feat(platform-wallet): report the balance a pooled build can actually spend - #4582
feat(platform-wallet): report the balance a pooled build can actually spend#4582romchornyi wants to merge 15 commits into
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…was given The wallet-aware finalizers add every unreserved UTXO of the funding account to the candidate pool, so seeding a subset through `core_wallet_tx_builder_add_inputs_from_outpoints` does not restrict what gets selected. A caller draining an account in batches that each stay under the standard-transaction input limit therefore achieves nothing: every batch sees the whole account and fails with a too-many-inputs error, and an account above the cap cannot be drained at all. That is the iOS CoinJoin sweep. A wallet with 589 mixed UTXOs reports "Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 589 (max 500)" on every attempt and every retry; its ~101 DASH cannot be moved by any route the app offers. Exposes key-wallet's opt-in through the FFI and the Swift SDK, and moves the rust-dashcore pin onto a branch carrying it. The pin continues the existing cherry-pick lineage rather than following dev: `chore/sync-fixes-filter-rescans-and-added-inputs` is the current pin (4db5c367) plus dash-spv #866 and #974 — committed-filter-range rescans for newly derived scripts, which address the launch-dependent balances seen on heavily mixed wallets — plus the four key-wallet commits. Pinning dev instead would drag in the sweep-event chain, whose platform-side handling is #4406's subject and which breaks this workspace on seven non-exhaustive matches today.
…was given The wallet-aware finalizers offer every unreserved UTXO of the funding account alongside anything `core_wallet_tx_builder_add_inputs_from_outpoints` seeded, so seeding a subset does not restrict what gets selected. A caller draining an account in batches that each stay under the standard-transaction input limit therefore achieves nothing: every batch sees the whole account and fails with a too-many-inputs error, and an account above the cap cannot be drained at all. That is the iOS CoinJoin sweep. Reproduced on a testnet wallet holding 700 mixed UTXOs: "Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 700 (max 500)" on every attempt; the reporting mainnet wallet has 589 and ~101 DASH it cannot move. key-wallet takes the choice per funding call (dashpay/rust-dashcore#994), and the finalizers make that call internally, so the intent is carried on the FFI builder and read when they run. `finalize_transaction` keeps its signature and delegates to `finalize_transaction_with_options`, so no existing caller changes.
… spend `core_wallet_get_balance` sums every funding account the wallet has — CoinJoin included — and never consults a reservation set. A host gating its amount entry on it therefore offers money the build then refuses, and the shortfall surfaces as CorePooledInsufficientFunds only after the user has committed to an amount. Support ticket 32081 is the shape of it: a wallet reading 94 DASH, of which 0.0054 was actually spendable, everything else on the CoinJoin account the send pool excludes by design. The same mismatch produces the asset-lock shortfall on the Transparent to Shielded path. `pooled_spendable_balance` answers with the accounts `finalize_transaction` funds from, resolved through the same `resolve_source_accounts` and the same source list, counting only UTXOs coin selection accepts. Hosts read it instead of mirroring the pooling rule themselves — the mirror is what drifted here. Reservations are not subtracted: key-wallet keeps each account's ReservationSet private, so reading it needs an accessor there and a pin bump. Documented at every layer. That part is transient — a reservation is released when its spend is processed, on a definitive rejection, at the TTL, or on restart — while the account-set difference is permanent and was the whole of the reported shortfall.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds pooled spendable and maximum-sendable calculations, applies checked fee, dust, and input-cap handling, corrects FFI handle resolution, and exposes both calculations through ChangesPooled balance APIs
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant SwiftClient
participant ManagedCoreWallet
participant FFI
participant CoreWallet
participant FundingResolver
SwiftClient->>ManagedCoreWallet: request pooled balance
ManagedCoreWallet->>FFI: pass account parameters and out-parameter
FFI->>CoreWallet: resolve core-wallet handle and calculate balance
CoreWallet->>FundingResolver: resolve and validate funding accounts
FundingResolver-->>CoreWallet: return eligible accounts and UTXOs
CoreWallet-->>FFI: return balance or error
FFI-->>ManagedCoreWallet: write output and return result
ManagedCoreWallet-->>SwiftClient: return balance or throw error
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This change adds pooled gross and fee-adjusted sendable balance APIs while excluding ineligible funds and handling fee, dust, and input-limit constraints. The implemented behavior is covered across core and FFI paths, with no remaining merge-blocking risk identified. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Reviewed the three files plus the key-wallet side (add_funding, select_coins_with_size, Utxo::is_spendable) to check the new figure really matches what selection accepts.
The diagnosis is right and the layering is right: .allSpendable → SEND_FUNDING_SOURCES genuinely keeps CoinJoin out, and spendable_utxos(height) genuinely matches select_coins_with_size, which filters candidates by is_spendable(current_height) on every strategy. So the CoinJoin over-report this targets is real and this fixes it.
Three things I think should be settled before merge, all of the same kind — the new function is a second hand-copy of finalize_transaction_with_options' funding loop, and it has already drifted from it in ways that reintroduce the over-report the PR exists to remove:
- Fee is not subtracted. The doc tells hosts to gate amount entry on this, but a build needs
amount + fee. A max-amount send entering the returned value verbatim fails with the sameCorePooledInsufficientFunds. account_of_typeis not checked, so accounts the build skips are still counted.- Single-family selectors (
.bip32,.coinJoin) returnOk(0)wherefinalizereturnsWalletNotFound— the mirror doesn't honourstrict.
Plus a read-only query holding the manager write lock, and the doc comments of finalize_transaction and core_wallet_tx_builder_use_only_added_inputs having been captured by the new functions in both Rust files.
On the untested point — I'd push back gently on shipping this one without a test specifically because the PR's own thesis is that an unpinned mirror of the pooling rule drifts. funded_wallet_manager_dual_standard(&[700_000], &[700_000]) is already in test_support and makes the core assertion about three lines; findings 2 and 3 would both have been caught by it.
Merge-order note in the description looks right and I agree this must not land first.
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…resolver Review found the new balance call had already drifted from the funding loop it was meant to be the truth for — the point of the PR, reproduced inside it. `resolved_funding_accounts` now names the accounts, and both `finalize_transaction_with_options` and `pooled_spendable_balance` are driven from it. Three divergences go with it: - the balance counted an account that resolved only on the managed side, while funding requires both halves and skips otherwise, so it over-reported exactly the shape this PR removes; - single-source selectors returned Ok(0) where funding errors WalletNotFound, giving two answers to the same selector — the strict rule, including the empty SET selector case, now lives in the resolver; - the dedup set existed twice. The balance also takes the read lock rather than the write lock: nothing here mutates, and gating amount entry means a call per keystroke against concurrent finalizers and sync writers. The fee is documented rather than subtracted. Doing it here means re-declaring key-wallet's input and output sizes in this crate, which is the duplication the call exists to remove; the estimate belongs beside FeeRate and MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS.
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All five addressed in 96c8be1, four by code and one by documentation. The duplication one was the right frame — the call meant to end the host's hand-copy was itself a hand-copy, and had drifted twice before merge.
The duplicated dedup Read lock — done, The fee I documented instead of subtracting, and I want to be explicit that this is a judgement call rather than agreement. Subtracting it here means re-declaring key-wallet's per-input and per-output sizes in this crate — the same duplication this call exists to remove, and the thing your last comment argues against. The estimate belongs beside What the doc now says: the figure is gross, a build needs 909 platform-wallet tests pass, 🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
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Thanks — I rechecked A few pieces from the review are still outstanding, though:
Could you address those three points? After that, the review findings look covered from my side. |
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One additional status note: GitHub now reports this branch as conflicting with its base ( |
#4548 landed as a squash, so this branch's copies of its commits no longer match by hash and both files conflicted. Resolved by taking v4.2-dev on every line the two share: the aliasing-safe read (ffi.reservation_only, not through the consumed raw pointer) and the setter doc that now names both finalizers. The pooled-balance entry point moves below the setter instead of splitting its doc comment, where the stacking had wedged it. 938 lib tests pass.
Review asked for this and for the doc capture; both were still open. The getter had no test at all, which is odd for a function whose entire justification is that it must not drift from finalize_transaction's account set - the drift it replaces is a host-side hand-copy of the same rule. Three couplings are now pinned: the pooled selector sums both standard families (1_400_000 from the dual fixture), a DashPay contact account contributes through AllDashpayReceivingFunds, and a single-source miss errors with WalletNotFound exactly as single_source_missing_account_still_errors requires of finalize, rather than answering Ok(0) that a host renders as insufficient funds. A fourth pins the ticket itself: a wallet holding only CoinJoin reports 0 spendable, which is the 94-DASH-against-0.0054 gap from 32081 in miniature. Verified the strictness leg kills its mutant (strict -> false gives Ok(0)). Also return the doc line the insertion captured: finalize_transaction's summary had become the first line of pooled_spendable_balance's doc, leaving finalize undocumented and describing a read-only getter as reserving and signing. The FFI-side twin of this was resolved in the v4.2-dev merge.
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Re-walked all eight comments. Six were already addressed; two were still open and are fixed now in Still open → fixed:
Already addressed in earlier rounds (flagging so you can check I read them the way you meant):
940 lib tests pass, clippy clean on both crates. The branch also carries the 🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
Review's remaining point: the gross balance is not an amount a build accepts, so a host wiring a max control to it relocates the shortfall this API removes from the CoinJoin edge to the max-amount edge. Answered with the number rather than a caveat in the doc. pooled_max_sendable prices the fee off the inputs that spending everything would take - one output, no change - using key-wallet's own estimate_tx_size and FeeRate. The earlier objection that this would re-declare key-wallet's per-input and per-output sizes here was wrong: both are public, and the per-input cost is taken by difference from the estimator rather than as a constant, so it cannot drift from what the build charges. A UTXO whose value does not cover the fee its own input adds is excluded, since including it lowers the answer - the maximum is a selection problem, not a subtraction. Kept additive: pooled_spendable_balance still reports the gross sum, which is what an available-balance line should show, and its doc now points at the net figure instead of asking hosts to guess headroom. New FFI entry point takes a fee rate (0 = the builder default) and the Swift wrapper mirrors it. Two tests, both mutation-checked. The first settles the question by building rather than by arithmetic: the gross figure fails finalize_transaction, the net one builds and takes both accounts' inputs with it - asserting only max < gross would pass an estimate that is merely close. The second pins the dust rule. 942 lib tests pass.
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Coming back on the fee one — I took the doc option earlier and gave a reason that doesn't hold up. Fixed properly in My stated reason was that subtracting the fee here would mean re-declaring key-wallet's per-input and per-output sizes in this crate. That was simply wrong:
One thing that fell out of doing it properly: this is a selection problem, not a subtraction. A UTXO whose value doesn't cover the fee its own input adds has to be excluded — including it lowers the answer — so Kept additive rather than changing the existing getter: Two tests, both mutation-checked:
Mutants: dropping the fee subtraction reds the first; the strictness mutant from the previous round still reds its own test. Two limits are documented as deliberately not modelled, both of which can only make the real ceiling lower, never higher: reservations held by another in-flight build, and the standard-transaction input cap — 942 lib tests pass, clippy clean on both crates. That closes all eight comments on this PR. 🤖 Generated with Claude Code |
cargo fmt --check was the only red job; nothing else in the workspace differs.
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In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs`:
- Line 492: Update pooled_max_sendable to cap the eligible UTXO count using the
same key-wallet transaction input limit enforced by finalize_transaction before
calculating the fee and maximum sendable amount. Preserve the existing
profitable-UTXO selection behavior within that cap, and add a regression test
covering more eligible UTXOs than the limit.
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…imit A pool holding more eligible UTXOs than one transaction can carry was summed whole, so the reported maximum named an amount no build could reach - the same class of over-report this API exists to remove, just at a different edge. The figure is now taken from the largest MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS UTXOs, and the doc says the money beyond the cap is unreachable in a single send rather than gone. key-wallet enforces the limit but keeps the constant private, so it is mirrored here. Rather than trust the mirror, the regression test builds against a wallet holding one UTXO more than the cap: the uncapped amount is refused, the capped one builds and fills the transaction exactly to the cap. Raising the mirror above key-wallet's real limit therefore reds the test - verified with 600. Lowering it does not, and cannot: every assertion is written in terms of the mirror and moves with it. Both the constant's doc and the test say so plainly rather than claiming a guarantee in both directions; under-reporting is conservative, over-reporting is the failure. Making the key-wallet constant public - it sits one line from MAX_STANDARD_OP_RETURN_BYTES, which was made public for this exact reason - would remove the mirror, at the cost of a pin bump on this branch. 943 lib tests pass.
…re-wallet table `core_wallet_pooled_spendable_balance` and `core_wallet_pooled_max_sendable` are exposed on the core wallet (`ManagedCoreWallet` in the Swift SDK), so the handle they receive is the one `platform_wallet_get_core` issues — a `CORE_WALLET_STORAGE` entry, the same one `core_wallet_get_balance` takes. Both were written beside the `core_wallet_tx_builder_*` entry points and copied their lookup, `PLATFORM_WALLET_STORAGE.with_item(handle)`. Handles come from one global counter, so a core handle is never present in the platform table: every call failed with `ErrorInvalidHandle`. The Swift caller swallowed that error and published a permanent 0, which zeroed Max and blocked every send in the 2026-09-03 QA build (dashwallet-ios#1107) — for every wallet, mixed or not, which is what both QA and a support report hit. Reproduced on a fresh 2 tDASH testnet wallet. Resolve through `CORE_WALLET_STORAGE`, name the parameter for what it is, and pin the contract with tests: a core handle returns the same figure as the direct `CoreWallet` call, and an unknown handle is refused with the out-parameter left at 0. The positive test fails on the old lookup with `NotFound`.
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## v4.2-dev #4582 +/- ##
============================================
+ Coverage 86.13% 86.95% +0.81%
============================================
Files 2796 2767 -29
Lines 367966 364480 -3486
============================================
- Hits 316958 316917 -41
+ Misses 51008 47563 -3445
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All eight points from the previous round are addressed, and several of them better than what I asked for. Re-checked against key-wallet rather than taking the diff's word for it:
- Fee —
pooled_max_sendableis the right shape: it prices the fee off the inputs a drain would actually take rather than subtracting from the gross figure, and dropping UTXOs whose value doesn't cover their own input cost makes it a true maximum instead of an approximation.per_inputderived fromestimate_tx_sizeby difference is a nice touch —estimate_tx_sizeis10 + 148·inputs + 34·outputs, strictly linear, so the difference is exact and nothing is re-declared here that could drift. MAX_STANDARD_TX_INPUTS = 500matches key-wallet's private constant (transaction_builder.rs:29, enforced at :542). The doc's reasoning about which direction the test can pin is correct and honestly stated.- Account-set and strictness divergence — both gone, and gone at the right depth:
resolved_funding_accountsis now the single resolver, withfinalize_transaction_with_optionsdriving off it. - Write lock — now
.read()+get_wallet_and_info+funds_account. - Docs — the FFI capture is fixed and
use_only_added_inputshas its rationale back (one new instance below). - Tests — these are stronger than I suggested. Asserting by building rather than by arithmetic is the right call:
pooled_max_sendable_is_an_amount_a_build_acceptsrunning both the gross and the net figure throughfinalize_transactionis exactly the proof the claim needs, andpooled_max_sendable_respects_the_input_capfilling a transaction to exactly the cap pins the mirrored constant in the direction that can actually break the promise.
Also noting the handle-table bug the QA build turned up (CORE_WALLET_STORAGE vs PLATFORM_WALLET_STORAGE) — I missed that one entirely last round, and unknown_handle_is_refused_with_zero_out is a good regression pin for it.
Approving. Three cosmetic things below and one request, none blocking:
Please refresh the description before merge. It still describes only the three balance entry points — pooled_max_sendable / core_wallet_pooled_max_sendable / pooledMaxSendable aren't mentioned at all — still says "Based on #4548 rather than v4.2-dev … rebase once that lands" after the rebase, still lists #4548 as pending in the merge order, and still has the test checkbox unticked with ~300 lines of new tests in the diff. Since the description becomes the squash commit body, it's worth a pass.
Merge-order caveat from last time still stands and the remaining ordering looks right.
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Final validation — Phase 2 only (queue backlog)
Verified all supplied findings against the exact head and pinned key-wallet dependency, consolidating the duplicate fee-overflow reports into one finding. The three existing send-max tests pass, while temporary independent probes confirmed the input-cap failure, dust-sized maximum, overflow panic, and ineffective negative cap assertion; the probes were removed and the working tree is clean. These are client-wallet correctness and test-coverage issues, classified as suggestions under the supplied policy for non-consensus findings.
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 3: gpt-6-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); final verifier: gpt-6-astra (agent: astra-verifier, role: final-verifier)
Review provenance
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6-astra(effort low) — The change touches wallet fund availability and fee-adjusted maximum-send calculations across Rust, FFI, and Swift, where mistakes in account selection, UTXO eligibility, reservations, or input limits could misrepresent spendable funds and cause transaction failures. - Phase 1 reviewers: not run (skipped for throughput: 48 PRs queued, above the 10 limit)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6-astra— final-verifier; agentastra-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6-astra— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:491: Validate fee arithmetic before calling the upstream calculator
The new getter accepts an unrestricted FeeRate, and the new FFI entry point forwards its u64 argument without validation. In the pinned key-wallet dependency, calculate_fee computes `(sat_per_kb * size_bytes as u64).div_ceil(1000)` using unchecked multiplication. An independent native probe with FeeRate::new(u64::MAX) panicked on the initial 148-byte input calculation instead of returning PlatformWalletError. The exported extern "C" function has no panic containment, and dev-ios explicitly uses panic = "abort", so this failure terminates the host rather than becoming a Swift error. Builds without overflow checks can instead calculate wrapped fees. Validate the multiplication bounds for both the per-input and complete transaction calculations, or use checked/wider arithmetic and propagate a typed error through the ABI. Add boundary-value tests; a panic guard alone does not protect panic-abort builds.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:512-518: The capped estimate can still make finalization select more than 500 inputs
Truncating the estimator's value list does not constrain the UTXOs offered to finalization. The default BranchAndBound selector rounds each input's effective fee separately, while this getter rounds once over the complete transaction. With 500 confirmed 10,000-duff UTXOs, one additional 575-duff UTXO, and FeeRate::new(1001), an independent probe confirmed that pooled_max_sendable returns 4,925,881, but finalizing a single P2PKH output for that amount at the same rate fails with `Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 501 (max 500)`. The additional input fills the selector's rounding gap even though the estimator excluded it. Make estimation and finalization agree on a cap-valid selection, or enforce the input cap during selection with a cap-valid fallback. Extend the buildability regression to fractional-duffs-per-byte rates.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:517-519: Return no sendable amount when the net output would be dust
The subtraction only checks whether the selected inputs cover the fee; it does not check whether the resulting payment clears the modeled output's dust threshold. An independent funded-wallet probe confirmed that one confirmed, unreserved 600-duff UTXO produces a maximum of 408 duffs at the default rate, while the modeled P2PKH output's script_pubkey().dust_value() is 546 duffs. A host using the documented send-max value therefore offers a positive payment that standard relay policy rejects. Return zero or an explicit no-sendable-amount result when the net amount is below the modeled output's dust threshold, and cover the below-threshold and threshold boundaries.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/core/transaction.rs:1355-1363: Make the cap test reach the too-many-inputs rejection
This negative case requests 5,000,001 duffs from 5,010,000 duffs of inputs, leaving too little for the 74,192-duff fee. An independent probe confirmed that it returns CoreInsufficientFunds with required 5,074,193 before reaching the input-cap check. Consequently, this assertion still passes if the dependency removes or raises its cap; it does not establish the claimed uncapped-send rejection. Use the gross amount minus the estimated 501-input fee—4,935,808 duffs for this fixture—and assert that rejection is specifically attributable to too many inputs. That amount independently reproduced the intended 501-input rejection.
Three defects in `pooled_max_sendable`, all found in review. The fee arithmetic could not hold every rate a caller may pass. key-wallet's `FeeRate::calculate_fee` multiplies `sat_per_kb * size_bytes` unchecked, and the rate arrives as a `u64` the host picks and `core_wallet_pooled_max_sendable` forwards verbatim. The iOS profile builds with `panic = "abort"`, so an overflow there ends the process instead of the call, and a profile without overflow checks wraps into a fee that makes the answer nonsense. `checked_fee` does the same arithmetic with `checked_mul` and returns a typed error instead. Covering the fee was also being mistaken for being spendable. A net output below the modeled script's dust threshold is refused by standard relay, so reporting it names a payment that cannot be made: one confirmed 600-duff UTXO advertised 408 duffs against a 546-duff threshold. Below the threshold now reports nothing sendable, the same answer an empty pool gives. The input-cap test did not test the input cap. Asking for `capped_value + 1` leaves too little for the 501-input fee, so it failed on funds before reaching the cap and would have kept passing if key-wallet dropped its cap entirely. It now asks for the gross total minus that fee — which is *below* `capped_value`, because the 501st input's fee costs more than the 10,000 duffs it brings, and which needs that input because it exceeds what a 500-input build can pay — and asserts the refusal is specifically the too-many-inputs one. Also from review, in `resolved_funding_accounts`: the doc block belonging to `resolve_source_accounts` had been captured by the function inserted above it; the strict-miss error formatted `sources.first()` and so printed `Some(BIP44)` where it used to print `BIP44`; and a bare block left over from an earlier edit wrapped only the funding loop.
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… prices it `pooled_max_sendable` charged one rounded fee over the whole transaction, while the default BranchAndBound selector rounds per input: it subtracts `ceil(rate × TX_INPUT_SIZE)` from every candidate's value and compares the total against `amount + ceil(rate × base)`. `ceil(a) + n·ceil(b) >= ceil(a + n·b)`, so the selector always needs at least as much as the whole-transaction arithmetic suggested — and on a rate that is not a whole number of duffs per byte it needs strictly more. It closes that gap by taking one more UTXO, which for a pool already truncated to the 500-input cap is the input there is no room for: the build fails with "too many inputs" on the exact amount this getter had just promised. Reported with a probe: 500 × 10,000-duff UTXOs plus one of 575, at `FeeRate::new(1001)`. The small one survives the profitability filter, misses the top-500 cut so the estimate never sees it, and is then pulled in as the 501st input. The fee is now summed the selector's way. At a whole number of duffs per byte the two agree, so nothing changes for the default rate. `pooled_max_sendable_is_buildable_at_a_fractional_fee_rate` pins it — it reproduces the reported pool and fails with `Too many inputs for a standard transaction: 501 (max 500)` without the change.
4 participants
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
core_wallet_get_balancesums every funding account the wallet has — CoinJoin included — and neverconsults a reservation set. A host that gates its amount entry on it offers money the build then
refuses, and the shortfall surfaces as
CorePooledInsufficientFundsonly after the user has committedto an amount.
Ticket 32081 is the shape of it: a wallet reading 94 DASH, of which 0.0054 was actually
spendable — everything else sat on the CoinJoin account, which
SEND_FUNDING_SOURCESexcludes bydesign. The user was offered a 1 DASH send, entered it, and got
The same mismatch produces
asset lock coin selection is shorton Transparent → Shielded, with theidentical
available 538503.What was done?
CoreWallet::pooled_spendable_balance(sources, source_index), pluscore_wallet_pooled_spendable_balanceandManagedCoreWallet.pooledSpendableBalance(...).It resolves accounts through the same
resolve_source_accountsand the same source listfinalize_transactionuses, and counts only UTXOs coin selection accepts. Hosts read it instead ofmirroring the pooling rule — the mirror is exactly what drifted: the app's own comment claims
.allSpendablepools "the same set the home balance already totals", which was never true.Reservations are not subtracted. key-wallet keeps each account's
ReservationSetprivate, soreading it needs an accessor there and a pin bump. Documented at all three layers. That part is
transient — released when the spend is processed, on a definitive rejection, at the TTL, or on restart
— while the account-set difference is permanent and was the whole of the reported shortfall.
How Has This Been Tested?
cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib— 909 passed, 0 failed.dashpayTestnet target compiles against it with the hostside wired (fix(build): restore dashpay compilation dashwallet-ios#1095).
Not yet exercised against a live CoinJoin-heavy wallet: the testnet wallet built for this work has
since been swept, so the state has to be rebuilt to see the ceiling change.
Breaking Changes
None. New read-only entry point; no existing behaviour changes.
Merge order
This is one of three defects behind ticket 32081, and this one must not land first: it lowers the
ceiling the amount screen shows, so a user with mixed coins sees less. That is only safe once the
sweep works and can unlock the difference.
Based on #4548 rather than
v4.2-devto avoid conflicting intransaction.rs; rebase once that lands.Checklist:
For repository code-owners and collaborators only
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes