chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.4 [security] #595
+398
−401
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This PR contains the following updates:
4.10.4→4.11.4GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-22818
Summary
A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.
Details
When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s
algfield if present. If the JWK did not specify an algorithm, the middleware fell back to using thealgvalue provided in the unverified JWT header.Because the
algfield in a JWK is optional and commonly omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to influence which algorithm is used for verification. In some environments, this may result in authentication or authorization bypass through crafted JWTs.The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used to make authorization decisions.
Impact
In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially leading to authentication or authorization bypass.
Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.
Resolution
Update to the latest patched release.
Breaking change:
The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values.
Instead, callers must explicitly specify which asymmetric algorithms are permitted, and only tokens signed with those algorithms will be accepted. This prevents JWT algorithm confusion by ensuring that algorithm selection is fully controlled by application
configuration.
As part of this fix, the
algoption is now required when using the JWK/JWKS middleware, and symmetric (HS*) algorithms are no longer accepted in this context.Before (vulnerable configuration)
After (patched configuration)
CVE-2026-22817
Summary
A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s
algvalue to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.Details
When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s
algfield if present, but otherwise fell back to thealgvalue provided in the unverified JWT header.Because the
algfield in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorizationbypass through crafted tokens.
The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions.
Impact
In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially resulting in authentication or authorization bypass.
Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.
Resolution
Update to the latest patched release.
Breaking change:
As part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the
algoption to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values.Applications upgrading must update their configuration accordingly.
Before (vulnerable configuration)
After (patched configuration)
Release Notes
honojs/hono (hono)
v4.11.4Compare Source
v4.11.3Compare Source
What's Changed
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.2...v4.11.3
v4.11.2Compare Source
What's Changed
HonoURLtypes by @yusukebe in #4592SimplifyinToSchemaby @yusukebe in #4597MergeMiddlewareResponsetype by @yusukebe in #4598New Contributors
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.1...v4.11.2
v4.11.1Compare Source
What's Changed
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.0...v4.11.1
v4.11.0Compare Source
Release Notes
Hono v4.11.0 is now available!
This release includes new features for the Hono client, middleware improvements, and an important type system fix.
Type System Fix for Middleware
We've fixed a bug in the type system for middleware. Previously,
appdid not have the correct type with pathless handlers:This has now been fixed.
Thanks @kosei28!
Typed URL for Hono Client
You can now pass the base URL as the second type parameter to
hcto get more precise URL types:This is useful when you want to use the URL as a type-safe key for libraries like SWR.
Thanks @miyaji255!
Custom NotFoundResponse Type
You can now customize the
NotFoundResponsetype using module augmentation. This allowsc.notFound()to return a typed response:Now the client can correctly infer the 404 response type.
Thanks @miyaji255!
tryGetContext Helper
The new
tryGetContext()helper in the Context Storage middleware returnsundefinedinstead of throwing an error when the context is not available:Thanks @AyushCoder9!
Custom Query Serializer
You can now customize how query parameters are serialized using the
buildSearchParamsoption:Thanks @bolasblack!
New features
All changes
New Contributors
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.8...v4.11.0
v4.10.8Compare Source
What's Changed
IsAllowedOriginHandlerby @baseballyama in #4558IsAllowedSecFetchSiteHandlerby @baseballyama in #4559New Contributors
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.7...v4.10.8
v4.10.7Compare Source
What's Changed
NotSpecifiedandStrictVerifyOptionsby @ysknsid25 in #4525bun.lockby @yusukebe in #4548New Contributors
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.6...v4.10.7
v4.10.6Compare Source
Deperecated
bearer-auth options
The following options are deprecated and will be removed in a future version:
noAuthenticationHeaderMessage=> usenoAuthenticationHeader.messageinvalidAuthenticationHeaderMessage=> useinvalidAuthenticationHeader.messageinvalidTokenMessage=> useinvalidToken.messageWhat's Changed
New Contributors
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.5...v4.10.6
v4.10.5Compare Source
What's Changed
Vary: *is present by @pHo9UBenaA in #4504New Contributors
Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.4...v4.10.5
Configuration
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