feat(crypto): add proposal-gated ECDSA validation - #49
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds fork-gated strict ECDSA validation. It stores activation state through a proposal, enforces 65-byte signatures and recovery bounds, applies strict checks to blocks and transactions, and invalidates cached verification states after activation. ChangesStrict ECDSA validation
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ProposalService
participant DynamicPropertiesStore
participant Manager
participant TransactionCapsule
participant ECKey
ProposalService->>DynamicPropertiesStore: save strict validation value
Manager->>DynamicPropertiesStore: detect activation at maintenance boundary
Manager->>TransactionCapsule: clear verified state
TransactionCapsule->>ECKey: validate signatures in strict mode
ECKey-->>TransactionCapsule: accept or reject recovered signature
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Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
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Inline comments:
In `@framework/src/main/java/org/tron/core/db/Manager.java`:
- Around line 1924-1930: Update the transaction verification cache used by
pushTransaction and validateSignature to bind each cached result to the strict
ECDSA activation state or validation epoch, and revalidate whenever it does not
match the current state. Ensure an in-flight legacy validation cannot restore a
cache entry usable after activation, while preserving normal cache reuse within
the same state. Add an overlap test covering legacy validation blocked until
activation completes.
In `@framework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/WalletMockTest.java`:
- Around line 212-217: Gate strict signature-length validation on the shared
EC-key and dynamic-property activation condition. In
framework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/WalletMockTest.java:212-217, explicitly
test strict validation disabled and enabled, preserving legacy handling before
activation and expecting SIGERROR after activation; update
Wallet.broadcastTransaction accordingly. In
framework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/net/messagehandler/TransactionsMsgHandlerTest.java:405-421,
add the same off/on coverage, preserving legacy P2P handling before activation
and expecting BAD_TRX after activation; gate the P2P validation path with the
same condition.
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ℹ️ Review info
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Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro Plus
Run ID: 14f8d709-6824-4aa8-aed3-17684f6258b4
📒 Files selected for processing (20)
actuator/src/main/java/org/tron/core/utils/ProposalUtil.javachainbase/src/main/java/org/tron/core/capsule/BlockCapsule.javachainbase/src/main/java/org/tron/core/capsule/TransactionCapsule.javachainbase/src/main/java/org/tron/core/store/DynamicPropertiesStore.javacommon/src/main/java/org/tron/core/Constant.javacommon/src/main/java/org/tron/core/config/Parameter.javacrypto/src/main/java/org/tron/common/crypto/ECKey.javacrypto/src/main/java/org/tron/common/crypto/SignUtils.javaframework/src/main/java/org/tron/core/Wallet.javaframework/src/main/java/org/tron/core/consensus/ProposalService.javaframework/src/main/java/org/tron/core/db/Manager.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/common/crypto/ECKeyTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/WalletMockTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/actuator/utils/ProposalUtilTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/capsule/BlockCapsuleTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/capsule/TransactionCapsuleTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/db/ManagerMockTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/db/ManagerTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/net/messagehandler/TransactionsMsgHandlerTest.javaframework/src/test/java/org/tron/core/services/ProposalServiceTest.java
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (1)
- common/src/main/java/org/tron/core/Constant.java
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What does this PR do?
This PR tightens fresh RPC and P2P ECDSA signature admission to exactly 65 bytes and introduces proposal-gated strict consensus validation for transaction and block-witness signatures. Strict mode validates the encoded length, normalized recovery ID, and
r/sscalar bounds before elliptic-curve recovery, preserves high-S signatures, and usesBigIntegers.modOddInversefor valid modular inverses.Strict public-key recovery now rejects point-at-infinity results instead of encoding them as
{0x00}and deriving an address from an empty public-key payload. It also rejects null signatures and nullr/scomponents with a predictableIllegalArgumentException. Legacy recovery behavior remains unchanged before activation.It adds proposal 99 (
ALLOW_STRICT_ECDSA_VALIDATION) and block version 4.8.3 support for one-way activation. The same activation state is loaded into the VM configuration snapshot so ECRecover and signature-recovery precompiles use strict recovery after activation while preserving historical VM behavior before activation. Relay hello-message verification is a non-consensus admission path and therefore always uses strict ECDSA recovery.PBFT message-signature validation is explicitly outside the scope of this PR and retains its existing legacy behavior.
When the proposal becomes active during maintenance processing, cached transaction verification results are invalidated across the pending, re-push, popped, and pushing queues. Block verification reuses a pending result only when the cached capsule is explicitly verified and its signatures match.
Transaction signature validation and cache invalidation are synchronized per
TransactionCapsule, withisVerifiedpublished through a volatile field. This prevents an in-flight legacy validation from restoringisVerified=trueafter activation invalidation, without serializing validation of different transactions on a global lock.Why are these changes required?
Padded and malformed ECDSA signatures create non-canonical encodings and may reach expensive or failure-prone elliptic-curve operations. A specially constructed, range-valid signature can also recover the secp256k1 point at infinity, which is not a valid public key but was historically encoded as
{0x00}and converted into a deterministic address.Proposal-gated consensus activation preserves transaction, block, and VM historical compatibility while allowing the network to enforce strict validation for post-activation processing. Non-consensus admission paths can reject these invalid signatures immediately.
A successful verification cache entry is valid only for the rule set under which it was computed. Invalidating and coordinating cached results at the activation boundary ensures that a transaction accepted under legacy rules cannot bypass strict validation when it is later considered for block inclusion.
This PR has been tested by:
./gradlew :framework:test --tests 'org.tron.common.crypto.ECKeyTest'./gradlew :framework:test --tests 'org.tron.common.crypto.ECKeyTest' --tests 'org.tron.common.runtime.vm.PrecompiledContractsTest.testECRecoverPointAtInfinityStrictValidation'./gradlew :framework:test --tests 'org.tron.core.net.services.RelayServiceTest'WalletMockTest,ProposalUtilTest,BlockCapsuleTest,TransactionCapsuleTest,ManagerMockTest,ManagerTest,TransactionsMsgHandlerTest, andProposalServiceTestr/svalues0,n, andn+1, invalid wire recovery values, invalid compact headers and recovery IDs, valid high-S signatures, point-at-infinity recovery, and VM behavior before and after activation../gradlew :framework:checkstyleMain./gradlew :framework:checkstyleTestFollow up
Coordinate the final TIP review, release version, and proposal activation schedule before enabling proposal 99.
Extra details
Related TIP draft: Federico2014/tips#2
Compatibility:
Consensus upgrade: all block-producing and validating nodes must run a release containing this change before proposal 99 is activated.
Cross-module impact: crypto validation, VM execution, chainbase state, proposal processing, admission checks, and transaction-cache lifecycle changes share one activation boundary and must be deployed together.