in instruction_source + assert 'innerHTML' in instruction_source + assert 'DOMPurify.sanitize' in instruction_source + + feature_doc_source = read_text(FEATURE_DOC) + assert 'Fixed/Implemented in version: **0.241.021**' in feature_doc_source + assert 'scripts/check_xss_sinks.py' in feature_doc_source + assert '.github/workflows/xss-sink-check.yml' in feature_doc_source + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + tests = [ + test_checker_flags_dynamic_html_sinks_and_attribute_interpolation, + test_checker_flags_marked_parse_inline_handlers_and_server_side_bypasses, + test_checker_allows_safe_dom_patterns_static_shells_and_reviewed_suppressions, + test_checker_assets_and_version_are_wired_into_repo, + ] + results = [] + + for test in tests: + print(f'\n🧪 Running {test.__name__}...') + try: + test() + print('✅ PASS') + results.append(True) + except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - standalone script reporting + print(f'❌ FAIL: {exc}') + results.append(False) + + success = all(results) + print(f'\n📊 Results: {sum(results)}/{len(results)} tests passed') + sys.exit(0 if success else 1) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/scripts/check_broken_access_control.py b/scripts/check_broken_access_control.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..892a1cb90 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/check_broken_access_control.py @@ -0,0 +1,630 @@ +# check_broken_access_control.py + +"""Validate changed Python files for high-confidence broken access control regressions.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +import ast +import re +import subprocess +import sys +from dataclasses import dataclass +from pathlib import Path + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES = {'.py'} +SUPPRESSION_TOKEN = 'bac-check: ignore' +DIFF_HUNK_RE = re.compile(r'^@@ -\d+(?:,\d+)? \+(?P\d+)(?:,(?P\d+))? @@') +ACTIVE_SCOPE_KEYS = { + 'activeGroupOid': { + 'read_helper': 'require_active_group(...)', + 'write_helper': 'update_active_group_for_user(...)', + }, + 'activePublicWorkspaceOid': { + 'read_helper': 'require_active_public_workspace(...)', + 'write_helper': 'update_active_public_workspace_for_user(...)', + }, +} +ACTIVE_SCOPE_READ_ALLOWED_PATHS = { + 'application/single_app/functions_group.py', + 'application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py', +} +ACTIVE_SCOPE_READ_TARGET_PREFIXES = ( + 'application/single_app/route_backend_', + 'application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/', +) +APPROVED_ACTIVE_SCOPE_WRITE_CONTEXTS = { + ('application/single_app/functions_group.py', 'update_active_group_for_user', 'activeGroupOid'), + ( + 'application/single_app/functions_public_workspaces.py', + 'update_active_public_workspace_for_user', + 'activePublicWorkspaceOid', + ), +} +KERNEL_SENSITIVE_PARAMS = { + 'user_id', + 'conversation_id', + 'group_id', + 'public_workspace_id', + 'scope_id', + 'scope_type', + 'active_group_id', + 'active_group_ids', + 'active_public_workspace_id', + 'active_public_workspace_ids', +} +APPROVED_KERNEL_SCOPE_HELPERS = { + '_resolve_authorized_scope_arguments', + '_resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call', + '_resolve_blob_location_with_fallback', + '_get_authenticated_history_user_id', +} +PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_ROUTE_FILES = { + 'application/single_app/route_backend_chats.py', + 'application/single_app/route_backend_conversations.py', + 'application/single_app/route_backend_documents.py', + 'application/single_app/route_backend_feedback.py', + 'application/single_app/route_frontend_conversations.py', +} +ADMIN_DECORATORS = {'admin_required', 'control_center_required'} +EXPLICIT_OWNERSHIP_SNIPPETS = ( + "conversation_item.get('user_id') != user_id", + 'conversation_item.get("user_id") != user_id', + "conversation_item['user_id'] != user_id", + 'conversation_item["user_id"] != user_id', + "conversation.get('user_id') != user_id", + 'conversation.get("user_id") != user_id', + "conversation['user_id'] != user_id", + 'conversation["user_id"] != user_id', +) + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class Issue: + """A single checker violation.""" + + file_path: Path + line: int + message: str + + +def get_relative_path(file_path: Path) -> str: + """Return a repository-relative path when possible.""" + try: + return file_path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT).as_posix() + except ValueError: + return file_path.as_posix() + + +def format_error_annotation(issue: Issue) -> str: + """Return a GitHub Actions error annotation for one issue.""" + return f'::error file={get_relative_path(issue.file_path)},line={issue.line}::{issue.message}' + + +def normalize_paths(paths: list[str]) -> list[Path]: + """Resolve CLI paths relative to the repository root and keep supported files.""" + normalized: list[Path] = [] + for raw_path in paths: + candidate = Path(raw_path) + if not candidate.is_absolute(): + candidate = (REPO_ROOT / candidate).resolve() + if candidate.exists() and candidate.suffix in SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES: + normalized.append(candidate) + return normalized + + +def matches_changed_lines(changed_lines: set[int] | None, start_line: int, end_line: int) -> bool: + """Return True when the issue overlaps changed lines or full-file mode is active.""" + if changed_lines is None: + return True + return any(line in changed_lines for line in range(start_line, end_line + 1)) + + +def is_suppressed(source_lines: list[str], start_line: int, end_line: int) -> bool: + """Return True when a suppression token exists near the reported lines.""" + window_start = max(1, start_line - 2) + window_end = min(len(source_lines), end_line) + for line_number in range(window_start, window_end + 1): + if SUPPRESSION_TOKEN in source_lines[line_number - 1]: + return True + return False + + +def get_changed_lines(file_path: Path, base_sha: str, head_sha: str) -> set[int] | None: + """Return added-line numbers for one file between two revisions.""" + relative_path = get_relative_path(file_path) + command = [ + 'git', + 'diff', + '--unified=0', + base_sha, + head_sha, + '--', + relative_path, + ] + + try: + result = subprocess.run( + command, + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + check=False, + capture_output=True, + text=True, + ) + except OSError: + return None + + if result.returncode not in {0, 1}: + return None + + changed_lines: set[int] = set() + for line in result.stdout.splitlines(): + match = DIFF_HUNK_RE.match(line) + if not match: + continue + + start_line = int(match.group('start')) + line_count = int(match.group('count') or '1') + if line_count == 0: + continue + + changed_lines.update(range(start_line, start_line + line_count)) + + return changed_lines + + +def call_name(call_node: ast.Call) -> str | None: + """Return the simple callable name for a Call node when available.""" + if isinstance(call_node.func, ast.Name): + return call_node.func.id + if isinstance(call_node.func, ast.Attribute): + return call_node.func.attr + return None + + +def decorator_name(decorator_node: ast.expr) -> str | None: + """Return the simple decorator name for a decorator node when available.""" + if isinstance(decorator_node, ast.Name): + return decorator_node.id + if isinstance(decorator_node, ast.Attribute): + return decorator_node.attr + if isinstance(decorator_node, ast.Call): + if isinstance(decorator_node.func, ast.Name): + return decorator_node.func.id + if isinstance(decorator_node.func, ast.Attribute): + return decorator_node.func.attr + return None + + +def has_decorator(function_node: ast.FunctionDef | ast.AsyncFunctionDef, names: set[str]) -> bool: + """Return True when the function has any decorator in the provided set.""" + return any(decorator_name(decorator) in names for decorator in function_node.decorator_list) + + +def build_parent_map(tree: ast.AST) -> dict[ast.AST, ast.AST]: + """Return a child-to-parent AST mapping.""" + parent_map: dict[ast.AST, ast.AST] = {} + for parent in ast.walk(tree): + for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(parent): + parent_map[child] = parent + return parent_map + + +def get_enclosing_function( + node: ast.AST, + parent_map: dict[ast.AST, ast.AST], +) -> ast.FunctionDef | ast.AsyncFunctionDef | None: + """Return the nearest enclosing function for a node when available.""" + current_node = node + while current_node in parent_map: + current_node = parent_map[current_node] + if isinstance(current_node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)): + return current_node + return None + + +def string_constant(node: ast.AST | None) -> str | None: + """Return a string constant value when the AST node is a string literal.""" + if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str): + return node.value + return None + + +def iter_dict_literals(call_node: ast.Call) -> list[ast.Dict]: + """Return dict literal arguments passed to a call.""" + dict_literals: list[ast.Dict] = [] + for argument in call_node.args: + if isinstance(argument, ast.Dict): + dict_literals.append(argument) + for keyword in call_node.keywords: + if isinstance(keyword.value, ast.Dict): + dict_literals.append(keyword.value) + return dict_literals + + +def collect_function_call_names(function_node: ast.FunctionDef | ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> set[str]: + """Return the set of simple call names used inside a function.""" + call_names: set[str] = set() + for node in ast.walk(function_node): + if isinstance(node, ast.Call): + name = call_name(node) + if name: + call_names.add(name) + return call_names + + +def get_function_source(source_text: str, function_node: ast.FunctionDef | ast.AsyncFunctionDef) -> str: + """Return the exact source segment for one function.""" + return ast.get_source_segment(source_text, function_node) or '' + + +def is_conversation_authorization_helper_name(name: str) -> bool: + """Return True when a helper name clearly represents a conversation authorization helper.""" + lowered_name = str(name or '').lower() + return lowered_name.startswith('_authorize_') and 'conversation' in lowered_name + + +def function_has_conversation_auth( + function_node: ast.FunctionDef | ast.AsyncFunctionDef, + source_text: str, +) -> bool: + """Return True when the function already uses an approved conversation auth boundary.""" + if is_conversation_authorization_helper_name(function_node.name): + return True + if has_decorator(function_node, ADMIN_DECORATORS): + return True + + function_calls = collect_function_call_names(function_node) + if any(is_conversation_authorization_helper_name(name) for name in function_calls): + return True + + function_source = get_function_source(source_text, function_node) + return any(snippet in function_source for snippet in EXPLICIT_OWNERSHIP_SNIPPETS) + + +def call_references_name_fragment(call_node: ast.Call, fragment: str, source_text: str) -> bool: + """Return True when the call source references the provided name fragment.""" + call_source = ast.get_source_segment(source_text, call_node) or '' + return fragment in call_source + + +def collect_direct_active_scope_write_issues( + *, + file_path: Path, + relative_path: str, + tree: ast.AST, + parent_map: dict[ast.AST, ast.AST], + source_lines: list[str], + changed_lines: set[int] | None, +) -> list[Issue]: + """Collect issues for direct persistence of authorization-sensitive active scope keys.""" + issues: list[Issue] = [] + for node in ast.walk(tree): + if not isinstance(node, ast.Call) or call_name(node) != 'update_user_settings': + continue + + function_node = get_enclosing_function(node, parent_map) + function_name = function_node.name if function_node else '' + + for dict_literal in iter_dict_literals(node): + for key_node in dict_literal.keys: + key_name = string_constant(key_node) + if key_name not in ACTIVE_SCOPE_KEYS: + continue + if (relative_path, function_name, key_name) in APPROVED_ACTIVE_SCOPE_WRITE_CONTEXTS: + continue + + start_line = getattr(dict_literal, 'lineno', node.lineno) + end_line = getattr(dict_literal, 'end_lineno', start_line) + if not matches_changed_lines(changed_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + if is_suppressed(source_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + + helper_name = ACTIVE_SCOPE_KEYS[key_name]['write_helper'] + issues.append( + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=start_line, + message=( + f"Do not persist {key_name} through update_user_settings(...) outside {helper_name}. " + f"Route active-scope writes through the validator, or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + return issues + + +def collect_direct_active_scope_read_issues( + *, + file_path: Path, + relative_path: str, + tree: ast.AST, + source_lines: list[str], + changed_lines: set[int] | None, +) -> list[Issue]: + """Collect issues for raw active scope reads in backend and plugin code.""" + if relative_path in ACTIVE_SCOPE_READ_ALLOWED_PATHS: + return [] + if not relative_path.startswith(ACTIVE_SCOPE_READ_TARGET_PREFIXES): + return [] + + issues: list[Issue] = [] + for node in ast.walk(tree): + if not isinstance(node, ast.Call) or call_name(node) != 'get' or not node.args: + continue + + key_name = string_constant(node.args[0]) + if key_name not in ACTIVE_SCOPE_KEYS: + continue + + start_line = node.lineno + end_line = getattr(node, 'end_lineno', start_line) + if not matches_changed_lines(changed_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + if is_suppressed(source_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + + helper_name = ACTIVE_SCOPE_KEYS[key_name]['read_helper'] + issues.append( + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=start_line, + message=( + f"Avoid reading {key_name} from raw settings in backend or plugin code. " + f"Use {helper_name} or a request-scoped authorization helper, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + return issues + + +def collect_kernel_scope_param_issues( + *, + file_path: Path, + relative_path: str, + tree: ast.AST, + source_lines: list[str], + changed_lines: set[int] | None, +) -> list[Issue]: + """Collect issues for kernel functions that expose sensitive scope ids without normalization.""" + if not relative_path.startswith('application/single_app/semantic_kernel_plugins/'): + return [] + + issues: list[Issue] = [] + for node in ast.walk(tree): + if not isinstance(node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)): + continue + if not has_decorator(node, {'kernel_function'}): + continue + + parameter_names = { + argument.arg + for argument in ( + list(node.args.posonlyargs) + + list(node.args.args) + + list(node.args.kwonlyargs) + ) + if argument.arg != 'self' + } + sensitive_params = sorted(parameter_names & KERNEL_SENSITIVE_PARAMS) + if not sensitive_params: + continue + + start_line = min([node.lineno] + [decorator.lineno for decorator in node.decorator_list]) + end_line = getattr(node, 'end_lineno', node.lineno) + if not matches_changed_lines(changed_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + if is_suppressed(source_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + + function_call_names = collect_function_call_names(node) + if function_call_names & APPROVED_KERNEL_SCOPE_HELPERS: + continue + + issues.append( + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=start_line, + message=( + f"Kernel functions that expose {', '.join(sensitive_params)} must immediately normalize those values " + f"through an approved authorization helper such as _resolve_authorized_scope_arguments(...), " + f"_resolve_blob_location_with_fallback(...), or _resolve_authorized_fact_memory_call(...), " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + return issues + + +def collect_direct_personal_conversation_read_issues( + *, + file_path: Path, + relative_path: str, + tree: ast.AST, + source_text: str, + source_lines: list[str], + changed_lines: set[int] | None, +) -> list[Issue]: + """Collect issues for direct personal conversation reads without an auth boundary.""" + if relative_path not in PERSONAL_CONVERSATION_ROUTE_FILES: + return [] + + issues: list[Issue] = [] + for function_node in ast.walk(tree): + if not isinstance(function_node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)): + continue + if function_has_conversation_auth(function_node, source_text): + continue + + for node in ast.walk(function_node): + if not isinstance(node, ast.Call) or call_name(node) != 'read_item': + continue + + call_source = ast.get_source_segment(source_text, node) or '' + if 'cosmos_conversations_container.read_item' not in call_source: + continue + if not call_references_name_fragment(node, 'conversation_id', source_text): + continue + + start_line = node.lineno + end_line = getattr(node, 'end_lineno', start_line) + if not matches_changed_lines(changed_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + if is_suppressed(source_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + + issues.append( + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=start_line, + message=( + "Avoid direct personal conversation reads from request-derived conversation_id values without " + "_authorize_personal_conversation_read(...), _authorize_personal_conversation_access(...), " + f"or an explicit ownership check, or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + return issues + + +def inspect_source(file_path: Path, source_text: str, changed_lines: set[int] | None = None) -> list[Issue]: + """Inspect one Python source string and return any BAC-related issues.""" + source_lines = source_text.splitlines() + + try: + tree = ast.parse(source_text, filename=str(file_path)) + except SyntaxError as exc: + return [ + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=exc.lineno or 1, + message=f'Unable to parse file for BAC validation: {exc.msg}', + ) + ] + + relative_path = get_relative_path(file_path) + parent_map = build_parent_map(tree) + issues: list[Issue] = [] + issues.extend( + collect_direct_active_scope_write_issues( + file_path=file_path, + relative_path=relative_path, + tree=tree, + parent_map=parent_map, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_direct_active_scope_read_issues( + file_path=file_path, + relative_path=relative_path, + tree=tree, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_kernel_scope_param_issues( + file_path=file_path, + relative_path=relative_path, + tree=tree, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_direct_personal_conversation_read_issues( + file_path=file_path, + relative_path=relative_path, + tree=tree, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + ) + ) + + unique_issues: list[Issue] = [] + seen = set() + for issue in issues: + dedupe_key = (issue.file_path, issue.line, issue.message) + if dedupe_key in seen: + continue + seen.add(dedupe_key) + unique_issues.append(issue) + + return unique_issues + + +def inspect_file(file_path: Path, changed_lines: set[int] | None = None) -> list[Issue]: + """Load one file and return any BAC-related issues.""" + try: + source_text = file_path.read_text(encoding='utf-8') + except UnicodeDecodeError: + source_text = file_path.read_text(encoding='utf-8-sig') + except OSError as exc: + return [ + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=1, + message=f'Unable to read file for BAC validation: {exc}', + ) + ] + + return inspect_source(file_path, source_text, changed_lines=changed_lines) + + +def main() -> int: + """Run the Broken Access Control checker for the provided files.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( + description='Validate changed Python files for high-confidence broken access control regressions.' + ) + parser.add_argument('files', nargs='*', help='Files to validate relative to the repository root.') + parser.add_argument('--base-sha', help='Base git revision used to limit checks to added lines.') + parser.add_argument('--head-sha', help='Head git revision used to limit checks to added lines.') + parser.add_argument( + '--full-file', + action='store_true', + help='Scan the full file contents instead of only added lines.', + ) + args = parser.parse_args() + + files = normalize_paths(args.files) + if not files: + print('No supported files to validate for Broken Access Control guardrails.') + return 0 + + all_issues: list[Issue] = [] + checked_files = 0 + + for file_path in files: + changed_lines = None + if not args.full_file and args.base_sha and args.head_sha: + changed_lines = get_changed_lines(file_path, args.base_sha, args.head_sha) + if changed_lines == set(): + continue + + issues = inspect_file(file_path, changed_lines=changed_lines) + checked_files += 1 + all_issues.extend(issues) + + if all_issues: + print('Broken Access Control guardrail validation failed:') + for issue in all_issues: + print(format_error_annotation(issue)) + return 1 + + if checked_files == 0: + print('No added lines found in the provided files. Broken Access Control check skipped.') + return 0 + + print(f'Broken Access Control guardrail validation passed for {checked_files} file(s).') + return 0 + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + sys.exit(main()) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/scripts/check_xss_sinks.py b/scripts/check_xss_sinks.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b3d570098 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/check_xss_sinks.py @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +# check_xss_sinks.py + +"""Validate changed files for risky XSS sink patterns.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +import re +import subprocess +import sys +from dataclasses import dataclass +from pathlib import Path + + +REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES = {'.js', '.html', '.py'} +SUPPRESSION_TOKEN = 'xss-check: ignore' +INLINE_EVENT_ATTRIBUTE_RE = re.compile( + r'\bon(?:abort|auxclick|beforeinput|blur|change|click|contextmenu|dblclick|error|focus|input|keydown|keypress|keyup|load|mousedown|mouseenter|mouseleave|mousemove|mouseout|mouseover|mouseup|reset|scroll|submit|touchend|touchstart|transitionend)\s*=\s*["\']', + re.IGNORECASE, +) +INLINE_EVENT_API_RE = re.compile( + r'\.(?:onabort|onblur|onchange|onclick|ondblclick|onerror|onfocus|oninput|onkeydown|onkeyup|onload|onmousedown|onmouseenter|onmouseleave|onmousemove|onmouseout|onmouseover|onmouseup|onscroll|onsubmit)\s*=|setAttribute\(\s*["\']on', + re.IGNORECASE, +) +JAVASCRIPT_URL_RE = re.compile(r'javascript\s*:', re.IGNORECASE) +MARKUP_RE = re.compile(r'\bMarkup\s*\(') +JINJA_SAFE_RE = re.compile(r'\|\s*safe\b') +MARKED_PARSE_RE = re.compile(r'\bmarked\.parse\s*\(') +DANGEROUS_REACT_HTML_RE = re.compile(r'\bdangerouslySetInnerHTML\b') +ATTRIBUTE_INTERPOLATION_RE = re.compile( + r'\b(?:href|src|title|style|data-[\w-]+)\s*=\s*["\'][^"\'\n]*\$\{[^}]+\}', + re.IGNORECASE, +) +HTML_ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile( + r'\.(?PinnerHTML|outerHTML)\s*=\s*(?P.{0,500}?);', + re.DOTALL, +) +INSERT_ADJACENT_HTML_RE = re.compile( + r'\.insertAdjacentHTML\s*\(\s*[^,]+,\s*(?P.{0,500}?)\)\s*;?', + re.DOTALL, +) +JQUERY_HTML_RE = re.compile( + r'\.html\s*\(\s*(?P.{0,500}?)\)\s*;?', + re.DOTALL, +) +DIFF_HUNK_RE = re.compile(r'^@@ -\d+(?:,\d+)? \+(?P\d+)(?:,(?P\d+))? @@') + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class Issue: + """A single checker violation.""" + + file_path: Path + line: int + message: str + + +def get_relative_path(file_path: Path) -> str: + """Return a repository-relative path when possible.""" + try: + return file_path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT).as_posix() + except ValueError: + return file_path.as_posix() + + +def format_error_annotation(issue: Issue) -> str: + """Return a GitHub Actions annotation for one issue.""" + return f"::error file={get_relative_path(issue.file_path)},line={issue.line}::{issue.message}" + + +def normalize_paths(paths: list[str]) -> list[Path]: + """Resolve CLI paths relative to the repository root and keep supported files.""" + normalized: list[Path] = [] + for raw_path in paths: + candidate = Path(raw_path) + if not candidate.is_absolute(): + candidate = (REPO_ROOT / candidate).resolve() + if candidate.exists() and candidate.suffix in SUPPORTED_SUFFIXES: + normalized.append(candidate) + return normalized + + +def get_line_number(source_text: str, offset: int) -> int: + """Return the 1-based line number for a source offset.""" + return source_text.count('\n', 0, offset) + 1 + + +def matches_changed_lines(changed_lines: set[int] | None, start_line: int, end_line: int) -> bool: + """Return True when the issue overlaps the changed lines or full-file mode is active.""" + if changed_lines is None: + return True + return any(line in changed_lines for line in range(start_line, end_line + 1)) + + +def is_suppressed(source_lines: list[str], start_line: int, end_line: int) -> bool: + """Return True when a suppression token is present near the reported lines.""" + window_start = max(1, start_line - 2) + window_end = min(len(source_lines), end_line) + for line_number in range(window_start, window_end + 1): + if SUPPRESSION_TOKEN in source_lines[line_number - 1]: + return True + return False + + +def is_static_html_expression(expression: str) -> bool: + """Return True when an HTML expression is a static literal without interpolation.""" + stripped = expression.strip() + if not stripped: + return True + + quote_pairs = [("'", "'"), ('"', '"'), ('`', '`')] + for start_quote, end_quote in quote_pairs: + if stripped.startswith(start_quote) and stripped.endswith(end_quote): + return '${' not in stripped and '+' not in stripped + + return False + + +def is_allowed_html_expression(expression: str) -> bool: + """Return True when an HTML sink expression is explicitly allowed.""" + if 'DOMPurify.sanitize(' in expression: + return True + return is_static_html_expression(expression) + + +def get_changed_lines(file_path: Path, base_sha: str, head_sha: str) -> set[int] | None: + """Return the added-line numbers for one file between two revisions.""" + relative_path = get_relative_path(file_path) + command = [ + 'git', + 'diff', + '--unified=0', + base_sha, + head_sha, + '--', + relative_path, + ] + + try: + result = subprocess.run( + command, + cwd=REPO_ROOT, + check=False, + capture_output=True, + text=True, + ) + except OSError: + return None + + if result.returncode not in {0, 1}: + return None + + changed_lines: set[int] = set() + for line in result.stdout.splitlines(): + match = DIFF_HUNK_RE.match(line) + if not match: + continue + + start_line = int(match.group('start')) + line_count = int(match.group('count') or '1') + if line_count == 0: + continue + + changed_lines.update(range(start_line, start_line + line_count)) + + return changed_lines + + +def collect_regex_issues( + *, + file_path: Path, + source_text: str, + source_lines: list[str], + changed_lines: set[int] | None, + pattern: re.Pattern[str], + message: str, +) -> list[Issue]: + """Collect issues for a simple regex rule.""" + issues: list[Issue] = [] + for match in pattern.finditer(source_text): + start_line = get_line_number(source_text, match.start()) + end_line = get_line_number(source_text, match.end()) + if not matches_changed_lines(changed_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + if is_suppressed(source_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + issues.append(Issue(file_path=file_path, line=start_line, message=message)) + return issues + + +def collect_html_sink_issues( + *, + file_path: Path, + source_text: str, + source_lines: list[str], + changed_lines: set[int] | None, + pattern: re.Pattern[str], + sink_name: str, +) -> list[Issue]: + """Collect issues for dangerous HTML sinks.""" + issues: list[Issue] = [] + for match in pattern.finditer(source_text): + expression = match.group('expr') + if is_allowed_html_expression(expression): + continue + + start_line = get_line_number(source_text, match.start()) + end_line = get_line_number(source_text, match.end()) + if not matches_changed_lines(changed_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + if is_suppressed(source_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + + issues.append( + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=start_line, + message=( + f"Avoid dynamic {sink_name} sinks with untrusted data. Prefer DOM APIs, textContent, " + f"or DOMPurify.sanitize(...), or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + return issues + + +def collect_marked_parse_issues( + *, + file_path: Path, + source_text: str, + source_lines: list[str], + changed_lines: set[int] | None, +) -> list[Issue]: + """Collect issues where marked.parse is not paired with DOMPurify.sanitize.""" + issues: list[Issue] = [] + for match in MARKED_PARSE_RE.finditer(source_text): + start_line = get_line_number(source_text, match.start()) + end_line = get_line_number(source_text, match.end()) + if not matches_changed_lines(changed_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + if is_suppressed(source_lines, start_line, end_line): + continue + + window_start = max(1, start_line - 2) + window_end = min(len(source_lines), end_line + 2) + window_text = '\n'.join(source_lines[window_start - 1:window_end]) + if 'DOMPurify.sanitize(' in window_text: + continue + + issues.append( + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=start_line, + message=( + "Wrap marked.parse(...) output with DOMPurify.sanitize(...) before rendering HTML, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + return issues + + +def inspect_source(file_path: Path, source_text: str, changed_lines: set[int] | None = None) -> list[Issue]: + """Inspect one source string and return any XSS-related issues.""" + source_lines = source_text.splitlines() + issues: list[Issue] = [] + + issues.extend( + collect_regex_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=INLINE_EVENT_ATTRIBUTE_RE, + message=( + f"Avoid inline event-handler attributes in rendered HTML. Use addEventListener or data-* hooks, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_regex_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=INLINE_EVENT_API_RE, + message=( + f"Avoid inline event-handler APIs such as onclick/onerror. Use addEventListener, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_regex_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=JAVASCRIPT_URL_RE, + message=( + f"Avoid javascript: URLs in rendered content. Normalize dynamic URLs explicitly, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_regex_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=ATTRIBUTE_INTERPOLATION_RE, + message=( + f"Avoid interpolating untrusted values directly into href/src/title/style/data-* attributes. " + f"Prefer DOM APIs and explicit URL normalization, or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_regex_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=DANGEROUS_REACT_HTML_RE, + message=( + f"Avoid dangerouslySetInnerHTML without a reviewed sanitizer boundary, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + + if file_path.suffix == '.py': + issues.extend( + collect_regex_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=MARKUP_RE, + message=( + f"Avoid Markup(...) on untrusted content without a reviewed sanitizer boundary, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + + if file_path.suffix == '.html': + issues.extend( + collect_regex_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=JINJA_SAFE_RE, + message=( + f"Avoid Jinja '|safe' on untrusted content without a reviewed sanitizer boundary, " + f"or add '{SUPPRESSION_TOKEN}' with a justification." + ), + ) + ) + + issues.extend( + collect_html_sink_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=HTML_ASSIGNMENT_RE, + sink_name='innerHTML/outerHTML', + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_html_sink_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=INSERT_ADJACENT_HTML_RE, + sink_name='insertAdjacentHTML', + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_html_sink_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + pattern=JQUERY_HTML_RE, + sink_name='jQuery .html()', + ) + ) + issues.extend( + collect_marked_parse_issues( + file_path=file_path, + source_text=source_text, + source_lines=source_lines, + changed_lines=changed_lines, + ) + ) + + unique_issues: list[Issue] = [] + seen = set() + for issue in issues: + dedupe_key = (issue.file_path, issue.line, issue.message) + if dedupe_key in seen: + continue + seen.add(dedupe_key) + unique_issues.append(issue) + + return unique_issues + + +def inspect_file(file_path: Path, changed_lines: set[int] | None = None) -> list[Issue]: + """Load one file and return any XSS-related issues.""" + try: + source_text = file_path.read_text(encoding='utf-8') + except UnicodeDecodeError: + source_text = file_path.read_text(encoding='utf-8-sig') + except OSError as exc: + return [ + Issue( + file_path=file_path, + line=1, + message=f'Unable to read file for XSS sink validation: {exc}', + ) + ] + + return inspect_source(file_path, source_text, changed_lines=changed_lines) + + +def main() -> int: + """Run the XSS sink checker for the provided files.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Validate changed files for risky XSS sink patterns.') + parser.add_argument('files', nargs='*', help='Files to validate relative to the repository root.') + parser.add_argument('--base-sha', help='Base git revision used to limit checks to added lines.') + parser.add_argument('--head-sha', help='Head git revision used to limit checks to added lines.') + parser.add_argument( + '--full-file', + action='store_true', + help='Scan the full file contents instead of only added lines.', + ) + args = parser.parse_args() + + files = normalize_paths(args.files) + if not files: + print('No supported files to validate for XSS sink coverage.') + return 0 + + all_issues: list[Issue] = [] + checked_files = 0 + + for file_path in files: + changed_lines = None + if not args.full_file and args.base_sha and args.head_sha: + changed_lines = get_changed_lines(file_path, args.base_sha, args.head_sha) + if changed_lines == set(): + continue + + issues = inspect_file(file_path, changed_lines=changed_lines) + checked_files += 1 + all_issues.extend(issues) + + if all_issues: + print('XSS sink validation failed:') + for issue in all_issues: + print(format_error_annotation(issue)) + return 1 + + if checked_files == 0: + print('No added lines found in the provided files. XSS sink check skipped.') + return 0 + + print(f'XSS sink validation passed for {checked_files} file(s).') + return 0 + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + sys.exit(main()) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ecb11f810 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +# test_agent_template_gallery_actions_escaping.py +""" +UI test for agent template gallery actions escaping. +Version: 0.241.020 +Implemented in: 0.241.020 + +This test ensures malicious actions_to_load values render as inert text in the +agent template gallery instead of becoming executable DOM. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv('SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL', '').rstrip('/') +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv('SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE', '') +SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES = {401, 403, 404} + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type='application/json', + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_agent_template_gallery_escapes_actions_to_load(playwright): + """Validate gallery action labels keep attacker-controlled values inert.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip('Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.') + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip('Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.') + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={'width': 1440, 'height': 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + first_action = 'Action' + second_action = 'Action' + + page.route( + '**/api/user/settings*', + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {'settings': {}, 'selected_agent': None}), + ) + page.route( + '**/api/get_conversations*', + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {'conversations': []}), + ) + page.route( + '**/api/agent-templates', + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + { + 'templates': [ + { + 'id': 'template-1', + 'title': 'Escaping Template', + 'display_name': 'Escaping Template', + 'description': 'Regression coverage for gallery action rendering.', + 'helper_text': 'Regression coverage for gallery action rendering.', + 'instructions': 'Do not execute action labels.', + 'actions_to_load': [first_action, second_action], + 'tags': [], + } + ] + }, + ), + ) + + try: + response = page.goto(f'{BASE_URL}/chats', wait_until='domcontentloaded') + assert response is not None, 'Expected a navigation response when loading /chats.' + + if response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip(f'/chats returned HTTP {response.status} in this environment.') + + assert response.ok, f'Expected /chats to load successfully, got HTTP {response.status}.' + + page.evaluate( + """async ({ firstAction, secondAction }) => { + window.__agentTemplateActionXss = false; + window.__agentTemplateActionSvgXss = false; + window.appSettings = { + ...(window.appSettings || {}), + enable_agent_template_gallery: true, + }; + + const existing = document.getElementById('agent-template-gallery-test'); + if (existing) { + existing.remove(); + } + + const wrapper = document.createElement('div'); + wrapper.id = 'agent-template-gallery-test'; + wrapper.innerHTML = ` +
    +
    +
    + + +
    +
    + `; + document.body.appendChild(wrapper); + + await import(`/static/js/agent_templates_gallery.js?test=${Date.now()}`); + }""", + {'firstAction': first_action, 'secondAction': second_action}, + ) + + expect(page.locator('#agent-template-gallery-test .accordion-item')).to_have_count(1) + expect(page.locator('#agent-template-gallery-test')).to_contain_text('Recommended actions:') + expect(page.locator('#agent-template-gallery-test')).to_contain_text(first_action) + expect(page.locator('#agent-template-gallery-test')).to_contain_text(second_action) + expect(page.locator("#agent-template-gallery-test img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator('#agent-template-gallery-test svg')).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + image: !!window.__agentTemplateActionXss, + svg: !!window.__agentTemplateActionSvgXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == {'image': False, 'svg': False} + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_chat_messages_authorization_error.py b/ui_tests/test_chat_messages_authorization_error.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7047b18a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_chat_messages_authorization_error.py @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# test_chat_messages_authorization_error.py +""" +UI test for chat message authorization error handling. +Version: 0.241.012 +Implemented in: 0.241.012 + +This test ensures the chat message loader renders a controlled access-denied +message when the conversation messages endpoint returns 403. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv('SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL', '').rstrip('/') +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv('SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE', '') + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_chat_loader_shows_forbidden_message(playwright): + """Validate chat message loading handles a forbidden response cleanly.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip('Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.') + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip('Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.') + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={'width': 1440, 'height': 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + def fulfill_forbidden_messages(route): + route.fulfill( + status=403, + content_type='application/json', + body=json.dumps({'error': 'Forbidden'}), + ) + + try: + page.route('**/conversation/blocked-conversation/messages', fulfill_forbidden_messages) + page.goto(f'{BASE_URL}/chats', wait_until='networkidle') + page.wait_for_function( + "() => window.chatMessages && typeof window.chatMessages.loadMessages === 'function'" + ) + + page.evaluate( + """async () => { + await window.chatMessages.loadMessages('blocked-conversation'); + }""" + ) + + expect(page.locator('#chatbox')).to_contain_text( + 'You do not have access to this conversation.' + ) + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_chat_modal_filename_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_chat_modal_filename_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e55b8cdb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_chat_modal_filename_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +# test_chat_modal_filename_escaping.py +""" +UI test for chat modal filename escaping. +Version: 0.241.018 +Implemented in: 0.241.018 + +This test ensures citation and uploaded-file modal titles render malicious +filenames as inert text on first display. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") +SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES = {401, 403, 404} + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_chat_modals_escape_malicious_filenames_on_first_render(playwright): + """Validate chat modal titles keep attacker-controlled filenames inert.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + citation_filename = '.pdf' + file_filename = '.txt' + + page.route( + "**/api/user/settings", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"selected_agent": None, "settings": {"enable_agents": False}}), + ) + page.route("**/api/get_conversations", lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"conversations": []})) + + try: + response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/chats", wait_until="domcontentloaded") + assert response is not None, "Expected a navigation response when loading /chats." + + if response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip(f"/chats returned HTTP {response.status} in this environment.") + + assert response.ok, f"Expected /chats to load successfully, got HTTP {response.status}." + page.wait_for_selector("#chatbox") + + page.evaluate( + """ + async ({ citationFilename, fileFilename }) => { + window.__citationModalTitleXss = false; + window.__fileModalTitleXss = false; + + const citationsModule = await import('/static/js/chat/chat-citations.js'); + citationsModule.showCitedTextPopup('Citation body', citationFilename, 7); + + const fileActionsModule = await import('/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js'); + const citationModal = document.getElementById('citation-modal'); + const citationInstance = bootstrap.Modal.getInstance(citationModal); + if (citationInstance) { + citationInstance.hide(); + } + + fileActionsModule.showFileContentPopup( + 'Uploaded file body', + fileFilename, + false, + 'database', + null, + null, + ); + } + """, + {"citationFilename": citation_filename, "fileFilename": file_filename}, + ) + + expect(page.locator("#citation-modal .modal-title")).to_have_text( + f"Source: {citation_filename}, Page: 7" + ) + expect(page.locator("#citation-modal img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#citation-modal svg")).to_have_count(0) + + expect(page.locator("#file-modal")).to_be_visible() + expect(page.locator("#file-modal .modal-title")).to_have_text( + f"Uploaded File: {file_filename}" + ) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal svg")).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + citation: !!window.__citationModalTitleXss, + file: !!window.__fileModalTitleXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == {"citation": False, "file": False} + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e622b94dc --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +# test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escaping.py +""" +UI test for chat scope-lock and conversation-details escaping. +Version: 0.241.019 +Implemented in: 0.241.019 + +This test ensures malicious workspace names and conversation metadata render as +inert text in the chat scope-lock modal and conversation-details modal. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_chat_scope_lock_and_conversation_details_escape_malicious_metadata(playwright): + """Validate chat scope-lock and conversation-details metadata render as inert text.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + scope_lock_name = ' Locked Scope' + conversation_title = ' Conversation' + primary_context_name = ' Primary Context' + participant_name = ' Participant' + participant_email = '@example.com' + document_title = ' Document' + document_scope_name = ' Scope' + classification_label = ' Secret' + semantic_tag = 'Semantic' + model_tag = ' gpt-xss' + agent_tag = 'Agent' + web_source = 'javascript:window.__webSourceXss = true' + summary_model = ' summary-model' + + metadata_payload = { + "title": conversation_title, + "context": [ + { + "type": "primary", + "scope": "group", + "id": "group-1", + "name": primary_context_name, + }, + { + "type": "secondary", + "scope": "public", + "id": scope_lock_name, + "name": scope_lock_name, + }, + ], + "tags": [ + { + "category": "participant", + "user_id": "user-1", + "name": participant_name, + "email": participant_email, + }, + { + "category": "document", + "document_id": "doc-1", + "title": document_title, + "classification": classification_label, + "chunk_ids": ["chunk_1_p1", "chunk_1_p2"], + "scope": { + "type": "group", + "id": "group-1", + "name": document_scope_name, + }, + }, + { + "category": "semantic", + "value": semantic_tag, + }, + { + "category": "model", + "value": model_tag, + }, + { + "category": "agent", + "value": agent_tag, + }, + { + "category": "web", + "value": web_source, + }, + ], + "strict": False, + "classification": [classification_label], + "last_updated": "2026-05-05T12:00:00Z", + "chat_type": "group-single-user", + "is_pinned": False, + "is_hidden": False, + "scope_locked": True, + "locked_contexts": [ + {"scope": "group", "id": scope_lock_name}, + ], + "summary": { + "content": "Safe summary text.", + "generated_at": "2026-05-05T11:00:00Z", + "model_deployment": summary_model, + }, + } + + def fulfill_empty_docs_or_tags(route): + if "/tags" in route.request.url: + _fulfill_json(route, {"tags": []}) + return + _fulfill_json(route, {"documents": []}) + + try: + page.route("**/api/user/settings*", lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"settings": {}, "selected_agent": None})) + page.route("**/api/get_conversations*", lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"conversations": []})) + page.route("**/api/documents*", fulfill_empty_docs_or_tags) + page.route("**/api/group_documents*", fulfill_empty_docs_or_tags) + page.route("**/api/public_workspace_documents*", fulfill_empty_docs_or_tags) + page.route("**/api/user/profile-image/**", lambda route: route.fulfill(status=404, body="")) + page.route( + "**/api/conversations/conversation-xss/metadata", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, metadata_payload), + ) + + page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/chats", wait_until="domcontentloaded") + page.wait_for_selector("#scopeLockModal") + + page.evaluate( + """async (scopeLockName) => { + window.__scopeLockXss = false; + window.__conversationTitleXss = false; + window.__conversationContextXss = false; + window.__participantNameXss = false; + window.__participantEmailXss = false; + window.__documentTitleXss = false; + window.__documentScopeXss = false; + window.__classificationXss = false; + window.__semanticTagXss = false; + window.__modelTagXss = false; + window.__agentTagXss = false; + window.__webSourceXss = false; + window.__summaryModelXss = false; + + const chatDocumentsModule = await import('/static/js/chat/chat-documents.js'); + chatDocumentsModule.restoreScopeLockState(true, [{ scope: 'group', id: scopeLockName }]); + + const scopeLockModal = document.getElementById('scopeLockModal'); + bootstrap.Modal.getOrCreateInstance(scopeLockModal).show(); + }""", + scope_lock_name, + ) + + locked_list = page.locator("#locked-workspaces-list") + expect(page.locator("#scopeLockModal")).to_be_visible() + expect(locked_list).to_contain_text(scope_lock_name) + expect(page.locator("#locked-workspaces-list img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#locked-workspaces-list svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.evaluate( + """() => { + const scopeLockModal = bootstrap.Modal.getInstance(document.getElementById('scopeLockModal')); + if (scopeLockModal) { + scopeLockModal.hide(); + } + }""" + ) + + page.evaluate( + """async () => { + const detailsModule = await import('/static/js/chat/chat-conversation-details.js'); + await detailsModule.showConversationDetails('conversation-xss'); + }""" + ) + + details_modal = page.locator("#conversation-details-modal") + details_content = page.locator("#conversation-details-content") + expect(details_modal).to_be_visible() + expect(page.locator("#conversation-details-modal .modal-title")).to_contain_text(conversation_title) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(primary_context_name) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(participant_name) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(participant_email) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(document_title) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(document_scope_name) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(classification_label) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(semantic_tag) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(model_tag) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(agent_tag) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(web_source) + expect(details_content).to_contain_text(summary_model) + expect(page.locator("#conversation-details-modal img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#conversation-details-modal svg")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#conversation-details-modal a[href^='javascript:']")).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + scopeLock: !!window.__scopeLockXss, + title: !!window.__conversationTitleXss, + context: !!window.__conversationContextXss, + participantName: !!window.__participantNameXss, + participantEmail: !!window.__participantEmailXss, + documentTitle: !!window.__documentTitleXss, + documentScope: !!window.__documentScopeXss, + classification: !!window.__classificationXss, + semanticTag: !!window.__semanticTagXss, + modelTag: !!window.__modelTagXss, + agentTag: !!window.__agentTagXss, + webSource: !!window.__webSourceXss, + summaryModel: !!window.__summaryModelXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == { + "scopeLock": False, + "title": False, + "context": False, + "participantName": False, + "participantEmail": False, + "documentTitle": False, + "documentScope": False, + "classification": False, + "semanticTag": False, + "modelTag": False, + "agentTag": False, + "webSource": False, + "summaryModel": False, + } + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_control_center_group_members_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_control_center_group_members_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..476e0f1c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_control_center_group_members_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +# test_control_center_group_members_escaping.py +""" +UI test for Control Center group member escaping. +Version: 0.241.010 +Implemented in: 0.241.010 + +This test ensures malicious group member names and emails render as inert text +in the Control Center group-members modal instead of executing as HTML. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_control_center_group_member_metadata_is_escaped(playwright): + """Validate malicious group member metadata renders as inert text.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + member_name = '' + member_email = '@example.com' + + payload = { + "id": "group-1", + "name": "Escaping Test Group", + "owner": { + "id": "owner-1", + "displayName": "Owner", + "email": "owner@example.com", + }, + "admins": [], + "documentManagers": [], + "users": [ + { + "userId": "member-1", + "displayName": member_name, + "email": member_email, + } + ], + } + + def fulfill_group_details(route): + route.fulfill( + status=200, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + try: + page.route("**/api/admin/control-center/groups/group-1", fulfill_group_details) + + page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/control-center", wait_until="networkidle") + page.evaluate( + """async () => { + document.getElementById('groupManagementModal').setAttribute('data-group-id', 'group-1'); + await window.GroupManager.loadGroupMembers(); + }""" + ) + + table_body = page.locator("#groupMembersTableBody") + expect(table_body).to_contain_text(member_name) + expect(table_body).to_contain_text(member_email) + expect(page.locator("#groupMembersTableBody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#groupMembersTableBody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + name: !!window.__controlCenterMemberNameXss, + email: !!window.__controlCenterMemberEmailXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == {"name": False, "email": False} + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e3e6ce94 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +# test_control_center_public_workspace_escaping.py +""" +UI test for Control Center public workspace escaping. +Version: 0.241.007 +Implemented in: 0.241.007 + +This test ensures malicious public workspace metadata renders as inert text +in the Control Center public workspace table instead of executing as HTML. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_control_center_public_workspace_metadata_is_escaped(playwright): + """Validate malicious public workspace metadata renders as inert text.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + workspace_name = '' + workspace_description = '' + owner_name = '' + + payload = { + "workspaces": [ + { + "id": "workspace-1", + "name": workspace_name, + "description": workspace_description, + "owner": { + "displayName": owner_name, + "email": "owner@example.com", + }, + "member_count": 2, + "status": "active", + "activity": { + "document_metrics": { + "total_documents": 1, + "ai_search_size": 0, + "storage_account_size": 0, + } + }, + } + ] + } + + def fulfill_public_workspaces(route): + route.fulfill( + status=200, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + try: + page.route("**/api/admin/control-center/public-workspaces?*", fulfill_public_workspaces) + + page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/control-center", wait_until="networkidle") + + with page.expect_response(lambda response: "/api/admin/control-center/public-workspaces?" in response.url): + if page.locator("#workspaces-tab").count() > 0: + page.locator("#workspaces-tab").click() + else: + page.locator('[onclick*="workspaces-tab"]').first.click() + + table_body = page.locator("#publicWorkspacesTableBody") + expect(table_body).to_contain_text(workspace_name) + expect(table_body).to_contain_text(workspace_description) + expect(table_body).to_contain_text(owner_name) + expect(page.locator("#publicWorkspacesTableBody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#publicWorkspacesTableBody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + name: !!window.__controlCenterNameXss, + description: !!window.__controlCenterDescriptionXss, + owner: !!window.__controlCenterOwnerXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == {"name": False, "description": False, "owner": False} + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2c662b355 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +# test_control_center_public_workspace_members_escaping.py +""" +UI test for Control Center public workspace member escaping. +Version: 0.241.016 +Implemented in: 0.241.016 + +This test ensures malicious public workspace member names and emails render as +inert text in the Control Center workspace-members modal instead of executing +as HTML. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_control_center_public_workspace_member_metadata_is_escaped(playwright): + """Validate malicious public workspace member metadata renders as inert text.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + member_name = '' + member_email = '@example.com' + + payload = { + "success": True, + "workspace_name": "Escaping Test Workspace", + "members": [ + { + "userId": "owner-1", + "displayName": member_name, + "email": member_email, + "role": "owner", + } + ], + } + + def fulfill_workspace_members(route): + route.fulfill( + status=200, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + try: + page.route( + "**/api/admin/control-center/public-workspaces/workspace-1/members", + fulfill_workspace_members, + ) + + page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/control-center", wait_until="networkidle") + page.evaluate( + """async () => { + document.getElementById('publicWorkspaceManagementModal').setAttribute('data-workspace-id', 'workspace-1'); + document.getElementById('modalWorkspaceName').textContent = 'Escaping Test Workspace'; + await window.WorkspaceManager.loadWorkspaceMembers(); + }""" + ) + + table_body = page.locator("#workspaceMembersTableBody") + expect(table_body).to_contain_text(member_name) + expect(table_body).to_contain_text(member_email) + expect(page.locator("#workspaceMembersTableBody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#workspaceMembersTableBody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + name: !!window.__controlCenterWorkspaceMemberNameXss, + email: !!window.__controlCenterWorkspaceMemberEmailXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == {"name": False, "email": False} + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_document_share_modal_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_document_share_modal_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bb8148900 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_document_share_modal_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +# test_document_share_modal_escaping.py +""" +UI test for personal and group document share modal escaping. +Version: 0.241.020 +Implemented in: 0.241.020 + +This test ensures malicious names, descriptions, emails, and toast messages +render as inert text in the personal and group document sharing modals. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") +SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES = {401, 403, 404} + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +def _require_ui_env(): + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + +def _new_page(playwright): + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + return browser, context, page + + +def _assert_ok_or_skip(response, route_path: str) -> None: + assert response is not None, f"Expected a navigation response when loading {route_path}." + if response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip(f"{route_path} returned HTTP {response.status} in this environment.") + assert response.ok, f"Expected {route_path} to load successfully, got HTTP {response.status}." + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_workspace_share_modal_escapes_malicious_names_and_toasts(playwright): + """Validate the personal workspace share modal renders malicious values inertly.""" + _require_ui_env() + + browser, context, page = _new_page(playwright) + + shared_name = '' + shared_email = '@example.com' + search_name = '' + search_email = '@example.com' + + try: + page.route( + "**/api/documents/doc-1/shared-users", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + { + "shared_users": [ + { + "id": "shared-user-1", + "displayName": shared_name, + "email": shared_email, + } + ] + }, + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/userSearch*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "id": "search-user-1", + "displayName": search_name, + "email": search_email, + } + ], + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/documents/doc-1/share", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"success": True}), + ) + + response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/workspace", wait_until="networkidle") + _assert_ok_or_skip(response, "/workspace") + page.wait_for_function("() => typeof window.shareDocument === 'function'") + + page.evaluate( + """() => { + window.__workspaceSharedNameXss = false; + window.__workspaceSharedEmailXss = false; + window.__workspaceSearchNameXss = false; + window.__workspaceSearchEmailXss = false; + window.shareDocument('doc-1', 'Escaping Test Document.txt'); + }""" + ) + + expect(page.locator("#shareDocumentModal")).to_be_visible() + expect(page.locator("#sharedUsersList")).to_contain_text(shared_name) + expect(page.locator("#sharedUsersList")).to_contain_text(shared_email) + expect(page.locator("#sharedUsersList img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#sharedUsersList svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#userSearchTerm").fill("malicious") + page.locator("#searchUsersBtn").click() + + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_name) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_email) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody .user-search-add-btn").click() + + expect(page.locator("#toastContainer")).to_contain_text(f"Document shared with {search_name}") + expect(page.locator("#toastContainer img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#toastContainer svg")).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + sharedName: !!window.__workspaceSharedNameXss, + sharedEmail: !!window.__workspaceSharedEmailXss, + searchName: !!window.__workspaceSearchNameXss, + searchEmail: !!window.__workspaceSearchEmailXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == { + "sharedName": False, + "sharedEmail": False, + "searchName": False, + "searchEmail": False, + } + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_group_share_modal_escapes_malicious_names_descriptions_and_toasts(playwright): + """Validate the group workspace share modal renders malicious values inertly.""" + _require_ui_env() + + browser, context, page = _new_page(playwright) + + shared_group_name = '' + shared_group_description = ' shared description' + search_group_name = '' + search_group_description = ' search description' + + try: + page.route( + "**/api/group_documents/group-doc-1/shared-groups", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + { + "shared_groups": [ + { + "id": "shared-group-1", + "name": shared_group_name, + "description": shared_group_description, + } + ] + }, + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/groups/discover*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "id": "search-group-1", + "name": search_group_name, + "description": search_group_description, + } + ], + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/group_documents/group-doc-1/share-with-group", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"success": True}), + ) + + response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/group_workspaces", wait_until="networkidle") + _assert_ok_or_skip(response, "/group_workspaces") + page.wait_for_function("() => typeof window.shareGroupDocument === 'function'") + + page.evaluate( + """() => { + window.__sharedGroupNameXss = false; + window.__sharedGroupDescriptionXss = false; + window.__searchGroupNameXss = false; + window.__searchGroupDescriptionXss = false; + window.shareGroupDocument('group-doc-1', 'Escaping Group Document.txt'); + }""" + ) + + expect(page.locator("#groupShareDocumentModal")).to_be_visible() + expect(page.locator("#sharedGroupsList")).to_contain_text(shared_group_name) + expect(page.locator("#sharedGroupsList")).to_contain_text(shared_group_description) + expect(page.locator("#sharedGroupsList img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#sharedGroupsList svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#groupSearchTerm").fill("malicious") + page.locator("#searchGroupsBtn").click() + + expect(page.locator("#groupSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_group_name) + expect(page.locator("#groupSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_group_description) + expect(page.locator("#groupSearchResultsTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#groupSearchResultsTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#groupSearchResultsTable tbody .group-search-add-btn").click() + + expect(page.locator("#toastContainer")).to_contain_text( + f"Document shared with group: {search_group_name}" + ) + expect(page.locator("#toastContainer img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#toastContainer svg")).to_have_count(0) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + sharedName: !!window.__sharedGroupNameXss, + sharedDescription: !!window.__sharedGroupDescriptionXss, + searchName: !!window.__searchGroupNameXss, + searchDescription: !!window.__searchGroupDescriptionXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == { + "sharedName": False, + "sharedDescription": False, + "searchName": False, + "searchDescription": False, + } + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_group_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_group_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eeff499b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_group_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +# test_group_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py +""" +UI test for group workspace member rendering escaping. +Version: 0.241.017 +Implemented in: 0.241.017 + +This test ensures malicious member, request, and user-search display names and +emails render as inert text in the group workspace member-management UI. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +def _require_ui_env(): + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_group_workspace_member_management_escapes_malicious_fields(playwright): + """Validate group workspace member-management views render malicious fields inertly.""" + _require_ui_env() + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + member_name = '' + member_email = '@example.com' + request_name = '' + request_email = '@example.com' + search_name = '' + search_email = '@example.com' + + try: + page.route( + "**/api/groups?page_size=1000", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + { + "groups": [ + { + "id": "group-alpha", + "name": "Escaping Group", + "isActive": True, + "userRole": "Owner", + "status": "active", + } + ] + }, + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/group_documents?*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + { + "documents": [], + "page": 1, + "page_size": 10, + "total_count": 0, + }, + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/group_documents/tags?*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"tags": []}), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/groups/group-alpha/members*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "userId": "member-1", + "displayName": member_name, + "email": member_email, + "role": "Admin", + } + ], + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/groups/group-alpha/requests*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "userId": "request-1", + "displayName": request_name, + "email": request_email, + } + ], + ), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/userSearch*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "id": "search-1", + "displayName": search_name, + "email": search_email, + } + ], + ), + ) + + response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/group_workspaces", wait_until="networkidle") + + assert response is not None, "Expected a navigation response when loading /group_workspaces." + assert response.ok, f"Expected /group_workspaces to load successfully, got HTTP {response.status}." + + page.evaluate( + """() => { + if (typeof loadMembers === 'function') { + loadMembers(); + } + if (typeof loadPendingRequests === 'function') { + loadPendingRequests(); + } + }""" + ) + + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody")).to_contain_text(member_name) + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody")).to_contain_text(member_email) + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(request_name) + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(request_email) + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#addMemberBtn").click() + page.locator("#userSearchTerm").fill("search") + page.locator("#searchUsersBtn").click() + + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_name) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_email) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody .select-user-btn").click() + expect(page.locator("#newUserDisplayName")).to_have_value(search_name) + expect(page.locator("#newUserEmail")).to_have_value(search_email) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + memberName: !!window.__groupMemberNameXss, + memberEmail: !!window.__groupMemberEmailXss, + requestName: !!window.__groupRequestNameXss, + requestEmail: !!window.__groupRequestEmailXss, + searchName: !!window.__groupSearchNameXss, + searchEmail: !!window.__groupSearchEmailXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == { + "memberName": False, + "memberEmail": False, + "requestName": False, + "requestEmail": False, + "searchName": False, + "searchEmail": False, + } + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..685692c23 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +# test_public_workspace_member_rendering_escaping.py +""" +UI test for public workspace member rendering escaping. +Version: 0.241.017 +Implemented in: 0.241.017 + +This test ensures malicious member, request, and user-search display names and +emails render as inert text in the public workspace member-management UI. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +from urllib.parse import urlparse + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") +SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES = {401, 403, 404} + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +def _require_ui_env(): + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_public_workspace_member_management_escapes_malicious_fields(playwright): + """Validate public workspace member-management views render malicious fields inertly.""" + _require_ui_env() + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + member_name = '' + member_email = '@example.com' + request_name = '' + request_email = '@example.com' + search_name = '' + search_email = '@example.com' + + def handle_public_workspace_api(route): + path = urlparse(route.request.url).path + + if path == "/api/public_workspaces/public-1": + _fulfill_json( + route, + { + "id": "public-1", + "name": "Escaping Workspace", + "description": "Regression coverage", + "owner": { + "displayName": "Owner User", + "email": "owner@example.com", + }, + "status": "active", + "heroColor": "#225577", + "userRole": "Owner", + "isMember": True, + }, + ) + return + + if path == "/api/public_workspaces/public-1/members": + _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "userId": "member-1", + "displayName": member_name, + "email": member_email, + "role": "Admin", + } + ], + ) + return + + if path == "/api/public_workspaces/public-1/requests": + _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "userId": "request-1", + "displayName": request_name, + "email": request_email, + } + ], + ) + return + + route.continue_() + + try: + page.route("**/api/public_workspaces/public-1*", handle_public_workspace_api) + page.route( + "**/api/userSearch*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "id": "search-1", + "displayName": search_name, + "email": search_email, + } + ], + ), + ) + + response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/public_workspaces/public-1", wait_until="networkidle") + assert response is not None, "Expected a navigation response when loading /public_workspaces/public-1." + + if response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip( + f"/public_workspaces/public-1 returned HTTP {response.status} in this environment." + ) + + assert response.ok, ( + "Expected /public_workspaces/public-1 to load successfully, " + f"got HTTP {response.status}." + ) + + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody")).to_contain_text(member_name) + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody")).to_contain_text(member_email) + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#membersTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(request_name) + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(request_email) + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#pendingRequestsTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#addMemberBtn").click() + page.locator("#userSearchTerm").fill("search") + page.locator("#searchUsersBtn").click() + + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_name) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody")).to_contain_text(search_email) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody svg")).to_have_count(0) + + page.locator("#userSearchResultsTable tbody .select-user-btn").click() + expect(page.locator("#newUserDisplayName")).to_have_value(search_name) + expect(page.locator("#newUserEmail")).to_have_value(search_email) + + flags = page.evaluate( + """() => ({ + memberName: !!window.__publicMemberNameXss, + memberEmail: !!window.__publicMemberEmailXss, + requestName: !!window.__publicRequestNameXss, + requestEmail: !!window.__publicRequestEmailXss, + searchName: !!window.__publicSearchNameXss, + searchEmail: !!window.__publicSearchEmailXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == { + "memberName": False, + "memberEmail": False, + "requestName": False, + "requestEmail": False, + "searchName": False, + "searchEmail": False, + } + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_projection_non_member_ui.py b/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_projection_non_member_ui.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9d35d88bd --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_projection_non_member_ui.py @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +# test_public_workspace_projection_non_member_ui.py +""" +UI test for public workspace projection hardening. +Version: 0.241.013 +Implemented in: 0.241.013 + +This test ensures the public directory renders owner display names without +falling back to owner email addresses, and that non-members who open the +workspace details page see the public summary view without member-only tabs. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path +from urllib.parse import urlparse + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") +SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES = {401, 403, 404} + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +def _handle_public_workspace_projection_api(route): + request = route.request + parsed_url = urlparse(request.url) + path = parsed_url.path + + if path == "/api/user/settings": + _fulfill_json( + route, + { + "settings": { + "publicDirectorySettings": { + "public-1": True, + } + } + }, + ) + return + + if path == "/api/public_workspaces/discover": + _fulfill_json( + route, + [ + { + "id": "public-1", + "name": "Projection Workspace", + "description": "Directory summary only", + } + ], + ) + return + + if path == "/api/public_workspaces/public-1": + _fulfill_json( + route, + { + "id": "public-1", + "name": "Projection Workspace", + "description": "Directory summary only", + "owner": { + "displayName": "Directory Owner", + }, + "status": "active", + "heroColor": "#224466", + "userRole": None, + "isMember": False, + }, + ) + return + + if path == "/api/public_workspaces/public-1/fileCount": + _fulfill_json(route, {"fileCount": 7}) + return + + if path == "/api/public_workspaces/public-1/promptCount": + _fulfill_json(route, {"promptCount": 3}) + return + + route.continue_() + + +def _require_ui_environment(): + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip( + "Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file." + ) + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_public_directory_owner_display_and_non_member_workspace_fallback(playwright): + """Validate the public directory and non-member workspace details view use the safe payload.""" + _require_ui_environment() + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + page.route("**/api/user/settings", _handle_public_workspace_projection_api) + page.route("**/api/public_workspaces*", _handle_public_workspace_projection_api) + + try: + directory_response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/public_directory", wait_until="networkidle") + assert directory_response is not None, "Expected a navigation response when loading /public_directory." + + if directory_response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip(f"/public_directory returned HTTP {directory_response.status} in this environment.") + + assert directory_response.ok, ( + f"Expected /public_directory to load successfully, got HTTP {directory_response.status}." + ) + + expect(page.locator("#public-directory-table tbody")).to_contain_text("Projection Workspace") + page.locator('button.expand-btn[data-id="public-1"]').click() + expect(page.locator("#owner-public-1")).to_have_text("Directory Owner") + assert "@" not in page.locator("#owner-public-1").inner_text() + + manage_response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/public_workspaces/public-1", wait_until="networkidle") + assert manage_response is not None, "Expected a navigation response when loading /public_workspaces/public-1." + + if manage_response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip( + f"/public_workspaces/public-1 returned HTTP {manage_response.status} in this environment." + ) + + assert manage_response.ok, ( + "Expected /public_workspaces/public-1 to load successfully, " + f"got HTTP {manage_response.status}." + ) + + expect(page.locator("#workspaceHeroName")).to_have_text("Projection Workspace") + expect(page.locator("#workspaceOwnerName")).to_have_text("Directory Owner") + expect(page.locator("#workspace-access-alert")).to_be_visible() + expect(page.locator("#workspace-access-alert")).to_contain_text( + "Membership, statistics, and workspace settings are only available to workspace members." + ) + expect(page.locator("#membership-tab")).to_be_hidden() + expect(page.locator("#stats-tab")).to_be_hidden() + expect(page.locator("#settings-tab-item")).to_be_hidden() + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py b/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91bb295f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +# test_public_workspace_tag_color_rendering.py +""" +UI test for public workspace tag color XSS hardening. +Version: 0.241.022 +Implemented in: 0.241.022 + +This test ensures malicious tag color payloads remain inert in the public +workspace grid, tag-management rows, tag-selection rows, and selected-tag chips. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") +SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES = {401, 403, 404} +TAG_NAME = "reviewed" +MALICIOUS_COLOR = ( + '#ff0000"; onclick="window.__publicTagColorXss = true" ' + 'onmouseover="window.__publicTagColorXss = true' +) + + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + + +def _require_ui_env(): + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip( + "Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file." + ) + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_public_workspace_tag_color_payloads_render_inertly(playwright): + """Validate malicious tag color payloads do not become live browser attributes.""" + _require_ui_env() + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + page.add_init_script( + """() => { + localStorage.setItem('publicWorkspaceViewPreference', 'grid'); + window.__publicTagColorXss = false; + }""" + ) + + documents_payload = { + "documents": [ + { + "id": "doc-1", + "file_name": "reviewed-spec.pdf", + "title": "Reviewed Spec", + "tags": [TAG_NAME], + "status": "Complete", + "percentage_complete": 100, + "document_classification": "Public", + "classification": "Public", + "version": "1", + "authors": "Owner User", + "number_of_pages": 3, + "enhanced_citations": False, + "publication_date": "2024-01-01", + "keywords": "reviewed", + "abstract": "Regression coverage", + } + ], + "page": 1, + "page_size": 1000, + "total_count": 1, + } + tag_payload = [{"name": TAG_NAME, "color": MALICIOUS_COLOR, "count": 1}] + + try: + page.route( + "**/api/public_documents*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, documents_payload), + ) + page.route( + "**/api/public_workspace_documents/tags*", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, tag_payload), + ) + + response = page.goto( + f"{BASE_URL}/public_workspaces/public-1", + wait_until="networkidle", + ) + assert response is not None, ( + "Expected a navigation response when loading /public_workspaces/public-1." + ) + + if response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip( + f"/public_workspaces/public-1 returned HTTP {response.status} in this environment." + ) + + assert response.ok, ( + "Expected /public_workspaces/public-1 to load successfully, " + f"got HTTP {response.status}." + ) + + expect(page.locator("#public-tag-folders-container")).to_contain_text(TAG_NAME) + page.locator("#public-tag-folders-container .tag-folder-icon i").first.hover() + + audit = page.evaluate( + """(tagName) => { + refreshPublicTagManagementTable(); + renderPublicTagSelectionList(); + window.eval(`publicDocSelectedTags.add(${JSON.stringify(tagName)});`); + updatePublicDocTagsDisplay(); + + const selectors = [ + '#public-tag-folders-container', + '#public-existing-tags-tbody', + '#public-tag-selection-list', + '#public-doc-selected-tags-container', + ]; + + const attributes = selectors.flatMap((selector) => + Array.from(document.querySelectorAll(`${selector} *`)).flatMap((node) => + Array.from(node.attributes) + .filter((attr) => attr.name.toLowerCase().startsWith('on') || String(attr.value).includes('__publicTagColorXss')) + .map((attr) => ({ + selector, + tagName: node.tagName, + attribute: attr.name, + value: attr.value, + })) + ) + ); + + return { + attributes, + selectedTagsText: document.getElementById('public-doc-selected-tags-container')?.textContent || '', + managementText: document.getElementById('public-existing-tags-tbody')?.textContent || '', + selectionText: document.getElementById('public-tag-selection-list')?.textContent || '', + gridText: document.getElementById('public-tag-folders-container')?.textContent || '', + xssTriggered: !!window.__publicTagColorXss, + }; + }""", + TAG_NAME, + ) + + assert TAG_NAME in audit["gridText"] + assert TAG_NAME in audit["managementText"] + assert TAG_NAME in audit["selectionText"] + assert TAG_NAME in audit["selectedTagsText"] + assert audit["attributes"] == [] + assert audit["xssTriggered"] is False + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py b/ui_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b5ebdea28 --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +# test_uploaded_file_preview_escaping.py +""" +UI test for uploaded file preview body escaping. +Version: 0.241.022 +Implemented in: 0.241.022 + +This test ensures uploaded file preview content renders attacker-controlled +plain text, CSV cells, and legacy HTML table payloads as inert text. +""" + +import json +import os +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + +BASE_URL = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/") +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv("SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE", "") +SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES = {401, 403, 404} + +def _fulfill_json(route, payload, status=200): + route.fulfill( + status=status, + content_type="application/json", + body=json.dumps(payload), + ) + +def _show_file_preview(page, file_content, filename, is_table, flag_name): + page.evaluate( + """ + async ({ fileContent, filename, isTable, flagName }) => { + window[flagName] = false; + + const fileActionsModule = await import('/static/js/chat/chat-input-actions.js'); + fileActionsModule.showFileContentPopup( + fileContent, + filename, + isTable, + 'database', + null, + null, + ); + } + """, + { + "fileContent": file_content, + "filename": filename, + "isTable": is_table, + "flagName": flag_name, + }, + ) + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_uploaded_file_preview_renders_untrusted_content_as_inert_text(playwright): + """Validate uploaded file previews do not turn attacker-controlled content into DOM.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.") + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip("Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.") + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={"width": 1440, "height": 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + plain_text_payload = ' plain text body' + csv_payload = 'column_a,column_b\n,safe' + legacy_table_payload = ( + '
    ' + '
    ' + ) + + page.route( + "**/api/user/settings", + lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"selected_agent": None, "settings": {"enable_agents": False}}), + ) + page.route("**/api/get_conversations", lambda route: _fulfill_json(route, {"conversations": []})) + + try: + response = page.goto(f"{BASE_URL}/chats", wait_until="domcontentloaded") + assert response is not None, "Expected a navigation response when loading /chats." + + if response.status in SKIP_RESPONSE_CODES: + pytest.skip(f"/chats returned HTTP {response.status} in this environment.") + + assert response.ok, f"Expected /chats to load successfully, got HTTP {response.status}." + page.wait_for_selector("#chatbox") + + _show_file_preview( + page, + plain_text_payload, + "plain-preview.txt", + False, + "__filePreviewPlainXss", + ) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal")).to_be_visible() + expect(page.locator("#file-content pre")).to_have_text(plain_text_payload) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal svg")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal script")).to_have_count(0) + + _show_file_preview( + page, + csv_payload, + "table-preview.csv", + True, + "__filePreviewCsvXss", + ) + expect(page.locator("#file-content table")).to_be_visible() + expect(page.locator("#file-content")).to_contain_text( + '' + ) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal img[src='x']")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal svg")).to_have_count(0) + expect(page.locator("#file-modal script")).to_have_count(0) + + _show_file_preview( + page, + legacy_table_payload, + "legacy-table-preview.html", + True, + "__filePreviewLegacyXss", + ) + expect(page.locator("#file-content pre")).to_contain_text("
    ({ + plain: !!window.__filePreviewPlainXss, + csv: !!window.__filePreviewCsvXss, + legacy: !!window.__filePreviewLegacyXss, + })""" + ) + assert flags == {"plain": False, "csv": False, "legacy": False} + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ui_tests/test_web_search_notice_copy.py b/ui_tests/test_web_search_notice_copy.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7630d418f --- /dev/null +++ b/ui_tests/test_web_search_notice_copy.py @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +# test_web_search_notice_copy.py +""" +UI test for web search disclosure copy. +Version: 0.241.008 +Implemented in: 0.241.008 + +This test ensures the admin settings page shows the updated current-message-only +web-search disclosure copy for the user notice placeholder and the admin +consent modal warning text. +""" + +import os +import re +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest +from playwright.sync_api import expect + + +BASE_URL = os.getenv('SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL', '').rstrip('/') +STORAGE_STATE = os.getenv('SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE', '') + + +@pytest.mark.ui +def test_admin_settings_shows_current_message_only_web_search_notice(playwright): + """Validate the admin-facing web-search disclosure copy.""" + if not BASE_URL: + pytest.skip('Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_BASE_URL to run this UI test.') + if not STORAGE_STATE or not Path(STORAGE_STATE).exists(): + pytest.skip('Set SIMPLECHAT_UI_STORAGE_STATE to a valid authenticated Playwright storage state file.') + + browser = playwright.chromium.launch() + context = browser.new_context( + storage_state=STORAGE_STATE, + viewport={'width': 1440, 'height': 900}, + ) + page = context.new_page() + + try: + page.goto(f'{BASE_URL}/admin/settings', wait_until='networkidle') + + notice_textarea = page.locator('#web_search_user_notice_text') + expect(notice_textarea).to_have_count(1) + expect(notice_textarea).to_have_attribute( + 'placeholder', + re.compile(r'Your current message will be sent to Microsoft Bing for web search', re.IGNORECASE), + ) + + consent_modal = page.locator('#web-search-consent-modal') + expect(consent_modal).to_have_count(1) + consent_text = consent_modal.text_content() or '' + assert 'Only the user\'s current message is sent for web search.' in consent_text + assert 'Users should avoid including sensitive content in any message that uses web search.' in consent_text + finally: + context.close() + browser.close() \ No newline at end of file